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Introduction 1 
1 Introduction 
During the time period in which the present study was conducted, the popular Pixar 
film Inside Out came out in movie theaters across the globe, introducing to its 
audience a well-understood, film-length metaphor that easily can stand in for a type 
of emotion metaphor that plays a universal role in the cognitive and folk model of 
emotions cross-culturally and cross-linguistically, i.e., EMOTIONS ARE PEOPLE. 
The story revolves around the inner workings of the mind of a girl on the verge of 
adolescence, Riley, whose emotions come to life in the personified forms of Anger, 
Disgust, Fear, Joy and Sadness – a rambunctious team of emotions guiding Riley 
through life via a control console in her mind. Joy, a bubbly and optimistic sort, is 
in charge of Riley’s lighter moods and memories, while the rest of the team take 
their turns at the controls depending on the events of the day, like when Anger 
literally blows his top at the announcement of “no dessert”, which results in Riley’s 
scream-filled temper tantrum at the dinner table.  
 Inside Out presents a modally rich explanation for the conceptualization of 
EMOTIONS as PEOPLE that has resonated with audiences worldwide. In doing 
so, it has (probably unwittingly) tapped into a universal recognition that it is 
inevitably part of the human condition to allow emotions to control and influence 
our behavior. This personified understanding of emotions is even reflected in the 
tagline to a series of trailers for the movie: “Ever wonder why you feel the way you 
do? Well, get to know your emotions!”1  
 By now we can look back at a long and productive academic tradition of 
research into emotion concepts, particularly in the cognitive linguistic vein (see, 
e.g., Ansah 2011; Apresjan 1997; Baider & Cislaru 2014; Bednarek 2009; Beger 
2011; Chen 2010; Constantinou 2014; Folkersma 2010; Geeraerts & Grondelaers 
1995; Gevaert 2001; King 1989; Kövecses 1990, 1991, 1998, 2000, 2008a; 
Kövecses et al. 2015; Lakoff 1987a; Lakoff & Kövecses 1984; Li 2015; Naidu 
2009; Ogarkova 2007; Ogarkova & Soriano 2014; Patowari 2015; Schwarz-Friesel 
_________________ 
1  Trailer for “Inside Out”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIGF-Fkxbk0 
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2007; Stefanowitsch 2004, 2006a; Tissari 2010, 2011; Türker 2013; Wilson & 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2017; Yu 1995). This scholarly interest is by no means 
surprising since emotions are a basic part of everyday, human experience, and the 
way we talk about emotional experience very commonly occurs in metaphors, often 
in the form of personification: I had to fight my fear of writer’s block; Anger 
overwhelmed me for missing a deadline; Happiness has been my constant 
companion since finishing my manuscript. Since the conception of Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, we have learned a lot about how such metaphorical concepts are 
realized on the linguistic level and beyond (Casasanto 2009; Deignan 2005, 2007, 
2006, 2008a, 2008b; Fauconnier & Turner 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008; Forceville 
2017; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi 2009; Gibbs 2002, 2008, 2010, 2012; Grady 
1997a; Johnson 1987, 2008; Lakoff 1987a, 2007, 2008; Steen 2008, 2011a; Steen 
et al. 2010b; Steen et al. 2010a; Steen et al. 2010b). Yet, thinking about emotion 
metaphors did not emerge with the inception of cognitive linguistic studies. 
Philosophy, in particular, has an attested long history of theorizing about emotion 
metaphors. Consider the following emotion analogy, which as a setting draws from 
a likely scenario in the 19th century American frontier:  
 
The year is 1846. You are a stagecoach driver. All is quiet and peaceful as the red sun 
sets beyond the horizon, the coach rumbles contentedly along, and sagebrush cast long 
shadows across the lonesome prairie. Hidden in the shadows, however, is a 
rattlesnake. Disturbed from its slumber by the horses, the rattler suddenly strikes out, 
scaring the horses into a fearful, frenzied sprint. Out of control, the stagecoach careens 
towards the edge of a sheer cliff. First you try to soothe your steeds, but they cannot 
hear you. Then you try to forcibly rein them in, but their strength is too great. Life 
itself hangs in the balance as you grimly struggle to control the careening stagecoach 
(Barret et al. 2007: 173).  
 
 
Barret et al. (2007) use this highly emotive scenario – depicting the uncontrollable 
horses (= emotions) and the unlucky stagecoach driver (= the human mind / reason) 
– as a means of illustrating the difference “between feeling and thinking embedded 
within Western Culture”, particularly in reference to the “primitive, automatic, 
animalistic” view of emotions, which “the more developed human part of our minds 
come to know about and control” (173). As Zlatev (2012) asserts, this 
understanding of emotion has a long historical echo, emanating from ancient 
Greece, which interestingly happens to be the often cited origin of the (albeit hotly 
debated) intellectual history of metaphor. In fact, as illustrated by the passage  
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above, it seems natural to fall into metaphorical musings while attempting to 
explicate the nature of human emotion. Barret et al.’s (2007) frontier metaphor of 
the nature of the mind and emotion draws its parallels from Plato’s “Chariot 
Allegory” in Phaedrus, which equates emotion with “wild horses” that “drive us to 
emotional places we do not deliberately choose to visit and thus must be harnessed 
and restrained” (173).  
 
[…] and first the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair [of horses, BAG], and 
secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite 
in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and 
troublesome (Plato, as cited by the Perseus Digital Library Project).   
 
 
Both the charioteer and the stagecoach driver and their troublesome horses are used 
metaphorically to underline what Barret et al. (2007) refer to as the “commonsense 
view” that emotions automatically (and thus uncontrollably) arise when 
encountering particular life situations, which they, furthermore, maintain has been 
employed as the “consensual view” and, thus, the basis of academic investigations 
into the emotions (173), particularly in line with causal-evaluative theories of 
emotion in both philosophy and psychology (Lyons 1999: 21). Therefore, taking a 
historical view of a philosophy of cognition and emotion, we already find ourselves 
confronted with a widely held notion about emotion still residing in modern 
Western thought. In other words, a model that can be traced back to Plato in ancient 
Greece still dictates an understanding of emotion as “wild” and out of control as 
opposed to human rationality that can be “reigned in”. In short, a still viable maxim 
of Western culture and thought dictates that reason must conquer emotion 
(Goleman 2003: 65) – a decidedly metaphorical interpretation of the nature of 
emotion. This construal of DANGEROUS ANIMALS can be attested even in 
modern metaphorical data relating EMOTION metaphors of English and thus 
underscores a folk theory of emotion as reflected in languages of various cultures. 
Yet, for now, it acts only as a minor preview to the various metaphorical construals 
of emotion concepts we can find attested in the conceptual systems in the language 
of various cultures across the world. 
 It was not until the early 1980s that scholarly interest on the part of linguists 
morphed into a so-called “metaphormania” (Johnson 1981b). “Only three decades 
ago the situation was just the opposite: poets created metaphors, everybody used 
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them, and philosophers (linguists, psychologists, etc.) ignored them. Today we 
seem possessed by metaphor” (xi), and the possession has only deepened since. 
While Aristotle provided the “first extended philosophical treatment of metaphor”, 
his definition of metaphor posed three problematic views, especially for cognitive 
linguistics swept up in the “metaphormania”: 1) metaphor analysis is restricted to 
the word level, overemphasizing the study of semantic change in words; 2) 
metaphor is understood as a deviant usage in comparison to literal usage of 
language; 3) metaphor is based on similarities between two things (Johnson 1981a: 
5–6).  
 Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), whose beginnings are marked by the 
seminal work of Lakoff & Johnson (1980), provided paradigmatic changes to 
Aristotle’s view of metaphor that had been considered valid for so long. Especially 
within Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor was no longer regulated to the realm of 
(poetic) language alone, but began to be viewed as fundamentally conceptual, an 
integral part of our human conceptual system. Seeing as human beings across the 
world share the same conceptual makeup, this quickly lead to exploration of the 
universal basis of metaphors in our conceptual system, culminating in an embodied 
view of conceptualization. However, since being human is not strictly a matter of 
existing in the physical world, but very importantly, a matter of participating in the 
cultural world as well, it became clear that, by comparison across cultures, we can 
be characterized by the metaphors in the conceptual system by which we think not 
only in terms of what we share (universal), but in terms of what we don’t share 
(culture-specific). Therefore, embodiment (cognition structured by sensorimotor 
experience) has to be contrasted or critically evaluated by contrast to cultural 
influences on metaphorical thinking. This is particularly relevant when metaphor 
study involves language stemming from distinct cultural groups, such as a study on 
emotion metaphors in New Englishes, institutionalized second-language varieties 
of English.   
 Emotional experience is clearly also a fundamental part of the human 
experience and is talked about in and filtered by the cultures of the world. Much of 
the way we talk about our emotional experience is decidedly metaphorical. The 
question is whether culturally and regionally unique varieties of a pluricentric 
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language like English talk about emotional experience in the same way. On the one 
hand, the mere fact that speakers of New English share a common language with 
other native English speakers across the world would point to a ‘common core’ of 
metaphors reflected in language. On the other, it is a reasonable assumption that 
New Englishes (by virtue of their individual cultural circumstances, as well as being 
characterized by substrate language influence not present in traditional norm-
providing varieties, such as British and American English) have the potential to use 
metaphors that can be seen as products of their respective cultural and multilingual 
contexts. In this, English as a pluricentric language with diverse cultural centers 
seems to offer an ideal testing ground for investigating what is shared and what is 
not shared in the conceptualizations of a basic human experience, such as emotions.  
 The present study intends to do just that for metaphors relating to the domains 
of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. This involves combining insights from 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Cognitive Linguistics in general, with insights 
from the World English paradigm and research into emotion concepts. The 
discussion in the following study starts with the fundamental tenets of Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, in Chapter 2, with a focus on the systematic and pervasive nature 
of metaphor and embodied cognition. It also considers some criticisms and 
challenges for Conceptual Metaphor Theory, most importantly how to introduce the 
cultural component to metaphor research. Chapter 3 expands on this by outlining 
the relationship of body and culture in emotion metaphor and providing an 
overview of the debate between universality and variation in conceptualizing 
emotions. This leads into establishing English as a pluricentric language as a testing 
ground to further the debate and introduces Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural 
Linguistics as guiding paradigms. Furthermore, this chapter offers a brief review of 
previous research into New English metaphor, which has to date been largely 
underrepresented in metaphor research, especially for emotion, and outlines the 
research questions guiding the present study. Chapter 4 presents the methodology 
used to collect emotion metaphors from a corpus designed to investigate varieties 
of English worldwide. Importantly, this chapter not only outlines the detailed 
methodological steps from extraction of metaphor from the corpus to the process of 
labelling conceptual metaphors, but it also highlights a major issue of the corpus 
employed concerning the authentification of variety-specific authorship. Chapters 
Introduction 6 
5-7 present the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, which are largely 
involved in capturing metaphor profiles (i.e., the sum of all source domains 
participating in conceptualizing ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, respectively) 
that are attributable to the each variety. Metaphor profiles are used in the case 
studies as the baseline for comparison across New Englishes and in reference to a 
(former) norm-providing variety, British English. The present study ends with 
Chapter 8, which provides some concluding remarks and an outlook for future 
research.  
 
 
 
Theoretical Background for Investigating Conceptual Metaphor 7 
2 Theoretical Background for 
Investigating Conceptual Metaphor  
The main purpose of this initial theoretical chapter is to situate the present study in 
the context of the Cognitive Linguistics paradigm, since it utilizes Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory (henceforth, CMT) as the backdrop to its empirical findings (see 
Chapters 5-7). Specifically, a review of the basic assumptions underlying cognitive 
linguistic study, as well as establishing the theoretical ramifications for metaphor 
from a cognitive point of view, is the first step in outlining one major aim of the 
present study, i.e., to encounter a point of reference for a variational investigation 
of conceptual phenomena. This has hereto been underrepresented in variational 
linguistic studies of English varieties (see Chapter 3). Thus, the following chapter 
offers a brief discussion of the principal tenets to which a cognitive linguistic study 
of the present type should adhere. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of 
CMT in general and some fundamental insights that have particularly informed the 
motivation behind the present study. Finally, a few of the various criticisms of CMT 
will be addressed.   
2.1 Principal Tenets of Cognitive Linguistics  
Cognitive Linguistics has grown in recent decades into what prominent researchers 
have labelled as a “revolution” (see, e.g., Steen 2014), as well as an “enterprise” 
(see, e.g., Evans et al. 2007). By taking a metaphorical reading of these labels, it 
becomes clear why they are nowadays so readily applied to Cognitive Linguistics 
as the thriving school of linguistic thought it has become2. If we take revolution as 
it relates to the domain of POLITICS and enterprise as it relates to the domain of 
BUSINESS, the metaphorization of Cognitive Linguistics in these labels tells us 
something fundamental about the historical development of linguistic thought, in 
_________________ 
2  For a convincing testimony of the “academic appeal” of Cognitive Linguistics, see Geeraerts & Cuyckens 
(2007: 10–15). 
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particular as regards the relationship between language and the human mind. A 
revolution signifies a fundamental transforming of (unsatisfying) political 
structures that often has as its driving force an underlying ideology at opposition 
with the previous political powers, whereas an enterprise often literally denotes an 
important organizational entity characterized by its involvement in satisfying the 
demand for a sought-after good or service. From a modern perspective, Cognitive 
Linguistics as an academic discipline can be considered as figuratively possessing 
the characteristics of both: Cognitive Linguistics has not only ideologically 
challenged the preeminent 20th century linguistic paradigm, most notably 
personified by Noam Chomsky and the proponents of a formal linguistic approach 
like Generative Grammar, who take a modular view of separate language areas in 
the mind. But, with this challenge, it has also become involved in the business of 
providing alternative ‘goods and services’ to the linguistic ‘customers’, in particular 
to those who acknowledge that language cannot be fully understood apart from its 
relationship to other cognitive mechanisms at work in the human mind.  
 These metaphorical readings can be found in the ‘origin stories’ of Cognitive 
Linguistics, as told by cognitive linguists themselves. Consider the following 
passage from Nerlich & Clarke (2007):  
 
Cognitive Linguistics emerged from its dissatisfaction with dominant orthodoxies in 
twentieth-century linguistics, among them the structuralist/formalist tradition in 
European semantics, the generative/formalist tradition that dominated research into 
syntax in North America, and the formalist/computational approach to semantics that 
prevailed in North America and Europe during the second half of the twentieth 
century. Natural allies of Cognitive Linguistics by contrast are functionalist and 
contextualists of all persuasions […]. Whereas previous generations of linguists had 
tended to search for simplicity, monosemy, regularity, and rules, cognitive linguists 
revel in complexity, flexibility, and patterns, including irregular ones (Nerlich & 
Clarke 2007: 590-591). 
 
Not only does this passage position Cognitive Linguistics as the driving force 
behind the fundamental transformation of the previously prevailing linguistic 
powers of the 20th century, it also, like a revolution, claim “natural allies” for its 
oppositional and thus transforming ideology. Furthermore, Nerlich and Clarke 
(2007) implicitly state the difference in commodities offered by the ‘supply and 
demand’ of the Cognitive Linguistic enterprise: 20th century linguists sought out 
the ‘goods’ of “simplicity, monosemy, regularity, and rules”, while 21st century 
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cognitive linguists not only go for the very opposition (“complexity, flexibility, and 
patterns, including irregular ones”), but, in fact, they positively “revel” in it3.  
 Therefore, at the outset of the present study, it is well worth considering just 
what the motivating ideology of the cognitive linguistic revolution is and what it 
has to offer as the enterprise it has become. Evans et al. (2007) summarize this as 
follows:  
 
Cognitive linguistics is best described as a ‘movement’ or an ‘enterprise’, precisely 
because it does not constitute a single closely-articulated theory. Instead, it is an 
approach that has adopted a common set of core commitments and guiding principles, 
which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes 
competing) theories (Evans et al. 2007: 3).  
 
 Cognitive linguists regard “language as interacting with perception, memory 
and reasoning. It emphasizes that even seemingly arbitrary aspects of language […] 
have meaningful systematic underpinnings in thought” (Krennmayr 2011: 11). 
According to Evans et al. (2007: 2), this approach to language has its roots in work 
inspired largely by cognitive science and cognitive psychology during the 1970s 
(e.g., Fillmore 1975; Rosch 1973, 1975, 1978; Rosch & Mervis 1975), especially 
concerning approaches to human categorization, which have been ushered into the 
mainstream of modern linguistic study during the 1980s, as evidenced by Lakoff’s 
prominent contributions (e.g., Lakoff 1987a). The origins of the cognitive linguistic 
school of thought were motivated by a “dissatisfaction with formal approaches to 
language which were dominant, at that time, in the disciplines of linguistics and 
philosophy” (Evans et al. 2007: 2).  This neatly falls in line with our metaphorical 
reading of COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AS A REVOLUTION above, since 
“dissatisfaction” at the status quo in 20th century linguistic schools of thought were 
born of a need to explain the relationship between language and cognition in ways 
that have previously been inaccessible with the previously reigning theories and 
methodologies of formal linguistics. Despite the practicality of partitioning the 
_________________ 
3  To extend these metaphorical readings of Cognitive Linguistics a bit further (perhaps to exhaustion), 
Nerlich & Clarke (2007: 591) claim that “[t]he beginnings of Cognitive Linguistics lie somewhere round 
1975, which is the year when Lakoff appears to have used the term ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ for the first 
time”, making Lakoff the revolutionary ‘founding father” of Cognitive Linguistics, so to speak. In terms of 
its historical development, Nerlich & Clarke (2007: 592) pinpoint the fruition of the cognitive linguistic 
revolution during the 1990s when “Cognitive Linguistics changed its status from ‘revolutionary’ to 
‘established’.”   
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study of language into distinct areas (such as semantics and syntax, each with its 
own individual structuring principles), as was the consequence of taking a modular 
view of mind in formal linguistic approaches, this did not satisfy the inquiries of a 
growing number of researchers who began to reject this view and started to 
postulate a more unified view of language and mind and set out “to openly 
investigat[e] how various aspects of linguistic knowledge emerge from a common 
set of human cognitive abilities upon which they draw” (Evans et al. 2007: 3-4). 
Therefore, at the outset of the present study, which hones in on metaphor, it is vital 
to consider the fundamental precepts, which are undeniably pertinent to 
theoretically framing a study of conceptual metaphor, that have guided Cognitive 
Linguistics since its “birth […] as a broadly grounded, self conscious intellectual 
movement” (Langacker 1990: xv)4.  
2.1.1 The Generalization and Cognitive Commitments  
In his very influential article, incidentally published in the very first volume of the 
journal Cognitive Linguistics, which was instrumental in securing Cognitive 
Linguistics’ status as an established linguistic discipline, George Lakoff (1990) 
made clear his intentions of “rallying the troops” under a common banner for the 
continuance of the cognitive linguistic revolution:  
 
I hope that if we make our primary commitments clear to ourselves and to others, we 
can avoid such bickering [an earlier reference to “the acrimonious bickering that has 
characterized generative linguistics throughout its history”, BAG] both within our 
own discipline and with those who view linguistics from a different perspective 
(Lakoff 1990: 40). 
 
He goes on to maintain that, for him, Cognitive Linguistics is a linguistic discipline 
that prescribes adherence to two primary commitments: the Generalization 
Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment (40). The present section will serve 
to briefly outline these commitments. 
_________________ 
4  I have repurposed this Langacker quote to fit the narrative of the beginnings of Cognitive Linguistics as a 
revolution. Originally, he was referring to the announcement of the journal Cognitive Linguistics at a 
symposium in Duisburg, Germany (qtd. in Evans et al.2007: 2). Since birth is often used to construe 
REVOLUTION in metaphorical language, this seemed like an apt quote to frame the inception of Cognitive 
Linguistics as an academic discipline in general.  
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 Again, in defiance of the prevailing modular view of mind apparent in formal 
linguistics, the first primary commitment, the Generalization Commitment, breaks 
with linguistic tradition by demanding of cognitive linguists to be committed “to 
characterizing the general principles governing all aspects of human language” 
(Lakoff 1990: 40). Evans and Green (2006: 28) summarize this commitment as 
follows: “One of the assumptions that cognitive linguists make is that there are 
common structuring principles that hold across different aspects of language, and 
that an important function of linguistics is to identify these common principles”. 
These structuring principles are viewed as both common to separately viewed 
language “subsystems”, as well as cognition, so that an adherence to the 
Generalization Commitment makes the modular view, as well as a strict separation 
of the different areas of language in terms of their organization, unworkable for 
cognitive linguistic endeavors. For instance, “cognitive approaches to grammar 
treat lexicon and syntax not as distinct components of language, but instead as a 
continuum” (40)5.   
 Taken as a guiding principle, what the Generalization Commitment offers the 
linguist is the means of viewing the fuller picture of what is going on in language, 
beyond what separate views concerning the organization of just syntax or just 
semantics can sustain. In order to illustrate this with an apt metaphor, Evans et al. 
(2007) explains the Generalization Commitment with the image of a cross-section 
of a multi-layered cake:  
 
[…] cognitive linguistic approaches often take a ‘vertical’, rather than a ‘horizontal’ 
approach to the study of language. Language can be seen as composed of a set of 
distinct layers of organization – the sound structure, the set of words composed by 
these sounds, the syntactic structures these words are constitutive of, and so on. If we 
array these layers one on top of the next as they unroll over time (like layers of a cake), 
then modular approaches are horizontal, in the sense that they take one layer and study 
it internally – just as a horizontal slice of cake. Vertical approaches get a richer view 
of language by taking a vertical slice of language, which includes phonology, 
morphology, syntax, and of course a healthy dollop of semantics on top. A vertical 
slice of language is necessarily more complex in some ways than a horizontal one – it 
is more varied and textured – but at the same time it affords possible explanations that 
are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective (Evans et al. 2007: 4).  
 
_________________ 
5  It should be noted that Lakoff does not maintain “a priori commitment […] to separate [linguistic] subfields 
[like phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics].” He views this as “an empirical matter” 
and emphasizes that “empirical considerations suggest that they are not – that, for example, generalizations 
about syntax depend on semantic and pragmatic considerations”.  
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With this image in mind, let us turn to the proverbial icing on this cake, i.e., 
the Cognitive Commitment.  
 The second primary commitment outlined by Lakoff (1990) is known 
as the Cognitive Commitment. Although it “will mesh” with the 
Generalization Commitment outlined above, since “the general principles we 
seek [across areas of language] will be cognitively real”, Lakoff makes a point 
to emphasize that if generalizations cannot be brought in line with the 
Cognitive Commitment, then it should be prioritized, since cognitive linguists 
“are concerned with cognitively real generalizations” (1990: 41). The 
Cognitive Commitment asks the linguist to principally bring in line what is 
known about human language with what is known about the human mind and 
brain (40). What makes the Cognitive Commitment particularly germane to a 
study of metaphor is that it provides the motivational basis for theorizing 
about and researching conceptual metaphor (41), see Section 2.2.2 for a 
discussion of embodiment and metaphor. Since “it follows from the 
‘Cognitive Commitment’ that language and linguistic organisation should 
reflect general cognitive principles rather than cognitive principles that are 
specific to language” (Evans & Green 2006: 41), metaphor as it is realized in 
linguistic structure can tell us something about how concepts are organized 
in the mind. Since the function of metaphor in language and thought will be 
considered in more detail below, let us consider an example that illustrates 
the Cognitive Commitment during early developments in cognitive linguistic 
study (i.e., human categorization), which also has been associated with the 
study of metaphor6.  
_________________ 
6  An interesting debate took place in the pages of the journal Psychological Review in the early 1990s 
between Glucksberg & Keysar (1990) and Gibbs (1992) concerning the relationship of categorization and 
metaphor understanding. In their initial paper, Glucksberg & Keysar (1990) proposed a class-inclusion 
model of metaphor by maintaining that metaphors “are intended as class-inclusion statements” (16). Thus, 
for the a is b type of metaphors, like My job is a jail, where JOB is attributed to an ad-hoc category of 
which JAIL is a prototypical member. Gibbs (1992) took issue particularly with the view that metaphors 
are “instantiations of temporary, ad-hoc categories” and insisted instead on their ability to “reflect pre-
existing conceptual mappings in long-term memory that are metaphorically structured” (572). In a response 
paper, Glucksberg et al.  (1992) “acknowledge the potential role of conventional metaphors in the 
generation of ad hoc attributive metaphor categories” but point out that these conventional mappings “need 
not be accessed or used in the production and comprehension process. The issue then is not how many […] 
metaphorical expressions are understood by accessing prestored conventional metaphoric mappings, but 
rather under which circumstances (if any) such mappings come into play. Conventional metaphorical 
mappings, as well as other types of conceptual schema, can be available yet not accessible in given 
contexts” (578, emphasis in the original). 
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 The classical theory of categories maintained that category membership was 
defined by identifying shared properties that were viewed as necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. Potential category members were deemed as part of a 
category on the basis of common properties, which, in turn, served to supply the 
defining features of the category as such. Lakoff (1987a) points out that this view 
did not result from empirical study, but was nevertheless “taught in most disciplines 
[…] as an unquestionable, definitional truth” (6).  
 Yet, with the advent of Prototype Theory, which was the result of empirical 
study, Rosch and her colleagues radically changed our understanding of how human 
beings categorize. Categorization is a fundamental ability within our conceptual 
system “because it accounts, in part, for the organisation of concepts within the 
network of encyclopaedic knowledge” and, as such, is of great importance “for both 
cognitive psychologists and semanticists, since both disciplines require a theory of 
categorisation in order to account for knowledge representation and indeed for 
linguistic meaning” (Evans & Green 2006: 248). Among many other things, like 
the discovery of the importance of basic-level categories, Rosch’s research led to a 
rejection of the classical view of categorization by demonstrating that categories 
exhibit what is known as “family resemblance” (uncovered by Wittgenstein’s 
(1953) philosophical analysis of the category GAME):  
 
Wittgenstein (1953) argued that the referents of a word need not have common 
elements to be understood and used in the normal functioning of language. He 
suggested that, rather, a family resemblance might be what linked the various referents 
of a word. […] That is, each item has at least one, probably several, elements in 
common with one or more items, but no, or few, elements in common to all items 
(Rosch & Mervis 1975: 574-575).  
 
In line with this, Rosch discovered that not every member of a category can be 
counted as equally representative (e.g., robins are judged as a better example of the 
category BIRD than penguins); thus, categories exhibit prototype effects. Rosch 
(1978) explains this in the following:  
 
Most, if not all, categories do not have clear-cut boundaries. […] cognitive economy 
dictates that categories tend to be viewed as being as separate from each other and as 
clear-cut as possible. One way to achieve this is by means of formal, necessary and 
sufficient criteria for category membership. […] Another way to achieve separateness 
and clarity is by conceiving of each category in terms of its clearest cases rather than 
its boundaries. […] By prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest 
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cases of category membership defined operationally by people’s judgements of 
goodness of membership in the category (Rosch 1978: 35–36).  
 
 Despite some problematic stances taken within (early) Prototype Theory, 
Rosch’s prototype effects are “psychologically real” and have gone on to inspire 
work in the Cognitive Linguistic framework that seeks to unite the principles of 
language with findings from cognitive psychology (Evans & Green 2006: 250). In 
fact, as Lakoff (1990) states, “my present views on metaphor, image-schemas, 
radial categories and prototype theory in general are not a priori commitments in 
themselves. They are empirical consequences of adopting the generalization and 
cognitive commitments” (43). Therefore, adherence to Generalization Commitment 
and the Cognitive Commitment at times requires an adjustment to the approach we 
take to language.  
 With this brief outline of the primary commitments in Cognitive Linguistics, 
the present study aims to adhere to the generalizing capacity offered by a more 
unified view of language domains, as well as to take into account converging 
evidence as it relates to metaphors in language and cognition. Yet, before delving 
into a theoretical discussion of conceptual metaphors and related cognitive 
phenomena in specific, there is one more discussion to be had in the way of defining 
cognitive linguistic study as it pertains to the most prominent field of (linguistic) 
metaphor analysis, namely semantics.  
2.1.2 Guiding Principles in Cognitive Semantics  
Due to the fact that CMT was one of the earliest, and arguably most prominent, 
theories to adopt a cognitive semantic approach (Evans et al. 2007: 16), it is 
worthwhile in a study founded on the principal insights of CMT to consider the 
guiding principles that have driven cognitive semantics as a discipline.  
 Keeping with the narrative offered by the metaphor COGNITIVE 
LINGUISTICS AS A REVOLUTION, the cognitive semantic branch “began life 
as a reaction against formal theories of meaning”; in particular, it revolted against 
truth-conditional semantics by adopting four central assumptions or “guiding 
principles” which function to “characterise a cognitive semantics approach” (Evans 
& Green 2006: 156). Viewed as directly resulting from adherence to the two key 
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commitments of Cognitive Linguistics discussed above (157), the four fundamental 
beliefs about meaning and cognition can be summarized as follows:  
 
 1. Conceptual structure is embodied. 
 2. Semantic structure is conceptual structure.  
 3. Meaning representation is encyclopedic.  
 4. Meaning construction is conceptualization. (adapted from ibid: 157).  
 
Since the subsequent theoretical discussion of CMT is primarily contingent on the 
first two principles listed above (286), the present section will put its focus on 
illustrating only these two. For explication of the last two principles, the reader is 
referred to Evans and Green (2006: 160-163) or Evans et al. (2007: 8-9). Despite 
not receiving full consideration here, they are nevertheless important insights into 
how cognitive semanticists view meaning and should not be taken as secondary.  
  The first guiding principle relevant to a cognitive semantic approach to 
metaphor, like CMT, has something to do with how we as human beings “have a 
species-specific view” of our external world; that is, due to our sensory experience 
and the general nature of inhabiting the bodies we have, “our construal of ‘reality’ 
is mediated, in large measure, by the nature of our embodiment” (Evans et al. 2007: 
7). This is in stark contrast to the objectivist paradigm that views meaning as arising 
from arbitrary linguistic symbols and their relationship to the world  (Lakoff 1988: 
120).  
 
The fact that our experience is embodied – that is, structured in part by the nature of 
the bodies we have and by our neurological organization – has consequences for 
cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access to and the nature of the ‘reality’ 
we think and talk about are a function of our embodiment. We can only talk about 
what we can perceive and conceive, and the things we can perceive and conceive 
derive from embodied experience. This thesis, central to cognitive semantics, is 
known as the thesis of embodied cognition. This position holds that conceptual 
structure (the nature of human concepts) is a consequence of the nature of our 
embodiment and thus is embodied (Evans et al. 2007: 7).  
 
Therefore, the embodied cognition thesis guiding cognitive semantic inquiry 
centers on the human experience. “[G]iven our bodies and innate capacities and our 
way of functioning as part of a real word”, human perceptual and sensory 
experience is a motivating factor for “what is meaningful in human thought” 
(Lakoff 1988: 120).  
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 To illustrate in what way conceptual structure is embodied, consider the 
image schema associated with CONTAINER. Both Johnson (1987) and Lakoff 
(1987a) have been given credit with coining the term image schema7 to account for 
concepts being the “products of sensorimotor experiences” and, thus, defined image 
schemas “as dynamic analog [conceptual] structures arising from perception, bodily 
movements, manipulation of objects, and experience of force” (Mandler & Pagán 
Cánovas 2014: 2). Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987a) demonstrate in detail how 
both our bodies and things in the world around us are continually experienced as 
containers and, thus, become meaningful to us – not in a deeply poignant or 
sententious way – but instead “in a more mundane sense, […] involv[ing] an 
exceedingly complex interaction with your environment in which you experience 
significant patterns and employ structured processes that give rise to a coherent 
world of which you are able to make sense” (Johnson 1987: 31). One particularly 
pertinent example of this concerns the embodied experiences of a commonplace 
(and thus relatable) morning ritual:  
 
Consider just a small fraction of the orientational feats you perform constantly in your 
daily activities – consider, for example, only a few of the many in-out orientations 
that might occur in the first few minutes of an ordinary day. You wake out of a deep 
sleep and peer out from beneath the covers into your room. You gradually emerge out 
of your stupor, pull yourself out from under the covers, climb into your robe, stretch 
out your limbs, and walk in a daze out of your bedroom into your bathroom […] 
(Johnson 1987: 30, emphasis in the original, qtd. also in Lakoff (1987a: 271) and 
Lakoff (1988: 140)). 
 
The structural elements of the CONTAINER schema relate to INTERIOR, 
BOUNDARY and EXTERIOR (Lakoff 1987a: 272), and from this description of a 
banal morning ritual above, we can see how easily these basic experiential 
structures arise in our everyday experience and, consequently, become associated 
with the schematic properties of a CONTAINER in our conceptual system. Just 
based on the mere fact that some of our most basic bodily activities (i.e., ingesting 
food and excreting waste or walking out of the bedroom into the bathroom) serves 
to conceptualize BODY as a CONTAINER or THING, like ROOM, as a 
_________________ 
7 Gibbs (2009) highlights the importance of CMT’s promotion of images schemas by stating, “CMT has been 
especially significant in showing – in concrete detail – something about the content of linguistic meaning 
and the substance of fundamental abstract concepts in terms of ‘image schemas’” (15). For more discussion 
on image schema, particularly concerning the psychological reality of image schemas and its place in 
Cognitive Linguistics, see Gibbs & Colston (2006) and Oakley (2007) respectively.  
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CONTAINER (Lakoff 1987a: 271). Therefore, it is important to note that a 
motivating factor in formulating a concrete principle, like conceptual structure is 
embodied, has a lot to do with the fact that cognitive phenomena, like schemata, 
“are so pervasive and so constitutive of our ordinary experience that they are taken 
for granted (and thus overlooked) in standard accounts of meaning and 
understanding” (Johnson 1987: 31). Thus, a conscious following of the embodied 
cognition thesis helps to sharpen our attention to those facets of everyday (bodily) 
experience (and their cognitive by-products), which shape integral aspects of 
meaning in our conceptual systems.  
 In addition, as the Johnson (1987) example further illustrates, a great number 
of metaphors are grounded in the CONTAINER schema, which “extend[s] our 
body-based understanding of things in terms of CONTAINER schemas to a large 
range of abstract concepts […] emerging out of a stupor is a metaphorical, not a 
literal emergence from a container” (Lakoff 1987a: 272). Consequently, image 
schemas and metaphors, as attestations of embodied cognition in our conceptual 
system, provide an embodied basis for conceptual structure.8  
 The second guiding principle (i.e., semantic structure is conceptual structure) 
also takes on the objective paradigm – those semantic models which take into 
account the referential or denotational relationships between linguistic symbols and 
an external word – by maintaining that “semantic structure (the meanings 
conventionally associated with words and other linguistic units) can be equated with 
conceptual structure (i.e. concepts)” (Evans et al. 2007: 7, emphasis in the original). 
Cognitive semanticists, like Talmy (2000), highlight the fact that the cognitive 
approach to semantics is not only interested in studying the organizational patterns 
of conceptual content in language, but also concerns the general cognitive processes 
involved, making a point to define structure as a term employed to refer to both the 
_________________ 
8  Furthermore, image schemas and metaphors work together during the process of abstract reasoning. 
“Image-schemas provide particularly important evidence for the claim that abstract reason is a matter of 
two things: (a) reason based on bodily experience, and (b) metaphoric projections from concrete to abstract 
domains” Lakoff (1988: 144). Lakoff (1988) cites evidence provided by Johnson (1987) that can be 
summed up in four essential points: 1) “Image schemas structure our experience preconceptually”; 2) 
“Corresponding image-schematic concepts exist”; 3) “There are metaphors mapping image-schemas into 
abstract domains, preserving their basic logic”; 4) “The metaphors are not arbitrary, but are themselves 
motivated by structures inhering in everyday bodily experience” (144).  
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patterns and processes (2). In point of fact, the term cognitive semantics itself has a 
touch of the superfluous in his opinion:   
 
For me, the addition of the word ‘cognitive’ to that of ‘semantics’ is in fact redundant, 
since semantics is intrinsically cognitive. The need for the qualifying word is due to 
the existence of alternative views of meaning as independent of mind (Talmy 2000: 
18).  
 
Be that as it may, Evans et al. (2007) caution against equating semantic structure 
with conceptual structure, since our thought life is rife with more conceptual entities 
“than we can conventionally encode in language” (8). This coding disparity, for 
instance, can be illustrated by the fact that languages conventionally encode 
concepts, for which other languages have no words. Although the German language 
contains words like Weltschmerz (i.e., a sadness you feel due to the state of the 
world) or fremdschämen (i.e., the act of feeling shame as the product of someone 
else’s embarrassing behavior), English does not encode these particular concepts in 
specific lexical units – although they obviously can be thought of and, thus, 
described using the English language by other means. Nevertheless, the following 
elaborated version of the principle semantic structure is conceptual structure 
should be kept in mind:  
 
Semantics simply pertains to conceptual content as it is organized in language. Hence, 
the word ‘semantic’ simply refers to the specifically linguistic form of the more 
generic notion ‘conceptual.’ Thus, general conception – that is, thought – includes 
linguistic meaning within its greater compass. And while linguistic meaning […] 
apparently involves a selection from or constraints on general cognition, it is 
qualitatively of a piece with it. Thus, research on cognitive semantics is research on 
conceptual content and its organization in language and, hence, on the nature of 
conceptual content and organization in general. In this formulation, conceptual 
content is understood to encompass not just ideational content but any experiential 
content, including affect and perception. (Talmy 2000: 4) 
 
Therefore, although we can pinpoint qualitative differences between semantic 
structure and conceptual structure, they are in some ways interconnected. 
Consequently, we can interpret this second guiding principle of cognitive semantics 
as involving two sides of the same coin.  
 To illustrate this point with an example pertinent to metaphor, consider the 
view in Cognitive Linguistics that “metaphor is not inherently a linguistic 
phenomenon. In fact, cognitive linguists do conceive of metaphors of patterns of 
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thought […]” (Grady 2007: 189). Metaphors are conceptual phenomena, born of 
our cognitive abilities, including perception, memory, analogical reasoning, etc., 
which are, in turn, reflected in systematic patterns (and, thus, not arbitrarily) in 
language (see Section 2.2.1 for more on systematicity in conceptual metaphor). This 
becomes more apparent when we compare a cognitive semantic view with a 
traditional semantic view of idioms. The cognitive semantic view suggests “a great 
deal of systematic conceptual motivation for the meaning of most idioms”, to 
which, among other things, metaphor contributes (Kövecses & Szabó 1996: 326–
327). By contrast, the traditional approach to idioms, like (1) below, take a non-
compositional view (i.e., the meaning cannot be predicted by the sum the 
constituents) – an unobjectionable analysis, of course – but one that incorrectly 
assumes that idioms are dependent solely on language: “They are taken to be items 
of the lexicon that are independent of any conceptual system” (328). Kövecses & 
Szabó’s (1996) analysis of (2) and (3) reject the traditional view and demonstrate 
how idioms are anything but isolated from the conceptual system.  
 
(1) He was spitting fire. (‘He was behaving in a very angry manner.’) 
 
In their analysis, Kövecses & Szabó (1996) point out that, in an utterance like (1), 
metaphor is at work as a cognitive mechanism that “relate[s] a domain […] of 
knowledge to an idiomatic meaning in an indirect way” (331). The knowledge 
stored in memory about our perceptual and sensory experience with fire is offered 
as the experiential basis for (1), which makes an idiom like spit fire “conceptual, 
and not linguistic, in nature” in terms of its meaning motivation (330). What is also 
at work here is a mapping of that knowledge about fire to a more abstract domain 
like ANGER (i.e., ANGER IS FIRE), which licenses the spit fire idiom along with 
various other linguistic surface realizations of this metaphor:  
 
(2) He is smoldering with anger.  
(3) She was fuming.  
 
Furthermore, underscoring its role in the interplay between conceptual and 
linguistic structure, the FIRE mapping can account for idioms involving many other 
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domains, such as LOVE (4) and ENERGY (as it relates to human ability and 
resources) (5):  
 
(4) She carries a torch for him.  
(5) Don’t burn the candle at both ends.  
 
What we are seeing here in terms of semantic structure is conceptual structure is 
that, by evaluating the conceptual structure contributed by metaphor to idiomatic 
language, we can gain “a more precise notion of semantic transparency and that of 
the emergence of idiomatic meaning”, which, in turn, can assist in “describ[ing] in 
a more systematic way the figurative idiomatic structure of English and other 
languages” (Kövecses & Szabó 1996: 352). This view, again, highlights something 
very fundamental to the success of the cognitive linguistic enterprise: Language 
opens up a window to the study of conceptual structure, whereas converging 
evidence for our understanding of cognition and the conceptual system deeply 
enriches our study of linguistic structure. There is a reciprocal trade-off, of sorts, 
for understanding structure in linguistic terms within the purview of conceptual 
structure, combined with an understanding of embodiment, i.e., investigating the 
two sides of the coin reveals something about the coin as a whole. To this point, 
Talmy (2000) offers a résumé of the cognitive linguistic enterprise:  
 
[…] cognitive linguistics has […] addressed the structuring within language of such 
basic conceptual categories as those of space and time, scenes and events, entities and 
processes, motion and location, and force and causation. It has also addressed the 
linguistic structuring of basic ideational and affective categories attributed to 
cognitive agents, such as attention and perspective, volition and intention, and 
expectation and affect. It addresses the semantic structure of morphological and 
lexical forms, as well as of syntactic patterns. And it addresses the interrelationships 
of conceptual structures, such as those in metaphoric mapping, and those in the 
grouping of conceptual categories into large structuring systems. Overall, and perhaps 
above all, cognitive linguistics seeks to ascertain the global integrated system of 
conceptual structuring in language. (Talmy 2000: 3).  
 
Furthermore, this global view offered by cognitive semantics has turned out to be a 
very productive force, in particular for the study of metaphor. It strives for 
integration over separation of language and cognition, so that an individual object 
of study, like metaphor, necessarily entails aspectual contributions to the whole 
picture. As Geeraerts (2010) puts it:  
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Cognitive semantics emerged in the 1980s as an explicitly ‘maximalist’ attempt to 
integrate rather than separate meaning and cognition […]. Through the introduction 
of new models of description and analysis, like prototype theory and frame semantics, 
and through the revivification of metaphor studies in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, it 
has proved to be a highly productive approach, with a wide appeal among lexical 
semanticians (Geeraerts 2010: 275, emphasis in original). 
 
 After having painted the picture (albeit with broad strokes) of the cognitive 
linguistic revolution and, in particular, the nuances provided by cognitive 
semantics, we have gained a backdrop against which we can better examine (i.e., 
zoom into) the details of one its many flourishes (here CMT), to which we turn in 
the following section. 
2.2 Fundamental Insights from Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory 
Since the inception of CMT, commonly marked by the seminal work Metaphors 
We Live By (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]), a proverbial tide of academic interest 
and scholarly work into conceptual metaphors has swept throughout various 
academic communities, most prominently in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. As 
“one of the earliest theoretical frameworks identified as part of the cognitive 
semantic enterprise”, CMT has produced “much of the early theoretical impetus for 
the cognitive approach” (Evans & Green 2006: 286) and, playing on the metaphor 
highlighted above, has brought out the “second revolution” in cognitive science in 
terms of embodied cognition (Gibbs 2017: 6). The burgeoning interest in the 
conceptual aspects of metaphor (as opposed to the traditional view of metaphor as 
a rhetorical flourish and thus outside the realm of everyday language9) has also 
_________________ 
9  Since the time of Aristotle, scholars have maintained a “classical view” of metaphor, which was held firmly 
in the purview of language. Metaphors were considered “a matter of language not thought. Metaphorical 
expressions were assumed to be mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language […]. The 
classical theory was taken so much for granted over the centuries that many people didn’t realize that it was 
just a theory. The theory was not merely taken to be true, but came to be taken as definitional. The word 
metaphor was defined as a novel or poetic linguistic expression where one or more words for a concept are 
used outside of is normal conventional meaning to express a similar concept. But such issues are not matters 
for definitions; they are empirical questions” Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 267). Hence, a more traditional account 
of metaphor sets up a dichotomy between figurative and literal language, although such a distinction has 
not been borne out by empirical evidence (see Gibbs (1994)). Furthermore, Tendal & Gibbs (2008) point 
out that “[s]ince the time of Aristotle, scholars from many disciplines have struggled to define metaphor 
and understand its functions in language, thought, and culture”, which resulted in a 20th century “explosion” 
in metaphor study, especially within the disciplines of cognitive science by participating linguists, 
philosophers and psychologists (1823). Yet, despite this vigorous interdisciplinary campaign to promote 
metaphor to the realm of cognition, in Poetics of the Mind, Gibbs (1994) highlights the fact that this struggle 
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driven lines of investigation into the relationship between metaphor as used in 
language and reasoning in areas as diverse as educational discourse and learner 
language (Cameron & Deignan 2003; Low 1988; Nacey 2013; Wan & Low 2015), 
politics and public discourse (Goatly 2007; Lakoff 2006; Musolff 2016, 2006, 
2004), mathematics (Lakoff & Núñez 2002; Núñez 2008), academic discourse 
(Drewer 2003; Zichler 2010), among many others, as well as for specific groupings 
of concepts, like emotion (Kövecses 2008a, 2002, 2000; Kövecses et al. 2002; 
Kövecses 1990), etc. This interest extends as well to the various methodological 
gains being made in metaphor identification (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Steen et al. 
2010b; Steen et al. 2010a) and is particularly productive in recent decades in the 
field of corpus linguistics (Berber Sardinha 2012, 2011, 2010, 2008, 2007; 
Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 2008b, 2008a, 2005, 1999, 1998; Stefanowitsch 
2006a, 2004). This very brief sampling of the research into various developments 
pertaining to conceptual metaphor represents a trend that does not seem to be losing 
any steam since its foundation in the early 1980s. Despite various criticisms (see 
Section 2.3 for a brief overview) and the emergence of revised theoretical 
approaches to metaphors that have been put forth since (i.e, Primary Metaphor, 
Grady 1997a, 1997b, and Conceptual Integration (also known as Blending Theory), 
Fauconnier & Turner 1998, 2002), the impact of CMT is undeniable. Time and 
again, this has been evidenced by the indubitable “avalanche of studies from 
numerous academic disciplines that have been motivated by CMT”, which  
“currently represents the dominant theoretical framework in the academic study of 
metaphor” (Gibbs 2011: 530).  
 In order to zoom into some select, central claims of CMT, which have 
informed the present study, the following sections will focus on the broad thematic 
areas: 1) systematicity and pervasiveness and 2) embodied cognition. In the 
_________________ 
is far from over for some scholars: “The merits of figurative thought and language have been fiercely 
debated since the time of the ancient Greeks. Even though the study of figurative thought and language is 
now a respectable topic in the humanities, arts, and cognitive sciences, there remains on the part of many 
scholars a deep mistrust toward all things figurative […]. Scientists, philosophers, educators, and 
psychologists have each, on occasion, rallied their forces against the supposed evils of figurative thought 
and language” (3). Therefore, the inheritance of ancient Greeks is still visible in some academic thinking 
surrounding metaphor. However, since the introduction of CMT with the publication of Metaphors We Live 
By by Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]), this “deep mistrust” inherited by the classical or traditional theory 
of metaphor can be answered by modern insights into the relationship between language and thought, as 
evidenced by a conceptual metaphor’s capacity to be reflected on the linguistic level of an everyday, non-
poetic utterance. 
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following sections, each area will be presented on the basis of their respective 
central tenets, cumulating in a brief listing of guiding questions that have provided 
a direction from the theoretical to the empirical work at hand.   
2.2.1 The Systematic and Pervasive Nature of Metaphor  
The story of the discovery of the systematicity of metaphor starts with a 
paradigmatic shift in views on conceptual structure. Beginning in the 1970s, 
psychologists have altered their views on conceptual structure, shifting from a 
reliance on (sufficient) similarity as the mechanism connecting concepts due to “a 
growing awareness of the inadequacy of such similarity based views” (Komatsu 
1992: 521). One significant problem with viewing similarity to describe conceptual 
structure was “that the notion of similarity is too unconstrained to give an account 
of conceptual coherence” (Medin 1989: 1469; see also Murphy & Medin 198510). 
Instead, CMT suggests that “[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 
5). Briefly stated, CMT is all about the exploration of inference mapping from one 
conceptual domain to another (Grady 2007: 191)11. To use the terms most 
commonly found in CMT, there is a set of systematic correspondences, referred to 
as mappings, that we draw on to understand (i.e., conceptualize) concept A (= a 
target domain) in terms of concept B (= a source domain)12 (Kövecses 2010: 7). 
How these concepts relate to each other is now understood not to be based on 
similarity:  
 
_________________ 
10   According to Murphy and Medin (1985), “current ideas, maxims, and theories concerning the structure of 
concepts are insufficient to provide an account of conceptual coherence. All such accounts rely directly or 
indirectly on the notion of similarity, and we argue that the notion of similarity relationships is not 
sufficiently constraining to determine which concepts will be coherent or meaningful. These approaches 
are inadequate, in part, because they fail to represent intra- and inter-concept relations and more general 
world knowledge (289). 
11  Grady (2007) claims that mapping is the “most fundamental notion” proposed in CMT (190). Yet, it should 
be acknowledged that “despite the widespread acceptance of viewing metaphors as cross-domain mappings, 
there is little consensus on how these mappings take place” (Bowdle & Gentner 2005: 193). Due to the 
scope of the present study, this issue will not be directly addressed but I find Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) 
suggestion compelling that “whether metaphors are processed directly or indirectly and whether they 
operate at the level of individual concepts or entire conceptual domains will depend both on their degree of 
conventionality and on their grammatical form” (213).  
12  For early empirical evidence that abstract target domains are structured via mappings from the more 
concrete source domain, see Boroditsky’s (2000) study on the domains of time and space.  
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It holds that the concepts which are related to each other by metaphors often are not 
objectively ‘similar’ at all, but are associated because of how people are constituted 
and how they interact with the world. […] this type of explanation is much more 
satisfying than appeals to similarity. […] What could be the objective similarity 
between happiness and brightness, for instance (cf. sunny disposition, bright mood, 
radiant smile)? If the answer is that ‘both are properties,’ then this is an insufficient 
basis for associating these two particular properties […] If the answer is that ‘both are 
pleasing,’ this illustrates the point that it is not inherent features of the concepts which 
relate them but our interactions with them. (Grady 1997a: 5)13 
 
We associate a happy feeling with physically experiencing the brightness of a light, 
which “is correlated with warmth and increased visibility, both of which trigger 
contentment” (Grady et al. 1999: 112). In other words, brightness entails that we 
are warm (a pleasant physical sensation) and we can see well (a general condition 
for feeling safe in a particular location) and these things tend to make us happy. 
Therefore, it is not the similarity inherent to the concepts themselves, but the 
inferences we draw about these concepts in our real world experience (i.e., the 
interactional properties) that serves to map those properties of one concept onto 
another (for a more detailed discussion of metaphorical inferences on a neural basis, 
see Lakoff 2008).  
Another example should serve to provide clarity. Note that in this example 
ARGUMENT is acting as the target domain, which denotes a typically more 
abstract and subjective conceptual domain (Kövecses 2010: 329), while WAR is 
the source domain, which denotes a typically more concrete domain that aids in the 
construal of a target domain (328):  
 
(6) ARGUMENT IS WAR14 
He attacked every weak point in my argument 
I demolished his argument. 
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.  
He shot down all of my arguments.  
(examples taken from (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 4). 
_________________ 
13  However, it should be noted that Grady (1999) does concede in his “resemblance hypothesis” that some 
metaphors can be motivated on the basis of non-literal similarity, like “Achilles is a lion”, discussed in 
Lakoff and Turner (1989). This is reminiscent of the special status given to “image metaphors”, also 
discussed in Lakoff and Turner  (1989). Yet, “this kind of metaphor has a special status, since conceptual 
structure and inferences are not mapped from one domain to another. Instead the source and target of the 
metaphor share some feature in a single perceptual domain, such as color or shape” Grady (1999: 89).  
14  The conventional shorthand used for conceptual metaphor is A IS B. 
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The concepts of ARGUMENT and WAR adhere to certain patterned experience, in 
terms of their interactional properties, i.e., there are typical things, events, and 
experiences we engage in when having an argument or participating in war. This is 
also mirrored in the way we talk about them and is indicative of the metaphorical 
connection between them as concepts:  
 
ARGUMENT IS WAR […] structure[s] (at least in part) what we do and how we 
understand what we are doing when we argue. […] It is not that arguments are a 
subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things […] and the 
actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially 
structured, understood, performed and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is 
metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically 
structured.[…] A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes 
the concept of an argument, and the language follows suit (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 
[1980]: 5, 7). 
 
Therefore, ARGUMENT IS WAR is a typical example of a conceptual metaphor15, 
which is defined as the construal of “a more abstract domain (or concept) through 
a more physical domain (or concept) offline – either by means of long-term memory 
or as a result of a historical-cultural process” (Kövecses 2010: 8). Viewed in this 
manner, conceptual metaphor is seen as an “construal operation” and “[t]he choice 
of metaphor to describe a situation in a particular domain construes the structure of 
that domain in a particular way that differs depending on the metaphor chosen” 
(Croft & Cruse 2004: 55). For instance, ARGUMENT can also be conceived of and 
talked about as a JOURNEY: 
 
(7) ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY 
We have set out to prove that bats are birds. 
We will proceed in a step-by-step fashion.  
We have arrived at a disturbing conclusion.  
(examples taken from (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 90). 
 
ARGUMENT IS WAR and ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY are often referred to by 
the term structural metaphors because they illustrate the ability of the target 
_________________ 
15  Conceptual metaphors are also often discussed in terms of their conventionality (i.e., the mappings 
attributable to metaphors make up “a fixed part of our conceptual system” (Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 274)). 
Lakoff (1987b) maintains that there is a crucial distinction to be made between conventional metaphors and 
what he calls “historical metaphor”, like in the word pedigree (origin: French for crane’s foot). Metaphor 
behind this word comes from the mapping of the image of a crane’s foot onto the structure of a family tree. 
However, this mapping is not systematic and is no longer active in our conceptual system.  
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concept (ARGUMENT) to be metaphorically structured in terms of its systematic 
correspondences with the source domains (WAR, JOURNEY) (Lakoff & Johnson 
2003 [1980]: 14). At this point, it is important to highlight two insights underlying 
the cognitive linguistic understanding of metaphors: 1) mappings between the 
source and target domain are partial and constrained and 2) metaphors on the 
linguistic level reflect metaphors on the conceptual level.  
 Firstly, mappings between the source domain and the target domain are partial 
and constrained by what Lakoff (1990, 2007 [1993]) refers to as the “invariance 
hypothesis” (sometimes also referred to as the “invariance principle”):  
 
Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema 
structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the 
target domain (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 279, for a more detailed discussion, see Lakoff & 
Turner 1989; Lakoff 1990; Turner 1990). 
 
The introduction of the invariance principle to CMT sought to explain the 
phenomenon of “feature inheritance” from the source domain to the target (Jelec 
2014: 65). What this means is that when the basic knowledge structure of the source 
domain comes into conflict with the knowledge structure of the target domain, then 
the invariance principle hinders the mapping of what would otherwise be a 
metaphorical entailment between the two domains (Kövecses 2010: 131). To 
illustrate this point, consider again the metaphor ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY. 
In (7) the linguistic realizations of this metaphor show that the knowledge about 
journeys involving a path and reaching a destination become entailments of 
ARGUMENT (set out, proceed, step-by-step, arrived at). However, journeys often 
also contain knowledge about the means of transportation (e.g., taking a trip by 
plane, bus, etc.), which is not coherent with the target domain concept of 
ARGUMENT and, thus, does not conventionally sanction linguistic realizations of 
the following kind: I took the bus to arrive at this conclusion. As a consequence of 
what Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 279-280) refers to as the “target domain override”, this 
feature of journeys will not be transferred to the target ARGUMENT because the 
mapping would import conflicting material from the source” and be in violation of 
the invariance principle (Kövecses 2010: 132). This explains what we see of 
conceptual structure on the linguistic level, as well as what we do not see.  
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 Secondly, having established that the systematic correspondences target 
domains have with source domains are partial and constrained by invariance on the 
conceptual level, linguistic evidence becomes crucial. Inference mapping between 
the two domains is found not only on the level of conceptual structure (Lakoff & 
Johnson 2003 [1980]: 46), but it is reflected (or in other words “realized”) on the 
linguistic level (as examples (6) and (7) demonstrate). Accordingly, CMT maintains 
the “conventional cross-domain correspondences”, which are involved in a 
conceptual metaphor, hinges on the fact that the topological structure of a source 
domain is “projected” onto a particular target domain in accordance with the 
invariance principle, and, in doing so, “supplies the language and imagery which 
are used to refer to the [target] domain” (Grady 2007: 190).  
 Note that CMT was not intended to provide an explanation for patterns found 
in language: “The relationship is the other way around; patterns observed in 
language provide some of the main evidence which led to the development of the 
theory” (Deignan 2006: 107). Therefore, it is clear that “the locus of metaphor is 
not language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of 
another” and that CMT stands out exactly because it is in the business of 
characterizing “such cross-domain mappings” (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 267). Thus, the 
term conceptual metaphor emphasizes a notational difference to what is denoted by 
linguistic metaphor or metaphorical expression16, which “refers to a linguistic 
expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such a 
cross-domain mapping” (268). The relationship between the two is as follows:  
 
_________________ 
16  Grady (2007) makes a point to highlight that metaphor is not viewed as “inherently a linguistic 
phenomenon. In fact, cognitive linguistics do conceive of metaphors as patterns of thought which can be 
expressed on nonverbal ways, such as pictures and gestures” (189). For instance, Casasanto (2009), 
investigating the domains of TIME and SIMILARITY, comes to the conclusion that “[l]inguistic metaphors 
reveal only a subset of the conceptual metaphors that appear to structure our mental representations” (143). 
In line with this, Steen (2011b) reviews three dimensions of metaphor research (in grammar and usage, in 
language and thought, and in sign systems or behavior), which demonstrate that metaphor “is ambivalent 
between the semiotic structure of conceptual metaphor and its cognitive realization in individual behavior”, 
so that evidence for conceptual metaphor collected in one dimension “may be more or less secure and 
convincing” for other dimensions of metaphor research (82). Similarly, Gibbs (2012) argues for an 
acknowledgement of “multiple interacting dynamic factors” that shape metaphor and cautions against 
“privileging certain levels of metaphor”, like linguistic ones, in order to “recognize how all these [lexical, 
grammatical, conceptual, pragmatic, socio-cultural] constraints may be simultaneously operating at any 
given moment in time” (369). Being that this denotes the ideal situation for a metaphor researcher and due 
to the limited scope of the present study, conceptual metaphors and their linguistic realizations, as 
evidenced by corpus-based data, emerge as the focal points of the present examination, but do not exclude 
the possibility of being enriched by more balanced or converging evidence in the vein of Gibbs (2006).  
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We can state the nature of the relationship between the conceptual metaphors and the 
metaphorical linguistic expressions in the following way: the linguistic expressions 
(i.e., the way of talking) make explicit, or are manifestations of, the conceptual 
metaphors (i.e., way of thinking). To put the same thing differently, it is the 
metaphorical linguistic expressions that reveal the existence of the conceptual 
metaphors” (Kövecses 2010: 7).  
 
What follows from this is the assumption that systematic patterns in language use 
(e.g., using the semantics of WAR to talk about the experience of having an 
argument) is a key piece of evidence for how the conceptual system is constructed. 
In other words, systematicity in language points to systematicity in conceptual 
structure, which is the most common type of evidence given in support of CMT 
(Deignan 2006: 107–108; Grady 1997a: 6 ; see also Lakoff 1990 for a discussion 
of further evidence).  
Yet, systematicity also goes hand in hand with another aspect of metaphor 
that has been postulated in CMT: pervasiveness. This core assumption can be found 
in a passage from Lakoff and Johnson’s book, which, according to its highly 
influential insight, has been often cited in the initial pages of many a metaphorical 
study:  
 
[M]etaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and 
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 3). 
 
The pervasiveness aspect is an essential one to consider in a cognitive linguistic 
study of metaphor. If we adhere to the notion that metaphor is pervasive in 
language, thought and action, then we are forced to accept the notion that an entry 
point to discovering conceptual structure of metaphor is how it is realized in 
language. This is, of course, good news for linguistic researchers aiming at a better 
understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of metaphor in language, for 
obvious reasons. Pervasiveness of metaphor in our conceptual system, on which 
communicative activities of the speakers of a shared (conventional) language 
depends, underscores the realization (discussed in detail above) that conceptual 
structure is reflected in language and, thus, scrutinized, albeit indirectly, within the 
realm of its linguistic reflections. Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) formulate this 
assumption in the following manner: “Since communication is based on the same 
conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important 
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source of evidence for what that system is like. […] Metaphors as linguistic 
expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person’s 
conceptual system” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 3, 6). Therefore, by 
postulating conceptual metaphors in their influential work, Lakoff and Johnson 
(2003 [1980]) have laid down a theoretical premise for exploring the conceptual 
system and its relationship to language. This notion of conceptual metaphor has 
been understood as a desideratum of sorts, due to its systematic and pervasive 
properties, for the cognitive linguistically inclined researchers to embrace linguistic 
evidence as an ingress to conceptual phenomena, resulting in an abundance of 
research and theory ever since.  
 In fact, the “original evidence” for conceptual metaphors can be traced back 
to “the systematic analysis of conventional expressions in different languages”, 
(Gibbs 2011: 531). To my mind, these linguistic endeavors have demonstrated that 
pervasiveness of metaphor in language, thought and action presupposes a certain 
amount of systematicity – an examinable patterning in language and thought, which 
directs our attention to the assumed structuring function of metaphor in our 
conceptual systems. Indeed, this was Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003 [1980]) original 
intention, as evidenced by the following quote:  
 
Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in 
a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature 
of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of 
our activities (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 7). 
 
Yet, to paraphrase Johnson-Laird (1983: 1) in the introduction to his book on 
mental models, is the metaphor researcher perhaps biting off more than she can 
chew in aiming at conceptual structure via linguistic surface realizations? Is it, in 
fact, an operable approach to a better understanding of the relationship between 
cognition and language by exploring the systemic nature of what can be perceived 
on the linguistic surface as reflections of conceptual structure? We are well aware 
of the fact from research in psychology and cognitive science that it is impossible 
to directly investigate concepts as such, which I define by taking a cue from 
Mandler (2004), who states, “a concept refers to declarative knowledge about object 
kinds and events that is potentially accessible to conscious thought” (4, emphasis 
in the original). As we know from knowledge elicitation tasks in psychology, 
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declarative knowledge that is potentially available to conscious thought can be 
verbalized (Gordon 1992: 111) and, thus, can offer insights (even elicit 
metalinguistic knowledge) about a certain lexical form’s correspondence to a 
particular concept, for instance17. In this specific case, it is helpful to trace the 
knowledge of a lexical form as it pertains to a particular concept. Yet, this might 
not get us far in terms of systematicity. In order to discover conceptual structure, 
cognitive linguists, in particular, aim at uncovering cognitive systematicity on the 
linguistic level in language use, “[b]ecause [when] the metaphorical concept is 
systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is 
systematic” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 7). Therefore, linguistic evidence for 
conceptual structure is the cognitive linguist’s answer for tackling the conundrum 
faced by psychologists, who are tasked with understanding and theorizing about the 
complexities of the human mind:  
 
Introspection is not a direct route to understanding the mind and, as far as we know, 
there is no such route. Psychologists have available only a number of indirect 
methods, such as observing the characteristics and time course of behaviour. The 
phenomena that can be demonstrated in the psychological laboratory are only clues, 
but it is the progressive revelation of these clues that has convinced researchers that 
they are making progress in explaining human mentality (Johnson-Laird 1983: 2).  
 
Luckily, for the metaphor researcher, the burden of introspection is somewhat 
alleviated by the assurance of the pervasiveness qualities of metaphor in language, 
thought and action. The linguistic evidence at the core of CMT is undoubtedly an 
indirect route to conceptualization18. Yet, analog to Johnson-Laird’s (1983) quote 
above concerning the evidence available to the psychologist enquiring about the 
human mind as such, cognitive linguists within the tradition of CMT have 
continually found themselves engaging in the observation of “the characteristics 
[…] of [linguistic] behavior” that provide convincing “clues” in “progressive 
_________________ 
17  For more on the relationship between word use and conceptual content, including a discussion of 
psychological views of word use directly indicating conceptual content and their corresponding challenges, 
see Braisby & Franks (1997). 
18  Casasanto (2009) cautions the linguistic analyst from overemphasizing linguistic metaphors’ ability to 
reveal everything about the conceptual nature of domains: “[T]hey appear to be related in more complex 
ways than linguistic analyses alone can discover. As such, linguistic metaphors should be treated as a source 
of hypotheses about the structure of abstract concepts. Evaluating these hypotheses – determining when a 
linguistic metaphor reflects an underlying conceptual metaphor – requires both linguistic and extra-
linguistic methods, and calls for cooperation across disciplines of the cognitive sciences” (143, emphasis 
in the original).   
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revelation” that lead us to believe that systematic correspondences in language 
indicate systematic correspondences in thought. Consequently, it is these research 
activities in which a metaphor researcher must be involved in order to contemplate 
systematicity and pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor. Introspection, in this 
regard, will just not suffice.  
Furthermore, from a historical perspective, CMT, as a theory aligned with the 
guiding principles of cognitive semantics (discussed in the Section 2.1.3), can be 
firmly placed into the general linguistic countermovement to 20th century 
generativists, who have been soundly criticized for an overreliance on introspection 
in regard to arguments concerning the well-formedness of a linguistic expression 
or its meaning: “intuitions have been tacitly granted a privileged position in 
generative grammar. The result has been the construction of elaborate theoretical 
edifices supported by disturbingly shaky empirical evidence” (Wasow & Arnold 
2005: 1482). CMT not only provided a way beyond introspection via the 
authentification of systematicity in language as it relates to cognition, which 
necessitates empirical study of pervasive linguistic patterns, but it also ushered in a 
unifying approach to meaning, cognition and language use.  
Therefore, the weeding out of correspondences in language that point toward 
an understanding of many concepts being “metaphorically structured makes it 
possible to explain what traditionally has been seen as unrelated, conventional 
expressions” (Gibbs 2011: 532). It is exactly this activity that will highly inform 
the empirical research presented in the present study, which adheres to the 
following assumptions:  
 Systematicity of conceptual metaphors (including partial mapping of 
inferences) is reflected (and thus visible) in language use. Therefore, 
linguistic evidence is central to the hypothesizing of the existence of 
conceptual metaphors for specific concepts, like emotions.  
 Conceptual metaphors are pervasive in everyday language and it is this 
pervasiveness that compels us to look for metaphors for specific concepts 
in language use in the first place. 
These assumptions are combined to formulate the following guiding question for 
the present study:   
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 By assuming the systemic and pervasive nature of metaphors, can the 
examination of linguistic metaphors in a large collection of language data, 
(e.g., corpus data) reveal a better understanding of the metaphors for 
specific concepts (e.g., emotions) that exist in the conceptual systems of 
the speakers of a given language, e.g., English? 
2.2.2 Embodiment and Metaphor 
A highly influential insight from the cognitive neurosciences, which pertains to 
CMT, entails knowledge about the interworkings of the human brain: “[T]he 
physical brain does not process visual information in a disembodied, nonimagistic 
way, but instead maintains the perceptual topology of images presented to it, and 
then re-represents increasingly abstract spatial and imagistic details of that 
topology” (Rohrer 2007: 26). This insight provided the motivation behind the 
postulation of image schemas that act as topological links behind “the cross-domain 
mappings of systematic conceptual metaphors” (26). Furthermore, it connects to 
one of the most central lines of investigation in Cognitive Linguistics, particularly 
in the vein of CMT: How does the body itself, as an “apparatus” in the physical, 
cognitive and even social sense, “shape” our linguistic capacity for category and 
concept formation? (26; see also Grady 2007: 192). In other words, what is the 
experientialist basis for how we share meaning? The cognitive linguistic answer to 
this question, which relates directly to metaphor, is found in the principle of 
“embodiment” or “embodied cognition” (see Lakoff 1987a; Lakoff & Johnson 
1999; Johnson 1987; Gibbs 2006), which was briefly discussed in Section 2.1.3 
above. In this section we will take a more direct look at how embodiment has been 
initially applied to metaphor. 
 The term embodiment has been used in various different (albeit not 
completely distinct) senses throughout Cognitive Linguistics (see Rohrer 2007: 27–
31 for a survey of this term’s uses). In its broadest sense, embodiment entails “the 
claim that human, physical, cognitive and social embodiment ground our 
conceptual and linguistic systems” and as a hypothesis “is intended to be an 
empirical one” (27), a sentiment reiterated by (Goschler 2005: 35).  
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 Embodiment in CMT is often tied to what we know from linguistic evidence 
about the relationship between source and target domains. Reiterating a similar 
definition above, conceptual metaphor is “the cognitive mechanism whereby one 
experiential domain is partially ‘mapped’ […] onto a different experiential 
domain”, that is, we “ ‘make sense’ of our less directly apprehensible experiences 
[…] on the basis of more directly apprehensible and more easily describable 
experiences, which are usually bodily experiences” (Barcelona & Valenzuela 2011: 
27).  
 It becomes relatively clear that, within conceptual metaphors, source 
“domains stemming from bodily experience […] do the vast majority of work” in 
structuring more abstract target domain concepts (Rohrer 2007: 32). This result is 
a consequence of what has been called “directionality”19 in metaphor (32):  
 
we have suggested that there is directionality in metaphor, that is, that we understand 
one concept in terms of another. Specifically, we tend to structure the less concrete 
and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete 
concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience (Lakoff & Johnson 
2003 [1980]: 112).  
 
This tendency is borne out by linguistic evidence and, again, goes a long way to 
debunking the notion that metaphor is merely based on similarity (see Grady 1997a, 
2007; Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]). Consider example (8) below:  
 
(8) He was so cold to me when I tried to apologize for cancelling our date.  
 
Here, the physical feeling of being cold is not directly connected to the lacking of 
emotion being expressed in (8). In fact, Grady (2007) states that they “are not 
‘similar’ in a straightforward  way”, but instead “are associated in our experience, 
for instance, because intimate interactions can entail physical proximity which leads 
to body heat being shared” (192). That is, when someone is emotionally cold 
towards another person, they usually do not seek out physical proximity with that 
person, which would otherwise feel warm. Therefore, it is this lack of physical 
proximity that is associated with a lack of the physically felt warmth. This, in turn, 
_________________ 
19  Note that “unidirectionality“ has also been proposed for metaphorical mappings, which dictates that the 
source domain maps onto the target domain, but the reverse is not simultaneously true (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Lakoff & Turner 1989).  
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motivates the linguistic act of labelling someone displaying a lack of emotion as 
cold. It is the highlighting of this “experiential motivation” in conceptual metaphors 
that “most sharply distinguishes” CMT “from alternative theories” like traditional 
literary theories of metaphor (Grady 2007: 192). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
summarize the basis for this line of argumentation in the following way:  
 
Categorization […] is a consequence of how we are embodied. We have evolved to 
categorize; if we hadn’t we would not have survived. Categorization is, for the most 
part, not a product of conscious reasoning. We categorize as we do because we have 
the brains and bodies we have and because we interact in the world the way we do. 
[…] 
Most important, it is not just that our bodies and brains determine that we will 
categorize; they also determine what kinds of categories we will have and what their 
structure will be. Think of the properties of the human body that contribute to the 
peculiarities of our conceptual system. We have eyes and ears, arms and legs that work 
in certain very definite ways and not in others. We have a visual system, with 
topographic maps and orientation-sensitive cells, that provides structure for our ability 
to conceptualize spatial relations. Our abilities to move in the ways we do and to track 
motion of other things give motion a major role in our conceptual system. The fact 
that we have muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure 
of our system of causal concepts. What is important is not that we have bodies and 
that thought is somehow embodied. What is important is that the peculiar nature of 
our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 18–19, emphasis in the original) 
 
Therefore, the embodiment hypothesis was originally intended to ground 
“(universal) aspects of the human mind in (universal) aspects of the human body” 
(Hampe 2008: 4-5). Additionally, there is a more substantial view of embodiment 
that relates to metaphor: Concepts (like those linking temperature and emotion in 
example (8) above) are neural structures wired with a “inferential capacity”, that is, 
they can be “bound together in ways that yield inferences” by utilizing the 
sensorimotor system available to us (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 20). Extending this 
to the linguistic realm, a strong version of the embodiment hypothesis compels us 
to take the perspective that meaning construction is a reflection of “our overall 
experiences as human beings. […] we are embodied beings, not pure minds. Our 
organic nature influences our experience of the world, and this experience is 
reflected in the language we use” (Geeraerts 2006: 5).  
 A consequence of adopting the strong version of embodiment hypothesis 
entails a tendency to view certain conceptual metaphors as universal. This particular 
perspective is summarized by Yu (2008):  
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[…] human meaning and understanding are to a considerable extent metaphorical, 
mapping from the concrete to the abstract and linking sensorimotor experience with 
subjective experience. It also follows that our body, with its experiences and 
functions, is a potentially universal source domain for metaphorical mappings from 
bodily experiences onto more abstract and subjective domains. This is because 
humans, despite their racial or ethnical peculiarities, all have the same basic body 
structure, and all share many common bodily experiences and functions which 
fundamentally define us as being human […]. Sharing this common cognitive 
foundation of embodiment, different languages should have parallel conceptual 
metaphors across their boundaries (Yu 2008: 250).  
 
In citing Dirven (2002), Yu (2008) also points out that the “revolutionary” 
contribution of CMT has been to directly unite “this experientialist and universalist 
basis of metaphor” as “constructed around the core of the human body” (249).  
 Yet, Goschler (2005) points out that there is “a lack of differentiation” in the 
use of the term ‘embodiment’ in CMT and that it is not imperative to assume the 
grounding for all conceptual metaphors as embodied (34-35). Thus, her cautionary 
words against taking embodiment as “the ultimate explanation for all kinds of 
mapping, metaphor, analogy and blending” and equating empirical evidence for 
CMT with empirical evidence for embodiment (35). Furthermore, she argues for a 
“restricted” (albeit still “fuzzy”) use of the term in Cognitive Linguistics by 
maintaining that embodiment simply “means that parts of our conceptual system 
and therefore some aspects of our language are structured by the features of our 
bodies and the functioning of our bodies in everyday life” (35). Making use of this 
restricted definition clears the way for empirical research to explore to what extent 
conceptual metaphors are linked to embodiment (36).   
 At this point it should be noted, as Rohrer (2007: 32-33) does, that the “natural 
experiences” making up more concrete, basic concepts, like source domains in 
conceptual metaphor, detailed by Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]), result from 
interacting with the physical environment as well as the cultural context in which 
we experience the world. He sums up Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003 [1980]) position 
as follows:  
 
Reserving judgment for future research, they also indicated that while some of these 
natural kinds of experience might be universal, others might very well vary from 
culture to culture. They explicitly pointed out that they were using the terms ‘nature’ 
and ‘natural’ in the sense which encompasses at least the possibility of cultural 
variation, and not in the sense of the standard ‘nature-culture’ distinction. […] In 
short, they argued that three natural kinds of experience – experience of the body, of 
the physical environment, and of the culture – are what constitute the basic source 
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domains upon which metaphors draw. […] From the outset, then, the term 
‘embodiment’ was intended to cover research on both the experiential and bodily 
substrates of language” (Rohrer 2007: 33, emphasis in the original).  
 
From the Cultural Linguistic perspective, Yu (2015) takes this a step further by 
granting a more solidified position for culture in its relationship to embodiment. 
“The central idea is that embodiment is always situated in its sociocultural context”, 
and, consequently, the sensorimotor experience of the human body “sets up the 
contours” without denying the “impact” of the cultural environment that is 
fundamental to human experience (237). In fact, from the outset, adherence to a 
strong view of the embodiment hypothesis overemphasized “a ‘universalistic’ 
conception of the mind and tended to obscure the socio-cultural dimensions of 
human cognition” (Hampe 2008: 5). Furthermore, the “two strands” of embodiment 
(i.e., universal views relating to the human body vs. socio-cultural dimensions) have 
not yet “been integrated in a unified theory” (6). 
 The embodiment hypothesis from the point of view of socio-cultural 
cognition is considered more carefully in the following chapter. However, it is clear 
from this brief survey of embodiment and metaphor that a strict understanding of 
embodied cognition as relating to our physical experiences can be problematic 
when approaching an empirical study of cognitive metaphor in culturally distinct 
varieties of English, which has given me cause to formulate the following guiding 
questions:  
 Taking the view that embodiment can denote the grounding of metaphors 
from bodily and sociocultural experience, can the metaphorization of 
emotional experience, which is fundamental to human experience, be 
traced to both bodily and cultural experience? 
 If so, can emotion metaphors (attributable to culturally distinct speakers of 
the same language) be placed on a continuum, ranging from more 
embodied by physical and bodily experience (universal) to more embodied 
by the sociocultural context (potentially variational)?   
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2.3 Criticisms of and Challenges for Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory  
The previous sections served to highlight some fundamental insights of CMT that 
are particular pertinent to the present study. Along with various other important 
contributions, particularly stemming from CMT’s ability to inspire a myriad of 
work in an interdisciplinary vein, it has become clear that CMT has emerged as “the 
dominant perspective on metaphor”, while having “played a significant part in the 
rise of cognitive linguistics with its efforts to offer a new way of thinking about 
linguistic structure and behaviour” (Gibbs 2009: 14–15). Many individual scholars, 
particularly associated with CMT, have been quick to point out the undeniable 
influence CMT has wielded not only during the late 20th century, but also the 
continuing impact it has today (see, for example, Gibbs 2011, 2009; Kövecses 
2008b; Tay 2014). Nevertheless, with great significance comes great challenges and 
criticisms that beg scrutiny and deserve clear positioning from researchers engaged 
in CMT. A range of critical issues, for instance concerning the limitations of the 
metaphor analyst, methodological concerns, implications of embodiment in body 
and culture, etc., have been collected and addressed by Gibbs (2009) and Kövecses 
(2008b). Each individual issue deserves attention within the overall scholarly 
discourse on CMT, which profits from a critical examination of the charges brought 
up against it. Yet, for the sake of brevity and in line with the limited scope of the 
present study, I will concentrate on a brief discussion of those criticisms and 
challenges that can be addressed for our present purposes. Therefore, in the 
following I will focus on criticisms pertaining to the psychological reality of 
metaphor, the abstract-concrete distinction for the domains involved in conceptual 
metaphor, and two issues that require fundamental positioning in terms of an 
approach to metaphor study: analyst intuition and understanding the role of 
embodiment and culture. The first two criticisms have a more general concern with 
establishing the status of conceptual metaphor, while the last two are common 
criticisms that I have directly addressed in the present study.  
 First and foremost, doubt has been expressed about the psychological reality 
of conceptual metaphor; that is, the assumption that metaphoric mappings shape 
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conceptual structure is deemed unsatisfactory or is flatly rejected (McGlone 2007; 
Murphy 1997, 1996). McGlone (2007), for instance, takes issue with CMT and its 
supposed inability to conceptually distinguish between the literal and figurative:  
 
Its atmospheric influence notwithstanding, the CM view has not fared well 
theoretically or empirically. There is an ironic quality to its shortcomings: the view 
trumpets the importance of metaphor in human cognition, yet its major flaw is a hyper-
literal construal of the relationship between metaphoric language and thought. 
Although the linguistic evidence can support only the limited claim that certain 
abstract and concrete concepts are thematically parallel […], Lakoff asserts that our 
knowledge of abstract concepts is quite literally subsumed by our knowledge of 
concrete concepts. A conceptual system arranged in this fashion, however, would 
seem incapable of generating propositions about abstract concepts with figurative 
intent. For example, a conceptual system whose knowledge of theories was a subset 
of building knowledge should assume that theories are not merely metaphoric 
‘buildings,’ but literal buildings! Lacking a concept of theories that is 
representationally independent from that for buildings, the system cannot cogitate 
about theories in and of themselves, and consequently is incapable of appreciating the 
literal-metaphorical distinction. (McGlone 2007: 122).  
 
This assertion, however, runs contrary to the extensive study in experimental 
psycholinguistics that provides evidence for the psychological reality of conceptual 
metaphor (e.g., Athanasopoulous et al. 2017; Boroditsky 2001; Boroditsky & 
Ramscar 2002; Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008; Gentner 2001; Gibbs 2011; 1994; 
Katz & Law 2010; Núñez 2008, among others). Without delving into the findings 
in support of conceptual metaphor, which incidentally contradict the statement 
above that CMT “has not fared well”, I find the sheer amount of experimental work 
devoted to this topic encouraging and, on that basis, allow for the acceptance of a 
solid foundation to the claim that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real.  
 Secondly, a somewhat related issue to the psychological reality of metaphor 
is the purported problem of the status of concepts as either inherently concrete or 
abstract, discussed in Goschler (2008: 31-32). She points out that, in line with the 
CMT principle of unidirectionality, metaphorical mappings follow from the 
concrete domain to the abstract domain (31). By taking a developmental view of 
metaphorical concepts, she questions the abstract status of concepts like LOVE and 
ANGER, which are claimed in CMT to be construed via more concrete concepts 
like A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (e.g., I was boiling with rage). Her 
conclusion is that these emotion concepts have (in terms of their sensory 
experience) the same basic status as HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER for a child 
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who has yet to develop adult conceptualizations because all these concepts can be 
experienced physically (32). She also points out that the inner structure of a concept 
is understood as the an indicator of “abstractness” or “concreteness” by citing the 
following passage from Lakoff & Johnson (1999): “Our experience of love is basic 
– as basic as our experience of motion or physical force or objects. But as an 
experience, it is not highly structured on its own terms” (70). Yet, Goschler (2008) 
does not make clear what exact physical experiences a child has of LOVE or 
ANGER, which would support their basic status. Furthermore, during early human 
development, emotion concepts require cognitive structures beyond image 
schemas, like complex schematic integrations because “[t]he conceptualization of 
affective experiences is highly complex and involves a variety of inputs that result 
in many different metaphors” (Mandler & Pagán Cánovas 2014: 16). This insight 
lends credence to the argument presented by Lakoff and Johnson ([2003] 1980) that 
emotion concepts, albeit basic to our experience, lack the more straightforward 
nature of a concept like HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. That is, as a child, the 
sensorimotor experience of drinking hot chocolate from a mug or watching water 
boil in a pot can rightly be viewed as a more concrete experience, in terms of its 
internal conceptual structure, than the warm embrace of a parent intended to convey 
love through physical proximity, for example. The latter, in fact, describes an event 
associated with emotions and, in Mandler & Pagán Cánovas’ (2014) words, “that 
in itself is not enough to conceptualize them” (15). In addition, the mapping of HOT 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER to EMOTION, which is reflected on the linguistic 
level, helps to see that a domain, like ANGER, is more abstract vis-à-vis a more 
concrete domain, like HOT FLUID IN CONTAINER, as observed by the principle 
of unidirectionality (i.e., ANGER is simply not used to conceptualize a HOT 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER). Unidirectionality can also be taken to address those 
critics who take issue with the use of the terms “literal” and “metaphorical” or 
“figurative” in CMT (see, e.g., Glucksberg 2001). Gibbs 2009 provides the 
following answer:  
 
Cognitive linguists do not draw a rigid distinction between literal and metaphorical, 
primarily because of the polysemous nature of the concept ‘literal’ (Gibbs 2004); but 
they do clearly distinguish between metaphorical and non-metaphorical thought and 
language – although they do not see ‘non-metaphorical’ as defining an internally 
consistent category. Most simply, metaphorical thought involves a mapping from a 
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source domain into a target domain; non-metaphorical concepts and meaning do not. 
(Gibbs 2009: 23, emphasis in the original). 
 
 Thirdly, a very common and important complaint expressed towards CMT 
has to do with constructed, intuition-based linguistic examples that are posited as 
evidence of underlying conceptual mappings (for an overview and critical 
examination of the introspective side of metaphor data collection, see Csatár 2014). 
The core of this criticism can be summarized as such: “much of the classic work on 
CMT suffers from a strong confirmation bias: individual linguistic expressions are 
selectively chosen and advanced as evidence in favour of one conceptual metaphor 
or another” (Gibbs 2009: 19). For instance, reconsider the ARGUMENT IS WAR 
metaphor presented as (6) above. The mapping between the domain of 
ARGUMENT and the domain of WAR is postulated by Lakoff and Johnson (2003 
[1980]) on the grounds of linguistics metaphors (like “He attacked20 every weak 
point in my argument” and “I demolished his argument”), which can be pulled from 
an analysts’ intuition without any attestation in usage-based language. Without a 
stated methodology on how these examples were derived, Lakoff and Johnson leave 
the impression that the data, on which they found their theory, is purely intuitive 
and a result of an examination of their own linguistic competence (i.e., a heavy 
reliance on introspection) and thus not necessarily evidence for the systematic 
nature of metaphor. This, of course, is highly unsatisfactory in a field such as 
Cognitive Linguistics, which, being closely linked to the cognitive sciences and its 
interdisciplinary character, has been the recipient of pleas for more “methodological 
pluralism” and “converging evidence” (Steen 2011a), as well as for more devotion 
to empirical methods (Gibbs 2007). The issue of intuition-based elicitation of 
metaphors not only brings up the “circularity” problem some view in regard to 
linguistic expressions as evidence for conceptual metaphors (see McGlone 2001; 
Murphy 1996), but also highlights “a lack of explicit criteria” as “one of the major 
obstacles toward CMT’s acceptance as a comprehensive theory of metaphor use 
and understanding” (Gibbs 2009: 20). An influential improvement in cognitive 
linguistic research of metaphor is, thus, the addition of corpus-based study (e.g., 
_________________ 
20  Vervaeke & Kennedy (1996) put forth the interpretation that attack simply evolved into two different 
meanings and to attack an argument is, therefore, not necessarily an instantiation of ARGUMENT IS WAR.  
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Deignan 2005) and carefully created protocol for metaphor identification in actual 
discourse (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Steen et al. 2010b). These developments have 
informed the methodology of the present study (see Chapter 4 for details, which 
serves to illustrate that I take the challenge of transparent criteria seriously).  
 Finally, the attempt to better understand the role of embodiment and (at times, 
conversely or complementary) the role of culture in motivating conceptual 
metaphor, which was briefly touched upon in the previous section, has led to a 
crucial point of criticism that will be addressed more fully in the following chapter. 
To put it succinctly, the overemphasis of embodied cognition in cognitive 
approaches to metaphor has been deemed problematic when trying “to account for 
universality and cultural specificity” (Kövecses 2008b: 177). Citing Rakova (2002), 
Kövecses addresses her concern that a theory like CMT that “builds on image 
schemas and, in general, on the universality of essential physical experiences cannot 
in the same breath be a theory of cultural variation – especially not if embodiment 
is conceived naturalistically” (Kövecses 2008b: 177). His answer to her criticism 
goes as follows:  
 
we need to change the way we think about embodiment; we should not see it as a 
homogeneous, monolithic factor. This is made possible by the idea that embodiment 
consists of several components and that any of these can be singled out and 
emphasized by different cultures […] it seems that different languages and cultures 
base their anger-concepts on different components and levels of embodiment, thereby 
creating partly universal, partly culture-specific concepts. This account is made 
possible by the process of differential experiential focus. The idea of differential 
experiential focus can serve us […] in responding to this criticism (Kövecses 2005). 
The embodiment of anger […] is complex and consists of several components. Of 
these, as a result of certain cultural influences over the ages, different components 
may occupy [a] central position in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger 
(Kövecses 2008b: 177–178).  
 
Kövecses (2005) defines differential experiential focus in a way that intersects with 
Yu’s (2015) position on embodiment and the sociocultural context (see previous 
section). “The universal bodily basis on which universal metaphors could be built 
is not utilized in the same way or to the same extent in different languages and 
varieties” due to differential experiential focus, meaning that culturally distinct 
people are potentially “attuned to different aspects of their bodily functioning in 
relation to the target domain, or that they can ignore or downplay certain aspects of 
bodily functioning as regards the metaphorical conceptualization of a particular 
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target domain” (Kövecses 2005: 246). In this manner, differential experiential focus 
can be a possible driving force that leads to metaphorical variation (293). However, 
while Yu (2015: 237) sees embodiment as “always situated in its sociocultural 
context”, Kövecses (2008b) makes a more stark distinction between embodiment 
(as bodily experience) and the cultural context by conceiving of them as individual 
pressures on the motivation behind conceptual metaphors: 
 
Metaphorical conceptualization in natural situations occurs under two simultaneous 
pressures: the pressure of embodiment and the pressure of context. Context is 
determined by local culture. This dual pressure essentially amounts to our effort to be 
coherent both with the body and culture – coherent both with universal embodiment 
and the culture-specificity of local culture in the course of metaphorical 
conceptualization. We can achieve this in some cases, but in others it is either 
embodiment or cultural specificity that plays the more important role” (Kövecses 
2008b: 179).  
 
The overriding aim of the present study is to contribute to a better understanding of 
not only what emotion metaphors can be attested for culturally distinct varieties of 
English but also if they are shared by these culturally distinct varieties (and, if not, 
in what way can they be viewed as culturally conditioned products). The fact that 
speakers of New Englishes share a common language with each other and with a 
(formerly) norm-providing variety, like British English, does not automatically 
mean that they share the same metaphorical conceptualizations, even for concepts 
as fundamental as EMOTIONS. Therefore, whether or not we conceive of the 
cultural dimension as a competing pressure to bodily experience, like Kövecses 
(2008b), or as the situation in which it is embedded, like Yu (2015), it remains an 
important theoretical position to not discount culture’s ability to shape the 
conceptualizations of emotion, even if, at times, emotional experience is also part 
of our bodily experience (i.e., getting red in the face when angry, running away 
when afraid or scared, jumping up and down when happy, etc.). Furthermore, it also 
remains an empirical desideratum to tease out what is shared (potentially universal) 
and what is different (potentially culture-specific) in the metaphors of emotions. 
With this, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the case of emotion in the 
body and in culture and what that implies for a study of emotion metaphors in a 
pluricentric (and, thus, culturally diverse) language like English.   
 
Body, Culture, Metaphors and Varieties: The Case of Emotion 43 
3 Body, Culture, Metaphors and Varieties: The 
Case of Emotion  
The previous chapter, largely devoted to setting up the general theoretical 
background of CMT, emphasized fundamental insights that inform the present 
study: 1) Metaphors are systematic and pervasive in the way humans think, speak 
and behave, as well as 2) embodied. The latter insight, initially formulated in the 
embodiment hypothesis, opens a major issue up for debate: namely, to what extent 
are metaphors embodied by our experiences in the world, be they of a more bodily 
or culturally motivated kind? It is this debate that I have deemed most poignant for 
the study of emotion metaphors in varieties of English around the world. Therefore, 
a major aspect of the present chapter will be to further explore what can be gleaned 
about embodiment in metaphor along the physical-culture divide and consider the 
possibility that it is not really about a “divide” at all.  
 Yet, firstly, before delving into this discussion, it is necessary to critically 
examine how ‘culture’ has been previously defined (and problematized) in 
academic discourse. This serves to make clear in what way ‘culture’ as an object of 
study is being used in the present study and sets up a point of reference for the 
following debate. Thus, secondly, the debate concerning the ‘competing’ notions 
of universality (from the perspective of a strong version of embodied cognition as 
defined by bodily experience) and variation (as stemming from cross- and within-
cultural forces) will be put into focus for emotion metaphors on the basis of previous 
research. Thirdly, English as a pluricentric language will be put forth as an ideal 
testing ground in furthering understanding to what extent embodiment can be seen 
through the lens of physical as opposed to cultural experience in relation to 
conceptual metaphors in the minds of New English speakers around the world. 
Furthermore, this section will also shine a spotlight on previous studies specific to 
New English metaphor, which can serve as a baseline for the current status of this 
emerging line of investigation and to which the present study aims to directly 
contribute. Finally, the chapter concludes with the specific research questions and 
formulates the aims of the present study.   
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3.1 A Note on Defining ‘Culture’  
At this point, it behooves us to consider what exactly we mean when we talk about 
culture. The academic discussion surrounding the notion of culture, like so many 
theoretically defined notions, turns out to be a tricky one when put into practice. 
From the outset I would like to emphasize that, in this study, I generally take a cue 
from Kövecses (2005) by using a definition of culture that glosses over a more 
comprehensive understanding of culture and individual people’s participation in a 
specific culture. Nevertheless, like Kövecses, I maintain its workability for the 
present purposes:  
 
In line with some current thinking in anthropology, we can think of culture as a set of 
shared understandings that characterize smaller or larger groups of people […]. This 
is not an exhaustive definition of culture, in that it leaves out real objects, artifacts, 
institutions, practices, actions and so on, that people use and participate in any culture, 
but it includes a large portion of it: namely, the shared understandings that people 
have in connection with all of these ‘things’ (Kövecses 2005: 1, emphasis mine). 
 
The intention in following Kövecses is to underscore that the relationship between 
metaphor and culture (which is the focal point of his 2005 study) does not allow us 
to have any forgone conclusions about metaphors being shared between varieties 
of English that have undoubtedly been influenced by different cultural settings and 
practices or patterns of behavior. Therefore, although it might be the case that 
English shares its metaphors of emotions throughout its global varieties on the 
whole, we cannot at the outset discount the potential of metaphorical (and thus 
culture-specific) variation. The key to the search of culture-based metaphorical 
variation (or, indeed, similarity) can be found in the “shared understandings”. As it 
concerns metaphors of emotion, I interpret this to mean shared conceptualizations 
(as evidenced by linguistic metaphors) that drive the way members of a specific 
culture speak about individual emotions. This view has been adopted directly from 
Kövecses, who maintains that: 
  
if we think of culture as, in the main, a set of shared understandings of the world, the 
question of the role of figurative understanding in culture immediately arises. Because 
our understanding of the world includes both concrete and abstract objects and events, 
naturally figurative thought should play some role in the case of abstract objects and 
events. […] abstract thought is taken to be based on concrete domains of experience, 
of which the human body has a distinguished status. […] cultural models for abstract 
domains (i.e., our shared understandings of abstract objects and events) are, and can 
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only be, metaphorically constituted (Kövecses 2005: 283–284, emphasis in the 
original).  
 
Furthermore, “a major component of culture” is in fact the way we use language 
(Kövecses 2005: 284), so that it is possible to hypothesize about culture as a 
motivating factor in how metaphors, reflected in language, are shaped and, in doing 
so, point to shared understandings.21  
 Yet, alas, the notion of culture, as it appears in academic discourse in general, 
does not play out as straightforwardly as one would like. In particular for the 
empirical research of the present kind, there is the matter of how to operationalize 
a definition of culture in order to explore metaphor. In the present study, I will not 
offer any concrete solutions to this dilemma, since I rely mostly on the sentiment 
of “shared understandings” outlined above. However, I deem it important to make 
clear what caveats we encounter when working with the term ‘culture’, which 
inevitably turns up in any linguistic research of varieties worldwide.  
 Spencer-Oately (2000) maintains that culture “is notoriously difficult to 
define” (3). As evidence of this, she cites the anthropologists Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn, who in a 1952 study found 164 different definitions for culture (3). 
Their highly influential and often cited definition, quoted below, has furthered the 
discussion by highlighting the patterned behavior of participants of a specific 
culture as a hallmark of their membership in that culture:  
 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, 
including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on 
the other as conditioning elements of further action (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952: 
181). 
 
_________________ 
21  While also defining culture in terms of “shared understandings”, Quinn (1991) argues that these shared 
understandings are not always realized solely in language and, more poignantly, that metaphors only reflect 
underlying cultural models, but do not necessarily constitute them, such as in her analysis of LOVE and 
MARRIAGE (see Quinn 1987; 1991). “I will be arguing that metaphors, far from constituting 
understanding, are ordinarily selected to fit a preexisting and culturally shared model” Quinn (1991: 60). 
For an opposing view of this conclusion, see Kövecses (1999; 2000; 2005). Other oppositional voices are 
found in Gibbs (1994) and Shore (1996), who like Kövecses, view basic cultural models as being 
metaphorically constructed.  
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 Although this definition is intended to be taken in more social scientific terms, 
it can already say something a bit more about the “shared understandings” we intend 
to discover in emotion metaphors across varieties. Emotion metaphors may have 
the potential to reflect cultural differences and similarities by virtue of being what 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn call in their definition above “patterns […] of and for 
behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols” (that is, in the case of metaphor, 
linguistic symbols). As such, we can expect patterns to emerge in the metaphors 
people use to talk about emotional experience (i.e., they will show up systematically 
in the way people use language to express emotional experience). Therefore, 
linguistic metaphors relating to underlying conceptualizations about emotion serve 
as “embodiments in artifacts”, that is, the conceptual structure of ANGER IS FIRE 
is first made apparent and examinable when someone utters something like “I am 
burning up with rage”. This utterance also makes this kind of metaphor a “product 
of action”, albeit in the linguistic sense. Furthermore, if culture “consists of 
traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas” and their corresponding 
values, then any time such an utterance is performed and its meaning is received 
and understood, it solidifies the “shared understanding” that we conceive of 
ANGER in this way and makes its replication in language more likely (i.e., 
“conditioning elements of further action”). Therefore, the main assumption to be 
derived from this particular view on culture and metaphor is that a culture’s “shared 
understandings” (i.e., metaphorical conceptualizations) will show up as patterned 
language use in the discourse of that culture’s members22, which is something we 
can detect by means of linguistic inquiry. It can also be assumed that the more often 
a particular metaphor is repeated in linguistic performance, the further it is 
sanctioned by a particular culture as a “shared understanding” of the particular part 
of human experience it denotes: it becomes a culturally reinforced linguistic 
practice to conceptualize ANGER as FIRE, for instance.23 Wilson & Lewandowska-
_________________ 
22  Sewell (2005) views culture as possessing a “distinct semiotic logic”, which in Saussurian terms maintains 
a “coherence of symbol systems”. Thus, members of a culture “will form a semiotic community […] and 
therefore be capable of engaging in mutually meaningful symbolic action” Sewell (2005: 86). In essence, 
this relationship between culture and its semiotic coherence also holds for the particular metaphors reflected 
in a culture’s language.  
23  It could also be argued that the conceptualization ANGER IS FIRE arises from embodiment in the physical 
sense: We can feel something like an inner heat physically when we become angry. However, this 
understanding of embodiment should not at the outset of an empirical study be taken as given to the 
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Tomaszczyk (2017) lend further credence to this point in their discussion of the 
concept of culture:  
 
Numerous definitions of culture proposed throughout years of research involve 
constitutive properties […] which comprise patterning, that is human models for 
living and behavior, the sharing of these patterns, their repetitiveness and structure, 
learnability and acquisition, cultural transmission in terms of symbols and signs, and  
cultural imagery and its embodiment in artefacts and in human achievement in thought 
and language. […] a particular culture primarily involves patterns of thoughts and 
emotions shared by a given community of people (Wilson & Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk 2017: 247–248) 
 
Therefore, “shared understandings” on the level of cognitive structure (as well as 
corresponding linguistic realizations) are always a matter of patterning, which is 
luckily observable in linguistic data. The question that remains for our present 
purposes is how to obtain these patterns from the data, to which we will turn in 
Chapter 4.  
 The notion of shared understandings observable in “patterns” only helps to 
operationalize one facet of how culture has been previously defined, albeit an 
important one. Another problematic facet to consider remains in the attempts to 
define ‘culture’, in particular in reference to the groupings of individuals we talk 
about as being the members of a specific culture. Spencer-Oately offers the 
following definition, albeit with additional caveats worth considering:  
Culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural conventions, and basic 
assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each 
member’s behavior and each member’s interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of other 
people’s behaviour (Spencer-Oately 2000: 4). 
 
 Four issues are inherent in this definition of culture, as pointed out by 
Spencer-Oately herself. Firstly, the “attitudes, belief, behavioural conventions, and 
basic assumptions and values” of a particular culture represent various “layers of 
depth” that can be pinpointed for the individual (“inner core”), the community 
members as a whole (“outer core”) and the “surface-level” manifestations in 
behavior between the individual members (4). Secondly, what goes on in a cultural 
setting, which Spencer-Oatley terms the “sub-surface aspects of culture”, has a 
tendency to influence the individual participants’ behavior along with the meaning 
_________________ 
exclusion of the ability of culture to select or promote certain experiences and their corresponding 
conceptualizations over others.  
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attribution they conduct towards other people’s behavior (4). Thirdly, this is 
complicated by the fact that culture is indeed a “fuzzy” concept in the sense that it 
is not clearly demarcated and, thus, individual participants in a particular culture 
most likely will not share the “identical sets of attitudes, and beliefs and so on, but 
rather show ‘family resemblances’, with the result that there is no absolute set of 
features that can distinguish definitively one cultural group from another” (4). 
Finally, culture, as defined in this way, is often lumped together with the notion of 
social group, which is (in circulatory fashion) a notion that can be defined by 
various aspects of culture. For instance, an individual participant of a particular 
culture is, at the same time, a member of various social groups within that larger 
cultural context (e.g., different ethnic groups, age groups, professional groups, etc.). 
These more fine-grained groupings can, in turn, be viewed in and of themselves as 
cultural groups in their own right (4). It is this issue that is important to discuss in 
a linguistic study, which has at its core speakers of different varieties and, thus, 
automatically representatives of diverse cultural groups within their respective 
cultures – a distinction that many researchers tend to gloss over. Culture is often 
“operationalized primarily in terms of ethnolinguistic and/or national or regional 
political identity”, which is not meant to disregard the other types of cultural groups 
or to imply that homogeneity (as its members remain individuals). Equating culture 
with regional affiliation is simply a matter of the limited scope imposed on the 
researcher of (cross-)cultural variation in (linguistic) behavior (4). This is a fact that 
the present study does not attempt to overcome because, as a cognitive linguistic 
study of emotion metaphor using a corpus-based method, it is reliant on the 
demarcation of cultural groups by geographical location and, in fact, deals with the 
very same limited scope that Spencer-Oatley highlights.  
 However, it is important at least to acknowledge the palpably unsatisfactory 
use of ‘culture’ to equate national identity. In fact, this prompted Bond et al. (2000: 
49-50) to refer to culture as an “empty” term. Its lack of explanatory value comes 
to light when we (as we commonly do) apply it to the situation of encountering 
differences in behavior, for example, that results from travel experiences that 
expose us to a ‘foreign’ way of speaking or acting. Bond et al. (2000) uses this 
scenario to highlight the circulatory nature of using the term culture in this manner, 
which leads to observations that are less than illuminating, e.g., the British act and 
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speak a certain way because they are British, Germans act and speak a certain way 
because they are German and so forth. In fact, what is needed to overcome the 
definitional emptiness is what Bond et al. (2000) deem “usable content”. Usable 
content, in their view, is suggested by definitions of culture that, like Spencer-
Oatley’s above, uphold “values as a key role in differentiating cultures one from 
another” Bond et al. (2000: 50)24  
 One value (or, in other words, dimension of cultural variability) that is 
particularly applicable to the present study is the dimension of Individualism-
Collectivism (henceforth I-C). The I-C dimension can be defined by viewing 
Individualism and Collectivism “as two poles of a dimension of national culture” 
(Hofstede 2001: 225). A individualistic society is “a society in which the ties 
between individuals are loose: Everybody is expected to look after him/herself and 
her/his immediate family only”, while a collectivistic society denotes “a society in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, 
which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty” (225). In other words, Individualism drives a society to 
value personal freedom and independence over reciprocity and the demands of 
community and established tradition.  
It should be noted that I selected this dimension over the six others (see 
footnote 24 below) in Hofstede’s work because, in my view, it lent itself most 
readily to emotional aspects of our cultural experiences. For instance, by applying 
I-C to their study of ANGER metaphor in English, Russian and Spanish, Ogarkova 
and Soriano (2014) point out that “[c]ultural variance on the 
individualism/collectivism dimension has been robustly supported by empirical 
evidence on various types of appraisal, conceptualization, expression and regulation 
of emotions” (96). Furthermore, they conclude that “in collectivistic […] cultures 
anger is predominantly viewed as more negative and socially disruptive, […] and 
thus, should be regulated with regard to its expression and one’s acting on the 
_________________ 
24  An influential study conducted by Hofstede (1980), which is critically discussed by Bond et al. (2000: 51-
60) attempted to analyze the work-related values of 40 individual nations working at IBM and, in doing so, 
came up with “culture scores” relating to four variational dimensions: 1) Power Distance, 2) Individualism 
/ Collectivism, 3) Uncertainty Avoidance, and 4) Masculinity / Femininity. Hofstede later added a fifth and 
sixth dimension: 5) Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation (see Hofstede & Bond 1988; Hofstede 2001) 
and 6) Indulgence vs. Restraint (see Hofstede et al. 2010). For a summary of all six dimensions, see 
Hofstede (2011).  
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feeling. The evaluation is more positive in individualistic cultures, which are more 
favourable towards the open manifestation of intense emotional experience as 
affirmation of the self” (96-97).  
Furthermore, from the outset of a study on New Englishes, the application of 
the I-C dimension helps to further differentiate the regional varieties under 
investigation, because I-C is “the major dimension of cultural variability used to 
explain cross-cultural differences in behaviour” (Gudykunst 2000: 296). In 
addition, I-C gives us grounds to assume that in linguistic behavior (on the level of 
metaphor) the influence of difference in cultural context cannot be discounted, even 
for the universal experience of conceptualizing emotion. “[I]t is important to 
recognize that behaviour is unique within each culture” and, thus, in the grand 
scheme of things resists overgeneralizations. There are similarities and differences 
that can be “explained and predicted theoretically” (Gudykunst 2000: 295) by the 
values an individual culture has a tendency to uphold between its members. The I-
C dimension is characteristic of this predictability and can thus be deemed “usable 
content” in Bond et al.’s (2000) words.  
 Hofstede (2001, 1980) reports on the quantification of these values resulting 
in a “culture score” for individual nations participating in his study of the global 
corporation IBM. His statistical analysis for the I-C dimension on the basis of an 
“Individualism Index Value”(with a range of 0-100) resulted in a ranking of 50 
countries and three regions, with the highest values indicating a nation with a 
tendency towards Individualism and, conversely, the lowest a tendency towards 
Collectivism (Hofstede 2001: 214). Within his study I was able to locate all nations 
and regions representing the varieties of English in my study, namely Great Britain, 
Nigeria, Kenya, India and Singapore, and, therefore, took a look their Individualism 
Index Value, presented in Table 3.1 below.  
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Table 3.1: Individualism Index Values for Great Britain, Nigeria, Kenya, India and Singapore 
(adapted from Hofstede 2001: 215) 
Rank (out of 53) Country / Region Individualism 
Index Value (IDV) 
3 Great Britain 89 
21 India 48 
33/35 East Africa [Kenya] 27 
39/41 West Africa [Nigeria] 20 
39/41 Singapore 20 
 
 
What I can glean from Hofstede’s (2001) findings for my present purposes is that 
the nations (or regions) associated with the varieties of English I tend to investigate 
do mostly differ in terms of the I-C dimension, which, as it has been established 
above, is a major value dimension to explain unique culture behavior. What I find 
striking is that the lower Individualism Index Values of all New English 
representatives seem dramatically lower than the so-called norm-providing variety 
originating in Great Britain. Great Britain ranks very high on the Individualism 
scale - only other Western nations rank higher, namely the United States and 
Australia, according to Hofstede (2001). While India straddles the middle range, 
East Africa (presumably including Kenya), West Africa (presumably including 
Nigeria) and Singapore fall into the lower ranges, indicating a tendency towards 
Collectivism. It is important to note that with this there is not any concrete 
assumption about how this particular value plays a role in these varieties’ linguistic 
behavior concerning emotion metaphors, although it could play a role.25 However, 
I do find it valuable to have taken this dimension into consideration, so that it is 
_________________ 
25  A finding by Naidu (2009) about ANGER IS FIRE in British and Indian newspapers suggests that “Indian 
English uses the source domain of ‘fire’ in a culturally different way. It is speculated that this culturally 
determined way of using the source domain of ‘fire’ may reflect the ‘collectivist’ ideology of the 
culture/society which is different from the ‘individualistic’ ideology wherein an individual is in focus.” 
(222). This finding relates to a comparison of the Times of India (e.g., Rostock burns as G8 protests spiral) 
with the London Times (e.g., fiery speeches) – the latter illustrating the construal of FIRE as being contained 
in the human body, which is determined as a tendency for British English. Naidu concludes that, in the 
Indian example, there is an extension of the containment of the FIRE domain to a geographical location, 
thus suggesting an emphasis on the collective and a culturally conditioned difference in mapping (172-
175). Nevertheless, I am not entirely convinced by this analysis, considering the example Naidu highlighted 
(Rostock) is being used metonymically, and, as such, the conceptual connection to the individuals within 
the collective is present, if not made explicit on the linguistic level. 
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apparent that I am, in fact, dealing with regional varieties in my study with attested 
differences in a major cultural dimension. While that might be obvious from the 
varieties’ regional context, this, nevertheless, helps in overcoming what I called 
above “the palpably unsatisfactory use of culture to equate national identity” by 
relying on a value that can differentiate the cultures, i.e., “usable content” (Bond et 
al. 2000: 50), and that goes beyond regional differences. 
 This is especially relevant for taking into account countries that share a 
common language. We are fully aware that a pluricentric language such as English 
is shaped by the unique histories and sociocultural contexts of the respective regions 
it is spoken in (e.g., for an explanatory model for World English varieties, see, e.g., 
Schneider 2009 [2007]). Nevertheless, the more graspable the framework for 
defining the cultural component of these individual influences on the language, the 
better our position is to approach similarities and differences in their linguistic 
behavior, also on the level of metaphor.  
3.2 Body and Culture in Emotion Metaphor 
Having established our working definition of culture and that the varieties of the 
present study seem to be culturally distinct from each other concerning a significant 
value dimension, we can now take our discussion a step further to an extended view 
of embodiment that includes culture. Embodiment was discussed in the previous 
chapter in terms of the theoretical framework of CMT. Yet, researchers have been 
quick to note that embodiment (in the strictest physical sense) is not the only driving 
force; at least, it has to be reconciled with the cultural environment in which bodily 
experience is found. Although Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]) give priority to 
“direct physical experience” in their explanations of how our conceptual system is 
grounded, they nevertheless indicate the importance of culture within these 
experiences:  
 
[…] what we call ‘direct physical experience’ is never merely a matter of having a 
body of a certain sort; rather, every experience takes place within a vast background 
of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical 
experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then 
‘interpret’ in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values, and 
attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience 
as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through 
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and through, that we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our culture is already 
present in the very experience itself (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 57, emphasis in 
the original). 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) do, however, go on to maintain that there is a 
distinction to be made in experiences that can be more readily attributable to the 
physical or to the cultural26 (57). As evidence, they highlight orientational and 
ontological metaphors as more grounded in physical experience and thus are more 
likely embodied. For example, UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, etc. are 
illustrative of spatial concepts “that are relevant to our continual everyday bodily 
functioning, and this gives them priority over other possible structurings of space 
[…] the structure of our spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial 
experience, that is, our interaction with the physical environment” (Lakoff & 
Johnson 2003 [1980]: 56–57). Therefore, these concepts relate directly to how our 
bodies function in the physical world and are, thus, “more sharply delineated than 
others” (57).  
 When it comes to emotions, the lines are not as clearly drawn. “[O]ur 
emotional experiences are much less sharply delineated in terms of what we do with 
our bodies […] no sharply defined conceptual structure for the emotions emerges 
from our emotional functioning alone” (Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]): 58). 
Yet, orientational concepts (like UP) help to structure emotional experience 
(HAPPY IS UP), which, in turn, can help to “conceptualize our emotions in more 
sharply defined terms and also to relate them to other concepts having to do with 
general well-being (e.g., HEALTH, LIFE, CONTROL, etc.)”, which can be called 
emergent metaphors (58).  
 The question that remains, however, is how to view culture’s role in the 
structuring of concepts like emotions that perhaps reside on the cusp of direct 
physical experience (e.g., we feel our temperature rising when we get angry) and 
culturally mediated understanding of that experience (e.g., we may prefer to talk 
_________________ 
26  Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) also say something about the basicness of experience and take pains to 
highlight the difference between an experience as such and the conceptualizing of that experience in 
grounding. “We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than other kinds of 
experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural, or whatever. All of these experiences may be just as basic 
as physical experiences. Rather, what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize 
the nonphysical in terms of the physical – that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of 
the more clearly delineated” (59, emphasis in the original).  
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about the experience of our temperature rising when angry in different ways). The 
physiological effects of emotions are felt within the body and, thus, we see 
embodiment effects in the language we use to talk about emotions, like in I was 
burning with anger. However, are there cultural forces at play that also shape the 
way the metaphorization of emotion plays out in a given cultural context? Lakoff 
and Johnson (2003 [1980) do not have a direct answer for this, but they do claim 
that:  
 
[t]he most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical 
structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture […] We are not claiming 
that all cultural values coherent with a metaphorical system actually exist, only that 
those that do exist and are deeply entrenched are consistent with the metaphorical 
system (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 22–23).  
 
 In other words, from the set of values particular to a specific culture, some 
are prioritized, and it is these values, which are most connected to the metaphors of 
that culture. For example, “[n]ot all cultures give the priorities we do to up-down 
orientation. There are cultures where balance or centrality plays a much more 
important role [...]” which leaves room for a culture to dictate “which concepts are 
oriented which way and which orientations are most important” (24). For example, 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) state that in American culture ACTIVE IS UP 
(e.g., you should really rise to the occasion) and PASSIVE IS DOWN (e.g., the Wi-
Fi is down again) are products of prioritized values; yet, “there are cultures where 
passivity is valued more than activity” (24)27. In this vein, embodiment “attests not 
merely to the link between our body and mind, but also to the bodily experiences 
in a culture substantiated by meaningful imperatives, expectations, and norms” 
(Leung et al. 2011: 595).  
 Particularly productive in the 21st century, various other researchers have 
made attempts to explore culture’s role in metaphor (see, e.g, Boers 2003; Boers & 
Littlemore 2003; Charteris-Black 2003; Deignan 2003; Kimmel 2004; Kövecses 
2005; Littlemore 2003; Sharifian 2011; Sharifian et al. 2008; Yu 2008, 2009), 
centering on the debate between universality and cultural variation regarding 
_________________ 
27  Note that the examples given in this sentence are of my own construction, since Lakoff & Johnson  (2003 
[1980]) did not supply any directly.  
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metaphors. Within this debate, embodiment can be viewed as a “long-standing 
dualism” that has largely “been left intact” (Hampe 2008: 5). 
 
Taking a strong view of embodiment, which emphasizes bodily experience, tends “to 
obscure the socio-cultural dimensions of human cognition. […] To make up for this, 
proponents of the ‘cultural-cognition’ approach to the embodiment hypothesis have 
striven to understand language and cognition as part of the triad body-mind-culture, and 
‘extended’ the notion of embodiment […] by ‘situating’ cognition in socio-culturally 
determined contexts” (Hampe 2008: 5, emphasis in the original). 
 
 Considering the universalist view again, I repeat the line of argumentation 
outlined in the previous chapter for convenience: Despite our more superficial racial 
or ethnic differences, we all share the same basic biology, that is, a body with its 
various functional properties and experiences, as well as the same cognitive makeup 
(summarized by Yu 2008: 250). Since, in Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003 [1980]) 
words, our conceptual system is “fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (3) and 
“which metaphors we have and what they mean depend on the nature of our bodies” 
(247), it follows that a large bulk of the metaphors we have across the cultures of 
the world are shared and thus universal.  
 However, citing Strathern (1996), Yu (2015) maintains that, while 
embodiment does relate to our biology, what ends up as conceptually embodied is 
the result of “some set of meanings, values, tendencies, orientations that have 
derived from the sociocultural realm” (231). Furthermore, when considering the 
body as a culturally constructed concept in itself, “[t]he body is appreciated for its 
symbolic properties as people instill cultural meanings into bodily processes and 
activities. Culture does not just inform, but also constitute, embodied experience. 
Many embodied experiences are rooted in sociocultural contexts” (231). An 
example of this is found in the different conceptualizations of PERSON from 
Western and Chinese perspectives, summed up in two formulas: PERSON = BODY 
+ MIND (Western view) and PERSON = BODY + HEART (Chinese view) (234). 
Because the Chinese concept of HEART “is traditionally conceptualized as the 
central faculty of cognition”, it brings forth idiomatic expressions that do not have 
equivalents in English, e.g. xin-xiang (heart-think, ‘think to oneself’), jiao-xin 
(scorch-heart, ‘feel terribly worried’), xin-zui (be heart drunk, ‘be charmed / 
enchanted’), etc. (235). Therefore, language realizes embodied cognition, but 
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language is also cultural, and, as such, “should be studied in its social and cultural 
context, as conceptualizations underlying language and language use are largely 
formed and informed by cultural systems” (233). It follows then that language and 
its underlying conceptualizations, like the concept of body, are also rooted in the 
realm of the sociocultural.  
 When it comes to metaphors, our biological and cultural selves obviously play 
a role. Taking into account a revised version of CMT, Primary Metaphor Theory 
(Grady 1997a), Lakoff & Johnson (1999) explain why some metaphors seem 
universal by allowing for the distinction between primary and complex metaphors. 
Grady (2007) defines primary metaphors as “simple patterns, like Lakoff and 
Johnson’s MORE IS UP, which map fundamental perceptual concepts onto equally 
fundamental but not directly perceptual ones”28 (192). Primary metaphors are 
different from complex metaphors because they constitute the building blocks of 
the latter. 
 
All complex metaphors are ‘molecular’, made up of ‘atomic’ metaphorical parts 
called primary metaphors. Each primary metaphor has a minimal structure and arises 
naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means of 
conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed. Complex metaphors 
are formed by conceptual blending. Universal early experiences lead to universal 
conflations, which then develop into universal (or widespread) conventional 
conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 46).  
 
Thus, primary metaphors fall into line with a physical and biological understanding 
of embodiment, while complex metaphors, like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, 
are “built out of primary metaphors plus forms of commonplace knowledge: 
cultural models, folk theories, or simply knowledge or beliefs that are widely 
accepted in culture” (60). Not only does embodied cultural experience play a greater 
role in complex metaphors, it is these metaphors that have the potential to “differ 
significantly from culture to culture” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 257). Be that 
as it may, the adoption of the notions of primary and complex metaphor helps to 
theoretically reconcile (at least to some extent) the debated relationship of 
_________________ 
28 “Source concepts for primary metaphors include UP, DOWN, HEAVY, BRIGHT, FORWARD, 
BACKWARD, SWEET, various simple ‘force dynamic’ concepts (in the sense of Talmy 2008), and so on. 
Corresponding target concepts are such basic building blocks of mental experience as DOMINANT, SAD, 
DIFFICULT, HAPPY, SUCCESS, THE PAST, APPEALING, and COMPULSION” (Grady 2007: 192–
193). 
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universality and variation in the construction of metaphor. Whether or not New 
English complex metaphors of emotion tend to be of the more universal or culture-
specific type in the empirical evidence will be a matter of discussion later on (see 
the case studies in Chapters 5 - 7 and Chapter 8 for concluding remarks).  
 At this point, it is good to consider again how researchers view the 
relationship of body and culture for metaphors in light of what we have now 
established for Primary Metaphor Theory. Kövecses’ (2005) view (discussed in 
Section 2.3 in the previous chapter) is that it is a matter of the competing pressures 
of body and culture. Yu (2008) sees this less oppositionally and makes an appeal 
for the following view:  
 
[T]he interaction between body and culture contributes to the emergence of 
metaphors. I will argue that, for conceptual metaphors, body is a source, whereas 
culture is a filter. That is, while body is a potentially universal source domain from 
which bodily-based metaphors emerge, culture serves as a filter that only allows 
certain bodily experiences to pass through so that they can be mapped onto certain 
target-domain concepts. (Yu 2008: 249) 
 
Yu (2008) illustrates how this works in a comparative study of FACE in Chinese 
and English (see also Yu 2001). By taking a decompositional approach to the 
conceptual metaphors DIGNITY IS FACE and PRESTIGE IS FACE, he shows that 
“these two, simple as they are, are indeed complex metaphors constructed out of 
more complicated combinations of primary and complex metaphors and 
metonymies, as well as cultural beliefs and assumptions” (254), which is illustrated 
below.  
 
(1)  a. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS FACE AS A VALUABLE POSSESSION (a complex 
 metaphor) 
 b. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS FACE AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT (a complex metaphor) 
 c. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS A FEELING (a proposition) 
 d. FACE IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT (a complex metaphor) 
 e. A FEELING IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT (a primary metaphor) 
 f. FACE STANDS FOR A FEELING (a metonymy) 
 g. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS A DESIRABLE FEELING (a proposition)29  
           (Yu 2008: 255-256) 
 
_________________ 
29 (1g) represents a cultural belief (Yu 2008: 255). 
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DIGNITY IS FACE and PRESTIGE IS FACE consist of these multifaceted 
component parts, “with each of them being a condition for their selections or 
realization”. Therefore, “[o]nly in those languages that meet all the conditions, 
which constitute […] the ‘cultural filter’, can” these metaphors “exist and be 
manifested linguistically”, implying that even universal embodied experience must 
undergo a process of cultural filtration in order to participate in metaphorical 
mappings (254). For example, a culture could potentially conceptualize DIGNITY 
and PRESTIGE as an object other than FACE (although “there exists a robust 
experiential link between feelings and the face”), so that these metaphors would not 
emerge in that culture (256).  
 Assuming a cultural filter is in play for experiential, physical experience, the 
link between the body and culture in emerging metaphors becomes a bit clearer. 
The general allowance in CMT for universality on the basis of sensorimotor 
experience in the physical world and for variation in terms of culture’s interaction 
with this experience in the function of a filter lends more contour to the 
understanding of this relationship and heightens the status of the sociocultural 
context. Nevertheless, researchers of emotion metaphors have not always 
positioned themselves as understanding the interplay between the body and culture, 
relying often only on attestations of particular conceptual metaphors of emotions as 
being present in a culture / language or not. That is, if a conceptual metaphor exists 
in a certain language and not in another, then it is considered to be specific to that 
culture or, at least, not shared by the culture in which it is not found. This may be 
perfectly appropriate considering intended research goals of such studies, e.g., to 
determine via linguistic analysis what metaphors are actually used in a specific 
culture / language. The present study admittedly does something similar. However, 
at its theoretical backdrop is at least the awareness that culture can act as a filter 
and, thus, could be the reason why varieties of English share emotion metaphors or 
why the cultural filter acts as a constraint on their emergence in a particular variety. 
That having been said, we now turn to previous research that has postulated 
conceptual metaphors in support of the notion of universality vis-à-vis conceptual 
metaphors that support variation.  
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3.3 Emotion Metaphors: The Embodied Cultural 
Prototype View   
As a predominant focus of language typology and Universal Grammar, linguistic 
universals involve “generalizations that capture properties of language or languages 
that are essential to and stable across all possible languages and language types” 
(Siemund 2011: 1). Contrastingly, language variation, as its label suggests, 
concerns “the variable parts of language and languages” and the “charting [of] the 
range of variation” in terms of language contact, diachronic study of language 
change and acquisition, as well as “system-internal” grammatical variation, which 
has traditionally been in the purview of dialectology and sociolinguistics (1-2). 
However, “the boundaries between the research paradigms […] have become 
increasingly blurred” (3). The same can perhaps be said for metaphor research to a 
certain extent, based on the preceding discussion.  
 In the following I rely heavily on Kövecses (2000, 2005, 2008d) who has 
been a forerunner in emotion metaphor research and has extensively explored 
universality and culture-specificity as manifested in metaphor variation. Therefore, 
this section will serve to provide an overview of his “embodied cultural prototype” 
view, and, in doing so, introduce his typology of metaphor variation, of which a 
few types emerge as poignant to the contextualizing the results of the present study.  
 Citing Fernandez (1991), Kövecses (2008d) points out that the trend in 
Cognitive Linguistics concerning conceptual metaphor has been to overemphasize 
the universal proprieties in metaphor, while ignoring those instances where 
metaphor culturally varies (Kövecses 2008d: 52). In his view, this has something 
to do with the varying purposes of cognitive scientific research into metaphor as 
compared to anthropological interest in the same: Cognitive science seeks to 
ascertain something about the nature of metaphor in the mind, while the social 
sciences are more interested in viewing metaphor in its particular social-cultural 
contexts (51-52). In large part, this is due to the cognitive linguistic finding, going 
back to Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]), that conceptual metaphors are embodied 
(in the sense of the strong version of the embodiment hypothesis), without, at first, 
significant understanding of what their experiential basis is:  
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We do not know very much about the experiential bases of metaphors. Because of our 
ignorance in this matter, we have described the [orientational, BAG] metaphors 
separately, only later adding speculative notes on their possible experiential bases. We 
are adopting this practice out of ignorance, not out of principle. In actuality we feel 
that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented 
independently of its experiential basis (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 19, emphasis 
in the original). 
 
As a case in point, Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]: 15) discuss the orientational 
metaphors HAPPY IS UP vs. SAD IS DOWN (as in, I’m feeling up; That boosted 
my spirits; I’m feeling down; My spirits sank.). This up-down spatialization seems 
to clearly stem from our physical experience: When you are feeling happy, you tend 
to have an upright posture that correlates with this emotional state; when you are 
feeling sad, your posture tends to be drooping or hunched over. The correlation 
between emotional state and physical experience is also seen in metaphors, like 
ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (where an angry state produces 
physiological reactions like body heat, the feeling of rising internal pressure, etc.) 
and FEAR IS COLDNESS (corresponding to the chilled, cold feeling of the skin 
when fearful) (Kövecses 1990: 52, 72). The reason we are aware of this correlation 
has everything to do with what we see reflected on the linguistic level. If the 
conceptual system behind the languages of the world reflect metaphorical 
mappings, like ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER or HAPPY IS UP, 
then our tendency is to view them as universal and primarily motivated by bodily 
experience. Therefore, the extent to which a metaphor can be considered universally 
embodied (or, in other words, have (near-) universal status) can be gleaned by 
“look[ing] at how people in different cultures talk about their emotions in a detailed 
way. […] We have to check all the available linguistic evidence for the many 
figurative ways of talking about the emotions […] that characterize talk in 
presumably all cultures” (Kövecses 2000: 139). Various studies have been devoted 
to doing just that.  
 For instance, Kövecses (2000) reviews research conducted for ANGER 
metaphors in English, Hungarian, Chinese and Japanese, which show that the 
metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER may 
potentially have near-universal status. Along with the fact that “basic image 
schemas [like CONTAINER, BAG] emerging from fundamental bodily 
experiences can be expected to be universals” (Kövecses et al. 2002: 145), it is the 
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diversity of the cultures (represented by these diverse languages), which point to 
(near-) universality in that their linguistic metaphors seem to share a basic 
conceptual structure. Examples (2) – (5) illustrate this.  
 
(2) English  
He was filled with anger.  
 
(3) Hungarian  
Tele van dühvel [full is düh-with].  
He is full of anger. 
 
(4) Chinese 
man qiang fen nu [full cavity anger] 
to have one’s body cavities full of anger 
 
(5) Japanese 
Ikari ga karadajyu ni jyuman shita [anger in my body to be filled was].  
My body was filled with anger.      (Kövecses 2000: 147) 
 
While the CONTAINER metaphor is proven here to exist in these vastly different 
languages in distinct cultural settings and, thus, acts as a folk theory of sorts, it also 
happens to be a metaphor that contributes to a scientific theory of emotion (see, 
Kövecses 1990; Lutz 1988; Solomon 1984)30, which further boosts its potentially 
universal status. However, examining more specific instantiations of ANGER for 
English, Hungarian, Chinese and Japanese, Kövecses (2000) finds that this “general 
metaphor seems to be elaborated in more or less different ways” (147-148). 
Drawing on the study of the cognitive model of ANGER in English, published in 
Lakoff (1987a) by Lakoff and Kövecses, a major metaphor conceptualizing 
ANGER at a more specific level is ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER 
(as in, You make my blood boil). Here, ANGER is conceptualized as a hot fluid 
within the body, which produces the following metaphorical entailments:  
 
_________________ 
30  Similarly, in their study of emotion metaphors by experts of psychology and laypersons, Beger & Jäkel 
(2009) confirm the claim made by Lakoff and Kövecses in Lakoff (1987a) that ANGER IS A HOT FLUID 
IN A CONTAINER is the core metaphor for conceptualizing ANGER. The majority of ANGER metaphor 
attributable to both experts and laypersons centered on ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, in 
which the body of the angry person acts as the container.  
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(6) When the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises:  
His pent-up anger welled up inside him.  
 
(7) Intense anger produces steam / pressure on the container:  
Billy’s just blowing off steam. / He was bursting with anger.  
 
(8) When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes:  
When I told him, he just exploded.  
 
(9) When a person explodes, parts of him go up in the air / what was inside him 
comes out:  
I blew my stack. / His anger finally came out.   
       (adapted from Kövecses 2000: 148–149) 
 
Hungarian and Japanese metaphors confirm most of these entailments, with the 
exception that in addition to conceptualizing the emotion CONTAINER as the 
whole body, in Hungarian the head can be the container of ANGER as a hot fluid, 
while in Japanese “the stomach/bowels area […] is seen as the principal container” 
(Kövecses 2000: 149; 152)31. The Chinese metaphors, based on the analyses by 
King (1989) and Yu (1995), offer a slightly different version based on the notion of 
qi, which is a culturally constructed concept that envisions qi as an energy that “as 
a fluid or gas […] flows through the body. It is also a fluid or gas that can increase 
and then produce excess […] when we have the emotion of anger” (Kövecses 2000: 
150). The addition of this cultural concept to THE ANGRY PERSON IS A 
PRESSURIZED CONTAINER for Chinese results in some marked differences:  
 
First, it may be observed that in Chinese anger qi may be present in a variety of places 
in the body, including the breast, heart, stomach, and spleen. Second, anger qi seems 
to be a fluid that, unlike in English, Hungarian, and Japanese, is not hot. Its 
temperature is not specified. As a result, Chinese does not have the entailment 
involving the idea of steam being produced. Third, anger qi is a fluid whose buildup 
produces pressure in the body or in a specific body organ. This pressure typically leads 
to an explosion that corresponds to loss of control over anger (Kövecses 2000: 151).  
 
_________________ 
31  Ansah (2014a) in her study of ANGER in Akan, a Kwa language spoken in Ghana, also finds that different 
body parts, like the chest, heart and back of the head, can be conceptualized as “sub-containers“ for 
ANGER, where intensity of the angry emotional experience plays an interesting role. “[T]he general 
knowledge that intense heat causes a rise in volume or upward movement of a fluid in a container 
corresponds to the increase in the intensity of anger in Akan where either the entire sub-container or the 
hot fluid in it moves upward, e.g., n’akoma a-sɔre ‘his/her heart has risen’; n’akomakɔsoro ‘his/her heart 
has gone up’; neborehuru so ‘his chest is boiling over’ (Ansah 2014a: 138). 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that not all scholars assume that ANGER IS A HOT 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER, as realized in English, has by necessity a universal, 
experiential basis. Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995) argue for a culture-specific 
explanation by pointing to the medieval “four humors” doctrine as the motivation 
behind this metaphor (see also, Gevaert 2001; 2005).  
 Notice that in a discussion of linguistic evidence for a (near-) universal, like 
THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER, we are not far away 
from making cultural claims when taking a closer look at a more specific level. 
Going back to Kövecses’ (2008d) claim that cognitive linguists are more interested 
in the nature of metaphor in the mind, while anthropological and social science 
interest falls more in the realm of metaphor in its socio-cultural context, he 
formulates a challenge to cognitive linguists researching metaphor in the form of a 
fundamental question: “Can the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor 
simultaneously explain both universality and diversity in metaphorical thought?” 
His body of work (e.g., Kövecses 2000; 2005, 2003a, 2008a, 2008d) and that of 
various others (e.g., Ansah 2011, Ansah 2014b; Deignan 2003; Gibbs 1999; 
Kövecses et al. 2002; Patowari 2015; Yu 2008) seem to answer this question in the 
affirmative. However, for this to be valid, CMT, in particular, “needs to be 
modified, revised, and supplemented in several ways” (Kövecses 2008d: 52). Part 
of this revision involves taking Primary Metaphor Theory seriously (as discussed 
in Section 3.2 above), which allows for viewing more general metaphors as 
motivated by universal bodily experience vis-à-vis complex metaphors built from 
them. Another significant part entails defining types of metaphoric variation as 
explanatory tools for culturally filtered metaphorizations.  
 Types of metaphor variation have been defined in Kövecses’ (2005) 
“embodied cultural prototype” approach to CMT. It follows from the embodied 
cultural prototype view that conceptualizations of emotion can be simultaneously 
the products of universal embodied cognition and cultural embodied cognition. 
Gibbs (1999) underscores this point in the following:  
 
One cannot talk about, or study, cognition apart from our specific embodied 
interactions with the cultural world (and this includes the physical world which is not 
separate from the cultural one in the important sense that what we see as meaningful 
in the physical world is highly constrained by our cultural beliefs and values). Scholars 
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cannot, and should not assume, that mind, body, and culture can somehow be 
independently portioned out of human behavior as it is only appropriate to study 
particular ‘interactions’ between thought, language, and culture, respectively. 
Theories of human conceptual systems should be inherently cultural in that the 
cognition which occurs when the body meets world is inextricably culturally-based 
(Gibbs 1999: 153).  
 
Consequently, the culture of a particular language community conceivably plays a 
role in making some aspects of otherwise universal emotion concepts more salient 
over other aspects that might be more central to another cultural group’s 
understanding and manner of talking about the same concepts. Therefore, although 
we can expect to find great similarities in a cross-cultural study of metaphorical 
conceptualizations of emotion reflected in the many varieties of English, we can 
also readily expect to find differences in the way emotions are conceptualized, 
owing to each variety’s unique socio-cultural circumstances. Kövecses (2000) 
addresses this point in the following way: 
 
My view is that, given the universal real physiology, members of different cultures 
cannot conceptualize their emotions in a way that contradicts universal physiology 
(or maybe even their conceptualization of universal physiology); but nevertheless they 
can choose to conceptualize their emotions in many different ways within the 
constraints imposed on them by universal physiology. These limits leave a lot of room 
for speakers of very different languages [and, potentially, of different varieties of a 
pluricentric language like English, BAG] to conceptualize their intense emotions in 
sometimes very different ways (Kövecses 2000: 165, emphasis in the original). 
 
 Since we have grounds to postulate the existence of culture-specific 
metaphors, the question is merited on what level of specificity it may be assumed 
that variation most obviously occurs and, thus, can be studied (also see Onysko 
2017). The general expectation that has emerged from previous research on 
metaphor variation is that (cross-cultural) variation is observable in specific-level 
metaphors that can be considered “culturally embedded instantiations” of generic-
level metaphors. These, in turn, are more likely to reflect shared conceptualizations 
that cut across cultural and linguistic backgrounds and thus have more potential as 
being identified as candidates for universals (Kövecses 2005: 67). Kövecses (2005) 
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outlines several types of metaphor variation32, of which several are of particular 
interest for the present study.  
 The first type of metaphor variation is called congruent metaphor, which 
involve metaphors (like THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED 
CONTAINER) that may have near-universal status. Yet, from our discussion 
above, it is clear that culture plays a role as well, i.e., the interaction of universal 
general (or primary) metaphors with culture. “When the generic schema is filled 
out, it receives unique cultural content at a specific level. In other words, a generic-
level conceptual metaphor is instantiated in culture-specific ways at a specific 
level” (Kövecses 2005: 68). Examples of congruent metaphors concerning the 
cultural content of THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER 
are discussed by Kövecses (2005) for Japanese, Chinese and Zulu (68-69). The 
Chinese example (ANGER IS AN EXCESS OF QI) was briefly discussed above 
and shows that concept of QI, which “is deeply embedded in the long history of 
Chinese philosophy and medicine” is the gas that is exerting pressure on the (body) 
container (unlike the hot fluid in English). In Japanese, citing Matsuki (1995), and 
Zulu, citing Taylor & Mbense (1998), Kövecses demonstrates congruent metaphors 
of THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER that culturally 
specify the container itself. In Japanese, “there is a large number of anger-related 
expressions that group around the Japanese concept of hara (literally, ‘belly’)” (68). 
In Zulu, ANGER IS IN THE HEART entails that internal pressure arises because 
“too much ‘emotion substance’ is crammed into a container of limited capacity” 
(69). These metaphors show that the generic schema of A PRESSURIZED 
CONTAINER is expanded upon by culturally conditioned content, but remains in 
congruence with the generic schema, i.e., qui reflects a specific type of container 
substance, while hara and heart reflect specific types of containers.  
 The second type of variation involves alternative metaphors, which can be 
viewed from three perspectives: 1) the range of the target domain, 2) the scope of 
the source domain and 3) large-scale alternative conceptualizations. In its most 
basic form, we speak of alternative metaphors when languages are found to use 
_________________ 
32  Boers (2003) and Deignan et al. (1997) also define types of metaphor variation, but in a less elaborated 
manner than Kövecses (2005).  
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different source domains for the same target domain (Kövecses 2005: 70). This is 
what Kövecses (2005) calls the “range of the target”, which hinges on extensive 
comparative study of culturally distinct languages. Kövecses (2005) points out that 
the range of the target type is a common case for variation in emotion concepts and 
offers Yu’s (1995, 1998) finding on Chinese and English as evidence. While 
Chinese and English share primary source domains like UP, LIGHT and FLUID IN 
A CONTAINER for HAPPINESS, Chinese makes use of a metaphor that has not 
been attested for English: HAPPINESS IS FLOWERS IN THE HEART (Kövecses 
2005: 70). The second and third perspective of alternative metaphors are not as 
relevant to the present study because they involve either a source domain-oriented 
study (as in the “scope of metaphor” referring to the set of target domains a specific 
source domain applies) or have, as far as I am aware, not been discussed in terms 
of emotion concepts, like large-scale alternative conceptualizations of spatial 
relations (see Kövecses 2005: 72-82).   
 Along with congruent metaphors and the range of the target domain, the 
perhaps most apt type of metaphor variation defined by Kövecses (2005) for our 
present purposes concerns the third type of metaphor variation, namely preferential 
conceptualization. Preferential conceptualization denotes the circumstance when 
“two languages / cultures may have many of the same conceptual metaphors for a 
given target domain, but speakers of the languages may prefer to use a different set 
of metaphors for this target” (82). He illustrates this with a study by one of his 
students concerning target concepts for LIFE, as evidenced by metaphors from 
Americans and Hungarians. While many of the target domains for LIFE were 
shared, like GAME and JOURNEY, a language-specific preference emerged: 
“Americans had preference for the PRECIOUS POSSESSION and GAME source 
domains, and the participating Hungarians opted for viewing life as a STRUGGLE 
or WAR and as a COMPROMISE” (84-85). Here, it should be noted that, in order 
to gauge the extent of preferential conceptualizations, quantifiable metaphor data is 
needed. Despite defining this type and illustrating his student’s work as an example 
study involving metaphor frequencies, Kövecses (2005) does not provide any 
details into how preferential conceptualizations should be studied, although he does 
advocate in Kövecses (2008) for “a wide range of data” (52) and in later work 
applies quantifiable methods to corpus-data (e.g., Kövecses et al. 2015).  
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 Finally, the fourth type of metaphor variation proposed by Kövecses (2005) 
involves unique metaphors. A unique metaphor can be viewed as purely cultural, 
in that it involves a conceptual metaphor in which both a culturally unique source 
domain and a culturally unique target domain participate (e.g., the 
conceptualization of American slaves’ escape from the antebellum South fossilized 
in the Underground Railroad) (Kövecses 2005: 86). Another example of a unique 
metaphor in American English is the well-known AMERICA IS A MELTING POT 
(or even its modernized version SALAD BOWL). The target domain is clearly 
culturally unique in that it stands for the nation, and more specifically, the cultural 
and ethnic diversity within it. The target domain is also unique to American culture, 
used to highlight America’s cultural and ethnic diversity. This mapping has a long-
standing tradition in America’s self-image as a land of immigrants. In her analysis 
of AMERICA IS A MELTING POT / SALAD bowl, Wcisɫo (2011) points out that 
“[o]ver the centuries, as waves of immigrants gradually contributed to the general 
picture of the United States as a country of freedom and great opportunities, the 
notion of melting pot gained popularity, becoming one of America’s modern 
myths” (146). Furthermore, the culturally unique origin of the source domain 
MELTING POT can be traced back to the coinciding of the American Industrial 
Revolution and the second wave of immigration to the United States in the 18th and 
19th centuries – a time period, in which AMERICA IS A MELTING POT was 
already in use “to idealiz[e] the process of immigration and colonization […] where 
people of different nationalities, cultures, and ethnicities blended into a new, 
righteous community, and a unique American identity emerged” (147).  
 Due to the fact that the present study elicits ANGER, HAPPINESS and FEAR 
metaphors from corpus data on the basis of the general basic terms (anger, 
happiness, fear) and their corresponding subordinate terms in English, the target 
domains at hand (i.e, the target domain ANGER reflected in a linguistic metaphor 
by anger, etc.) are not – at least obviously – culturally unique. Nevertheless, 
Kövecses (2005) maintains that the types congruent metaphors, alternative 
metaphors and preferential conceptualization account for the majority of cases 
concerning metaphor variation, especially in the case of conventional metaphor 
(86). It is for this reason that I do not assume to discover unique metaphors in this 
study and focus on congruent metaphors, alternative metaphors (i.e., range of the 
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target) and preferential conceptualizations in the discussion of the results of each 
case study (see Sections 5.4 for ANGER, 6.4 for FEAR and 7.4 for HAPPINESS).  
 In summary, while there is a largely uncontested (universal) bodily basis for 
metaphorical conceptualizations of emotions, often in the form of metonymic 
principles like BODY HEAT and REDNESS OF THE SKIN for ANGER (Lakoff 
1987a: 382), there is still potential for the emergence of culturally distinct 
conceptualizations of emotions due to members of a cultural group participating in 
the unique negotiation processes shaping that cultural group’s understanding of 
emotion concepts. Consequently, the culture of a particular language community 
conceivably plays a role in making some aspects of otherwise universal emotion 
concepts more salient over other aspects that might be more central to another 
cultural group’s understanding and manner of talking about the same concepts. 
Therefore, in a study of New English emotion metaphors, the working hypothesis 
can be formulated as in the following: If the selected types of metaphor variation 
(i.e., congruent, range of target and preferential conceptualizations) are not frequent 
in the data attributable to the socio-culturally unique varieties of English, then we 
may more comfortably speak of a universal quality to emotion metaphors as they 
are realized through Englishes of the world.  
3.4 Pluricentric Language as a Testing Ground 
Before our working hypothesis can be tested, it is vital to take a closer look at our 
testing ground, that is, English as a pluricentric language. The notion of 
‘pluricentricity’ was introduced by Kloss (1978) to denote national standard 
languages with varieties of more or less equal status like Portuguese in Portugal and 
Brazil or German in Germany, Switzerland and Austria (67). English, in its present-
day form, “is probably the best example of a pluricentric language” with British and 
American English representing “the two most dominant – and primary – centres” 
that can be considered “norm-producing” (Hoffmann et al. 2011: 258). Along with 
British and American English, the 20th and 21st centuries have been witness to 
“other native varieties […] develop[ing] into norm-producing secondary centres in 
their own right with their own endo-normative standards, some of which may also 
serve as a model for their particular regions” (258). Since the 1980s, heightened 
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academic interest in institutionalized second-language varieties of English, 
commonly studied under the label of ‘New Englishes’33, has developed into the 
influential and largely descriptive paradigm of World Englishes34, which examines 
these contact varieties in terms of their own “distinctive properties and functions” 
(Schneider 2013: 131–132) and, in doing so, establishes their legitimacy (Mesthrie 
2009: 273). 
 Initially, due to British colonialism, New Englishes have emerged worldwide 
as varieties that have developed or are in the process of developing their own 
variety-specific features and preferences. Gut (2011) describes the use of New 
Englishes as “a collective term for the many postcolonial varieties of English that 
are spoken in – usually multilingual – countries in which English now has an 
important status as an official or national language and where it functions as the 
language of business and commerce, education, media and mass communication 
and as a means of interethnic communication” (101). Especially for research 
purposes, New Englishes “represent unique and vibrant areas of recent, ongoing 
and innovative change, given their typically multilingual contexts, their largely 
nonnative speech communities, and the widespread lack of codification” 
(Mukherjee & Schilk 2012: 190). Furthermore, as the extensive amount of research 
in the World Englishes paradigm has shown, it is a fruitful endeavor “to compare 
varieties of English in their entireties with each other to identify overarching 
intervarietal differences”, which bolsters the view that English is by no means “a 
monolithic entity”, especially since comparative research of New Englishes reveals 
a large extent of variation between the varieties (194, emphasis mine). 
Nevertheless, with the present study and on the basis of emerging cognitively 
oriented research programs attuned to World Englishes, I would like to argue that 
to date not enough has been done in terms of comparing varieties of English “in 
their entireties”. This is mostly due to an overemphasis on structural differences 
_________________ 
33 The term ‘New Englishes’ is a coinage that has been attributed to Platt et al. (1984) and will be used 
throughout this study as a cover term for the varieties under examination. Very succinctly put, they have 
developed originally from British English, which at some point acted as a norm-providing variety and, to 
some extent, still may do so.  
34  For an overview of the terminology, like ‘World Englishes’, ‘Postcolonial Englishes’, Kachru’s Circle 
Model etc., see Schneider (2013). For an overview of approaches in the World English paradigm, see Bolton 
(2009) and Wolf & Polzenhagen (2009, Chapter 1). 
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inherent in the pluricentricity of global English in the World English paradigm. As 
extensive and important as this research has been, it has so far left out or even 
discounted the conceptual dimensions of variation. Here I take a cue from Wolf 
(2008), who responds to Huber’s (2004) criticism that the cognitive linguistic 
approach is not suitable for the study of World Englishes. Wolf maintains that 
variation has been understood by the descriptivist tradition of World Englishes as 
being too restricted “with respect to linguistic form alone and that the cultural-
cognitive dimension of variation is ignored or deliberately excluded” (Wolf 2008: 
358). Sharifian (2010) echoes this view by claiming that “World Englishes should 
be differentiated and explored in terms of not just their phonological and syntactic 
dimensions, but also in terms of the cultural conceptualizations that underpin their 
semantic and pragmatic levels” (443). Furthermore, it is clear that the World 
Englishes paradigm continues to expand in focus beyond the structural aspects of 
variation, as can be attested by the emergence of Variational Pragmatics with the 
work of Schneider & Barron (2008), who have identified a research gap for the 
pragmatic level that “has not been systematically investigated in the study of 
language varieties”, including all national varieties of English (2-3). Luckily, the 
research gap for the conceptual dimension in describing varieties of English is 
starting to be filled by cognitively oriented paradigms, like Cognitive 
Sociolinguistics (see, e.g., Geeraerts et al. 2010; Kristiansen & Dirven 2008a; Pütz 
et al. 2014) and Cultural Linguistics (see, e.g., Sharifian 2011; 2015a, 2017a), into 
which a study of a pluricentric language like English neatly fits (see, e.g., Callies 
& Onysko 2017; Polzenhagen 2007; Polzenhagen & Wolf 2010; Sharifian 2006; 
2008, 2015b; Wolf 2008; Wolf & Polzenhagen 2009; Wolf & Chan 2016).  
Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics share a common goal that 
is also at the heart of the present study – to better understand the interplay of 
cognition, culture/society and language. Cognitive Sociolinguistics, as the name 
suggests, bridges the work of sociolinguistics and cognitive linguistics by 
extending: 
 
the cognitive paradigm into the regional and social patterns involved in linguistic 
symbolisation, to be studied either as a topic in its own right or parallel to conceptual 
structure. This focus on the way in which language usage in different regional and 
social groups is characterised by different conceptualisations, by different 
grammatical and lexical preferences, and by differences in the salience of particular 
connotations adds a necessary social dimension to the Cognitive Linguistic enterprise. 
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And as a usage-based approach, Cognitive Linguistics has a very natural basis for 
sharing concerns with Sociolinguistics. […] Cognitive Sociolinguistics naturally puts 
speakers in their socio-cognitive functioning in the centre of attention (Kristiansen & 
Dirven 2008b: 4).  
 
Wolf (2008) notes that culture has always been studied within Cognitive Linguistics 
and that “a socio-cultural approach” to cognitive linguistic study “rests on the 
assumption that culture-based conceptualizations underlying language or language 
varieties are systematic” (364). Furthermore, he argues for viewing World 
Englishes as “the ideal testing ground for the programmatic extension of CL, 
because variation can be studied among different varieties of one language, which 
still share a common core”, doing away with issues of translation and comparability 
inherent in the study of diverse languages (365). This highlights a major assumption 
about English as a pluricentric language: “one can expect that cultural specifics and 
different cultural models in the cognitive systems of their speakers should be 
reflected in the respective varieties of English” (Dirven et al. 2007: 1213–1214). 
Therefore, the present study of emotion metaphors in New English can be suited in 
the cognitive sociolinguistic approach on the following points: 1) It assumes and 
aims to explore language-internal variation from the perspective of English as a 
pluricentric language; 2) Its focus is on those regionally and culturally distinct 
varieties in term of their conceptual preferences for emotion concepts; 3) It draws 
on CMT as a theoretical framework to discover these preferences; 4) It implements 
a usage-based approach by relying on corpus analysis. These are, in fact, the 
characteristics of Cognitive Sociolinguistic research that are outlined by Kristiansen 
& Dirven (2008b: 5–6). 
Cultural Linguistics also has culture and social cognition as reflected in 
language at the core of its framework, but with the additional focus of understanding 
cognition “that moves beyond the level of the individual mind” (Sharifian 2017b: 
1–2). It is involved in exploring the dynamics of cultural cognition as “a complex 
adaptive system”, evolving from the interactive nature of a speech community, 
which “leave traces” in language and serves the speech community as “both a 
memory bank and a fluid vehicle for the (re-)transmission of cultural cognition” (2, 
see also, Sharifian 2009). This leads to the foundational assumption in Cultural 
Linguistics that:  
 
Body, Culture, Metaphors and Varieties: The Case of Emotion 72 
language is entrenched in conceptualisation, which is largely culturally constructed. 
That is, language does not always encode an “objective reality”, whatever that is, but 
largely communicates and embodies our construal and conceptualisation of various 
experiences, which […] emerge from the interaction between members of various 
cultural groups (Sharifian 2006: 14). 
 
 Central to this is the notion of ‘cultural conceptualizations’, introduced by 
Sharifian (2003). Cultural conceptualizations refer to conceptual structures, 
including metaphors, that “are developed through interactions between the 
members of a cultural group” and “ are negotiated and renegotiated through time 
and across generations” (Sharifian 2003: 190). Although conceptualizations may 
originate from the mind of one individual, they can become cultural 
conceptualizations by virtue of a cultural group’s interaction and are, thus, “best 
described as networks of distributed representations across the minds in cultural 
groups” (190).  
Cultural conceptualizations have recently been investigated for emotion 
concepts (Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2017), as well as by means of 
corpus study (Ebensgaard Jensen 2017). For our purposes, I would like to highlight 
one type of cultural conceptualization35 that can be captured by a cultural linguistic 
approach, namely cultural metaphor. ‘Cultural metaphor’ is defined as “cross-
domain conceptualisations that have their conceptual basis grounded in cultural 
traditions such as folk medicine, worldview, or a spiritual belief system” (Sharifian 
2017b: 4). An example of a cultural metaphor is LAND IS KIN in Aboriginal 
English, discussed by Sharifian (2006). 
 
[T]he use of kinship terms in referring to one’s country is not merely a matter of 
labelling but arises out of a system of conceptualisation that underlies the Aboriginal 
Dreamtime. For example, one view is that during the Dreamtime, Ancestor Beings, 
who were an amalgam of animal and human forms, travelled the land creating 
landforms and laying down the customs and at the end they transformed into part of 
the land in the shape of stones, trees, etc. (Sharifian 2006: 18). 
 
Postulating cultural metaphor puts it at odds with the universalist tendency of 
CMT, which has been involved in “regulating culture-specific variation [in 
metaphor, BAG] to a secondary, lexical and discursive ‘elaboration’ level” 
(Musolff 2017: 325–326). Taking a cultural metaphor view can complement 
_________________ 
35  Sharifian uses cultural conceptualizations as a collective term to not only refer to metaphor but also more 
broadly to ‘cultural schemas’ and ‘cultural categories’. For detailed discussion, see Sharifian  (2003, 2011).  
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traditional notions of conceptual metaphor because it “can help to integrate the 
cultural mediation-aspect of linguistic meaning-construction” (339). Due to the 
unique cultural and linguistic circumstances surrounding the development of New 
Englishes, it is possible that a study of emotion concepts in these varieties could 
yield culture-specific patterns that can, then, be attributable to the presence of 
cultural metaphors in this sense. Furthermore, the medium of a single language 
uniting these culturally distinct varieties may have the potential to reveal 
differences in conceptualization of the same emotion by direct contrast concerning 
potentially culture-specific source domains. The notion of cultural metaphor is, 
therefore, less restrictive than Kövecses’ (2005) unique metaphor that requires a 
culturally specific source domain and target domain.  
In summary, Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics offer guiding 
paradigms for exploring the relationship between cognition, culture and language 
and, among other things, promote studies of pluricentric language like English. 
Therefore, it is with acknowledgement of these traditions that the focus in the 
present study is put on an emerging direction in metaphor and variationist study, 
namely metaphor in New Englishes.  
3.4.1 Previous Research into Metaphors in New Englishes  
Although in this section the survey of research is fundamentally in line with the 
present study, of necessity it will be briefer than one would like. This has to do with 
the fact that the direction metaphor research has taken towards New Englishes is an 
emerging new path and, thus, research into New English metaphor falls outside the 
mainstream of metaphor study. This claim is backed up by Callies & Onysko 
(2017), who highlight the fact that “the role of conceptual metaphor in varieties of 
English has been a largely neglected field of research so far” (1). The present study 
is directly situated in and, thus, attempts to contribute to this emerging field.  
 Understandably, the basic point of departure is that we will find variation in 
metaphor because with New Englishes we are exploring the conceptual systems of 
culturally distinct varieties that have been shaped dynamically by the diverse and 
culturally rich contexts of their speakers. This is not a surprising general assumption 
considering the proverbial explosion of work that has been done in variational 
paradigms, like World Englishes (discussed above). However, it remains an 
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empirical matter to discover to what extent variation is characteristic of New 
English metaphor, in general, and there is much work to be done in this vein. Thus, 
I am encouraged by the recent trend of cognitively oriented studies of the New 
Englishes (for instance, the special issue of Cognitive Linguistic Studies edited by 
Callies & Onysko (2017) resulting from the first international workshop Metaphors 
in Englishes around the world (Met(V)iew) at the University of Bremen in June 
2015). In the following, I will shine a spotlight on some previous contributions to 
metaphor in New Englishes that inform the present study.  
 The most prominent researchers, and frontrunners, of metaphor in World 
Englishes are undoubtedly Wolf and Polzenhagen, working within the Cognitive 
Sociolinguistic approach. From their varied and extensive work I chose to focus on 
their highly influential (2009) publication, as it is commonly among the first to be 
cited in studies on metaphor in New Englishes. Along with a detailed discussion of 
approaches to World Englishes and the implications of their study for research into 
intercultural communication, the locus of Wolf and Polzenhagen’s (2009) is an in-
depth investigation of the cultural model of community in African English, which 
acts as a guiding study for research into conceptualizations in World Englishes. One 
of their major lines of argumentation is found in a discussion about a general 
network of EATING metaphors, which is briefly illustrated by the following. 
EATING can be mapped onto LOVE in the sense that a beloved person in a love 
relationship is understood as APPETIZING FOOD, while desire for that person’s 
love is conceptualized as HUNGER (69-70). “A parallel network of EATING 
metaphors is at work in several other domains”, like KNOWLEDGE and IDEAS, 
which can be conceptualized as HUNGER / THIRST and FOOD, respectively, and 
extended by ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS EATING / DIGESTING and 
GIVING INFORMATION IS FEEDING (70). This leads to “a general tendency to 
conceptualize all sorts of drives and desires as HUNGER, resources as FOOD, and 
achieving a purpose as EATING” – resulting in BEING BIG “which interacts with 
the metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG” (70-71). Their major point is that “particular 
instantiations of such general networks may be specific or restricted to certain 
languages or language varieties, or better, to certain cultural contexts” (72). For 
example, while across all varieties of English, EATING is used to conceptualize 
domains like LOVE and IDEAS, Wolf and Polzenhagen (2009) find evidence for 
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African English-specific domains linked to the cultural model of community in 
Africa, i.e., LEADERSHIP, WEALTH and WITCHCRAFT, which are not 
systematic and, thus, entrenched in English in the Western world (72). Furthermore, 
they provide an extensive analysis of the African cultural model of community 
along the dimensions of group membership (in which KINSHIP IS COMMUNITY 
is central), of mutual obligations (in which EATING metaphors are central), of 
spiritual relations (in which the ANCESTOR concepts in African spirituality is 
central) and of tensions (in which the concept of WITCHCRAFT is central) (77-
158). For the cultural model of community, they argue that “these dimensions are 
highly interwoven” and the source domains KINSHIP, EATING and 
WITCHCRAFT particularly emerge as “salient conceptualizations” (158).  
 In earlier work, Wolf & Polzenhagen (2007a, 2007b) describe culturally 
specific conceptual networks of EATING metaphors as particularly prevalent in 
West African Englishes, illustrating culture-specific metaphors, like BRIBE IS 
FOOD underlying various expressions that can indicate a bribe: kola ‘cola nut’, (to 
have eaten) soya ‘fried beef skewers’, gombo ‘okra or okra sauce’, etc. Callies 
(2017) takes these studies as a point of departure to examine cultural 
conceptualizations in idioms of African Englishes, and finds on the basis of corpus 
data that pepper-related idioms (such as, to show pepper ‘give someone a hard time, 
punish someone’) “can be considered a variety-specific signature-idiom of Nigerian 
English” (78).  
 In an earlier study, Callies (2011) investigates metaphor variation on the basis 
of sports-related idioms (from baseball, soccer and cricket) in newspapers written 
in American English, British English, Australian English, Indian English and South 
African English. Baseball-related idioms include (to throw) a curve (ball) 
‘unexpected, surprising, deceptive’, be (way) off base ‘completely wrong’, etc. 
Soccer-related idioms are expressions like to change / move the goalposts ‘change 
the rules’, score an own goal ‘create a problem for oneself’, etc., while cricket-
related idioms are illustrated by (be on a) sticky wicket ‘difficult or tricky situation, 
hit for six ‘score a big success’, etc. (Callies 2011: 69). One major finding of this 
study is that when the generic SPORTS domain “is instantiated as a specific-level, 
culturally-embedded metaphorical mapping” (like in relation to BASEBALL, 
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SOCCER or CRICKET) preferences across the varieties emerge, such as baseball-
related idioms being used more prominently in American English and cricket-
related idioms in British and Australian English (Callies 2011: 77). This result 
provides evidence for the CMT view of cultural specificity emerging at a more 
specific or elaborated level of metaphor over generic or primary ones.  
A doctoral dissertation by Naidu (2009) comes to similar conclusions about the 
culture dependency of more specific complex metaphors and their potential to vary 
across cultures, concluding that “conceptual metaphors are just as much cultural 
entities as they are cognitive ones” (225). The aim of this study was to explore to 
what extent Indian English varied regarding their metaphorical expressions by 
comparison to its norm-providing variety, British English. Metaphorical 
expressions were analyzed primarily in terms of their frequency and distribution in 
national newspapers of the respective varieties. Some major findings were that, in 
general, Indian English makes use of more metaphorical expressions overall when 
compared to British English, which is attributed to “the underlying philosophical 
disposition of Indian English” and to the combination of local Indian culture with 
historical influence of British rule, as well as general influences of globalization 
(223). However, there was a discernable overlap in source domains participating in 
the metaphors in Indian and British English. For instance, Naidu (2009) maintains 
that the source domain of FIRE in ANGER IS FIRE was used “in a culturally 
different way” in Indian English, attributable to the I-C dimension (discussed in 
Section 3.1), dividing Indian and British societies into more collectivist or more 
individualist types, respectively. (222) This finding is illustrated by a comparison 
of the Times of India (e.g., Rostock burns as G8 protests spiral) with the London 
Times (e.g., fiery speeches) – the latter illustrating the construal of FIRE as being 
contained in the human body, which is determined as a tendency for British English. 
Naidu concludes that, in the Indian example, there is an extension of in the 
containment of the FIRE domain to a geographical location, thus suggesting an 
emphasis on the collective and a culturally conditioned difference in mapping (172-
175). Nevertheless, I am not entirely convinced by this analysis, considering the 
example Naidu highlighted (i.e., Rostock) is being used metonymically, and, as 
such, the conceptual connection to the individuals within the collective is present, 
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if not made explicit on the linguistic level. Therefore, more solid evidence for 
Naidu’s conclusion is needed.  
Closely connected to the aims of the present study is the small-scale study by 
Díaz-Vera (2015) on conceptualizations of LOVE in Englishes in Great Britain, 
India, Pakistan and Nigeria. Drawing metaphorical data from the GloWbE corpus, 
which is also the data basis of the present study, he aims at discovering how 
different English varieties around the world preferentially conceptualize LOVE 
and, in doing so, asks how social and cultural factors play a role in metaphor 
variation. Díaz-Vera (2015) bases his analysis on a random sample of 1,000 tokens 
of love for each variety and classified metaphorical instances as motivated by three 
general source domains, namely SPACE, FORCE and RELATIONSHIP.36 His 
results demonstrate a preference in the British data for SPACE (BOUNDED 
SPACE and CONTAINER) vis-à-vis the other varieties, while FORCE metaphors 
emerge as preferential for India, Pakistan and Nigeria, including metaphors that are 
not attested to in the British data, like LOVE IS A DEITY, WARMTH or MAGIC37. 
However, these findings should be approached with some caution on the basis of 
his uncritical use of the GloWbE. As the studies by Callies (2017) and Güldenring 
(2017) demonstrate, researchers in English metaphor variation need to be fully 
aware of the limitations the GloWbe as a web-based corpus of English, primarily 
due to the question of authorship (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4), 
and acknowledge these limitations in their work. Otherwise, there is no basis on 
which to determine if the metaphors encountered were actually produced by a 
variety speaker. Furthermore, Díaz-Vera (2015) states the exploration of social and 
cultural factors behind conceptual variation as an aim of his study, but fails to offer 
any insight on what exactly is socially or culturally conditioned in the preferences 
he found. I naturally sympathize with the intention behind this aim and view it as 
an important step for future research on the basis of studies that uncover metaphor 
_________________ 
36  In Díaz-Vera (2015), these three broad domains include subdomains: SPACE (e.g., BOUNDED SPACE, 
CONTAINER), FORCE (e.g., NATURAL FORCE, STRUGGLE, FIRE / LIGHT) and RELATIONSHIP 
(e.g., domains related to romantic or other human relationships, like FRIENDSHIP, as well as related to 
physical objects, like PLANT, BUILDINGS, etc. and interactive activities, like JOURNEYS, ECONOMIC 
EXCHANGE, etc.). 
37  Incidentally, Díaz-Vera (2015) does not illustrate any of his findings with actual examples from the 
GloWbE varieties he studies. This makes it difficult confirm that these mappings actually occur in his 
dataset.  
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preferences in varieties of English. However, it is my opinion that larger-scale 
preferences need to be discovered first, not only on the basis of more data pertaining 
to the emotions, but also on more detailed analyses pertaining to cultural influences 
in the way people talk about emotions (and, by extension, use emotion metaphors). 
Additionally, a deep understanding of the social and cultural circumstances of the 
varieties under investigation is needed on the part of the analyst to make claims 
about the extent to which social and cultural factors play a role. This is, indeed, a 
tall order for any one analyst, such as myself, who cannot simultaneously be a 
member of these culturally distinct speech communities. It is for this reason that I 
forgo any major claims about social and cultural factors in my discussion of variety-
specific emotion metaphor and leave this line of investigation within the purview 
of future researchers.  
With the present study, I intend to fill an essential gap in the previous research 
on New English metaphor by providing a larger-scale study of emotion metaphors 
from representative varieties from the supraregional areas of West Africa, East 
Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia as well as from their (former) norm-
providing variety, British English.  
3.4.2 Research Questions  
The general aim of the present study is to uncover to what extent varieties of a 
pluricentric language like English are similar or different in their metaphorical 
construals of emotion concepts. As we have established, institutionalized second-
language varieties, New Englishes, seem to offer a fruitful testing ground due to 
their unique socio-cultural and regional differences. Therefore, the hypothesis of 
the present study is that emotion metaphors will demonstrate, on the one hand, some 
variation (in line with Kövecses’ (2005) congruent metaphors, range of target and 
preferential conceptualizations) by virtue of being socio-culturally unique varieties 
of English and, on the other hand, some commonality on the basis of having a 
common core, as well as the speakers of these varieties sharing a basic biological 
makeup.  
The general research questions at the heart of the empirical part of this study 
can be formulated as follows:  
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 What conceptual metaphors exist for the emotion concepts of ANGER, 
FEAR and HAPPINESS in New English varieties, as evidenced by 
corpus-based data?  
 Does a comparison across New English varieties of these emotion 
metaphors reveal what is conceptually shared throughout the varieties? 
Conversely, does a comparison also reveal what is not conceptually shared 
and, thus, potentially culture-specific along the lines of Kövecses’ (2005) 
types of metaphor variation (i.e., congruent metaphors, range of target and 
preferential conceptualizations)?  
 How do emotion metaphors in New Englishes match up against emotion 
metaphors attributable to their (former) norm-providing variety, British 
English?  
These questions will be answered through a corpus-based analysis of emotion 
metaphors attributable to representative varieties of the New Englishes along with 
British English, which results in individual metaphor profiles that can be compared 
and contrasted. A detailed discussion of the methodology follows in the next 
chapter.  
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4 Methodology  
The present chapter serves to document the development of the methodology 
employed in this study, which is discussed in detail below and presents illustrative 
examples in order to make my approach to conceptual metaphors with corpus-based 
data as transparent as possible. The individual steps primarily concern: 1) raw data 
extraction, 2) identification of linguistic metaphors, 3) verification of authorship, 
i.e., linguistic metaphors are, in fact, attributable to the respective variety speakers, 
4) annotation of  conceptual metaphor types and, finally, 5) further classification of 
conceptual metaphors into different levels of granularity.  
 Prior to a detailed discussion of my method, I would like to draw attention to 
a valid point made by Gibbs (2009) about studies in line with CMT. “CMT needs 
to be more open about what it can accomplish – either because of methodological 
choices or simply because no single theory may be capable of explaining all aspects 
of the complex phenomena that are metaphorical language and thought” (Gibbs 
2009: 32). I take this statement seriously and, therefore, attempt to make clear 
throughout this chapter what I am capable of accomplishing by adhering to CMT 
and the present methodology. First and foremost, the methodology allows at various 
points a step away from intuition-based decisions. However, it does not do away 
with intuition completely, as automatic identification of conceptual metaphor is not 
possible, although it is currently being researched (for studies in this vein, see, e.g., 
Gandy et al. 2013; Neuman et al. 2013)38. Secondly, the methodology serves to 
illustrate the steps that I took from linguistic metaphor to conceptual metaphor. The 
resulting conceptual metaphors are not intended to be understood as evidence for 
active cross-domain mappings in the minds of the individual speakers, but, instead, 
are offered by me, the analyst, as what I will call ‘plausibility offerings’. These 
plausibility offerings set up the basis of comparison and it is conceivable that a New 
English speaker could potentially disagree with my conclusions based on culturally 
_________________ 
38 For an overview of the most prominent approaches to extracting metaphor from corpus data, see 
Stefanowitsch (2006b: 1–6). For an assessment of metaphor extraction approaches, see Berber Sardinha 
(2012). Semi-automatic retrieval and analysis approaches have been also developed, e.g., Berber Sardinha 
(2008, 2010), Gómez-Moreno & Faber (2011) and Majoros (2013), but do not yet represent the norm.  
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filtered metaphorical conceptualizations that I, as an American English native 
speaker, do not have the ability to ascertain. Thirdly, although the corpus data at 
hand, from which I draw the conceptual metaphors, are discourse-based, the scope 
of my study does not allow for adding a discourse-based approach to the analysis 
and, thus, does not make any conclusions about the rhetorical or communicative 
functions of these metaphor in the context of their use39.  
 Furthermore, “there is an increasing awareness that the study of linguistic 
phenomena needs to be grounded in usage” in Cognitive Linguistics, resulting in 
the emergence of corpora as fundamental sources of data for cognitive linguistic 
study (Arppe et al. 2010: 2). The reliance on corpus data and methods helps to 
continue “the tradition of linguistic argumentation” in Cognitive Linguistics but 
counteracts intuition-based judgements (Stefanowitsch 2011a: 305)40. The marriage 
of conceptual metaphor study to corpus-based research has been particularly fruitful 
(see, e.g., Ahrens 2011; Berber Sardinha 2007, 2011; Cameron & Deignan 2003; 
Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 1998, 1999, 2005, 2009; Koller 2006; Koller et al. 
2008; Kreyer 2012; Ogarkova 2007; Stefanowitsch 2006a; Tissari 2010; Türker 
2013; Vereza 2008). Therefore, at this point in time, we can already speak of the 
corpus-based study of metaphor as an established practice. This came about not 
only due to the fact that CMT and corpus linguistic methodology have developed 
and gained importance in roughly the same period of time (i.e., since the late 1970s) 
(Deignan 2008a: 149), but primarily stems from the major criticism of early CMT 
work concerning intuition. Luckily, as Gibbs (2009) points out, “corpora analyses 
mostly support the wide range of conceptual metaphors identified, by introspection 
[…] at the same time, they are better able to quantify metaphorical patterns and so 
provide important insights on the relative salience of conceptual metaphors in 
different domains” (21). Moreover, the ability to quantify metaphorical patterns via 
corpus-based data and methods is also essential for understanding the cultural 
_________________ 
39  For studies that do take a discourse-based approach to conceptual metaphor, see, e.g., Charteris-Black 
(2004), Hart (2008), Hart & Lukeš (2010), Musolff (2012), and Steen (2008). 
40  Stefanowitsch (2011b) calls the use of corpora in Cognitive Linguistics the “second wave” (the first being 
of an experimental nature) in terms of advancements in methodology. He also claims that “systematic 
corpus-linguistic studies only began to have a noticeable impact on the field around the early 2000s and 
corpus linguistic methods are still a long way from being a fully accepted method in the cognitive linguistic 
toolbox” (258).  
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salience of these patterns in cross-cultural and/or cross-linguistic study. With this 
in mind, we now turn to the methodology of the present study.  
4.1 Data and Method  
The following provides detailed discussion of the data and methodology of the 
present study. At various points I will provide illustrative examples of parts of my 
methodology that would otherwise not be as apparent, as well as some critical 
remarks that have driven the development of this methodology.  
4.1.1 The Corpus: Global Web-based English  
The following empirical study was conducted with data from the Corpus of Global 
Web-based English (GloWbE; Davies 2013). The GloWbE contains 1.9 billion 
words from general websites and blogs, which has been attributed to twenty 
different varieties of English around the world, including varieties that have been 
identified as New Englishes. The present study draws on data from New English 
varieties within the corpus that are represented by speakers from the following 
countries: Nigeria, Kenya, India and Singapore. As a reference variety, British 
English was chosen due to its status as a norm-providing variety within the dynamic 
evolution of these New Englishes (see, Schneider 2003, 2009 [2007]).  
 The main advantage of opting for the GloWbE in a comparative study of 
emotion metaphors over a well-established corpus like the International Corpus of 
English (ICE; Greenbaum 1996) lies in the amount of (raw) data the GloWbE can 
provide to the metaphor researcher. With its 1.9 billion words, the GloWbE appears 
to be particularly advantageous for the present study since one of its aims is to 
construct a ‘metaphor profile’41 of the emotion concepts ANGER, FEAR and 
HAPPINESS for each variety. Furthermore, the metaphor profiles obtained from 
GloWbE data offer the basis of comparison across varieties. It follows that for a 
_________________ 
41  I originally used the term ‘metaphorical profile’, for instance in Güldenring (2017), but have since 
discovered the work of Ogarkova & Soriano (2014), who use ‘metaphorical profile’ to refer to their highly 
sophisticated, analytic method for emotion metaphors and who have applied it fruitfully to uncover 
variational aspects of ANGER metaphors in English, Russian and Spanish. In order to avoid confusion, I 
use ‘metaphor profile’ to denote the sum of conceptual metaphors I was able to collect for each variety per 
emotion, which was my original intention in using the term ‘metaphorical profile’.  
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viable comparison of metaphor profiles across New Englishes and in reference to 
the (former) norm-providing variety, British English, a sizable amount of data is 
required, and the GloWbE appears, at first glance, to offer this.  
 Before opting for the GloWbE over ICE (which is to date “the most widely 
used corpus for research on World Englishes” (Davies & Fuchs 2015: 2)), I 
conducted a pilot study, in order to compare frequencies. As a proverbial test 
balloon, I chose to examine the recall of metaphorical instances pertaining to a 
lexical query of anger in the Singapore component of the ICE (ICE-SIN) and the 
Singapore subcorpus of the GloWbE. ICE-SIN, with its roughly one million words 
of spoken and written text, yielded only 21 hits for anger. Of these 21, twelve were 
deemed metaphorical (e.g., Swallow your anger […] <ICE-SIN:W1B-
010#X295:7>). Disappointingly, five among these twelve metaphorical expressions 
found in ICE-SIN did not stem from utterances attributable to a Singapore English 
speaker: Two instances were from the title of a play by John Osborne; one was from 
a Bible verse; one was contained in an indirect quote attributed to Sigmund Freud 
and one was a quote from the dictionary. Hence, at least for larger-scale metaphor 
studies, size of corpus does matter. Nelson (2015) concedes this point in his 
response to Davies & Fuchs (2015) by stating, “Of course I am also aware of the 
limitations of the ICE corpora, chiefly in terms of their size, at one million words 
each. […] I must point out that ICE corpora were not designed to be ‘all-purpose’ 
corpora. Instead, they were designed primarily for the study of the grammar of 
English worldwide” (38). As will become clear from the results of the following 
case studies (see Chapters 5-7), the GloWbE provides the opportunity to examine 
far more instances of anger, fear, and happiness (including their subordinate terms), 
of which many were indeed used metaphorically. This alone suggested the use of 
the GloWbE as a more suitable corpus for constructing more extensive metaphor 
profiles of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS.  
 Nevertheless, the selection of the GloWbE from which to pull metaphorical 
data does, in fact, have two major caveats, namely the issue of text types (i.e., the 
diversity thereof), as well as the issue of authorship. These aspects have to be 
considered carefully when using the GloWbE. Firstly, as the name suggests and due 
to the  nature of its compilation, the corpus only includes web-based texts (60% of 
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the words stem from informal blogs and 40% from other web-based genres (Davies 
& Fuchs 2015: 4). By contrast, the ICE corpora are a valued resource for their 
diversity of text types (both written and spoken).  
 Secondly, questions of representativity of the varieties featured in the 
GloWbE have been addressed during compilation (for details, see Davies 2013 and 
Davies & Fuchs 2015), which prompted Davies and Fuchs to maintain that the 
subcorpora of the GloWbE “constitute representative samples of how these national 
varieties of English are used in web-based communication” (2015: 5). Yet, as step 
3 in the methodology outlined in Section 4.2.4 will demonstrate, this claim should 
be approached with some caution when working off the assumption that the data 
elicited from the GloWbE is in fact authored by particular speakers of a variety, 
despite claims by the compilers that the data originated from websites located in the 
respective countries. In their response papers to Davies & Fuchs (2015), Mair, 
Mukherjee and Nelson jointly voice the same warning:  
 
Background checks are sometimes difficult, because the source websites have 
disappeared (Mair 2015: 31). 
 
While small and controlled corpora like ICE […] have been construed very carefully 
in order to ensure the intended representativeness in corpus design, GloWbE is in  
many regards unspecified or, for that matter, aggregative: apart from the specification 
that approximately 40 per cent of the corpus is made up of informal blogs, we do not 
know which types of speakers and which language variants are represented by the 
national web domains included in GloWbE (Mukherjee 2015: 35). 
 
Obviously, in a globalised world with the Internet as a global network for 
communication, the fuzzy boundaries between varieties of English (and their 
speakers) are not identical with the rigid lines between national web domains (and 
their texts) (Mukherjee 2015: 36) 
 
[O]ne of the major attractions of the Internet is the anonymity that it affords to writers 
(especially of weblogs). For the corpus builder, however, this is a major drawback, 
since it means that we know little or nothing about the authors of the webpages. Even 
if a webpage is not anonymous, we still cannot rely on the domain name alone to 
indicate the author’s nationality or background (Nelson 2015: 39). 
 
 Nevertheless, based on the fact that the GloWbE offers more extensive and 
more recent data than the ICE, four New Englishes, which differ from British 
English in terms of the I-C dimension (see Section 3.1), were selected from the 
current pool of twenty varieties of English in the GloWbE for the comparative study 
of emotion metaphors: Nigeria (NG) representing West Africa, Kenya (KE) 
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representing East Africa, India (IN) representing South Asia, and Singapore (SG) 
representing South-East Asia.  
 This categorization is important for the present study because it sets up the 
framework for discussing the potential of nativized construals or culture-specific 
conceptualizations of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS concepts in New Englishes 
from four major regions. It could be the case that we encounter source domain 
preferences or mappings specific to a certain variety or on the basis of overriding 
regional similarity between the varieties (African vs. Asian Englishes). 
Furthermore, dissimilarity across the varieties could also potentially emerge at a 
finer level of granularity, that is, by considering the specific-level metaphors 
involved in the conceptualizations of the emotions under examination (see step 5 in 
Section 4.1.4). Therefore, in order to determine how similar or different the 
varieties are in terms of metaphorizing ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, there 
needs to be, firstly, an examination of the variety-specific metaphor profiles, which 
provide an overview of the broadly labeled source domains involved, and, secondly, 
a breakdown of these broadly labeled source domains into more specific-level 
instantiations.  
 Before considering the results, it is essential to sketch the method guiding the 
identification of metaphorical expressions in the GloWbE subcorpora and their 
underlying conceptual mappings in the data, in order to be maximally transparent. 
The overriding methodology is informed, firstly, by Stefanowitsch’s Metaphorical 
Pattern Analysis (MPA; 2004, 2006a), outlined in Section 4.1.2, and, secondly, by 
the revised version of the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIPVU42, see Steen 
et al. 2010b), outlined in Section 4.1.3. After a brief introduction to these 
approaches to metaphorical identification and analysis, the details of the individual 
methodological steps will be presented in Section 4.1.4, followed by an additional 
note on authorship in the GloWbE in Section 4.1.5.  
_________________ 
42  The revised version of the original MIP (Pragglejaz Group 2007) is referred to as MIPVU, in which the VU 
stands for Vrije Universiteit – the university at which the authors of this extended version are employed  
Steen et al. (2010b: ix). 
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4.1.2 Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (MPA) 
Cognitive metaphor research of a more intuitive bent has often “focused on 
uncovering large-scale mappings rather than an exhaustive description of the 
specific linguistic items instantiating these mappings in a particular language”, 
which poses a problem for studies aiming at discovering the “systematic 
characterization of a specific source or target domain”, particularly in terms of the 
quantification of results for comparative study (Stefanowitsch 2004: 138). This, in 
fact, has been one of the major criticisms levied at CMT. Specifically developed 
for corpus-based studies devoted to the exploration of the target domain, 
Stefanowitsch (2006a) proposed a method called “Metaphorical Pattern Analysis” 
(MPA) (see also, Stefanowitsch 2004). This approach is founded on the retrieval of 
target domain lexis from corpora, which in a further step leads to the identification 
of metaphorical expressions from the source domain and, in turn, the identification 
of conceptual metaphors. Accordingly, MPA is designed for the extraction and 
analysis of linguistic metaphors in corpus data that contain lexis associated directly 
with the target domain; the present study contains lexical items related to ANGER, 
FEAR and HAPPINESS (for examples, see Sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). Hinging on 
the observation that the presence of both source domain and target domain lexis is 
at times used to identify metaphorical expressions in an utterance, Stefanowitsch 
proposes metaphorical patterns as the basis for studies using corpus data to explore 
a specific target domain. He defines a “metaphorical pattern” as such in the 
following:  
 
A metaphorical pattern is a multi-word expression from a given source domain (SD) 
into which one or more specific lexical item [sic] from a given target domain (TD) 
have been inserted (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 66).  
 
 By concordancing for lexical items from a specific target domain, such as 
ANGER (including the superordinate term anger and various subordinate terms, 
like rage, wrath, etc.), it is possible to focus on and identify metaphorical patterns 
for this target domain and thus set up the necessary grounds for comparison between 
the varieties.  
Of course, employing MPA as an overriding approach underlying the present 
study does not allow for the retrieval of all metaphorical expressions related to 
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ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS that could potentially be contained in the corpus 
data, because the proposed procedure “will only capture a subset of metaphorical 
expressions – those manifesting themselves as metaphorical patterns for specific 
lexical items” (66). MPA would, for instance, not capture He blew his top or She is 
smoldering. However, any potential drawbacks are outweighed by the fact that 
quantification of the results is made easier through metaphorical patterns, which 
helps to generalize “the importance of the conceptual metaphors underlying these 
patterns” (66). This would not be such a straightforward endeavor for metaphorical 
expressions that do not reveal metaphorical patterns due to the lack of explicit target 
domain lexis, thus leaving the metaphor researcher with some uncertainty about 
which target domain is involved (see Stefanowitsch 2006a: 66–67). Furthermore, 
metaphorical patterns help to create a “standard of comparison for cross-linguistic 
research” (69) and, by logical extension for the present purposes, for cross-varietal 
research. In this vein, the present study is informed on the whole by MPA. The 
ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS metaphors identified in the preceding case 
studies have been formulated via analysis of their metaphorical patterns in the 
GloWbE. Reliance on MPA is beneficial to the researcher because, without having 
to intuitively construct examples of conceptual metaphors, MPA aids in identifying 
patterned metaphorical behavior in the data, which then act as the basis for 
contemplation of the conceptual mappings being reflected by them. Within this 
process, metaphors were also identified via (limited) application of the MIPVU 
(details provided below).  
4.1.3 Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIPVU) 
The Metaphor Identification Procedure Vrije Universiteit (MIPVU) procedure 
establishes detailed guidelines for discovering metaphor-related words in discourse. 
The basic procedure, as outlined by Steen et al. (2010b) is as follows:  
 
1. Find metaphor-related words (MRWs) by examining the text on a word-by-word 
basis. 
 
2. When a word is used indirectly and that use may potentially be explained by some 
form of cross-domain mapping from a more basic meaning of that word, mark the 
word as metaphorically used (MRW).  
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3. When a word is used directly and its use may potentially be explained by some 
form of cross-domain mapping to a more basic referent or topic in the text, mark the 
word as direct metaphor (MRW, direct).  
 
4. When words used for the purpose of lexico-grammatical substitution, such as third 
person personal pronouns, or when ellipsis occurs where words may be seen as 
missing, as in some forms of co-ordination, and when a direct or indirect meaning is 
conveyed by those substitutions or ellipses that may potentially be explained by some 
form of cross-domain mapping from a more basic meaning, referent, or topic, insert a 
code for implicit metaphor (MRW, implicit).  
 
5. When a word functions as a signal that a cross-domain mapping may be at play, 
mark it as a metaphor flag (MFlag).  
 
6. When a word is a new-formation coined, examine the distinct words that are its 
independent parts according to steps 2 through 5 (Steen et al. 2010b: 25–26) 
 
In order to ascertain basic meanings of words, Steen et al. (2010b) recommend 
consulting the Macmillan Dictionary, the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary 
English and the Oxford English Dictionary, whose respective online versions I 
consulted throughout this study.  
 There were two ways in which the present study did not fully adhere to these 
guidelines, which I would like to make transparent. Firstly, there was no exhaustive 
examination of the full texts on a word-by-word basis. This had to do with the nature 
of elicitation. Extraction of the data resulted in concordance lines, so that the full 
text, in which the sentence containing the emotion lexeme (as the target domain 
lexeme) occurs, was not immediately available. However, during the authorship 
verification process (step 3 below), I did end up accessing each full text from which 
a concordance line originated. Yet, even for these cases, it did not seem necessary 
to examine each text on a word-by-word basis due to the fact that these texts, in 
general, were not topically about the emotion I was investigating and the application 
of MIPVU on the entirety of the text would not have yielded any more insight into 
the emotion metaphor at hand. Furthermore, it would have been too time-intensive 
considering the amount of originally extracted data. 
 Secondly, MIPVU, and originally MIP (Pragglejaz Group 2007) were not 
intended as a procedure for identifying conceptual metaphors. “Our current 
undertaking […] is to focus on the method for linguistic metaphor identification in 
usage. […] we do claim that it is possible to do empirical work […] without having 
to specify what distinct conceptual domains are mapped on to each other” (Steen et 
al. 2010b: 9–10). While within this study I do end up formulating conceptual 
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metaphors for the linguistic metaphors found in the data (see step 4 below), I do so 
with the acknowledgement that this was not in reference to the MIPVU procedure. 
Furthermore, I make use of the basic definitions in the dictionaries suggested by 
MIPVU to help formulate source domain labels with the recognition that using the 
basic definitions in this manner is not endorsed by MIPVU.  
4.1.4 Methodological Steps  
The following methodological steps have been used to ensure maximum 
consistency in a) the extraction of metaphorical expressions from the corpus, b) the 
annotation of metaphor-related words (MRWs) by applying the MIPVU procedure 
(Steen et al. 2010b)43 to individual concordance lines, and c) the identification of 
conceptual metaphors by means of metaphorical patterns for specific lexical items 
related to ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. Nevertheless, as common for research 
on conceptual metaphor, I was forced to take recourse to my intuition at various 
points during the following steps, albeit with the aid of what I call “intuition-
boosters” (illustrated in step 4 below). Therefore, the conceptual metaphors, as they 
are formulated in the case studies, can be viewed as plausible interpretations, which 
are not intended to strictly reflect the mappings in the minds of individual speakers 
of a variety of English at the time of utterance. Since annotation decisions were 
carefully recorded for each variety, and the entirety of the data was analyzed and 
scrutinized in multiple rounds for consistency, I do consider the variety-specific 
data to be comparable with data from the other varieties. 
 Furthermore, the annotation of the metaphors extracted from the GloWbE 
also involved classifying them in terms of different levels of granularity, 
corresponding to the conceptual detail reflected on the linguistic level (illustrated 
in Figure 4.1 below).  
 
_________________ 
43  Key to Steen et al.’s procedure is “the demarcation of lexical units as the relevant unit of analysis” in which 
can be found “the linguistic structures that may qualify as Metaphor-Related Words, or MRWs” (2010: 
167). Emphasizing that “[e]ven though it is true that metaphorical use may also be found at levels below 
the lexical unit (morphemes), above lexical units (phrases), and even ‘around’ lexical units (constructions)”, 
which were not considered for theoretical reasons, it is important to note that “ lexical units are the level of 
linguistic organization that is most closely related to the level of conceptual structures involved in cross-
domain mappings: words activate concepts which apply to referents in direct ways (non-metaphorically) or 
indirect ways via cross-domain comparison (metaphor)” (167).  
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of levels of granularity in metaphor analysis 
 
Once metaphorical instances were extracted from the corpus and authenticated as 
having been produced by a variety speaker, the MRWs provided clues for the source 
domain label, which in the first round of analysis was kept intentionally broad (e.g., 
ILLNESS). In further rounds of analysis, depending on the specificity of the MRWs 
in the linguistic metaphor, metaphors either retained this broad source domain label 
(= generic-level / level 1) or were further classified at level 2 (= specific-level) (e.g., 
ILLNESS  ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS, INFECTIOUS 
ILLNESS, MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY, etc.). In addition, some level 2 
metaphors were also able to be broken down into level 3 on the basis of an even 
more specific meaning focus (e.g., ILLNESS  ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL 
SYMPTOMS  LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, PHYSICAL PAIN, WOUND 
/ SKIN-RELATED, etc.)  
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 The following provides details, step-by-step, of the methodological decisions 
made for the present study: 
 
Step 1: Extraction of data from the GloWbE 
 
 a) Extract all nominal instances of lexical items relating to ANGER, FEAR 
and HAPPINESS by using the search strings: [=anger].[n*], [=fear].[n*] and 
[=happiness].[n*]. The use of these particular search strings is intended to exploit 
the internal thesaurus of the corpus and, in doing so, they act as a semi-automatic 
version of the first step of MPA: “choose a target domain that […] has vocabulary 
associated with it that is uncontroversially representative of the domain in question” 
(Stefanowitsch 2006a: 70). 
 b) Along with the superordinate (= basic) terms anger, fear and happiness, 
which, in general, are the most frequent terms and lend themselves as the labels of 
the target domains, select sufficiently synonymous subordinates – determined via 
their denotational properties in the dictionary – and discard unrelated (and possibly 
falsely coded) types. For example, for anger this included words like e.g., dander 
(i.e., animal dandruff). For this study, the six selected subordinate terms for each 
emotion category are:  
 
ANGER – annoyance, fury, irritation, rage, resentment, and wrath. 
FEAR – concern, distress, dread, horror, terror and worry  
HAPPINESS – bliss, delight, elation, gladness, glee, and joy44 
 
These terms were selected from the available synonyms in GloWbE on the basis of 
a study by Shaver et al. (1987), who, in testing the applicability of Rosch’s (1978) 
principles of categorization to emotions, provide experiential evidence for anger, 
fear and joy as basic level terms and the terms in the lists above as subordinate 
clusters (1067). Although joy emerges at the basic level in their study, they concede 
_________________ 
44  The total of six synonyms arose due to the condition that they should denote concepts that are sufficiently 
synonymous with, e.g., anger. For example, despite some connotational differences, the subordinate terms 
selected for ANGER (annoyance, fury, irritation, rage, resentment, and wrath) were deemed as such after 
consideration of their dictionary definitions. The same holds for subordinates of fear and happiness. All 
other potential terms listed in the GloWbE as synonyms of the search term anger, fear or happiness were 
discarded. 
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that “happiness may be a better general name than joy, which intuitively seems 
briefer and more intense than happiness” (1065). Therefore, in view of this and due 
to the fact that HAPPINESS is the most common source domain label in metaphor 
study (e.g., Kövecses 2000), I have used happiness as the basic level term.45  
c) Copy and paste concordance lines into a spreadsheet software and create 
randomized samples for further analysis.46  
 
Step 2: Identification of MRWs47  
 
a) Employ the metaphor identification procedure MIPVU to determine for each 
concordance line if it contains MRWs. For this decision, larger stretches of co-text 
made available through the GloWbE web interface had to be consulted at times.  
b) For each concordance line, record the number of MRWs potentially 
instantiating an ANGER, FEAR or HAPPINESS metaphor. When MRWs are 
intuitively deemed to relate to the same potential source domain, record only one 
instance. An example of this in the GB subcorpus is shown in (1). 
 
(1) It leaves a bitter taste of biilious [sic] fury in me. (GB G)48 49 
 
_________________ 
45  Furthermore, in the research on basic emotions (see, e.g., Ekman 1992; Izard 1992; Prinz 2004; Ortony & 
Turner 1990), there is no consensus on using joy or happiness as the basic emotion label. “One might point 
to the fact that nearly everybody who postulates basic emotions includes anger, happiness, sadness, and 
fear. One might also argue that not all of the variation in lists of basic emotion is real because the same 
emotion is often labeled differently by different researchers. […] the same pleasant emotion may be labeled 
happiness by one author, joy by another, and elation by yet another” Ortony & Turner (1990: 315). 
46 The need for randomized samples relate to the presentation of concordance lines in the GloWbE web 
interface. The results for each variety is presented according to the alphabetical listing of the source 
websites, initially for general websites and then for blogs. Thus, creating a random sample of the 
concordance lines guarantees a mix of different sources, as well as texts from general websites and blogs. 
Incidentally, the BYU corpus interface does allow for the drawing of a random sample containing 100, 200, 
500 or 1,000 concordance lines but, for reasons of comprehensiveness, I opted for randomizing using a 
spreadsheet software containing all concordance lines from a search. 
47  Some false positives (e.g., due to polysemy) will be discarded in this step, e.g., irritation denoting a skin 
condition, annoyance denoting the thing that makes someone angry, dread denoting a part of a hairstyle, 
horror denoting a movie genre, etc. Also discarded are “false positives” that indicate proper nouns, e.g., 
Rage Against the Machine (a band), St. Anger (name of an Metallica album), The Grapes of Wrath (a book), 
etc., as well as compounds that denote something more specific than the emotion concept, e.g., anger 
management, road rage, etc. 
48  Italics were used to highlight source domain lexis, while target domain lexis is presented in bold. 
49  G refers to web-based texts that are part of the general section of the GloWbE, while B refers to the blog 
section. 
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bitter, taste, and bilious all point to a potential source domain related to 
something like a body fluid such as bile [= semantic frame]. Due to this 
interpretation, as well as these three words making up a single pre- and 
postmodified NP [= syntactic frame], only one potential metaphorical instance was 
recorded. 
c) Repeat a) and b) for each concordance line until 350 metaphors are collected 
for each variety.50 
 
Step 3: Verification of authorship  
 
It was only after all 350 metaphors per variety were collected that the issue of 
authorship of the texts from which the data originated arose.51 Although Davies and 
Fuchs (2015: 4) maintain that the websites collected for the GloWbE were 
associated with the 20 respective varieties according to their Google country tag, it 
remained unclear if the texts contained within these websites were actually 
produced by authors who are representative speakers of the respective varieties. 
This, in fact, mirrors the same issue found in the ICE-SIN data during the corpus 
selection process (see Section 4.1.1). Therefore, in order to confirm that a speaker 
of a certain variety is in fact the author of an individual text in which a metaphor 
was contained, I manually tracked down the original source for each concordance 
line and annotated the data according to three categories: authentic speaker, speaker 
from another variety and unverifiable (i.e., original website not found or not enough 
biographical information given to determine authenticity). 
  In order to identify the authenticity of a speaker, I examined various sources 
available via a Google search: biographical information on the website, location of 
author as listed by Twitter, Linkedin or biographical details provided by the authors 
themselves, Wikipedia for prominent authors, etc. (often including a combination 
of these). Examples of this procedure will be provided in Section 4.1.5 below. 
_________________ 
50  The threshold of 350 metaphors emerged during the analysis of the individual varieties, which was the 
highest number that could be gleaned for an individual variety. In order to maintain a comparative basis, 
this threshold was adhered to for the other varieties under investigation. 
51  This vital realization comes courtesy of the thorough scrutiny of an anonymous reviewer of a previously 
published paper (see Güldenring 2017) who checked the source information of data presented in a previous 
draft of that paper. I am very grateful and deeply indebted to the efforts of said reviewer.   
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Although some of this information could still be somewhat based on speculation, 
as it was not possible to interview the authors personally, it did provide more solid 
evidence for determining if the author of a text was indeed a resident of the 
respective country, which was used as the benchmark for confirming that author’s 
likely membership in a variety-specific speech community. For this study, I did not 
include any metaphors that were determined to have originated with speakers from 
other varieties or that were unverifiable because the websites were no longer 
available or the biographical information was too sparse to make an informed 
decision. This, of course, significantly reduced the amount of data from 350 
metaphors to 150, which was the highest number I was able to determine as 
authentic in the Singapore subcorpus during the annotation of the ANGER 
metaphors. Thus, my study had to be limited to a random sample of 150 metaphors 
per emotion concept for each of the varieties. This resulted in a total of 750 
metaphors each for ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, i.e., a grand total of 2,250 
emotion metaphors. 
 
Step 4: Identification of conceptual metaphors and annotation according to 
metaphor types 
 
a) On the basis of the MRWs identified in step 2, identify potential 
metaphorical patterns by formulating a broad label for a potential source domain 
with the aid of the following so-called “intuition boosters”: 
 
 previously postulated conceptual metaphors in the tradition of CMT, for 
instance with recourse to the Master Metaphor List (Lakoff et al. 1991); 
 basic definitions in the dictionaries consulted during the application of the 
MIPVU procedure, chiefly the Macmillan online dictionary 
(http://www.macmillandictionary.com/), in step 2; 
 a collocational analysis of MRWs using the entire GloWbE as a reference 
corpus52. 
_________________ 
52  Despite the problematic nature of an unscrutinized view of authorship in the GloWbE, I do consider the 
GloWbE, viewed in its entirety, as a good representation of English as it is collectively used around the 
world. The assumption behind using the collocational frames as a point of reference, without verification 
of authorship, was to discover collocations, which represent literal frames in which target domain lexis 
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Examples of how the use of intuition boosters led to the identification of a source 
domain is illustrated in (2) and (3). 
 
(2) […] the anger may lead to hatred [...] (NG B) 
 
When consulting the basic meaning in the Macmillan online dictionary, it was 
not entirely clear whether lead to as used here could be pointing to ANGER IS A 
PERSON, as in a person that shows someone the way to go, i.e., A GUIDE ON A 
JOURNEY, or if ANGER is more likely conceptualized in (2) as PART OF A 
JOURNEY, i.e., a path, road, etc. that leads in a certain direction. For this particular 
case, I conducted a collocational analysis in the GloWbE using the search string 
[lead*].[v] to in a span of four words to the left and zero to the right, which revealed 
a great number of collocates that have a literal sense, e.g., road (934 tokens), trail 
(259 tokens), paths (255 tokens) and pathway (110 tokens). Due to Stefanowitsch’s 
(2006a: 67) claim that metaphorical patterns can “establish specific paradigmatic 
relations between target domain lexical items and the source domain items that 
would be expected in their place in a non-metaphorical use”, I viewed this as an 
instance in which such a paradigmatic relation is established, which gave me 
grounds to postulate a metaphor like ANGER IS A PATH ON A JOURNEY.  
 
(3) Resentment against ex-militants was already brewing for some time because of 
rampant extortion […] (IN B) 
 
According to the Macmillan online dictionary (and confirmed by the Longman 
online dictionary (http://www.ldoceonline.com/) ), the basic sense for brew (both 
transitively and intransitively used) relates to the preparation of a (hot) beverage. 
The collocational analysis ([brew*].[v] in a span of four words to the left and right) 
confirms this basic sense, the top three collocates being coffee (714 tokens), beer 
(700 tokens) and tea (438 tokens), which seems to suggest the source domain 
FOOD / DRINK. However, the decision for (3) was not so straightforward. In fact, 
(3) only offers the MRWs brewing for some time for analysis and, thus, does not 
provide any further textual cues that would lead to an interpretation that the 
_________________ 
occurs, in English as a whole and, therefore, that denote generally accepted and frequently encountered 
lexico-grammatical instantiations.   
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mapping involved is something like ANGER IS FOOD / DRINK (being prepared). 
The Oxford English Dictionary online (http://www.oed.com/) also confirms the 
basic sense for brew as relating to (hot) beverages, but additionally defines it by its 
relation to “natural phenomena, as rain, wind, a storm.” The collocational analysis 
for brew also retrieved collocates aligning to this sense, storm(s) (178 tokens) and 
even clouds (12 tokens), as well as various words indicating a bad or unpleasant 
experience that could be conceivably conceptualized as a STORM, such as trouble 
(145 tokens), crisis (54 tokens), controversy (31 tokens), tension (26 tokens), over 
the usually pleasant experience of preparing a (hot) beverage. Therefore, when brew 
was used without any explicit textual cues indicating the source domain FOOD / 
DRINK, I counted anger brewing as relating to the mapping ANGER IS A 
STORM. Admittedly, a storm brewing is in itself metaphorically motivated. 
However, it remains to be determined if its figurative use is salient to the speakers 
of English. If not, then anger and storm are in a paradigmatic relationship, which 
further lends evidence to the interpretation that ANGER can be conceptualized as 
a STORM.  
b) If intuitive analysis and consultation of the intuition boosters fail to yield a 
broadly formulated source domain label, like PERSON or FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER, then label these metaphors as type 1 (= general, basic)53. An 
example is given in (4). 
 
(4) […] Mark, a foreign aid worker, wrote in anger in response to my suggestion 
[…] (KE G)  type 1 
 
c) If metaphors are determined to not be general, then annotate metaphors with 
a source domain label as type 2 metaphors (= more structural). An example is 
provided in (5).  
 
(5) If they can address the heart of each problem, they will be able to defuse the 
anger (SG G)  type 2  ANGER IS A WEAPON (likely A BOMB) 
_________________ 
53  Type 1 metaphors will not be considered in the present study because, due to their general image schemas, 
like CONTAINMENT, they were not deemed as suitable objects for the study of potential metaphor 
variation, and they indeed seem to be uniformly used throughout the varieties examined in this study. 
Example (4) above is typical of a type 1 metaphor, in anger, i.e., ANGER IS A BOUNDED REGION, a 
specification of EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS, which Kövecses points to as a 
submetaphor of EVENT STRUCTURE  (2000: 58–59). 
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Step 5: Classification of type 2 metaphors into different levels of granularity 
 
For this step, only the type 2 metaphors were considered in terms of different 
levels of granularity / specificity that could be gleaned from an examination of the 
conceptual detail reflected on the linguistic level (i.e., in relation to the MRWs 
identified above). Recourse was also made to the above-mentioned intuition 
boosters. 
a) Level 1 = It was not possible to find a more specific label and the broad 
source domain label from step 3c was retained (e.g., ANGER IS AN ILLNESS); 
the metaphor was thus considered a generic-level one. Example (6) illustrates a 
generic-level metaphor.54 
 
(6) When one suffers from anger, it's not Buddhist anger, Hindu anger, or Christian 
anger. (IN G)  ANGER IS AN ILLNESS 
 
b) Level 2 = It was possible to find a more specific label (e.g., ANGER IS 
MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY), which could be contrasted with other 
metaphors from the same broad category (e.g., ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH 
PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS, ANGER IS AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS, etc.). 
Example (7) demonstrates a specific-level metaphor.  
 
(7) […] the beacon of light that keeps him from going crazy with anger at the unfair 
world around them. (SG B)  ANGER IS A MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
c) Level 3 = It was possible to even further specify a level 2 metaphor (e.g., 
ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS) on the basis of a more 
_________________ 
54  I would like to point out that when I use the terms generic-level and specific-level in this study, I am only 
referring to my annotation system here. This should not be confused with the notions of generic-level 
metaphor and specific-level metaphor in Lakoff & Turner (1989). They view a metaphor like EVENTS 
ARE ACTIONS as a generic-level metaphor due to a lack of specificity; “they do not have fixed source 
and target domains, and they do not have fixed lists of entities in the mapping.” Accordingly, they view a 
metaphor like LIFE IS A JOURNEY as a specific-level metaphor because it doesn’t lack this specificity 
(81).  
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specific meaning focus55 in the mapping. Examples (8) and (9) illustrate level 3 
metaphors.  
 
(8) My body was shaking with rage as I opened the gate. (NG B) ANGER IS AN 
ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY) 
(9) By letting the unresolved linger, silence allows resentment to fester. (IN B)  
ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (WOUND / SKIN-
RELATED) 
 
 Metaphorical expressions were extracted and classified by employing this 
methodology for each variety and emotion concept under consideration. In the 
following chapters, the results of this method are presented and discussed from a 
comparative point of view. 
4.1.5 An Additional Note on Authorship  
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 briefly outlined the question of representativity in using 
the GloWbE corpus for a study of varieties of English and the methodological step 
of author identification (step 3). Since this represents a major challenge for the 
present study (and, by extension, any study relying on the GloWbE as a source of 
variety-specific data), I would like to conclude this chapter with some illustrative 
examples on how I went about identifying variety-specific authors for the linguistic 
metaphors found. As mentioned above, although this step gave me a much more 
solid grounds for attributing a linguistic metaphor to a particular variety speaker, 
complete certainty is unfortunately not possible, which would not be as much of an 
issue if a more representative corpus, like the ICE corpora, could have been 
consulted.  
 Step 3, outlined in Section 4.1.4, addressed the challenge of reviewing all 
concordance lines for each variety that were previously found to contain 
metaphorical instances of the respective emotion concept on the linguistic level in 
_________________ 
55  Kövecses (2003b) maintains that conceptual metaphors have a major thematic orientation or what he terms 
a “main meaning focus”, which serves to shine a spotlight on some (but not all) aspects of the target domain. 
“Each source is associated with a particular meaning focus (or foci) that is (or are) mapped onto the target. 
This meaning focus (or foci) is (are) constituted by the central knowledge that pertains to a particular entity 
or event within a speech community. The target inherits the main meaning focus (or foci) of the source” 
(82). For a discussion of CMT based on the main meaning focus in the context of other approaches to 
metaphor, like blending, see Kövecses (2011a). 
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order to determine if they can be contributable to variety speakers. During this 
reviewing process, it became clear that many of the previously collected 350 
metaphors per variety and emotion could not be authenticated either due to the 
fluctuating nature of the internet (many original websites could not be found) or 
due to its anonymity (many authors did not provide biographical information from 
which to determine their regional membership56). Not only did this significantly 
reduce the amount of data I could collect (150 metaphors per variety and emotion), 
but it also revealed the particularly harsh consequence that entire varieties had to 
be excluded from the present study. For example, the GloWbE component of Hong 
Kong, which had been included at an earlier stage, had to be completely discarded 
due to a tendency to include webpages originating from expatriates from other 
English-speaking countries, who happen to live in Hong Kong. Example (10) 
illustrates how this was discovered.  
 
(10) […] to bear the anger of a lot people (HK G)  
 
After discovering this metaphorical instance of anger, I attempted to track down the 
original source, which revealed that it originated from a Hong Kong-based 
marketing consultant, who in her biography on the site, identifies as Scottish, see 
Figure 4.2 below.  
 
Figure 4.2: Screenshot from a Hong Kong based blog with biographical information about 
the author 
_________________ 
56  I acknowledge that “regional membership” is also not a fool-proof marker of variety membership, but at 
least it provides an indication that the person responsible for the text is indeed locatable in the region where 
the variety is spoken and, thus, an assumed member of the respective speech community.  
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Given that it is a reasonable assumption that the identified author of the blog is 
responsible for its text, particularly when it is the only source found, it was clear 
that incidences like these could not be included in the data.  
 However, it was this kind of biographical information particularly (and 
internet presence of the respective authors generally) that proved to be helpful for 
the 150 metaphors per variety and emotion that were deemed “authentic”. In the 
following I will illustrate this process for some Nigerian FEAR metaphors and, in 
doing so, show that due to the amount of information about the authors that is 
available on the Internet there are different degrees of speculation at hand.  
 
(11) The termite of fear […] has eaten you up? (NG G)  
 
The metaphor contained in (11) originated from an author who luckily happened to 
be a prominent Nigerian pastor with a Wikipedia page confirming that he was born, 
educated and works in Nigeria (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Olukoya). 
Furthermore, a google search of the concordance line illustrated in (11) revealed 
his sermon “Termites of the Soul” is the only source. With this information at hand, 
the metaphor was deemed authentic.  
 The same level of confidence was attributed to those authors, journalists in 
particular, that had links to their Facebook and Twitter accounts, like for (12).  
 
(12) The fear of disease outbreak was heavy […] (NG G)  
 
The metaphor in (12) also stemmed from a single source and was attributable to the 
Nigerian journalist, Ahaoma Kanu, whose Twitter profile, which lists his location, 
can be seen in Figure 4.3 below.  
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot of Twitter account with information about geographical location  
 
 As helpful as the recourse to social media for identification of an author was, 
it was not always possible as (13) illustrates. For this case, contextual clues 
contained within the available text provided the basis for verification.   
 
(13) […] the streets of Lagos are now smouldering with fear […] (NG G)  
 
This metaphor was found in statement by Chief Olabode Ibyinka George, which 
was published by a Nigerian newspaper, News of the People. I was unable to find 
any social media accounts or the like linking to the website where (13) was found, 
but the textual cues in the published statement provided some evidence that its 
author is in fact Nigerian. Not only does the full text mention the Yoruba people 
(an ethnic group in Nigeria), but Chief Olabode Ibyinka George also signs his 
statement with “Atona Oodua” (a Yoruba native title), as well as with a time and 
place “Lagos, November 3, 2012”. Additional google searches of this author 
confirmed his status.  
 By contrast to (11), (12) and (13), the authentification of authorship became 
more speculative when tracking down the author for (14). 
 
(14) […] partly benumbed by fear (NG B)  
 
While for (14) the situation was similar to the Hong Kong example above, with the 
important difference that the blog owner, Tolu Ogunlesi, identifies as living and 
working in Lagos, Nigeria in his on-site biography, no further information on the 
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author could be found other than he is a published author of a book of poetry. A 
google search of his book, listen to the geckos singing from a balcony, did not reveal 
any further information on his regional membership or nationality. In this case I had 
to rely solely information from his biography.  
 These examples are typical of the reviewing process it took to identify variety 
authors. However, they also serve to illustrate an important caveat regarding the 
present study that needs to be made transparent. I was only able to identify the 
authors as (speculative) variety speakers due to their internet presence. This, of 
course, implies that the speakers at my disposal are not necessarily representative 
of the entire speech community, but only represent more “prominent” members in 
the sense that they have made their texts available to a potentially global audience 
by virtue of being on the internet (This is especially true for online journalists who 
tend to be located in the urban centers). It may be the case that for those writing on 
the internet that their primary audience is, in fact, people from the same region, like, 
e.g., readers of the Nigerian newspaper in (13). However, whether conscious or not, 
the global availability of their texts makes their internet presence (and perhaps their 
use of language) less likely to be a true product of cultural influence or filtering. 
This is not an optimal situation for a study that assumes variation in metaphor to 
some degree and must be taken into account for the proceeding case studies. 
Nevertheless, if cultural forces are at play in the metaphorization of emotion 
concepts, it is my hope that they can also be revealed in widely distributed language 
use, like that stemming from web-based corpus data, due to the assumption that our 
systems of “conventional metaphor […] is constantly in use, automatically and 
below the level of consciousness” (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 310). The automaticity and 
unconsciousness behind our systems of conceptual metaphor may also allow for 
culture-specific conceptualizations to emerge in language as used on a global stage. 
With that being said, let us turn to the results of the case studies of ANGER, FEAR 
and HAPPINESS in the following chapters. 
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5 Case Study: ANGER  
The case study of ANGER starts with a brief discussion of previously attested 
metaphors of ANGER in English, which will shape expectations of what we can 
assume to occur in the GloWbE data. After this review, the metaphor profiles of 
ANGER for each variety will be presented, along with a ranking of the most 
common source domains. A finer-grained analysis follows by breaking down each 
of the most common source domains into specific levels, which will be illustrated 
by examples and considered for any indication of a variety-specific preference. This 
case study concludes with a discussion of what the results suggest in terms of 
metaphor variation and/or commonality across the varieties. 
5.1 Previous Metaphors of ANGER 
Before delving into the empirical findings of the present student, it behooves us to 
take into account the scholarly work that has previously discussed emotion 
metaphors as part of “folk theories”, otherwise known as “cultural models”57, for 
English in general. In this particular chapter the focus will naturally be on ANGER. 
However, it is here in the first case study that we need to have an introductory 
discussion of what folk theories entail in general. Thus, I will forgo this discussion 
in the following case study chapters.  
 Furthermore, prior to the presentation and analysis of the empirical data for 
emotion metaphors, the rationale for considering what we know about emotion 
concepts from what has been discovered from research into folk theories on 
emotion concepts is twofold. Firstly, “Cognitive Linguistics has stressed the idea 
that we think about social reality in terms of models – ‘cultural models’ or ‘folk 
theories’” by emphasizing that cognitive linguistic analysis contributes to 
_________________ 
57  There has been some debate surrounding the label “folk theory”, also known variously as “cultural model”, 
“folk psychology”, “commonsense psychology” and “naïve psychology”, which is prominently used in the 
realms of psychology and cognitive science in relation to what is also called “theory of mind”. For an 
overview of three distinct senses of this term, along with a brief discussion of its varied uses, see 
Ravenscroft (2016). For more discussion in this vein, in particular to psychology, see Fletcher (1995). 
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understanding “how our conception of social reality is shaped by underlying 
patterns of thought” (Geeraerts 2003: 25). In terms of how we think about language 
in general as “a social and cultural reality”, particularly in view of different varieties 
of the same language, the basic question can be asked: “[W]hat are the models that 
shape our conception of language?” (25). This question can be extended to 
particular aspects of our social and cultural reality like, in adherence to our present 
purposes, the conception of emotional experience: What are the models that shape 
our conception of emotions? A further question arises when considering a 
pluricentric language such as English: Do culturally and regionally distinct varieties 
of English share these models? This will be a major line of investigation when 
considering the emotion metaphors across varieties of English in the present study, 
since metaphor analysis has contributed significantly to the uncovering of theories 
of emotion.  
 Secondly, by initially exploring the cognitive models of emotions that have 
already been uncovered in previous scholarly work, we have a benchmark, that is, 
a point of reference, from which to contextualize the findings presented in this 
study. Therefore, the question guiding us here concerns to what extent previously 
explored folk theories or cognitive models of emotion relate to metaphorical 
patterns found in usage-based data.   
 In their edited volume on the subject, Holland & Quinn (1987) explore the 
cognitive view of the organization of cultural knowledge. Backgrounded by the 
anthropological perspective that culture can be viewed as “shared knowledge”, they 
define folk theories or cultural models in the following way:  
 
Cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are 
widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) 
by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of 
that world and their behavior in it. (Holland & Quinn 1987: 4, emphasis in the 
original).  
 
Therefore, one definitional aspect of folk theories or cultural models lies in the 
“shared” quality of conceptual structures – a point reiterated by Kövecses (2000: 
114), who further maintains that they can “in many cases […]  be uncovered on the 
basis of ordinary language”. A cognitive approach to folk theories outlines “an 
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attempt to specify the cognitive organization of such ideational complexes and to 
link this organization to what is known about the way human beings think” (Holland 
& Quinn 1987: 4). This is where metaphor can play a big role.  
 Folk theories or cultural models can also be defined as “a theory about mental 
phenomena that common folk allegedly hold, a theory in terms of which mental 
concepts are understood”, making the study of folk theories “part of the psychology 
of concepts” in terms of both “the study of conceptualization and classification in 
general” and “the study of specific folk concepts or families of folk concepts, such 
as number concepts, material object concepts, and biological kind concepts” to 
which human beings do not usually have “direct introspective access” (Goldman 
1993: 15). As discussed in Section 2.2.2, direct introspection does not lend itself to 
a scientific investigation of conceptual content because it cannot be directly 
accessed. However, consideration of folk theories, referred to in the following quote 
as “intuitive theories”, offer indirect access – often on the basis of language – 
because “the mental representations that humans use to structure experience 
provide rich insights into how mind mediates world” (Gelman & Legare 2011: 380). 
 
The vast and unwieldy topic of mental content can be fruitfully approached by 
examining the intuitive “theories” that people construct […] Intuitive theories are not 
scientific theories – they are not formal, explicit, precise, or experimentally tested. 
Intuitive theories are implicit and imprecise, but as with scientific theories, intuitive 
theories have broad implications: They organize experience, generate inferences, 
guide learning, and influence behavior and social interactions. Most centrally, 
intuitive theories are causal and explanatory. Indeed, explanatory systems of 
knowledge are integral to human cognition and learning. A recurring theme is that 
intuitive theories are not neutral or passive snapshots of experience; they embody 
cognitive biases that influence thought and action. (Gelman & Legare 2011: 380).  
 
Moreover, folk theories or cultural models can be contrasted with “[s]cientific, or 
expert, theories […] as the theories that experts […] construct to account for a given 
area of experience” (Kövecses 2000: 114). Kempton (1987) contrasts these two 
notions in the following manner:  
 
Human beings strive to connect related phenomena and make sense of the world. In 
doing so, they create what I call folk theory. The word folk signifies both that these 
theories are shared by a social group and that they are acquired from everyday 
experience or social interaction. To call them theories is to assert that they use 
abstractions that apply to many analogous situations, enable predictions, and guide 
behavior. I contrast folk theories with institutionalized theories, which are used by 
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specialists and acquired from scientific literature or controlled experiments. Thus, a 
folk theory is one type of cultural model. (Kempton 1987: 222) 
 
 Since we are primarily concerned with the everyday language reflecting 
metaphors of the emotions, I will forgo a discussion of expert theories on the 
emotions, which would otherwise be beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
shared knowledge identifiable within a folk theory or cognitive model of emotion 
is vital to understanding the conceptualization of emotions for a particular cultural 
group. One such cultural model has been extensively discussed, albeit largely on 
the basis of intuition, for ANGER in American English by the work of Kövecses 
and Lakoff (see Kövecses 1990, Kövecses 2000, Lakoff & Kövecses 1984, Lakoff 
1987a). The following provides a brief review of this cultural model and the 
metaphors constituting it.  
 In his 1990 book on emotion concepts, Kövecses summarizes the previous 
work on the cognitive model of ANGER for American English that was previously 
established in collaboration with Lakoff (see Lakoff & Kövecses 1984 and Case 
Study 1 in Lakoff 1987a) and further discussed in Kövecses (2000). Although 
American English does not feature in the present study, I take recourse to Lakoff 
and Kövecses’ work because they were the first to present a systematic model of 
ANGER involving metaphor and, in doing so, uncovered fundamental insights into 
how anger is conceptualized that can be applied beyond American English.  
 The common assumption in all of Lakoff and Kövecses’ publications is that 
the emotions themselves cannot be viewed as lacking in conceptual structure, but 
instead, by virtue of the conventionalized language used to talk about emotion, it 
can be determined that emotions have a complex conceptual structure, which in fact 
entail varied inferences (Kövecses 1990: 50). The point of departure for analyzing 
the metaphors and metonymies participating in the cognitive model of ANGER 
entails consideration of “the common cultural modal of the physiological effects of 
anger” (51). The physiological effects of anger include an increase in body heat and 
pressure felt within the body (i.e., blood and muscle pressure), general agitation and 
the impedance of visual perception (51). Due to the fact that as humans we all share 
the same basic biology and, thus, experience these physiological effects of anger as 
shared experiences, it is assumed that this model is universal and is largely 
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employed to understand anger in oneself or in others via a general metonymic 
principle that relates to all emotional experience: “The physiological effects of an 
emotion stand for the emotion” (51-52). Applied to ANGER, this principle helps to 
uncover a system of metonymies, given here with corresponding language 
examples supplied by Kövecses (1990: 52):  
 
(1) ANGER IS BODY HEAT (Don’t get hot under the collar.) 
(2) ANGER IS INTERNAL PRESSURE (When I found out, I almost burst a blood 
vessel.)  
(3) ANGER IS REDNESS IN FACE AND NECK AREA (She was scarlet with 
rage.)  
(4) ANGER IS AGITATION (She was shaking with anger.)  
(5) ANGER IS INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION (She was 
blind with rage.)  
 
Kövecses (1990) claims that from these physiological effects, as indicated by the 
above metonymies, we can glean a more central general metaphor: ANGER IS 
HEAT (52). This general metaphor can be divided up into two versions depending 
on whether the heat is related to fluids or solids: ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER and ANGER IS FIRE, respectively (52-53). Of these 
two, the fluid version is considered to be more elaborate and can be considered a 
product of combining the general metaphor ANGER IS HEAT with a general 
emotion metaphor in which the body acts as a container for emotions, i.e., THE 
BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (53). This is illustrated in (6) 
below.  
 
(6) ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (You make my blood 
boil. / Simmer down! /I had reached a boiling point. / Let him stew.)  
          (Kövecses 1990: 53)  
 
Furthermore, part of the more elaborated nature of ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER involves the metaphorical entailments pertaining to the 
nature of hot fluids in a container, which can be mapped onto the emotional 
experience of anger. Kövecses (1990: 54-56) outlines these entailments in the 
following way:  
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(7) WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE FLUID RISES. 
(His pent-up anger welled up inside him.) 
(8) INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM (She got all steamed up. /I was 
fuming.) 
(9) INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER (He was 
bursting with anger. / I could barely keep it in anymore.) 
(10) WHEN ANGER BECOMES TOO INTENSE, THE PERSON EXPLODES 
(When I told him, he just exploded. / She blew up at me.) 
(11) WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GO UP IN THE AIR (I 
blew my top.)  
(12) WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, WHAT WAS INSIDE HIM COMES OUT 
(His anger finally came out. /Smoke was pouring out of his ears.)  
 
According to Kövecses (1990), the central metaphor of ANGER IS THE HEAT OF 
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER uncovers an “ontology of anger” that puts into focus 
central aspects of anger in our conceptual system, namely that anger is an intense 
emotional experience that can lead to a dangerous loss of control of ourselves, just 
as increasing heat in a container can lead to an explosion (56-57).  
 The second version of ANGER IS HEAT, namely ANGER IS FIRE, relates 
to its application to solids, according to Kövecses (1990). While intensity and 
danger also play a part in understanding ANGER IS FIRE, this metaphor further 
highlights the causes of anger, the duration of the emotional experience and the 
damage that can be incurred by the angry individual, as illustrated in the examples 
below (Kövecses 1990: 58):  
 
(13) ANGER IS FIRE (the cause of anger) (That kindled my ire. / Those are 
inflammatory remarks.) 
(14) ANGER IS FIRE (intensity and duration) (She was doing a slow burn. / After 
the argument, Dave was smoldering for days.)  
(15) ANGER IS FIRE (danger to others) (He was breathing fire.)  
(16) ANGER IS FIRE (danger to the angry person) (He was consumed by his 
anger.)  
 
 While ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER and 
ANGER IS FIRE very clearly relate to the physiological experiences outlined 
above, another metaphor can be identified particular to aspect of agitation. ANGER 
IS INSANITY draws from the cultural theory that insane individuals “are unduly 
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agitated – they go wild, start raving, flail their arms, foam at the mouth, and so on” 
– physiological effects and behavior that act as metonymies for insanity. (59).  
 
(17) ANGER IS INSANITY (He got so angry, he went out of his mind.) 
 
 While insanity, particularly insane behavior, has the potential for danger, 
another metaphor focuses more clearly on the dangerous aspect of anger, 
particularly concerning the loss of control of the angry individual, that is, ANGER 
IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) (61-62). This is illustrated by (18):  
 
(18) ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) (He was battling his anger. 
/ She fought back her anger.)  
 
However, when the focus is on a loss of control that is dangerous to other people, a 
metaphor arises that makes use of the widely accepted metaphor in Western culture 
PASSIONS ARE BEASTS INSIDE OF A PERSON, which is formulated for 
ANGER as ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL (62).  
 
(19) ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL (He has a monstrous temper. / He 
unleashed his anger.)  
 
 ANGER can also be conceptualized in terms of physical annoyances, which 
involve to some extent a person committing an offence and a victim of that offence, 
i.e., the angry person (64-65). This is illustrated in (20) and (21), whereas (21) 
specifically relates to a territorial transgression:  
 
(20) THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS A PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (Don’t be a pain 
in the ass.)  
(21) CAUSING ANGER IS TRESPASSING (You’re beginning to get to me. / This 
is where I draw the line!) 
 
In line with the dynamic of an offender and victim, the victim is seen to have 
experienced a type of injustice, in which getting angry can be thought of as a type 
of retribution (65). From the perspective of retribution, ANGER can be viewed as 
a BURDEN that one should do away with:  
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(22) ANGER IS A BURDEN (retributive justice) (After I lost my temper, I felt 
lighter.) 
 
However, ANGER IS A BURDEN also relates to our sense of responsibility to 
control anger, which “may place a considerable burden on one’s ‘inner resources’” 
(65):  
 
(23) ANGER IS A BURDEN (controlling anger) (He carries his anger around with 
him.) 
 
The above outlined metaphors have been identified by Kövecses and Lakoff’s work 
as contributing most significantly to the cultural model of ANGER for American 
English. In his 2000 publication, Kövecses adds three more metaphors 
conceptualizing ANGER, illustrated by (24) – (26), but beyond an example of each 
one he does not provide specific discussions of these additions (21).  
 
(24) ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE (It was a stormy meeting.) 
(25) AN ANGRY PERSON IS A FUNCTIONING MACHINE (That really got him 
going.)  
(26) ANGER IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (His actions were completely governed 
by anger.)  
 
 Taking these metonymies and metaphors together as a prototypical cultural 
model of ANGER, we start to get a picture of the systematic nature of the everyday 
expressions of ANGER. 
 It is important to remind ourselves at this point that these metaphors and their 
illustrative examples on the linguistic level were discovered via introspection and, 
therefore, are not quantifiable. Stefanowitsch (2006a) takes issue with the 
introspective method used to create this cultural model of anger and, in his own 
study of emotion metaphors using BNC data and applying MPA, tests to what 
extent these metaphors can be found in naturally occurring language. Of the 
ANGER metaphors listed above, he finds metaphorical patterns for all but 
TRESPASSING, example (21), and A FUNCTIONING MACHINE, example (25). 
Nevertheless, the total of the metaphorical patterns identified for these metaphors 
only amount to 14.3% of all metaphorical patterns found in the corpus data by 
applying MPA, “which suggests that the introspective method misses the majority 
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of metaphorical expressions for the domain of ANGER” (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 73). 
Among other findings, like general emotion metaphors relating to EVENT 
STRUCTURE (see Lakoff 2007 [2003]) and very infrequent metaphors, like 
ANGER IS A BALLOON, Stefanowitsch is able to identify metaphors that are not 
mentioned in the model above or are categorized differently as dictated by the 
patterns in the corpus data (73-78). These metaphors are given in (27) – (38)58 and 
their addition can be viewed as an extension and/or reworking of the conceptual 
system attributed to ANGER by Lakoff and Kövecses’ work.  
 
(27) ANGER IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) (X 
filled with anger, X keep lid on/contain anger, burst/explosion/outburst of anger, 
etc.) 
(28) ANGER IS A LIQUID (anger well up, anger bubble inside X, spurt of anger, 
etc.) 
(29) ANGER IS HEAT/COLD (hot anger, anger grow/turn cold, etc.)  
(30) ANGER IS A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE 
(mixture/mingling/combination of anger and EMOTION, anger be pure, etc.)  
(31) ANGER IS LIGHT (flash/flicker/white glow of anger, etc.) 
(32) ANGER IS DARKNESS (black gloom of anger, anger eclipse EMOTION, 
etc.) 
(33) ANGER IS HIGH/LOW (INTENSITY) (level of anger, anger rise (in X), 
anger drop, etc.) 
(34) ANGER IS A SLEEPING ORGANISM (X rouse anger, X arouse anger (in 
Y)) 
(35) ANGER IS A DISEASE (bouts of anger, festering/impotent/paralysing anger, 
etc.) 
(36) ANGER IS GORGE (= EATING) (anger rise into X’s mouth, bitter anger, X 
bite back/swallow anger, etc.) 
(37) ANGER IS A SHARP OBJECT (sharp anger, pinpoint of anger, spike of 
anger, etc.) 
(38) ANGER IS A PLANT (anger be rooted in X, anger stem from EMOTION, 
anger grow)            
          (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 76) 
 
While Stefanowitsch concedes that the combination of ANGER IS A 
SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) together with ANGER 
_________________ 
58  Stefanowitsch (2006a) does not report the full citations from the corpus data but presents the metaphorical 
patterns in an abstracted form, i.e., verbs are in the infinitive, patterns that are similar grouped together in 
a compact form, etc. (73).  
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IS HEAT being able to account for ANGER IS A HEAT OF A FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER (2006a: 75), he highlights those mappings which have not yet been 
mentioned in the previous literature. For instance, ANGER IS LIGHT, while related 
to ANGER IS FIRE, is found alongside its opposite ANGER IS DARKNESS, 
although they “do not encode the opposite ends of a scale” in terms of intensity 
(77). The others include A SLEEPING ORGANISM (which could be potentially 
related to A DANGEROUS ANIMAL), DISEASE, GORGE, A SHARP OBJECT 
and A PLANT.  
 Without going into a detailed discussion of these additions, which 
Stefanowitsch himself does not provide, a major point has been made by his study 
nonetheless: There is more to discover about the conceptual structure of emotions 
when we go beyond introspection. This is underscored by results found in Esenova's 
(2011) study, which makes use of mostly corpus-based examples (along with 
linguistic examples from dictionaries) and discovers even more metaphors for 
ANGER. (39) and (40) illustrates what Esenova considers to be sub-categories of 
CONTAINMENT (2011: 46-47). 
 
(39) ANGER IS A COLOR (There is a tinge of anger in his voice.) 
(40) ANGER IS A CHILD (Do not judge or humiliate anyone, for this gives birth 
to anger.) 
 
(41) – (43) illustrate metaphors not discussed either by Kövecses or Stefanowitsch 
above (Esenova 2011: 53, 55, 64-65) 
 
(41) ANGER IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING (I’m haunted by anger.)  
(42) ANGER IS A HIDDEN ENEMY (Rage creeps up on you unawares too.) 
(43) ANGER IS A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE (I’ve seen their cruelty, smelt their 
putrid anger. / Two vinegary fellows bickering.) 
 
 Therefore, quantifiable approaches like MPA help to fill in the gaps and, most 
importantly, gauge the frequency of the patterns instantiating the conceptual 
metaphors attributable to ANGER. This not only allows the metaphor researcher to 
examine the systematicity of these individual metaphors, but also act “as a basis for 
contrastive studies investigating cross-cultural and cross-linguistic similarities and 
differences in the metaphorical conceptualization of experience” (Stefanowitsch 
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2006a: 103). In recent work, Kövecses et al. (2015) aimed at uncovering 
metaphorical salience of ANGER metaphors in American English, Spanish, 
Turkish and Hungarian by employing quantitative corpus analysis. In the American 
English results, it turns out that the most salient source domains are CONTAINER, 
POSSESSED OBJECT and OPPONENT (including the subtypes of OPPONENT 
AS A PERSON and WEAPON) (346-348). This finding not only confirms two 
major aspects of the prototypical cultural model of ANGER outlined above, i.e., 
intensity and control of ANGER, which will be discussed in Section 5.3 for the 
present study’s results. It also adds two more mappings to the conceptualization of 
ANGER, namely POSSESSED OBJECT and WEAPON. These recent additions 
make it clear that the full story of the prototypical cultural model of ANGER has 
yet to be told. Findings in the recent study will help to make the picture more 
complete. As it stands now, Table 5.1 provides an overview of the previously 
attested metaphors of ANGER for convenience. Note that I have grouped together 
those source domains that I deem to be sufficiently similar, although they were 
presented as separate mappings (OPPONENT and A SOCIAL SUPERIOR, who 
could be understood as an OPPONENT of sorts, as highlighting the control aspect 
of an emotion). 
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Table 5.1: Previously attested ANGER metaphors 
 
 
It is with this overview that we now turn to the results for the present case study on 
ANGER in New Englishes.  
5.2 Metaphor Profiles for ANGER   
The following section provides an initial overview of ANGER metaphors of the 
type 2 kind (see Section 4.1.4) found for all varieties in the GloWbE. This 
introductory glance is the first step in answering the research questions: 1) What 
conceptual metaphors exist for ANGER in New English, as evidenced by corpus 
data, and 2) Does a comparison across New English varieties reveal what is 
conceptually shared and/or what is conceptually different across the varieties? In 
fact, the creation of the metaphor profiles for each variety sets up the means of 
comparison across New English varieties along with the (former) norm-providing 
variety, British English, by directing the analysis along broader conceptual 
categories to, later on in this chapter, a breakdown into different levels of 
granularity.  
ANGER IS: Source 
THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER / A SUBSTANCE IN 
A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE / A LIQUID 
Kövecses (1990) and 
Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
FIRE / HEAT / A NATURAL FORCE 
INSANITY / DISEASE  
A DANGEROUS ANIMAL / A SLEEPING ORGANISM 
AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) / A HIDDEN ENEMY / A 
SOCIAL SUPERIOR 
Kövecses (1990) and 
Esenova (2011) 
A PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE Kövecses (1990) 
TRESPASSING Kövecses (1990) 
A BURDEN  Kövecses (1990) 
A FUNCTIONING MACHINE Kövecses (1990) 
COLD Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
LIGHT / DARKNESS Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
HIGH/LOW (INTENSITY) Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
GORGE Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
SHARP OBJECT  Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
PLANT Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
COLOR (OF SOMETHING IN A CONTAINER) Esenova (2011) 
CHILD (IN MOTHER-CONTAINER) Esenova (2011) 
A SUPERNATURAL BEING Esenova (2011) 
A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE Esenova (2011) 
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 For each variety, a total of 150 mappings (= type 2) were identified, which 
contained the target domain lexical items anger, annoyance, fury, irritation, rage, 
resentment, or wrath. This resulted in a total sample of 750 metaphors. Table 5.2 
provides an overview of the various source domains participating in these 
metaphors, as well as their absolute frequencies and relative frequencies (in 
percent) for each variety. Table 5.2 also serves to illustrate the so-called metaphor 
profiles for ANGER metaphors in each variety and provides insight into the variety-
specific source domain preferences. 
 
Table 5.2: Overview of absolute and relative frequencies of all source domains in ANGER 
metaphors per variety 
 
 
Note that the “miscellaneous” category contains instances that did not contribute in 
large numbers to the overall metaphor profile, i.e., “metaphorical hapax legomena”, 
as in (44) and (45), which seem to be of an innovative or novel kind, or those 
metaphors with a source domain that showed up less than five times in a single 
variety, as in (46) and (47). 
 
 GB NG KE IN SG total 
Fluid In a Container 
30  
(20%) 
35 
(23.3%) 
37 
(24.7%) 
31 
(20.7%) 
28 
(18.7%) 
161 
(21.5%) 
Food / Drink 
6  
(4%) 
3  
(2%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
3  
(2%) 
3  
(2%) 
16  
(2.1%) 
Illness 
17 
(11.3%) 
19 
(12.7%) 
8  
(5.3%) 
22 
(14.7%) 
17 
(11.3%) 
83 
(11.1%) 
Natural Force  
26 
(17.3%) 
15  
(10%) 
13  
(8.7%) 
23 
(15.3%) 
17 
(11.3%) 
94 
(12.5%) 
Part of a Journey 
4  
(2.7%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
6  
(4%) 
5  
(3.3) 
17  
(2.3%) 
Person  
32 
(21.3%) 
43 
(28.7%) 
47  
(31.3) 
36  
(24%) 
41 
(27.3%) 
199 
(26.5%) 
Possession 
2  
(1.3%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
7  
(4.7%) 
5  
(3.3%) 
3  
(2%) 
18  
(2.4%) 
Punishment 
3  
(2%) 
9  
(6%) 
3  
(2%) 
5  
(3.3%) 
9  
(6%) 
29  
(3.9%) 
Supernatural Being / 
Religious Practice 
1  
(0.7%) 
6  
(4%) 
4  
(2.7%) 
5  
(3.3%) 
4  
(2.7%) 
20  
(2.7%) 
Weapon 
24  
(16%) 
10  
(6.7%) 
17 
(11.3%) 
11  
(7.3%) 
17 
(11.3%) 
79 
(10.5%) 
Misc.  
5  
(3.3%) 
8  
(5.3%) 
12  
(8%) 
3  
(2%) 
6  
(4%) 
34  
(4.5%) 
total  150 150 150 150 150 750 
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(44) We know that anger can be a kind of compost […] (SG G)  ANGER IS 
COMPOST 
(45) A mask of anger fell over his face, tightening his lips before he turned away. 
(NG G)  ANGER IS A MASK 
(46) In such a situation you have lost substantial votes and reaped resentment. (KE 
G)  ANGER IS A PLANT 
(47) He should not allow the anger to take deep root in his Antahkarana for a long 
time. (IN G)  ANGER IS A PLANT 
 
 Not taking into account the miscellaneous metaphors (which do not represent 
a cohesive group anyway), the metaphor profiles show that all varieties make use 
of the range of source domains for conceptualizing ANGER metaphors. In terms of 
source domain preference, the two highest ranked source domains are the same for 
all varieties, namely PERSON and A FLUID IN A CONTAINER. In British 
English they are almost equally present (32 (21.3%) for PERSON and 30 (20%) for 
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER). It was to be expected that PERSON and FLUID 
emerge as the most prominent source domains, considering the pervasiveness of 
personification as an ontological metaphor (Kövecses 2010: 39). This also coheres 
with Lakoff’s claim that ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is the 
“central metaphor” for the metaphorical system of ANGER (Lakoff 1987a: 283). 
The current results confirm this centrality of both source domains in ANGER 
metaphors, although we can note that personification functions to attribute human 
characteristics to non-human beings (Kövecses 2010: 39) and, thus, cannot 
necessarily be compared to the specificity of A FLUID IN A CONTAINER. 
 Differences in the rankings, which were based on the frequencies in Table 
5.2, start to become visible when considering the other source domains involved in 
conceptualizing ANGER. For instance, the third most frequent source domain is 
NATURAL FORCE in GB and IN, ILLNESS in NG, and WEAPON in KE. For the 
SG data, all three of these source domains occupy the third rank. In fact, PERSON, 
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, and WEAPON 
emerge as the most salient source domains for all varieties. 
 However, considering the top five most frequently used source domains for 
all varieties collectively, there is a discernable overlap among preferred domains. 
Table 5.3 illustrates this. 
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Table 5.3: Five highest ranked ANGER source domains per variety 
Rank GB NG KE IN SG 
(1) PERSON PERSON PERSON PERSON PERSON 
(2) FLUID FLUID FLUID FLUID FLUID 
(3) NATURAL FORCE ILLNESS WEAPON 
NATURAL 
FORCE 
ILLNESS, 
NATURAL 
FORCE & 
WEAPON 
(4) WEAPON NATURAL FORCE 
NATURAL 
FORCE 
ILLNESS - 
(5) ILLNESS WEAPON ILLNESS WEAPON - 
total % of 
metaphor 
profile 
85.9% 81.4% 81.3% 82% 79.9% 
 
PERSON, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and 
WEAPON are shared as the most frequently used source domains by all of the 
varieties and, as such, constitute the bulk of all data for each variety (between 79.9% 
to 85.9%). 
 Nevertheless, in view of their slightly different rankings, the distribution of 
the shared top five source domains was analyzed for any significant differences. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates this distribution on the basis of the absolute frequencies. 
 
Figure 5.1: Absolute frequencies of top five (shared) source domains in ANGER metaphors 
per variety 
 
Since the data is in normal distribution, an analysis of variance was also conducted 
but the difference between the varieties was not significant (for F (4, 20) = 
0.01636135, p < 0.05). However, since up to this point we have been considering 
GB NG KE IN SG
PERSON 32 43 47 36 41
FLUID 30 35 37 31 28
ILLNESS 17 19 8 22 17
NATURAL FORCE 26 15 13 23 17
WEAPON 24 10 17 11 17
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broadly formulated source domains at a more general level (i.e., in some way related 
to the source domain at hand), it is plausible that differences start to emerge at a 
more fine-grained level for which the used methodology allows. Therefore, a finer-
grained look at these broader domains has more potential to answer the question if 
these metaphors have been instantiated in a culture-specific (or at least variety-
specific) way. 
 Before we delve into this finer-grained analysis, to which the following 
subsections that explore the so-called “specific-level” metaphors will be devoted, 
consider the individual percentages of the top five source domains shared across 
the varieties, which is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2: Percentages of top five (shared) source domains in ANGER metaphors per 
variety 
 
 PERSON and FLUID basically behave the same way across the varieties (i.e., 
they occupy the first and second rank, respectively, for all varieties and constitute 
between 41.3% and 56% of all metaphorical data). ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE 
and WEAPON offer a slightly different picture. These three source domains make 
up 44.6% of the GB data, which is more than the GB data for PERSON and FLUID 
combined (41.3%). Ranging from 44.7% to 56%, PERSON and FLUID provide the 
majority of metaphorical data of the top five source domains in the four New 
Englishes, while ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and WEAPON, taken together, 
provide 25.3% to 37.3% (as compared to 44.6% in GB). Considering their varied 
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rankings, a chi-square test was performed for ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and 
WEAPON with the absolute frequencies for each variety, which revealed no 
significant differences in distribution (x2 = 11.848, df = 8, p = 0.158).  
 So far, the focus has been on the absolute and relative frequencies in the 
metaphor profiles of each variety, which show that the top five source domains are 
shared across the varieties and contribute the most metaphorical data to each 
individual profile. However, when considering the normalized frequencies, we 
receive another perspective on some potential differences in source domain 
preference between the varieties.  
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Figure 5.3: Normalized frequencies of ANGER metaphors to 100%  
 
As Figure 5.3 demonstrates, there are differences across the varieties in terms of 
their relation to the average percentage of each source domain, especially for those 
source domains that are not in the top five ranking for each variety. This could 
provide some indication for variety-specific preferences for these source domains. 
Yet, it should be kept in mind that their absolute frequencies are, in general, low in 
comparison to the top five source domains. For instance, GB shows evidence of a 
preference for FOOD / DRINK, but this source domain contributed only 16 
instances overall out of the 750. Likewise, the New English varieties show a 
preference for SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, especially 
NG and IN, vis-à-vis GB. However, this source domain contributed only 20 
instances overall. Therefore, since source domains like FOOD / DRINK and 
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SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE do not contribute 
extensively to the individual metaphor profiles, and by extension to the entire 
dataset, it is difficult to assess if these are true preferences at present.  
 Considering the top five source domains shared by each variety, PERSON 
and FLUID IN A CONTAINER (again as the first and second ranks in all varieties) 
do not demonstrate major differences between the varieties, although the African 
varieties in both cases have slightly higher normalized frequencies for the African 
varieties. For ILLNESS, the biggest discrepancy is between IN, with the highest 
normalized frequency at 133%, and KE, with the lowest normalized frequency at 
48%). The remaining varieties figure in closer to the mean with NG at 115% and 
SG and GB at 102%. GB has the highest normalized frequency of NATURAL 
FORCE at 138%, while the New Englishes follow in descending order, with IN 
well above the mean at 122% and with SG at 90%, NG at 80% and KE at 69% 
below the mean. GB also has the highest normalized frequency of WEAPON at 
152%, while KE and SG are just above the mean at 108% and IN and NG are well 
below it with 70% and 63%, respectively. Taken together, this sets up the following 
assumptions: 1) PERSON and FLUID IN A CONTAINER do not seem to indicate 
any variety-specific preference or only slightly for the African varieties; 2) 
ILLNESS seems to be preferred by IN and (slightly less so) by NG; 3) NATURAL 
FORCE seems to be preferred by GB and (to some extent) by IN; 4) WEAPON 
seems to be preferred by GB.   
 Moreover, considering the broadness of these categories, further investigation 
is merited. As a reminder, the source domains were initially formulated as broad 
categories as a consequence of the annotation process of corpus data (see Section 
4.1.4). It was only during later steps in the methodology that more specific levels 
(to varying degrees) emerged for the source domains found. In the following, we 
will breakdown each source domain individually and examine the results on a cross-
variety basis.  
5.3 Specific-Level ANGER Metaphors across Varieties  
The above analysis of the broadly formulated source domains has not revealed any 
clear-cut variation on the whole for conceptualizing ANGER. In fact, it gives some 
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indication that they more likely share conceptualizations for ANGER in terms of 
the most frequent source domains, especially PERSON and FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER. However, a more in-depth look into the individual source domains 
is merited in order to be able to gauge if this similarity between the varieties holds. 
The following subsections are thus devoted to illustrating the inner structure of the 
source domain at hand via examples derived from the data. Individual subsections 
are provided for the most frequent source domains across all varieties, i.e., 
PERSON, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, NATURAL FORCE, WEAPON and 
ILLNESS. All remaining (infrequent) metaphors will be discussed together as 
“minor metaphors”, as their absolute frequencies were low and, therefore, although 
existent in the metaphor profiles of all or some of the varieties, they contributed 
little in terms of the overall metaphorical content and, thus, make them less 
sufficient candidates for variety-based comparison.   
5.3.1 ANGER IS A PERSON 
To reiterate a point made above, it is not surprising that PERSON is the most 
prominent source domain for ANGER, considering that personification is pervasive 
as an ontological metaphor in general (Kövecses 2010: 39). Yet, this pervasive 
aspect tells us little about what can be defined as personification. A few thoughts 
on this are necessary before we turn to a specific-level breakdown of PERSON, as 
evidenced by the GloWbE data, because these thoughts directly relate to the 
decision-making process involved in deeming an utterance as belonging to the 
source domain PERSON or not.  
 Dorst (2011), after reviewing various definitions of personification, states:  
 
[W]hat counts as personification will depend greatly on the analysts’ field of research 
(psychology, literature, linguistics, visual arts) and on whether personification is 
studied at the linguistic, conceptual, communicative or cognitive level. One essential 
factor seems to be the assignment of agency via a violation of selection restrictions. 
Such selection restrictions play a central role during linguistic analysis, while the 
specification of a particular agent occurs primarily at a conceptual level. (Dorst 2011: 
117).  
 
What is important to adopt from this insight for the present study is that, during 
linguistic analysis, agency can be assigned (and, thus, personification determined) 
when considering the role of selection restrictions and word class. “We personify 
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when we metaphorically ascribe agency to normally inanimate objects, turning non-
existent or imaginary entities into realistic actors or agents” (Hamilton 2002: 411 
cited in Dorst 2011: 116). During linguistic analysis, this ascription of agency can 
be accomplished via the selection restrictions and attention to word class.  
 Dorst (2011) illustrates this with metaphorical examples analyzed with 
MIPVU that have counterparts in the present study. I will first discuss Dorst’s 
examples and, following her lead, apply them to examples from the GloWbE data. 
Importantly, by applying MIPVU, “there should be a non-human contextual sense 
[…] and a basic human sense” that are available for contrast and comparison when 
analyzing an utterance for a personification metaphor (118). Dorst’s examples are 
illustrated in (48) and (49).  
 
(48) She has an obsession with the drug that verges on monomania. She tells me 
she needs to understand it if she’s going to defeat it. (BNC-Baby: CCW) 
(49) She studies the drug, you know? Like it was her enemy. (BNC-Baby: CCW) 
           (Dorst 2011: 117) 
 
Both examples illustrate the personification of DRUG as an ENEMY. In (48) “the 
personification results from the fact that the verb defeat normally requires both a 
human subject (a human agent) and a human direct object (a human patient). The 
personification […] is thus realized via the selection restrictions of the verb”, i.e., 
due to the argument structure of the verb (Dorst 2011: 119–120). Dorst provides a 
visualization of this analysis, replicated in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4: Personification derived from the argument structure of the verb (adapted from 
         Dorst 2011: 120) 
 
 For (49) Dorst claims a more “straightforward entity-to-entity mapping 
between a human source domain […] and a non-human target” via “the nominal 
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comparison at the linguistic level [which] closely resembles the nominal conceptual 
structure” (119). She further maintains that this type of mapping may be more 
salient to the metaphor analyst than (48) and illustrates its straightforwardness, as 
replicated in Figure 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.5: Personification set up by a noun-to-noun comparison (adapted from Dorst 2011: 
         119) 
 
 Dorst (2011) discusses another example on the linguistic level that can be 
directly compared to data from the GloWbE. Example (50) illustrates the 
personification of plants on the basis of a linguistic metaphor entailing adjectives 
(and also a verb).  
 
(50) Leaves and yellow blossoms obscured the top of the window, while the bottom 
was covered by aggressive pink hollyhocks, seemingly determined to fight their 
way inside. (BNC-Baby: FPB) 
           (Dorst 2011: 120) 
 
Adjectives (like aggressive and determined) and actions as denoted by verbs (like 
fight) directly link to the agency of a person. A person, who is characterized as 
aggressive and determined to fight, will, in our experience, likely carry out actions 
in accordance with this characterization, which in (50) is mapped onto the non-
human entity of plants.  
 These three examples from Dorst (2011) have informed decisions on the 
personification status of the following examples in the ANGER dataset (and those 
similar to it). (51) illustrates personification derived from the argument structure of 
the verb, similar to (48) above.  
 
(51) No man in this world can conquer anger. (IN G) 
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Here, personification is derived from the argument structure of the verb conquer, 
which necessitates having a human patient, which is then mapped onto ANGER, 
sanctioning the personification reading. The basic dictionary sense highlights the 
human aspect as well: “to take control of land or people using soldiers” (Macmillan 
online dictionary) 
 (52) illustrates the entity-to-entity mapping as expressed by a noun-to-noun 
correspondance, similar to (49) above.  
 
(52) Anger is the greatest enemy of man. (IN G) 
 
anger and enemy are in a noun-to-noun correspondence in this linguistic metaphor, 
which points to the entity-to-entity mapping on the conceptual level. The 
conceptual structure of ENEMY obviously entails a human (agent) in its most basic 
sense.  
 (53) – (54) illustrate a linguistic metaphor realized by metaphorically used 
adjectives, similar to (50) above.  
 
(53) And the more sinful a man is becoming, the more violent his anger would 
become (NG G) 
(54) They even act to help those in distress and they feel guilt, pride and righteous 
anger (SG B) 
 
The adjectives violent and righteous are attributes readily used to characterize 
human beings. violent, in its most basic sense, is defined as “someone who is violent 
often gets into fights and attacks people” (Macmillan online dictionary). righteous 
is defined as “morally good or correct, especially according to standards set by 
religion” (Macmillan online dictionary) – a characteristic most likely to be given to 
people in our most basic experience, although the definition here does not directly 
indicate this. (Note, however, that the example given by Macmillan for this 
definition is “righteous people”.) Furthermore, while righteous anger, in terms of 
its phraselogy, may be considered highly conventional, its metaphorical status still 
holds. Dorst (2011) provides a guideline here as well: “Personifications that are so 
conventional and automatic that we hardly notice them should not be disregarded, 
and the fact that an expression may not be processed as a personification or give 
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rise to a full conceptualization should not mean that the linguistic personification is 
ignored” (133). Therefore, even highly conventional personification, such as in 
(54), was considered as metaphorical in the data.  
 These insights provide a better understanding for why personification is so 
prevalent. Its status as an ontological metaphor that can be variously realized on the 
basis of direct mapping, as well as via argument structure and word class, opens up 
a lot of linguistic opportunities to reflect the conceptualization of EMOTION as a 
PERSON. This is at least the case for ANGER, as is demonstrated below.  
 Occupying the first rank for all varieties and comprising 26.5% of the total 
ANGER data, PERSON emerges as the most prominent source domain across all 
varieties. Figure 5.6 illustrates the percentages of PERSON metaphors in the 
metaphor profile of each variety.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Percentages of ANGER IS A PERSON per variety 
 
 As discussed in Section 5.2, PERSON is to be understood as an intentionally 
broad source domain category that requires a more fine-grained analysis in order to 
understand it more fully. So far, PERSON has been acting as a shorthand for 
personification metaphors and, as of yet, has not been fully explained in terms of 
its allocation to the human domain. When attempting to determine if the basic sense 
of a source domain lexical item in an ANGER linguistic metaphor reflects the 
domain of HUMAN BEINGS, some ambiguity remains. Dorst (2011) puts it this 
way, “it may not always be clear whether a basic sense should be interpreted as 
human only, human and animal, sentient beings, animate beings, concrete entities, 
and so forth” (118). Therefore, as will become apparent from Table 5.4 below, there 
is some conflation with HUMAN and ANIMAL in the GloWbE data, although the 
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majority of PERSON metaphors have been deemed as related to human experience. 
The reasoning for adding ANIMAL to the PERSON category has to do with a 
widened sense of personification, as I see it, i.e, the process of attributing qualities, 
including agency, of sentient or animate beings to something abstract, like 
EMOTIONS, which also conceptually belong in the realm of sentient experience. 
This brings to the forefront another aspect to be addressed. If EMOTIONS are part 
and parcel to the experience of humans (and animals), then we should also consider 
the role of metonymic readings of the following metaphors.  
 
Although it remains an empirical question whether personifications are processed as 
metaphors or metonymies or both, a study by Dorst, Mulder and Steen (submitted) on 
the recognition of personifications by non-expert readers showed that readers refer to 
both metaphoric and metonymic readings in their interpretations and indicate that the 
metonymic reading yields additional stylistic information in the interpretation of 
personification (Dorst 2011: 117).  
 
Consider a metonymic reading of the example righteous anger, listed as (54) above. 
A conceivable alternative analysis to righteous anger as a metaphor is viewing it as 
a metonymy, i.e., the righteousness aspect of personhood encompasses the feeling 
of anger (= metonymy). Yet, as Dorst (2011) states, “the important question is 
whether a metonymic reading and a metaphorical reading may not sometimes be 
equally plausible and occur alongside each other” (115-116). Therefore, for (54), 
righteousness entailing the feeling of anger or righteous anger standing in for the 
righteous person, as metonymies, could be just as plausible as anger itself being 
conceived of in terms of a righteous person, as a metaphor. An important point, 
reiterated by Dorst (2011: 115), is that the difference between metaphor and 
metonymy is not always clear cut and has been found to interact with each other to 
some extent (see Goosens 1990, 2002). This makes it, of course, difficult for the 
metaphor analyst, which is a point also conceded by the Pragglejaz Group in the 
evaluation of their initial MIP procedure (2007: 31). Nevertheless, I personally have 
been lead to annotate examples like righteous anger, like in (54), as metaphorical 
on the basis of metaphorical and metonymic readings being able to stand alongside 
each other, as Dorst (2011) maintains, as well as due to the fact that a clear-cut 
distinction between metaphor and metonymy remains difficult to ascertain. 
Furthermore, examples like (55), which I view as mixed metaphors and have 
annotated as such, occur in the data, which favors a more metaphorical reading of 
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righteous anger, by its juxtaposition to another type of ANGER metaphor, in this 
case FLUID.  
 
(55) There's something about righteous anger; it wells up within us when we think 
about how we've been wronged by one artisan or the other but it does make you 
think about ourselves too. (NG G)59 
 
 Having established these aspects, which will also apply to the following case 
studies in Chapter 6 (FEAR) and Chapter 7 (HAPPINESS), we have arrived at a 
point where PERSON can sensibly be broken down into its component metaphors. 
Table 5.4 provides an overview of the specific levels that have been gleaned for 
ANGER metaphors from the GloWbE data, along with the absolute frequencies 
across varieties. It should be noted that I do not consider this breakdown exhaustive. 
Many other conceptual correspondences between PERSON and ANGER, beyond 
what Table 5.4 demonstrates, are plausible and are surely reflected in language use. 
Simply put, this breakdown reveals what is most common in the varieties data from 
the GloWbE and is, therefore, the basis for our cross-variety comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________ 
59  Note that, in terms of annotation, I have counted this single utterance as instantiating two metaphors, which 
are mixed. righteous was annotated as a single instance of PERSON and wells up was annotated as a single 
instance of FLUID. That they happened to occur within the context of a single utterance was 
inconsequential for my research, since I did not aim at uncovering the communicative function of doing so 
and was merely interested in what conceptualizations occur. However, it should be noted that these types 
of mixed metaphors were relatively infrequent in the data, i.e., the majority of utterances reflect only one 
conceptual metaphor.  
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Table 5.4: Breakdown of ANGER IS A PERSON60 
PERSON GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 0 0 0 0 
PERSON - ACCOMPLICE - specific-level (= level 2) 2 0 3 0 3 
PERSON - BEING APPEASED / CALMED - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
1 2 4 1 7 
PERSON - COMPANION - specific-level (= level 2)  0 1 1 2 2 
PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - specific-level (= level 
2) 
2 8 8 2 5 
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 2)  1 0 1 0 0 
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= level 2)  1 0 0 0 1 
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2) 0 3 0 3 0 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)  5 7 13 13 8 
   A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3) 0 1 2 0 1 
   BEING CONTROLLED (BY FORCE) (= level 3) 3 0 1 1 2 
   DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3) 1 3 1 3 0 
   FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE(= level 3) 0 3 5 1 0 
   WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3) 1 1 1 2 0 
   WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)  2 4 0 4 2 
   WHO IS IN PURSUIT (= level 3)  0 2 0 0 0 
   WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) 1 1 2 3 1 
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2) 0 2 0 0 1 
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
3 0 1 0 2 
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - specific-level (= level 
2)  
4 1 1 0 1 
Misc. - ANGER TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON 
4 4 3 0 3 
Misc. - ANGER INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED 
TO A PERSON  
1 0 0 1 2 
total  32 43 47 36 41 
 
 
The first notable result in this breakdown is that none of the varieties conceptualize 
ANGER as a PERSON on a very generic level (= level 1), e.g., anger is a person, 
animal, being, etc. The metaphorical bulk of PERSON is found on the specific 
levels (= level 2), which collectively act as a snapshot of what Kövecses (2010) 
_________________ 
60  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.  
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calls “a main meaning focus” of conceptual metaphors: “[T]he main meaning focus 
represents some basic knowledge concerning a source that is widely shared in the 
speech community, that can be found in most instances of the source, and that 
uniquely characterizes the source” (Kövecses 2010: 138).  
 Therefore, let us consider what each specific level in Table 5.4 is highlighting 
about our basic understanding of PERSON and consider examples from the data 
that illustrate how this aspect is mapped onto ANGER. To do so, I will first proceed 
in alphabetical order (as presented in Table 5.4) and will then consider the variety-
specific perspective.  
 We begin with a metaphor that has not been attested by previous research 
outlined in Section 5.2. ANGER can be conceptualized as an ACCOMPLICE, 
albeit relatively infrequently (as is the case for the majority of the specific levels 
here). An accomplice is someone who is complicit with someone else in criminal 
or socially harmful behavior, which can lead to a situation in which one accomplice 
feels the need to protect (= harbor61) or betray the other, as illustrated by (56) and 
(57). 
 
(56) SADAM why do you harbour so much anger???? (KE B) 
(57) His book betrays rage, rage that all his sacrifices were going down the drain 
(KE B) 
 
 ANGER can be understood as a PERSON BEING APPEASED / CALMED, 
which also has a metonymic reading and relates indirectly to the AGITATION 
metonymy outlined by Kövecses (1990). In our basic dealings with angry people, 
the agitated state manifests itself visibly (e.g., shaking) and it is common to take 
action to calm a visibly agitated person through acts of appeasement, as illustrated 
in (58) and (59).  
 
_________________ 
61  The basic definition for harbor [V] in the Macmillan online dictionary is “to protect someone who has done 
something wrong”. This is further supported by a collocational analysis in the GloWbE, where harbor [V] 
collocates 308 times with either a general term denoting a human being, like people, or with terms indicating 
the unlawful connotation: terrorists, criminal, fugitive, rebels, dissidents. Incidentally, this is higher than 
the top two collocations, which have a figurative meaning: ambitions (155 tokens) and feelings (111 
tokens).  
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(58) No amount of ill-gotten wealth or blood money will pacify the outstretched 
hand of God's anger; no amount of offering and sacrifices will turn the face of God 
to favor those who feed on the flesh of others! (NG G) 
(59) […] they know that the resentment of Sporeans towards the PAP are still 
strong... thats why every single Ministers doing a good post GE wayang getai show 
now to appease the anger of many Sporeans. (SG B) 
 
 Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, ANGER can also be seen as a 
COMPANION, e.g., a person being courted, as in (60), or partaking in companion-
like rituals, as in (61). This mapping was not demonstrated by the outlined previous 
research. 
 
(60) To do otherwise is to court the wrath of the people who can hardly afford a 
three-square meal daily. (NG G)  
(61) Resentment presented me with another gift of being stubborn, the refusal to 
re-examine the situation […] (IN G) 
 
 ANGER can take on animalistic features, mostly of the potentially dangerous 
kind, as in (62) and (63), because an unencumbered animal (like Kövecses’ (1990) 
DANGEROUS ANIMAL) or one that has been aroused from sleep (like 
Stefanowitsch’s (2006a) SLEEPING ORGANISM) entails an ensuing attack in our 
experience with dangerous animals. However, not previously taken into account is 
that ANGER can also be conceptualized in a more inert way, as in an animal, like 
a cow, that is being taken advantage of, as in (64). 
 
(62) Our nation, once a land exciting and exuding hope, confidence, pride and 
patriotism, has gradually become a dungeon that arouses the anger and melancholy 
of her citizens. (NG G) 
(63) Given the chance, I am convinced that Nigerians abroad will not choose to 
remain silent, helpless witnesses to the deadly fury unleashed on unsuspecting 
Lagosians. (NG G) 
(64) Obama was smart to ride that anger and milk it. He timed his candidacy well. 
(IN B) 
 
 Also previously unaccounted for is that ANGER can also be a HELPER, but 
in a more specific sense than a COMPANION (albeit, perhaps related, since a 
companion would also in specific instances act as a helper). Nevertheless, HELPER 
was annotated separately from COMPANION on the basis of the more specific 
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theme of rescuing someone in trouble, as in (65), or keeping someone from trouble, 
as in (66).  
 
(65) S. T. Davis argues that the wrath of God rescues us from just such a moral 
relativism by showing us that right and wrong are objectively real and pointing us 
to the moral significance of our deeds. (GB G) 
(66) Our anger restores our pride and our pride is what keeps us grounded. (KE G) 
 
 ANGER is a person involved in the political realm, which could call up a 
metonymic reading as well. ANGER in (67) stands in for the electorate, while (68) 
speaks of the politics attributable to a politician.  
 
(67) […] a mild anger in Britain, an anger that could conceivably elect Buchanan 
in America. (GB G) 
(68) The “us” versus “them” mentality has grown stronger since the 2011 General 
Elections. Unfortunately, the politics of resentment can only go so far. (SG B) 
 
There was no previous attestation for this specific-level PERSON metaphor, but 
since it is very infrequent, i.e., restricted to these two instances above, it is not 
surprising that it has not previously been discussed in terms of a cognitive model of 
ANGER. Furthermore, by allowing for personification in general as a metaphorical 
mechanism, we have to concede all manner of human existence and experience is 
available for personification, if it is sanctioned by the particular discourse 
circumstances, i.e., in the case of (67) and (68) discourse about elections.  
 The creation or development of ANGER is highlighted by conceptualizing it 
as OFFSPRING. (69) illustrates that its relatedness to the ANIMAL domain, by 
conceiving of ANGER in terms of (large-scale) breeding, while (70) allocates 
responsibility for the arrival of ANGER in terms of birth (where the birthing mother 
in this instance is also a personified abstract concept). 
 
(69) Putting all the blame on Awo for their suffering during the war won't help Igbo 
people; it will only breed resentment towards them in Yorubas. (NG G) 
(70) Sooner or later they fall from these heights and then we want to trample them 
in the dirt. It is an anger born from disappointed admiration. (IN B) 
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Esenova (2011) postulated ANGER IS A CHILD as a subcategory of 
CONTAINMENT due to the nature of pregnancy and birth: A pregnant or birthing 
mother acts as a CONTAINER to the CHILD, which is mapped onto ANGER. 
However, utterances like (69) and (70) were not annotated in the present study in 
the sense of CONTAINMENT (along with the mirror image metaphor ANGER IS 
A PARENT in (73) and (74) below), because from the linguistic evidence I believe 
the CONTAINMENT sense is not in focus. For ANGER IS OFFSPRING, the onset 
of angry feelings is being highlighted, which suggested to me the creation process 
of bearing offspring over the containment sense, which is albeit indirectly 
conveyed.  
 To a large extent, ANGER is conceptualized as an OPPONENT in this study, 
which confirms previous findings by Kövecses (1990) and Stefanowitsch (2006a), 
as well as Esenova (2011), who postulates ANGER as a HIDDEN ENEMY, which 
I view as a specific-level instantiation of OPPONENT. This has mostly to do with 
the oppositional aspects of ANGER, which make sense in our basic experience. 
ANGER, expressed inappropriately, is widely considered a socially destructive 
emotion and as such needs to be opposed to in the individual or in society as a 
whole. Therefore, “the regulation and appropriate expression of anger are key 
developmental tasks. Individuals must learn their culture’s ‘display rules,’ which 
concern when, to whom, and how to express emotions in culturally acceptable 
ways” (Lemerise & Dodge 2008: 730–731). This regulation takes on an 
oppositional character because anger exists and attempts have to be made to control 
it, so that it is appropriately expressed or not at all. (71) makes the confrontation 
inherent in experiencing anger and controlling anger for the individual apparent. 
(72) puts the focus on the confrontational aspect of behaving badly coupled with a 
negative societal response. 
 
(71) […] keep an open attitude and sunny outlook in order to help fight negative 
emotions like anger, fear and guilt. (SG B) 
(72) As it is in kenya now, you either deal with people with dignity or face the 
wrath. (KE B) 
 
However, it should be noted that the ANGER IS AN OPPONENT metaphors are 
the only type of PERSON metaphors that can be broken down into further meaning 
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foci components (= level 3), which will be considered in more detail later in this 
section. 
 Conceptually related to OFFSPRING, ANGER can also be viewed as the 
PARENT, which was not discussed in the previous research outlined in Section 5.1. 
In this sense, ANGER is understood as responsible for having created something, 
like angry critics on social media, as in (73), or, even positively, as creating 
“something beautiful”, in (74), although this reading is the result of the mixed 
metaphor with COMPOST.  
 
(73) […] the idle and idling, twittering, collective children of anger, the distracted 
crowd of Facebook addicts, the BBM-pinging soap opera gossips of Nigeria […]. 
(NG G) 
(74) We know that anger can be a kind of compost, and that it is within its power 
to give birth to something beautiful. (SG G)  
 
 ANGER, as a PERSON WITH THE ABILITY TO SPEAK, can also invoke 
a metonymic reading and was not previously discussed. The collective voice 
attributable to ANGER in (75) could stand in for the angry people themselves, while 
the same is true for ANGER greeting in (76). Example (77), however, seems to 
relate ANGER to a person inside oneself that screams, which solidifies a more 
metaphorical reading, particularly since what it is saying is quoted.  
 
(75) We acknowledged common ground on this and more, reflecting on how hope 
and anger could find collective voice. (GB B) 
(76) […] a new paradigm of citizenship in a country where resignation and cynicism 
(if not resentment and anger) greets any mention of politics (KE G) 
(77) My tormented mind, wanting to reveal the truth, anger screams in my head... 
"Out with it... OUT with it... " (SG B) 
 
 ANGER can be personified as a PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS or WHO IS 
DYING. Not only is the death itself highlighted, as in (78), but also something 
related to ILLNESS, like blindness in (79), for which Kövecses (1990) pinpoints a 
metonymic relationship (ANGER IS INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE 
PERCEPTION). Furthermore, conceptually related and thus viewed as belonging 
to this particular categorization, is (80), which encodes the experience of taking 
care of someone who is ill or dying, i.e., nursing a person to health or a positive 
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physical state, such as, in this case, being warm. This particular mapping was not 
found in the previous research.  
 
(78) When did you die? Is Jesus living in you now? Has your anger died? (NG G) 
(79) […] I once threatened to smash the window of a car - acts of blind rage I still 
regret today. (SG B) 
(80) And should this come to pass, then like Tam's Kate, this one will be nursing 
her wrath to keep it warm for a very long time to come. (GB B) 
 
 In addition to the specific levels outlined above, there are two miscellaneous 
categories within the broad ANGER IS A PERSON metaphor that concern various 
characteristics and actions that can be attributed to human beings. They were 
considered miscellaneous because they were not easily characterized by the other 
specific levels and do not display any conceptual cohesion within themselves. They 
also provide evidence for the relative freedom of personification to select aspects 
of human experience for metaphorization that are perhaps not as central to the 
cognitive model of an emotion, but can arise in an appropriate discourse context. 
(81) and (82) illustrate ANGER TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON; (83) and (84) illustrate ANGER INVOLVED IN 
ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON.  
 
(81) The exposures grow by the day. So does the citizens righteous anger. (SG G) 
(82) […] the resentment appears to have morphed into an intense, almost irrational 
rage. (SG B) 
(83) This feeling of rage and hopelessness is what flips the switch for 4th Prince 
[…]. (SG G) 
(84) All the best to you. May you stump [= confuse, BAG] anger today! (IN G) 
 
 In terms of how the varieties compare regarding these above outlined 
specific-level instantiations of ANGER IS A PERSON, the unfortunate 
consequence of such a breakdown is that the frequencies available for comparison 
become relatively small. For instance, ANGER AS A HELPER, PERSON IN 
POLITICS and PARENT have no more than 2 or 3 instances. It would, therefore, 
be problematic to assume variety preferences on the basis of infrequency. For 
example, all three instances of PARENT show up in New English varieties only, in 
this case NG and SG, but this exclusivity is merely due to the infrequency with 
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which the GloWbE varieties has evidenced this mapping. It does not lead to the 
assumption that ANGER IS A PARENT can only be instantiated by New English 
varieties, especially since the constructions breed EMOTION or born from / of 
EMOTION do not strike me as a speaker of American English as culturally specific 
and, in fact, seem perfectly conventional and as possible utterances from other 
variety speakers. It is just that they are not attestable with the GloWbE data at hand 
beyond NG and SG.  
 A similar situation holds for the rest of the specific levels, with the exception 
of OPPONENT. ANGER IS AN OPPONENT emerges as a special instantiation of 
ANGER IS A PERSON based on the fact that with 101 total tokens, it makes up 
just over half of the PERSON metaphor grouping – 50.75% to be precise. 
 Furthermore, as Table 5.5 demonstrates, there are differences between 
varieties when conceptualizing ANGER as AN OPPONENT in comparison to the 
other types of PERSON (ex. ACCOMPLICE, HELPER, OFFSPRING, PARENT, 
etc.) 
 
Table 5.5: Absolute frequencies of OPPONENT as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A 
PERSON 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
OPPONENT 13 22 25 27 14 
PERSON (other) 19 21 22 9 27 
total 32 43 47 36 41 
 
 
A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.5 and 
revealed that the observed differences are significant (x2 = 14.42, df = 4, p = 
0.006068). It is striking that among all the varieties, the lowest proportion of 
OPPONENT metaphors is found in SG (34% of all PERSON metaphors) and GB 
(41% of all PERSON metaphors). The percentages in the other three New English 
varieties are much larger (NG with 51%, KE with 53% and IN with 75%). This 
perhaps indicates that the majority of the New Englishes, most prominently the 
Indian variety, tend to prefer conceptualizing ANGER as AN OPPONENT. 
Moreover, this leads us to look closer at the domain of OPPONENT.  
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As indicated above, OPPONENT can be broken down into different meaning 
foci, which are repeated in Table 5.6 for convenience.  
 
Table 5.6: Breakdown of ANGER IS AN OPPONENT per variety 
OPPONENT GB NG KE IN SG 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-
level (= level 2)  
5 7 13 13 8 
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3) 0 1 2 0 1 
BEING CONTROLLED (BY FORCE) 
(= level 3) 
3 0 1 1 2 
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT 
OPPONENT (= level 3) 
1 3 1 3 0 
FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE (= level 
3) 
0 3 5 1 0 
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3) 1 1 1 2 0 
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED 
AGAINST (= level 3)  
2 4 0 4 2 
WHO IS IN PURSUIT (= level 3)  0 2 0 0 0 
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) 1 1 2 3 1 
total 13 22 25 27 14 
 
 
All varieties make use of ANGER IS AN OPPONENT most frequently in the most 
general oppositional sense: ANGER is understood as an enemy or an opponent to 
be encountered. This is illustrated in the following examples. 
 
(85) Many wronged householders were therefore instrumental in saving the lives of 
burglars and other felons who faced the full wrath of the so-called 'bloody code'. 
(GB B) 
(86) […] the Senate expressing shock and surprise at the latest development, 
warning the legal body to desist or face the wrath of the Federal lawmakers. (NG 
B) 
(87) Musieka revealed that it was under this tree that Shikuku made the prophecy 
warning that whoever would cut it down should be ready to face his wrath. (KE G) 
(88) The Picasso of India had to face the wrath of hurting Hindu feelings and was 
compelled to live in exile till his death. (IN B) 
(89) Anyone can face the fury of LKY.... anyone! (SG G) 
In fact, making use of face to reflected the mapping ANGER IS AN OPPONENT 
constitutes the majority of metaphors of this kind (12 tokens (including anger […] 
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staring everyone in the face) in GB, all seven tokens in NG, eight tokens in KE, 
seven tokens in IN and 5 tokens (including in the face of […] anger) in SG), which 
speaks to its conventionality. Yet, the general oppositional meaning is also captured 
by the following examples, which demonstrate that this meaning can be encoded 
otherwise.  
 
(90) Doyle’s nervousness was fighting with irritation now. (GB G) 
(91) […] he still wrestles with horrendous feelings of “anger, bitterness and yes, 
revenge” (GB G) 
(92) I remember in primary school merely uttering the word “sex” was enough to 
encounter the wrath of an irate forty year old man wielding a cane […] (KE B) 
(93) We feared his wrath, but we knew he was always on our side. (KE G) 
(94) […] actually forced politicians of this country to come down to earth and fear 
the wrath of the people. (IN G) 
(95) […] anger is a more powerful foe than desire. (IN G) 
(96) The greatest enemies of the spiritual aspirant are wealth, sex, fame and 
anger. (IN G) 
(97) And I have really been enduring an unwarranted onslaught of anger and 
spitefulness - knowing that the other person is intentionally taking it out on me. 
(SG G) 
(98) I struggle a lot with unholy anger, especially on days where the kids are 
being difficult […] (SG G) 
 
 Level 3, as demonstrated in Table 5.6, retains the general oppositional 
meaning attached to ANGER AS AN OPPONENT, but highlights more specific 
focal meaning. The frequencies here are also very low, so that statistical analysis is 
difficult from a variety-specific perspective. Yet, they are nevertheless part of the 
metaphorical inventory of OPPONENT and are thus illustrated by examples (99) - 
(114) below.  
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (A HIDDEN ENEMY) 
(99) “Okay now Joanne. Hold on”, I said anger and righteous indignation creeping 
in. (KE G) 
(100) However, more often than we like to admit, our own agenda creeps in, and 
along with that, unholy anger. (SG G) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (BEING CONTROLLED BY FORCE) 
(101) Even otherwise (if you are not a spiritual seeker) you tend to suppress anger 
(after it is born) to promote particular professional or social image. (IN G) 
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(102) Girls were taught to be obedient and suppress their anger. However, one 
should rage when one needs to. (SG G) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT) 
(103) A major casualty of the fury in Muslim nations over a movie made in the 
United State which insulted the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) was the U.S 
Ambassador and three other US citizens. (NG B) 
(104) […] the anger against the media can turn vicious and dangerous to the lives 
of media persons […] (IN B) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE) 
(105) Even after moving elections to 2013, I promise them that they'll not escape 
the wrath of Kenyans. (KE B) 
(106) […] his obsequious servitors and promoters were forced to flee the wrath of 
the people. (NG G) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (WHO EXERTS CONTROL) 
(107) Anger makes everybody its slave and victim. (IN G) 
(108) There is no sign of righteousness, love, peace and hope, but injustice, 
unrighteousness, hate, anger, resentment, bitterness, evil, wickedness, violence, 
killings, and hopelessness reign supreme in every household, neighborhood and 
city. (NG B) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST) 
(109) The people stood down the rage of shibboleths and political predators to 
claim their state and it is a wakeup call for all Nigerians […] (NG G) 
(110) At times they are able to overcome their anger and other negative emotions 
and sometimes such emotions overpower them. (IN G) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS IN PURSUIT) 
(111) […] their activities had been on the increase, while urging those still in the 
trade to stop it as the wrath of the law would soon catch up with them. (NG G) 
(112) In recent literary history, one can think of only one parallel - the zealous fury 
that hounded Salman Rushdie after the publication of Satanic Verses. (NG B) 
 
ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS PREVAILING)  
(113) If you loved me indulgently you would buy two cheap plates every month, 
place them within reach and point me in their direction when my anger got the 
better of me (KE G) 
(114) Perhaps they fell victims to the hatred and rage of the raiders. (IN G) 
 This concludes the ANGER IS A PERSON breakdown, in which ANGER IS 
AN OPPONENT emerges as the most salient for all varieties. There was also 
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indication that it is a metaphor that is preferred (in the Kövecsesian (2005) sense) 
in the African and Indian varieties.  
5.3.2 ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER  
ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER has been widely attested to in previous 
research (e.g., Kövecses 1990 and Stefanowitsch 2006a), so it comes as no surprise 
that it features in the GloWbE data. A close second to PERSON, ANGER IS A 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER comprises 21.5% of the total ANGER data (161 total 
tokens) and is ranked in second place in all varieties. Figure 5.7 shows the 
percentages of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER in the individual 
metaphor profiles of the varieties.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Percentages of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER per variety 
 
There are no striking differences between the varieties for this source domain. KE 
has the largest amount of FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 24.7%, directly followed 
by NG with 23.3%, IN with 20.7%, GB with 20% and SG with 18.7%.  
 FLUID IN A CONTAINER, as an initially broadly labelled source domain, 
can be broken down, see Table 5.7 below, into specific levels that contribute 
different meaning foci. All specific levels variously highlight aspects about what 
we understand about the properties of a fluid in a container. 
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Table 5.7: Breakdown of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER62 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  3 2 2 0 0 
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)  3 1 1 2 2 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level 
(= level 2)  
3 4 4 4 5 
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - specific-
level (= level 2) 
1 0 0 0 1 
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
0 0 0 0 0 
   FLUID BEING DISRUPTED - (= level 3) 1 2 0 1 0 
   FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER 
PRESSURE)- (= level 3) 
0 3 0 1 1 
   FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER- (= level 3) 0 0 3 4 0 
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
4 6 12 7 7 
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM - (= 
level 3)  
7 9 11 9 11 
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) 
EXPLOSION - (= level 3)  
8 8 4 3 1 
total 30 35 37 31 28 
 
 
The most frequent specific level source domain for ANGER is expectedly HOT 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER (including its level 3s), especially for KE with 27 
instances. This frequency of HOT FLUID within the FLUID IN A CONTAINER 
domain harkens back to Lakoff’s (1987a) claim that it is a central mapping for 
ANGER, cited in Section 5.2 above. Yet, as Table 5.7 illustrates, not all specific 
level source domains had HEAT as an explicit meaning focus, as evidenced by 
examples from the GloWbE. Therefore, the broadest label that was given to this 
group of mappings was FLUID IN A CONTAINER.  
 FLUID IN A CONTAINER maps onto ANGER the general properties 
constituting our knowledge of how contained fluid behaves. We can select from 
these properties in the construction of linguistic metaphors in various ways. This 
can also occur in a very general way, as evidenced by the GB, NG, and KE 
examples below.  
_________________ 
62  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A. 
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(115) I was in complete bits and filled with rage. (GB B) 
(116) […] the employees were the taps and he and the other contract employees 
were the buckets into which the wrath poured. (NG B) 
(117) […] Wanjiku was filled with anger and picked a wooden plunk from the 
ground and hit Kodoosi on the head […] (KE G) 
 
The act of filling a container is one of our most basic experiences with containers, 
hence the labelling of utterances like (115) – (117) as generic. Example (116) is 
particularly clear about the container being filled with a fluid by the use of buckets 
and poured. However, filled with in (115) and (117) leaves some ambiguity about 
the substance being put into the container, because a container can be filled with 
something else other than a fluid (i.e., filling a bucket with dirt when working in 
the garden). Therefore, a collocational analysis of filled with was conducted with 
the GloWbE, which revealed that it most frequently collocates with terms denoting 
some sort of fluid: water (595 tokens), tears (305 tokens), fluid (46 tokens) and 
liquid (33 tokens). This finding boosted my intuition that filled with + emotion term 
likely reflects a mapping from the source domain FLUID IN A CONTAINER.  
 The first two specific levels listed in Table 5.7, namely BODY FLUID and 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER, demonstrate that ANGER is also generally 
understood as a FLUID, but it can be specified in terms of natural body fluids or on 
the basis of a folk model related to ENERGY AS A FLUID. We will consider 
BODY FLUID first.  
 ANGER can be understood as a BODY FLUID, like bile and vomit, although 
not very frequently (the most tokens were found in GB with three and IN and SG 
with two each).  
 
(118) It leaves a bitter taste of biilious [sic] fury in me. (GB G)  ANGER IS 
BILE 
(119) Their spewing their wrath against Obama […] (IN G)  ANGER IS VOMIT 
(120) […]  Singaporeans who knew nothing about critical social and political 
thinking and could only degenerate themselves into loudmouths who had nothing 
useful to say but with anger spewing out in every direction. (SG B)  ANGER IS 
VOMIT 
 
These largely indicate unpleasant bodily experiences with fluid. For instance, the 
taste of bile, like in (118), is bitter, and vomiting is obviously an unpalatable 
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experience (note that in (119) and (120) it is being mapped onto expressing anger, 
exploiting the image of someone expelling vomit).  
 The mapping of ANGER IS ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER presents 
a special case. The association between ANGER and a FLUID IN THE BODY is 
made by way of a folk model that dictates our (non-expert) understanding of 
ENERGY63, namely ENERGY AS A (FLOWING) FLUID. For instance, electricity 
is an energy source that “is a familiar phenomenon” but “its mechanisms are 
essentially invisible” (Gentner & Gentner 1983: 107). Because we have no real 
visual access to the mechanisms of electricity, it is common to explain it in terms 
of flowing water (108)64. Furthermore, “[g]iven that electricity is not something we 
can directly observe, our intuitive understanding of it is indirect”, which leads to 
metaphors that become part of our conventional and, thus, literal ways of thinking 
and talking about electricity (Lakoff 1986: 4). Examples from the GloWbE provide 
evidence for this.  
 
(121) Since anger is energy, try to channel it positively - exercise, art, sports etc. 
(GB G)  
(122) While they are investigating, let us take justice in our own hands, and channel 
our anger towards the government. (NG B) 
(123) […] persuade me into believing as though ‘everything is fine’ so that the 
anger energy subsides […] (KE G) 
(124) The anger must be channelized this way and not by killing others. (IN G) 
(125) A movement that is energized by outrage, wrath and hostility can hardly be 
something that can truly move the hearts […] (SG B) 
 
 The third specific level shows that ANGER can be conceived of as a BODY 
OF WATER, which also implies CONTAINMENT, albeit less prototypically. The 
BODY OF WATER domain merges the concept of FLUID with the CONTAINER 
_________________ 
63  For differences between the novice and expert models of an energy source, like electricity, see, e.g., 
Stocklmayer & Treagust (1996). They also highlight the long attested tradition of teaching electricity via 
recourse to the FLUID domain. “Children coming into high school have a vague and often fearful image of 
electricity. Once they encounter formal circuitry they are required to understand a mechanistic model of 
electron movement through a wire which, by analogy and metaphor, is closely allied to fluid transfer. All 
the language of electricity reinforces this model” (176).  
64  Gentner & Gentner (1983) demonstrate this by citing instructions for making a homemade lamp. “An 
electrical system can be compared to a water system. Water flows through the pipes of a water system. 
Electricity can be considered as ‘flowing’ through the wires of an electrical system. Wire is the pipe that 
electricity ‘flows’ through” (108). 
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itself, since, in our physical experiences with large bodies of water, it is difficult to 
disentangle the accumulation of water (like in a pond, river, ocean, etc.) with its 
geologically demarcated basins. Therefore, like in (126) and (127), ANGER is 
being conceptualized as something that has been vastly accumulated, like a 
reservoir of water.  
 
(126) As the right taps into a reservoir of anger and resentment in our divided 
society, it is harder than ever for the left to get a hearing on practically anything. 
(GB G) 
(127) Reservoirs of good will have been replaced with reservoirs of anger and 
resentment. (SG G) 
 
This metaphor, however, was very infrequent. The examples above show the only 
two instances found.  
 A more frequent specific level is that of FLUID MOVING IN A 
CONTAINER (16 total tokens), which can be broken down further into the meaning 
foci of FLUID BEING DISRUPTED, FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER 
(UNDER PRESSURE) and FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER. Although 
linguistic metaphors similar to those in (128) – (136) have at times been lumped 
together as instantiating the domain of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (e.g., like 
His pent-up anger welled up inside him in Kövecses (1990: 53)), I made the 
decision to consider them separately. This is largely due to the fact that the linguistic 
surface of the examples below did not suggest to me the inclusion of the HEAT 
component, at least not explicitly. Furthermore, the focus here lies on our 
understanding of how a fluid can move (or be moved) in a container, which is then 
mapped onto ANGER.  
 
ANGER IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER BEING DISRUPTED 
(128) Sylvain Distin stirred the rage of the Newcastle support by turning them 
down […] (GB G) 
(129) […]  the fact that the military government did not prosecute the officers that 
killed the northern leaders stirred further rage. (NG G) 
(130) […]American-made video denigrating the Prophet Muhammad that has 
stirred anger across the Muslim world. (IN B) 
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ANGER IS FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) 
(131) There's something about righteous anger; it wells up within us when we think 
about how we've been wronged by one artisan […] (NG G) 
(132) Cain would always swell with anger anytime Michael referred to him as a 
small boy. (NG B) 
(133) […] the amount of rage that builds up inside you can only be immense. (SG 
B) 
 
ANGER IS FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER 
(134) […] i will now again pour forth my wrath upon you Kenya […] (KE B) 
(135) […] an anger that, through the unravelling of many other scams, has now 
spilled on to the streets of Indian towns and cities. (IN G) 
(136) […] the anger of the common men and women of India began to spill out on 
the social web. (IN B) 
 
 The most frequent specific level, which also can be dissected further, is HOT 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 107 of the total 161 tokens (or 66.5%). What is 
being conveyed here is that the intensity of an angry feeling can increase like a 
heated fluid in a container (e.g., water boiling in a pot on the stove). Examples (137) 
– (141) illustrate this.  
 
(137) I read it through and I'm still seething with anger - and more importantly, I 
want to help. (GB G) 
(138) Nigerians are unaware of the source of this loot, don't wait for the anger of 
the people to boil over before you make amends. (NG G) 
(139) No, I am speaking for those of us who have been letting our anger simmer 
inside of us […] (KE G) 
(140) Long-simmering resentment among Uighurs over rule by China’s Han 
majority […] (IN G) 
(141) Lee Kuan Yew and his government are of course boiling with anger at what 
I am doing […] (SG G) 
 
 The two even more specific levels of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER speak 
to what happens when the intensity becomes a control issue. Our understanding of 
a HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is that, as the intensity of the heat of the fluid 
increases, it exerts so much pressure on the container that it has to be released, e.g., 
as gas or steam or even resulting in an explosion. These properties have been 
mapped onto ANGER and also exploit specific images we encounter in the physical 
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world, i.e., steam from a tea kettle, the powerful explosion of a volcano, etc. 
Examples below illustrate these mappings.  
 
ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER BEING RELEASED AS GAS / 
STEAM 
(142) His outrageous pen portraits, some comical, some steaming with anger […] 
(GB G) 
(143) It is therefore not uncommon that when university students feel like venting 
their rage, they go in search of the police. (NG G) 
(144) […] screaming at his students and even took off his clothes while he was 
venting his rage. (KE G) 
(145) […] shout out all the filth they knew and vent their anger. (IN G) 
(146) […] Singaporeans are sharing their frustrations and venting their anger at a 
‘no holds barred’ Government. (SG G) 
 
ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER BEING RELEASED IN A 
(VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION 
(147) Rock star Morrissey exploded with anger in the High Court when he was 
cross-examined […] (GB G) 
(148) Years of piled up anger and frustrations just saw a reason to erupt and inflame 
whatever was on its path. (NG G) 
(149) Mombasa erupts in anger, this being the last straw following assassinations 
[…] (KE G) 
(150) He was annoyed, and anger burst through his forehead. (IN G) 
(151) And seemingly unable to contain their own angered embarrassment of having 
been exposed of thorough incompetence by this very public eruption of peasantry 
anger […] (SG G) 
 
 Since the majority of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER are of the 
HOT FLUID kind, this specific level lends itself to closer inspection. Table 5.8 
shows the distribution of ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER vis-à-vis 
other FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphors and demonstrates that the African 
varieties (in particular KE) have the largest share of HOT FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER.  
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Table 5.8: Absolute frequencies of HOT FLUID as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
HOT FLUID 19 23 27 19 19 
FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER 
(other) 
11 12 10 12 9 
total 30 35 37 31 28 
 
 
All varieties have more instances of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER over all other 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER source domains combined. A chi-square test performed 
on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.8 did not reveal any significant differences 
(x2 = 1.241, df = 4, p = 0.87130). Therefore, it seems that for ANGER IS A FLUID 
IN A CONTAINER, the varieties collectively tend toward HOT FLUID, which 
again lends support to Lakoff’s (1987a) claim of its centrality to the metaphorical 
system of ANGER.  
5.3.3 ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE  
Another prominent source domain for ANGER is NATURAL FORCE, which we 
will zoom into in this section. NATURAL FORCE contributes 94 instances of the 
750 metaphors collected for ANGER – 12.5% to be precise. Although its 
contribution is not as pronounced as PERSON and FLUID, like these mappings, it 
has been attested to in the previous research, e.g., Kövecses’ (1990) ANGER IS 
FIRE (that kindled my ire) and ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE (it was a stormy 
meeting). Despite Kövecses having separately treated these two, I decided to treat 
them together, since I view FIRE as a specific instance of the more broadly framed 
NATURAL FORCE, as will be apparent in the breakdown below.  
 In view of their metaphor profiles, the varieties range between 8.7% - 17.3% 
for NATURAL FORCE, with the largest proportion being attributable to GB and 
the lowest to KE. Figure 5.8 provides us with an overview of the percentages across 
varieties.  
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Figure 5.8: Percentages of ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety 
 
 Of course, NATURAL FORCE was initially broadly constructed (following 
the method employed in the present study). As such, it can be broken down into its 
component parts. What these components have in common, however, is that they 
can be categorized on the virtue of referring to elemental powers, i.e, forces of 
nature like fire, wind, rain, etc., that we physically experience and interact with 
continually. From experience, we know that we technically have no control over 
them, which demonstrates that ANGER understood as a NATURAL FORCE 
emphasizes the control aspect, like OPPONENT. Furthermore, at times, we 
experience natural forces as particularly intense, like a severe rain storm or a raging 
fire. This emphasizes the intensity aspect of a cognitive model of ANGER. Table 
5.9 presents the breakdown of NATURAL FORCE for ANGER. 
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Table 5.9: Breakdown of ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety65 
NATURAL FORCE  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  1 0 0 0 0 
AVALANCHE – specific-level (= level 2) 0 1 0 0 0 
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2) 3 3 4 4 4 
   CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3) 1 1 0 0 0 
   DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3) 1 0 0 2 1 
   MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 3) 5 2 2 4 2 
   STARTING A FIRE (= level 3) 7 4 2 2 1 
HEAT - specific-level (= level 2) 3 2 0 0 1 
STORM - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 0 1 0 
WATER - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 1 0 0 
   RAIN (= level 3) 0 0 1 0 1 
   WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3) 5 2 2 9 7 
WIND - specific-level (= level 2)  0 0 1 1 0 
total 26 15 13 23 17 
 
 
The elements of NATURAL FORCE, which ANGER metaphors most commonly 
emphasize, are FIRE (including HEAT) and WATER, but not exclusively so. 
AVALANCHE, STORM and WIND are also represented, albeit in very small 
numbers, as illustrated by (152) - (154). Additionally, example (155) illustrates an 
instance of NATURAL FORCE that was determined to be generic, since sweep 
collocates with various terms denoting the elements (wave, wind, sea, fire, storm, 
etc.) and, therefore, it did not lend itself to specification.  
 
(152) But the avalanches of mass anger from below [...] (NG B) 
(153) Resentment against ex-militants was already brewing for some time because 
of rampant extortion […] (IN B) 
(154) The class seven pupil at Kasosi Primary School soon found himself on the 
receiving end of a whirling vortex of crowd anger […] (KE B) 
(155) We see far more alarming examples of it in the Muslim fury that sweeps the 
world. (GB B) 
_________________ 
65  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.  
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Although these mappings are only attributable to a few varieties, this does not 
entirely discount their existence as part of the metaphorical system of ANGER in 
other varieties. It merely demonstrates that these particular mappings are not 
necessarily prominent. The focal point for ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE is 
solidly FIRE and WATER (evidenced by their ability to be broken down even 
further into level 3s), which we will consider in more detail.  
 Starting with FIRE, it is mapped onto ANGER in the general terms of burning 
and in terms of its component parts, like, fumes, flares, etc. Examples to illustrate 
this general association are given below.  
 
(156) His essays on this subject are often great flares of truth and anger. (GB G) 
(157) I was in a burning rage that dominated my first series of tweets […] (NG B) 
(158) When he was confronted, he first burned with anger. (KE B)  
(159) […] all shades of saffron were left fuming in anger and disbelief. (IN G) 
(160) First comes the helplessness, then the indignation, followed by the burning 
anger. (SG G) 
 
Naturally, the most basic concept of FIRE, i.e., BURNING, is retained at an even 
more specific level for ANGER IS FIRE. The main meaning focus of these levels 
highlight other characteristics of FIRE, which, in turn, are mapped onto ANGER.  
 
ANGER IS A FIRE (CONTROLLING A FIRE) 
(161) […] I can not stamp out the feeling of resentment towards the profession for 
most of the reasons listed by various contributors above. (GB G) 
(162) When these are absent, no amount of armoured tanks would be able to put 
out the inferno of rage […] (NG G) 
 
ANGER IS A FIRE (A DESTRUCTIVE FIRE) 
(163) Christopher Calder clearly is consumed with anger, resentment and bitterness 
[…] (IN G) 
(164) The latter was engulfed by anger and embarassment [sic] at the same time. 
(SG G) 
 
ANGER IS A FIRE (MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE) 
(165) That's crazy, divisive, expensive and a recipe for stoking up resentment. (GB 
G) 
(166) The decision to charge miners under the apartheid era “common purpose” law 
fueled anger […] (KE B) 
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(167) While the TMC and the CPI(M) are determined to fan the anger for electoral 
gain, Abhijit is scouting for Muslim leaders to campaign for him. (IN G) 
 
ANGER IS A FIRE (STARTING A FIRE) 
(168) This revelation, something that had not crossed his mind before, sparked off 
an anger in him […] (GB G) 
(169) God is watching you and His anger is kindled waiting for the appropriate 
time to release vexation upon you. (NG G) 
 
 A related concept is that of HEAT. It was annotated separately from FIRE 
because the linguistic examples did not make the burning attribute of FIRE explicit, 
like in the examples above, although this is likely implied.  
 
(170) The scene shows Plainview incandescent with rage at having to demean 
himself […] (GB G) 
(171) Our anger must be felt in the heat of the sun. We must take back our nation; 
our lives depend on it. (NG G) 
(172) In the heat of anger, we forgot to ask him to explain his remark. (SG G) 
 
Nevertheless, HEAT can also be considered a component of FIRE and, therefore, 
there are grounds to merge it with FIRE, at least in terms of considering how the 
intensity of ANGER is metaphorized.  
 Moving on to WATER, there is only one instance that was considered to be 
generic, namely drowning in anger, because it was not clear from this linguistic 
metaphor if ANGER is being conceptualized as a body of water (which has obvious 
conceptual ties to CONTAINER) or something else more specific, like FLOOD. 
Nevertheless, there are two even more specific levels that highlight WATER’s 
contribution to the conceptualization of ANGER, although one is clearly preferred 
across the varieties to the other.  
 The less significant of the two is RAIN, with only two instances in KE and 
SG.  
 
(173) Dear God, as You rest Kasuku's soul in peace, may Your wrath and fury rain 
down on her killers! (KE G) 
(174) […] u will die under my wrath which will rain down […] (SG G) 
 What is much more substantial is WAVES (FLOOD), which was found in all 
varieties. Here again, we see that ANGER is being highlighted as an uncontrollable 
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and particular intense emotion, analogous to the lack of control and intensity we 
experience with something like a FLOOD.  
 
(175) […] Akin has attracted a small but determined band of female supporters who 
believe they can stem the tide of resentment against him. (GB G) 
(176) Any man who stands in this path deserve to be swept off with the deluge of 
our wrath. (NG B) 
(177) […] the Kismayo business community had been planning to demonstrate 
against the continued port closure, so there is a groundswell of resentment […] 
(KE B) 
(178) Do not let yourself be swept away by the rage. (IN G) 
(179) But anyway, after my little rant on twitter came a tidal wave of fury like I’ve 
never seen before (SG B) 
 
 From a cross-variety perspective, while GB makes use of the NATURAL 
FORCE domain more frequently overall, with 26 tokens (28%), there seems to be 
a consensus among the varieties that FIRE (including HEAT) is preferable to 
WATER. This preference for FIRE / HEAT is the most pronounced in NG (80%), 
GB (77%) and KE (62%). It is less so for the Asian Englishes. IN uses FIRE 52% 
of the time (there were no instances of HEAT in IN), while WATER is used 39% 
of the time. SG is similar: FIRE / HEAT is at 53%, while WATER is at 47%. 
Compared to the African Englishes and British English, the percentages for 
WATER trend lower (13% for NG, 19% for GB and 31% for KE).  
 Since three-fifths of the varieties clearly prefer FIRE over WATER, it is 
interesting to take a closer look. Table 5.10 demonstrates the distribution of FIRE 
+ HEAT across the varieties in comparison to other NATURAL FORCE domains.  
 
Table 5.10: Absolute frequencies of FIRE + HEAT as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A 
NATURAL FORCE 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
FIRE + HEAT 20 12 8 12 11 
NATURAL 
FORCE (other) 
6 3 5 11 6 
total 26 15 13 23 17 
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A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.10 and 
disclosed that the observed differences are not significant (x2 = 4.808, df = 4, p = 
0.30757). Therefore, what can be basically gleaned from this overview of FEAR IS 
A NATURAL FORCE is that the varieties tend to prefer FIRE / HEAT and 
WATER, considering the bulk is found for these source domains and there is no 
clear preference between them in a variety-specific way.  
5.3.4 ANGER IS AN ILLNESS 
ANGER being conceived of in terms of an ILLNESS has been postulated in 
previous research on the cognitive model of ANGER, e.g., Kövecses (1990) 
describes ANGER IS INSANITY, while Stefanowitsch (2006a) puts forth a more 
general mapping, ANGER IS A DISEASE, of which INSANITY could be viewed 
as a subcategory. The following section outlines ANGER IS AN ILLNESS (opting 
for the more inclusive label over DISEASE), which occupied between the third and 
fourth rank across the varieties and provides 11.1% of the ANGER data overall. 
Figure 5.9 demonstrates the percentages of ILLNESS within each variety.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Percentages of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS per variety 
 
KE is the most obvious outlier with only 5.3% of its ANGER metaphors being 
attributable to ILLNESS, while GB and SG are tied with 11.3%, and NG and IN 
proportionally demonstrate the most with 12.7% and 14.7%, respectively. 
Nevertheless, by dissecting ILLNESS into more specific-level components, as 
demonstrated in Table 5.11, it becomes apparent that the majority of these 
mappings congregate around a particular meaning focus on level 3, which, in 
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essence, provides indication that their preferences within the ILLNESS source 
domain are similar.  
 
Table 5.11: Breakdown of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS per variety66 
ILLNESS  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  1 0 1 4 1 
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2) 1 0 0 0 0 
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING 
SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)  
1 2 0 5 0 
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – 
specific-level (=level 2)  
0 0 0 0 0 
   ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL (= level 3) 0 0 0 0 2 
   LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3) 6 5 4 7 10 
   PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3) 0 2 1 0 0 
   WOUND / SKIN-RELATED (= level 3)  1 0 1 1 1 
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2) 3 4 0 0 0 
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
2 2 0 2 1 
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2) 2 2 1 3 2 
MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
0 2 0 0 0 
total  17 19 8 22 17 
 
 
All varieties show that AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (LOSS OF 
CONTROL OF BODY) is the most salient way of conceptualizing ANGER, which 
will be discussed in more detail below. First, it is necessary to illustrate the levels 
in Table 5.11 with examples.  
 At the generic level, ANGER IS AN ILLNESS puts forth an understanding 
of this negative emotion as something unhealthy or dangerous to our system or 
general well-being. This general conceptual aspect of ILLNESS is illustrated in the 
examples below.  
 
(180) […] my example of what I ‘need’ during bouts of anger is only figurative. 
(GB B) 
_________________ 
66  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.  
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(181) When one suffers from anger, it's not Buddhist anger, Hindu anger, or 
Christian anger. (IN G) 
(182) He suggests therefore a sovereign remedy that would at once cure him of the 
root cause of the dangerous disease that manifests itself in murder. Anger! (IN G) 
(183) I love how we sometimes get upset with each other but never ever got into 
full blown anger before […] (SG B) 
 
The general meaning is, of course, inherited by the more specific levels, which 
elaborate it in the following ways.  
 ANGER can be understood as so dangerous or so unhealthy that it is deadly 
to the person who experiences it. GB, provides, the only instance of this more 
elaborated mapping.  
 
(184) As I get older I understand that anger does nothing except kill me slowly. 
(GB B) 
 
 ANGER is also related to AN ILLNESS that has been brought about due to 
the ingestion of an intoxicating substance, which is either toxic to the system, as in 
(185) and (186), creates a heightened state of agitation, as in (187) and (188), or 
promotes addiction, as in (189) 
 
(185) Calder I feel has some very strong, deep and uncoscious [sic] resentment 
that turned into poisoning his awareness with skepticism and right/wrong. (IN G) 
(186) Uncontrolled anger becomes toxic in nature. (IN B) 
(187) A football crowd fired up on frustration and anger tends to get to the heart of 
the matter quickly […] (GB B) 
(188) It is not scientifically impossible therefore for Tricia to have in a state of 
shock, or adrenaline induced rage to gain the strength needed to commit this 
murder. (NG B) 
(189) But to make you unaddicted to your jealousy, to your ambition, to your 
competitiveness, to your anger, rage, your potentiality for violence, no Alcoholics 
Anonymous can be of any help. (IN G) 
 
 Another common property of ILLNESS is its ability to spread (at times 
rapidly) across a population – an attribute mapped on to ANGER for GB and NG, 
as (190) and (191) demonstrate.  
 
(190) There is widespread anger across Greece to harsh measures imposed by the 
government in return for international bailouts. (GB G) 
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(191) It was only the latest outbreak of anger in a decade-long cycle of aggression 
and reprisals. (NG G) 
 
 A specific type of behavioral or mental disorder categorized as an illness is A 
MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY, which coheres with an intense feeling of anger 
and the potential behavioral extremes that entails, i.e., a lack of control over one’s 
actions. On the linguistic level, this is largely reflected by the construction (go) mad 
/ crazy with + anger (or subordinate), which was present in all varieties, except for 
KE.  
 
(192) Mad with rage the Old Man's blows had been unaimed, some fell across 
Johnny's back […] (GB G)  
(193) […] so she told Emeka that she wants to take a break from sex she said Emeka 
almost went mad with anger when she told him […] (NG G) 
(194) When he heard the news of his brother's death, he became mad with rage. (IN 
G) 
(195) […] the beacon of light that keeps him from going crazy with anger at the 
unfair world around them. (SG B) 
 
 Two specific levels speak to some positive entailments of ANGER IS AN 
ILLNESS. Firstly, there can be relief from anger as an illness, because it can be 
cured (ANGER IS A TREATABLE ILLNESS). Secondly, in a related sense, 
ANGER itself can be viewed as part of the cure, i.e., MEDICINE TO TREAT AN 
ILLNESS. The former is found in all varieties and illustrated by (196) – (200), 
while the latter was only found in NG, for which (201) provides an example.  
 
(196) As a band, Primal Scream became a huge, human sledgehammer that 
slammed hard into the dark recesses of the last decade, finally purging their anger 
with XTRMNTR. (GB G) 
(197) Some need to be healed from the resentment in their hearts. (NG G) 
(198) […] 2012 is my year of healing from all the anger, bitterness, unforgiveness 
and guilt. (KE G) 
(199) Maharaj, you have completely eradicated anger: And how?? (IN G) 
(200) We have to increase our vibrations by eradicating greed, lust and anger. (SG 
B) 
(201) But it needs a heavy dose of holy anger to rebuild our nation […] (NG B) 
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 A specific level within ILLNESS that can be further dissected is ANGER IS 
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. The physical symptoms being 
attributed to ANGER include: ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL, LOSS OF 
CONTROL OF BODY, PHYSICAL PAIN and WOUND / SKIN-RELATED. 
These are exemplified in the following examples.  
 
(202) If you're reading this and foaming at the mouth in anger, there are a few 
things you can do. (SG B) 
(203) My body was shaking with rage as I opened the gate. (NB G) 
(204) […] as many smiles and laughs in such scenes as there are faces twisted in 
rage. (KE B) 
(205) By letting the unresolved linger, silence allows resentment to fester. (IN B) 
 
As mentioned above, ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS 
(LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY) is the most frequent at this level for all varieties 
and for ILLNESS as a whole. The others are infrequent. ACTING LIKE A WILD 
ANIMAL is only found twice in SG; PHYSICAL PAIN is only found in the African 
varieties (twice in NG and once in KE); for WOUND / SKIN-RELATED there are 
single instances in GB, KE, IN and SG each. Therefore, LOSS OF CONTROL OF 
BODY deserves a closer look.  
 As is clear from example (203) and further examples, given in (206) – (210), 
the main meaning focus of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, corresponding to 
what Kövecses (1990) identified as a metonymy of ANGER (namely 
AGITATION), is that ANGER can become so powerful an emotion that it inhibits 
agency over one’s own body. This most commonly takes the form of fits, as in (206) 
– (208) or paralysis, as in (209) and (210).  
 
(206) […] inopportune children sent a tremor of rage through his body […] (GB 
G) 
(207) After picking up the quarrel, one of his friends in a fit of rage stabbed him 
with a knife on the left side of his chest. (IN G) 
(208) Even before the latest convulsion of anti-US rage, Mr Obama had sought to 
restore relations with the Muslim world […] (SG G) 
(209) Again, I am incapacitated with rage. (KE B) 
(210) Islamic rage is functioning to paralyze the West into “walking on eggshells” 
around Muslims […] (GB B) 
Case Study: ANGER 158 
It should be noted that LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY is most frequently 
instantiated in the New Englishes by (in) (a) fit(s) of + anger or rage – four out of 
five times in NG, two out of four times in KE, all seven times in IN and nine out of 
ten times in SG. Conversely, it occurs two out of six times in GB.  
 Nevertheless, across the varieties, ILLNESS metaphors tend most frequently 
to be expressed as ANGER IS A LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY compared to 
any other specific level type. Of the 83 tokens, 32 were attributable to LOSS OF 
CONTROL OF BODY or, in other words, 39%. Table 5.12 demonstrates this 
grouping vis-à-vis other ILLNESS metaphors.  
 
Table 5.12: Absolute frequencies of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY as a special instantiation 
of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS  
 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
LOSS OF 
CONTROL OF 
BODY 
6 5 4 7 10 
ILLNESS (other) 11 14 4 15 7 
total 17 19 8 22 17 
 
 
The proportion of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY is similar for NG (26%), IN 
(32%) and GB (35%). It is at half for KE (50%) and over half for SG (58%), which 
testifies more to a preference. However, a chi-square test was performed on the 
figures for all varieties in Table 5.12 and the observed differences are not significant 
(x2 = 5.09, df = 4, p = 0.2782).  
5.3.5 ANGER IS A WEAPON  
Providing 10.5% of the total ANGER data, WEAPON, which occupies the third, 
fourth or fifth rank in the variety-specific metaphor profiles, is the last of the major 
source domains to consider. Figure 5.10 illustrates the percentages of WEAPON 
metaphors for each variety.  
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Figure 5.10: Percentages of ANGER IS A WEAPON per variety 
 
GB, with 16%, uses WEAPON to construe ANGER more commonly than the New 
Englishes, primarily due to two aspects apparent in the specific-level breakdown. 
Table 5.13 provides an overview of this breakdown and shows that WEAPON can 
be used to understand ANGER in general terms, a specific type of WEAPON and 
in terms of its directionality concerning its target. Note that ANGER IS A 
WEAPON was only briefly attested to in Stefanowitsch (2006a) as ANGER IS A 
SHARP OBJECT or as a subcategory of OPPONENT in Kövecses et al. (2015), 
but the breakdown in Table 5.13 suggests a more complex conceptual structure.   
 
Table 5.13: Breakdown of ANGER IS A WEAPON per variety67 
WEAPON GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1) 1 1 0 3 0 
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
0 0 0 0 0 
    A WEAPON TO SUFFOCATE SOMEONE WITH (= 
level 3) 
0 0 0 1 0 
    ARROWS (= level 3) 0 1 0 0 0 
    BLUNT INSTRUMENT (= level 3)  1 0 0 1 1 
    BOMB (= level 3)  4 2 3 1 2 
    GUN(-RELATED) (= level 3)  1 0 0 1 0 
    KNIFE (= level 3)  1 0 0 0 0 
A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET - specific-level 
(= level 2) 
15 6 14 3 13 
A WEAPON DIRECTED AWAY FROM 
ORIGINAL TARGET - specific-level (= level 2) 
1 0 0 1 1 
total  24 10 17 11 17 
_________________ 
67  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.  
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ANGER as a WEAPON, once again, calls to mind the potential dangerous or 
destructive quality we associate with ANGER unregulated or in excess. This 
understanding is already visible at a generic level, illustrated in (211) and (212). 
 
(211) I experienced the worst form of rejection and unkindness, but I learnt to fight 
back with anger and aggression because that was the only way I knew to cope. (NG 
G) 
(212) The manipulator uses anger to brandish sufficient emotional intensity and 
rage to shock the victim into submission. (IN G) 
 
The general focal meaning of something destructive is inherited by the specific 
levels. ANGER is viewed as A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON, which exploits 
corresponding imagery. ANGER is dangerous and destructive in a similar way 
people are threatened by a weapon being aimed at them or are hurt by a weapon 
being used against them.  
 
(213) I will overpower them with wrath and suffocate them with rage. (IN G)  
ANGER IS A WEAPON TO SUFFOCATE SOMEONE WITH 
(214) Unfortunately Nigeria workers have been shooting their arrows of anger at 
the wrong direction. (NG G) ANGER IS ARROWS 
(215) Naturally, they have been bearing the brunt of the wrath of outsourcing 
opponents. (IN G)  ANGER IS A BLUNT INSTRUMENT 
(216) This is Sarbok, a loudmouth, joker and living anger bomb, but he's quite a 
good friend. (GB G)  ANGER IS A BOMB 
(217) Anger is the first of the kashayas to go. Anger is like ammunition. (IN G)  
ANGER IS GUN-RELATED 
(218) Instead of coming together en masse drawing knives and stabbing the film 
with the rage of Brutus, they are raising a glass in honor […]. (GB B)  ANGER 
IS A KNIFE68 
 
Of these SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON images, BOMB is the most common and 
most often found in GB, which makes use of the SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON 
domain more frequently as compared to the New Englishes. However, the BOMB 
image also evinces the situation in which a bomb can be made inert, illustrated in 
(219) and (220), which is then applied to ANGER.  
 
_________________ 
68  Note that this particular instance is likely motivated by the well-known circumstance of Julius Caesar’s 
assassination with a dagger.  
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(219) It attributes to them a complete inability to defuse their rage by more 
democratic forms of protest, effectively viewing them as savages from which little 
better can be expected. (GB G) 
(220) If they can address the heart of each problem, they will be able to defuse the 
anger and with it the vitriolic. (SG G) 
 
 Similarly, ANGER as A WEAPON can be directed away from the person it 
is aimed at, coded as ANGER IS A WEAPON DIRECTED AWAY FROM THE 
TARGET, although this is infrequent with only three tokens. (221) provides an 
example, in which the image of a shield implies a weapon missing its mark and 
being deflected.   
 
(221) Although I too was Muslim, having researched and embraced Islam in a 
previous personal journey, my white skin shielded me from the wrath […] (GB G) 
 
 Nevertheless, directionality in terms of a weapon being aimed at a target is 
what motivates the largest amount of WEAPON metaphors; thus ANGER as A 
WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET coheres with a basic cognitive topology of 
WEAPON, constituting the weapon itself, the user of the weapon and the target at 
which it is aimed. There is a one-to-one correspondence between ANGER and 
WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET by the occurrence of target [V] and target(s) 
of / for in the linguistic metaphors.  
 
(222) At what or whom do you target your anger? (GB B) 
(223) And who was the most qualified target of their anger? (NG G)  
(224) Secondly, the goalkeeper whose poor timing cost the club the coveted title 
would have faced the wrath of the Gor faithful. Neither was a target of fury by Gor 
supporters. (KE G) 
(225) […] the bodies of some Nepali girls from Bhutan in the Adivasi areas and the 
resultant anger being used to target the community. (IN G) 
(226) You guys are just so fucking ANGRY all the time, wanting to find new targets 
for your rage. (SG G) 
 
Moreover, ANGER as A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET presents a special 
case in the entirety of the metaphorical data due to the directionality meaning being 
reflected by the use of prepositions, either as part of phrasal verbs, as is the case for 
(227) and (228), or occurring in a mix of FLUID and WEAPON metaphors, as in 
(229) and (230).  
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(227) United did not go down without a show of tantrums. Their annoyance instead 
of being directed at Arsenal, should have been aimed at themselves. (GB B)  
(228) Hey, do not crucify me, I did not cook the ‘soup’, please direct your anger to 
the former President of Nigeria […] (NG G) 
(229) They decided to vent their anger on motorists and the police. (KE B) 
(230) My advice to Singaporeans, please don't vent your anger at the Chinese 
migrant […] (SG B) 
 
A mixed metaphor of FLUID and WEAPON to conceptualize ANGER occurred in 
almost all the varieties, with the exception of IN, namely twice in GB and NG, four 
times in SG and five times in KE.  
 In fact, A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET is overall the most common 
specific level (that is, 51 of the total 79 instances or 65%), especially for GB. Table 
5.14 demonstrates the frequencies across varieties.    
 
Table 5.14: Absolute frequencies of WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET as a special 
instantiation of ANGER IS A WEAPON  
 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
WEAPON AIMED 
AT A TARGET 
15 6 14 3 13 
WEAPON (other) 9 4 3 8 4 
total 24 10 17 11 17 
 
 
A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.14 and 
revealed that the observed differences are significant (x2 = 10.226, df = 4, p = 
0.03679). It is interesting that the lowest proportion of WEAPON AIMED AT A 
TARGET is found in IN (27% of all WEAPON metaphors), which is the only 
variety that has A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON (4 tokens) as slightly more 
common than WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET (3 tokens). The percentages for 
the remaining varieties were well over half: NG with 60%, GB with 63%, KE with 
82%, and SG leading the pack with 76%. Therefore, with the exception of IN, all 
varieties seem to prefer this specific-level conceptualization.  
 Leaving the major contributors to the conceptualization of ANGER behind, 
we now turn to “minor metaphors” of ANGER that, despite their lower numbers, 
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still make up a part of the metaphor profiles for ANGER and, thus, deserve 
attention. 
5.3.6 Minor Metaphors of ANGER  
This final section of the ANGER case study results provides an overview of those 
metaphor groupings and miscellaneous metaphors that did not contribute to a large 
extent to the metaphor profiles of the varieties. This characterizes PUNISHMENT 
(with 29 tokens or 3.9%), SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 
(with 20 tokens or 2.7%), POSSESSION (with 18 tokens or 2.4%), PART OF A 
JOURNEY (with 17 tokens or 2.3%), FOOD / DRINK (with 16 tokens or 2.1%), 
and the mostly non-cohesive miscellaneous category. Taken together, these 
categories represent 14% of the metaphors in GB, 17.9% in IN, 18.7% in NG, 18.8 
in KE, and 20% in SG. For some of these source domains, it was possible to do a 
specific-level breakdown (which is visualized in Appendix A), but, as a rule, the 
frequencies remain so low that comparison across varieties was not possible. 
Moreover, with the exception of BURDEN, SUPERNATURAL BEING, and 
PLANT, the metaphors discussed here were not evidenced by the large-scale 
studies outlined in Section 5.2. The following provides an overview of these minor 
metaphors with some illustrative examples of each source domain category.  
 PUNISHMENT, the most frequent of the minor metaphors, hinged on four 
specific lexemes that relate ANGER to this domain: earn, incur, risk [V], and spare 
[V]. Examples of each are in (231) – (234). 
 
(231) Ask an ex-employee or a co-employee who has earned the wrath of his boss. 
(IN G) 
(232) […] if you gg [sic] to any country to do business, you have to follow the 
country's laws and even policies.. in order not to incur wrath of ppl and govt. (SG 
B) 
(233) I told my friend not to try such lest he risks God's wrath, but his reply was 
not verbal, he merely took my IPad from me, opened the browser and showed me 
the “exploits” our men of God are making on Forbes magazine. (NG B) 
(234) But the high and mighty prevailed on the heritage of the sage and the dunce 
was spared further wrath from an incensed race. (NG B) 
The decision to code these as PUNISHMENT (over another source domain, like 
earn = MONEY) relates to an interpretation of their basic definitions in the context 
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of talk about anger as a negative or, at least, socially unwelcome emotion. The co-
text in (231) – (234) demonstrates implied bad behavior throughout: In (231) the 
employee-boss relationship hierarchically entails potential punishment for bad 
behavior on the part of the employee; in (232) not following a country’s laws is, 
obviously, bad behavior that could be punished by its citizens or government; in 
(233) the bad behavior is explicitly stated in that the friend reveals online 
information about the “exploits” of clergymen, which from the author’s point of 
view risks punishment from God; in (234) the “dunce” encodes a social role that is 
often subjected to punishment, but in this instance is spared by the intervention of 
social superiors. Although the frequencies remain low (NG and SG have the most 
with nine tokens each, while IN has five and KE and GB have three), it was not 
previously discussed in terms of a cultural model of ANGER.  
 Of the twenty tokens overall in the data for SUPERNATURAL BEING / 
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, only one was contributed by GB (exorcise some inner 
resentment = ANGER IS A DEMON). The rest originated from the four New 
Englishes in this study, illustrated by examples (235) – (242).  
 
(235) This is spirit of Anger at work in the life of Dotun, He need to pray to God 
for Help. (NG G) 
(236) While Moses was calling fire on Mount Sinai, this demon of anger stood afar 
off watching him. (NG G) 
(237) […] get determined to be delivered from this spirit of anger in the Name of 
Jesus. (KE B) 
(238) I know cars need maintenance, insurance, and the patience of 69 saints (you 
know, to avoid sacrificing matatu crews to the gods of wrath and vengeance). (KE 
B) 
(239) Esoterically, lust, anger and greed are the demons who obstruct the intellect 
from rising up. (IN G) 
(240) Sometimes one is really in a deep rage. Then let anger be your prayer. (IN 
G) 
(241) […] and when you also tell them that anger is a spirit, no one likes to be used 
by a spirit. (SG G) 
(242) However, more often than we like to admit, our own agenda creeps in, and 
along with that, unholy anger. (SG G) 
 
Although these metaphors did not contribute extensively to the data overall, they 
may point in a direction towards underlying nativized construals or culture-specific 
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conceptualizations similar to the SPIRIT / GHOST domain underlying various 
conceptualizations in Hong Kong English, as discussed by Wolf (2008) and Wolf 
& Chan (2016). Nevertheless, due to their more frequent presence in the New 
Englishes and to the nature of this domain, which potentially taps into a culturally 
conditioned understanding of spirituality and emotion, the SUPERNATURAL 
BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE domain’s more likely participation in ANGER 
metaphors in New Englishes may provide an indication of where to look for 
metaphoric variation in more depth. Unfortunately, the present dataset makes an in-
depth analysis impossible. Furthermore, the previous study by Esenova (2011), as 
outlined in Section 5.1, attributes this conceptualization to English, but does not 
specify from what variety/varieties of English the linguistic examples originate.  
 ANGER IS A POSSESSION metaphors, with a total of 18 tokens, is found 
most frequently in KE (7) and IN (5). A more exhaustive examination of 
POSSESSION will be undertaken in the case study of HAPPINESS (see Chapter 
7), because of its more prominent role there. For ANGER metaphors, out of the 18 
POSSESSION tokens, the most widely used phrases are let go of (= LOSING 
OWNERSHIP), illustrated in (243) and (244), and hold on(to) (= MAINTAINING 
OWNERSHIP), illustrated in (245) and (246). It is in this way relatable to 
Kövecses’ (1990) ANGER IS A BURDEN; yet, the linguistic examples do not 
make explicit the concept of heaviness, which is most prototypical for BURDEN, 
and speak more to the act of relinquishing something you possess. Kövecses et al. 
(2015) attest to this mapping (labeled as ANGER IS A POSSESSED OBJECT) in 
a corpus of American English (347).  
 
(243) Some, who were participating for the first time, managed to let go of their 
anger and to move on. (KE B) 
(244) Forgiveness is the power to let go of anger, hatred and resentment and to 
discover, in humility, the nobility and generosity of the Spirit. (IN G) 
(245) That is, when somebody irritates you, love makes you to hold on your anger 
and seek a peaceful resolution without bitterness. (NG G) 
(246) We hold on to the anger, pain and hurt. It can be hard to forgive […] (SG G) 
 
 ANGER IS A PART OF A JOURNEY comprised a total of 17 tokens, the 
most being found in IN (6) and SG (5). This metaphor grouping will be treated more 
extensively in the following case studies, because it played a more extensive role 
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for conceptualizing FEAR and HAPPINESS. However, for ANGER, it suffices to 
say that this source domain includes specific-level meanings of BARRIER / 
OBSTACLE, DESTINATION, PATH and STARTING POINT, which are 
illustrated by (247) – (253).  
 
BARRIER / OBSTACLE 
(247) It broke through the barriers of anger held up between us; it became our 
sanctuary, our home. (IN B) 
(248) […] a body of people who will enter Parliament to make some speeches, but 
always remain inside the line without crossing Lee Kuan Yew's wrath. (SG G) 
 
DESTINATION  
(249) We are beginning to move from denial to anger about the reality that, what 
we commonly associate with a civilized life is not a possibility […]. (IN B) 
(250) […] we give too much to others, we often under-value ourselves, which leads 
to resentment. (SG G) 
 
PATH 
(251) […] the anger may lead to hatred, the hatred may generate violence, and 
violence sometimes was soothing. (NG B) 
(252) The way of the Christian should never be one of violence and anger. (SG G) 
 
STARTING POINT 
(253) The songs encapsulate the wrenching experience of having lost a great love - 
starting with anger and denial, and moving on through feelings of hurt and 
acceptance. (GB G) 
 
PART OF A JOURNEY, as I have outlined it here has definite parallels to 
discussions about LIFE / LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]; 
1999; Lakoff 2007 [1993]), as well as EMOTION’s relationship to EVENT 
STRUCTURE (Kövecses 2000, Chapter 4), which will be addressed more fully in 
the present study for HAPPINESS in Sections 7.3.2 – 7.3.3.  
 Although low in numbers, FOOD / DRINK was twice as likely to occur in 
GB (six tokens) over the New Englishes: NG, IN and SG has three tokens each, 
while KE only has one. In GB, five of the six metaphors concern ANGER being 
conceptualized as  FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED, illustrated in (254) – 
(255). 
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(254) […] these attacks have boosted the resistance, which feeds on the anger and 
frustration of civilians (GB G) 
(255) For a short period it seemed as if the glories of last year on March 26th, when 
every bank and The Ritz was given a taste of working class rage, might be repeated. 
(GB B)69 
 
While the sixth metaphor in GB is a novel one (reaching for the consoling cookies 
of anger), this is also the case for the few metaphors of FOOD / DRINK found in 
the New Englishes.  
 
(256) This volume of poetry is the sum of the poet’s experience, smashed, broken 
china in the rain channeling JP Clark hung over from his rage. (NG B)  ANGER 
IS AN ALCOHOLIC DRINK 
(257) It is painful, but GOD IS HONORED WITH OIL, THAT THE OLIVES 
PRODUCE, THE PRESS WILL CRUSH THE ANGER, THE FEAR, AND 
REBELLION, AND FROM THAT WILL COME OIL. (KE B)  ANGER IS 
OLIVES (BEING CRUSHED AND PRODUCING OIL)70 
(258) But, then, now that the first flush of rage has been spent - or so one would 
like to assume […] (IN G)  ANGER IS TEA  
(259) I am still keeping my cool. Very few words. Anger is still well kept in the 
freezer. (SG G)  ANGER IS HOT FOOD COOLED IN THE FREEZER71 
 
 Finally, as mentioned at various points, the ANGER metaphor profiles 
displayed miscellaneous metaphors for each variety, that either showed up less than 
five times in a single variety (e.g., CLUTTER / DEBRIS, PHYSICAL BURDEN, 
PLANT, MANUFACTURED PRODUCT, METAL BEING MANIPULATED and 
RESTRAINING DEVICE) or were metaphorical hapax legomena (e.g., CORD, 
HAZE, MASK, etc.). They constituted only 4.5% of the total data. The majority of 
these metaphors are less conventional and, due to their rarity, could be viewed as 
innovate or novel metaphors. The following illustrates an example of each source 
domain that had less than five instances in one variety.  
 
(260) You can not hear God with alot [sic] of clutter in you, and by clutter I mean 
the anger (NG B)  ANGER IS CLUTTER / DEBRIS 
_________________ 
69  Relatable to Esenova’s (2011) finding, ANGER IS A BAD TASTE  
70  Note that this particular metaphor is primed by the co-text, which evokes the symbolism of oil in Christian 
religious rituals. 
71  Note that this metaphor could also refer to HEAT, but I have decided to categorize it as belonging to FOOD 
/ DRINK because of the convention of keeping FOOD in the freezer.  
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(261) Many feel very frustrated and complain and lay all their anger on us […] 
(KE B)  ANGER IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN72 
(262) Igbo leaders seem oblivious of the fact that it is glaring injustices, oppressions 
and calculated attempt to subjugate and brutalise like this, which water the seeds of 
resentment, and rebellion […] (NG G) ANGER IS A PLANT73 
(263) I don't remember any “secularist” even displaying manufactured rage. (IN 
G)  ANGER IS A MANUFACTURED PRODUCT 
(264) […] the postmodern anger of the early New Adventures is tempered 
successfully with stories that are actually enjoying being Doctor Who. (GB B)  
ANGER IS METAL BEING MANIPULATED  
(265) To free yourself from the shackles of anger, you can disrupt it by asking what 
circumstance led you to be angry […] (SG B)  ANGER IS A RESTRAINING 
DEVICE 
 
 The following examples demonstrate the 11 metaphorical hapax legomena in 
the data, and, as such, can be viewed as highly innovative.  
 
(266) When the Lord is angry and speaks of justice and a cord of wrath we must 
speak it in that way […] (KE B)  ANGER IS A CORD 
(267) Our anger must amplify our voices now more than ever in challenging the rot 
in our system. (NG G)  ANGER IS A DEVICE TO AMPLIFY THE VOICE 
(LIKE A MEGAPHONE) 
(268) […] black scholars and activists spent their lives wandering around in a haze 
of rage and anger […] (KE B)  ANGER IS A HAZE (OF WATER OR SMOKE) 
(269) He survived Abacha, and not too long ago, he and President Olusegun 
Obasanjo exchanged letters of anger. (NG G)  ANGER IS A LETTER 
(270) So he called the head of the labourers unto the palace, and gave him bags of 
gold, that they might turn off the wrath of the people against the king. (NG B)  
ANGER IS A MACHINE 
(271) A mask of anger fell over his face, tightening his lips before he turned away. 
(NG G)  ANGER IS A MASK 
(272) I had graduated from fear to anger! (KE G)  ANGER IS A SCHOOL 
(273) You can treasure your resentment and sell it for a song. No bargaining. 
That's my ultimatum. (SG G)  ANGER IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY  
(274) We know that anger can be a kind of compost, and that it is within its power 
to give birth to something beautiful. (SG G)  ANGER IS COMPOST 
(275) For your marriage to work, your spouse has to dedicate himself to shedding 
old anger and fears. (KE G)  ANGER IS SKIN BEING SHED 
_________________ 
72  Attested by Kövecses (1990) 
73  Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) A PLANT (anger be rooted in X) 
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(276) I wear my anger at Richard's offhand manner on my forehead and he gets the 
message. (NG B)  ANGER IS SOMETHING WORN ON THE FOREHEAD 
 
 This concludes the overview and illustration of the ANGER metaphors across 
the varieties. In the following section, the results will be discussed on the basis of 
the dimensions of metaphor variation and end with a preliminary conclusion about 
universality and variation for conceptualizing ANGER. 
5.4 Discussion  
This section serves to contextualize the results in terms of Kövecses’ (2005) types 
of metaphor variation, specifically congruent metaphors, range of the target and 
preferential conceptualizations. That is, from the collective point of view of the 
results, we will answer the question: What have the results revealed on the whole 
about shared and what is not shared across the New Englishes and their (former) 
norm-providing variety, British English? Furthermore, this section will offer a 
preliminary conclusion on what might be considered universal (the bodily sense of 
embodiment) and culture-specific (owing the socio-cultural setting of the varieties) 
regarding the conceptualizations of ANGER. 
 So far, it has been apparent from the case study in this chapter that a lot is in 
fact shared by the varieties. Consider first Kövecses’ (2005) range of the target. As 
a reminder, the range of the target was discussed as one of the perspectives of 
alternative metaphors, in which Kövecses maintains that metaphors can be found 
to use different source domains for the same target domain. The target domain in 
this case study was, of course, ANGER, and as the metaphor profiles of each variety 
demonstrated, they all made use of each source domain to some extent (see Table 
5.2 in Section 5.2). The range of target also holds when we consider the varieties in 
terms of the top 5 ranking. All varieties listed PERSON, FLUID, NATURAL 
FORCE, ILLNESS and WEAPON as the source domains used most extensively to 
conceptualize ANGER (see Table 5.3 in Section 5.2). Furthermore, within this 
ranking, PERSON and FLUID emerged as the first and second source domains for 
all varieties. Therefore, all varieties in this study shared the range of target.  
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 Another type of variation that Kövecses (2005) identifies as accounting for 
variation in metaphor is congruent metaphor, which seems to have near-universal 
status, but demonstrates that a generic schema is being filled out in culture-specific 
ways. Even at the specific-level, where I assumed that congruent metaphors would 
occur, there did not seem to be any major indication that this is so on a large scale. 
There was, at best, only anecdotal evidence for congruent metaphors. For instance, 
consider an example from Indian English, repeated here as (277).  
 
(277) He was annoyed, and anger burst through his forehead. (IN G)  ANGER 
IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) 
EXPLOSION) 
 
The exit point conceptualized for ANGER in this example is through the forehead, 
which was unique in the whole of the HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER set. In the 
other metaphors found for this specific level, there was no explicit indication of 
how ANGER as a HOT FLUID actually exits the (body) container. Thus, it could 
be the case that (277) is conveying cultural content that fills out the generic schema 
of ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER.74 Nevertheless, without more 
data illustrating this in Indian English and without more data illustrating the exit 
point in other varieties, it is difficult to say if this is truly a congruent metaphor type 
or if it is just a novel extension of an established mapping.  
 The same can be said for examples from the minor source domain FOOD / 
DRINK, which could conceivably be even more open to cultural specification. 
Although it was in general more common in GB, there was at least one instance 
found in each of the New Englishes. Furthermore, examples, like (278) and (279), 
although perhaps novel conceptualizations, did have a hint of the cultural by 
comparing ANGER to COOKIES (in GB) and TEA (in IN).  
_________________ 
74  Owing to the fact that I personally do not possess any culture-specific knowledge to draw from in the 
interpretation of (277), I am very grateful to my student Aditya Upadhyaya, who kindly provided me with 
valuable insight into this example. According to her, the cultural content filling out the generic schema here 
is related to the main energy center in the Hindu religion, i.e., the third eye – the energy center for 
enlightenment and anger located between the eyes. Representations of Lord Shiva, the God of Destruction 
in the Hindu religion, show him with the third eye, which he can open to dispense enlightenment or 
destruction. Furthermore, the subtle meaning of the third eye is wisdom, but Hindus (jokingly) use it in the 
sense of anger in relation to the mythological story of Lord Shiva destroying Kaamdeva (Lust) through his 
third eye. The existence of expressions in Hindi like मुझे परेशान मत करो वरना मेरा तीसरा नेत्र खुल जायेगा 
(Don’t irritate me or my third eye will open) also reflect this culture-specific conceptualization of ANGER. 
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(278) I’ve been trying to “lose” my baggage, and dump years of negativity and 
years of reaching for the consoling cookies of anger, defeatism and criticism. (GB 
G) 
(279) But, then, now that the first flush of rage has been spent - or so one would 
like to assume […] (IN G) 
 
Yet, again, this evidence was only anecdotal and, thus, difficult to determine in 
terms of congruent metaphors that would hold for the culture as a whole. 
Nevertheless, as the normalized frequencies in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.2 above 
indicate, minor metaphors, like ANGER IS FOOD / DRINK, although low in 
numbers, seem to demonstrate the most variation between the varieties. An 
assumption that follows is that the less frequent a metaphor is on the whole, the 
more creative it tends to be, as in (278) comparing ANGER to COOKIES. This 
creative aspect, in turn, likely opens up the door for more obvious cultural content.  
 The majority of the case study was devoted to uncovering preferential 
conceptualizations at the specific-level metaphors determined for each broad source 
domain. Recall that by preferential conceptualizations Kövecses (2005) denotes the 
situation in which “two languages / cultures may have many of the same conceptual 
metaphors for a given target domain, but speakers of the languages may prefer to 
use a different set of metaphors for this target” (82). Since it was established from 
the perspective of the range of target that the varieties in this study indeed largely 
share the same conceptual metaphors for ANGER, it made sense to look closer for 
preferences, which I also assumed would reveal themselves in a specific-level 
breakdown. Yet, even here, the New Englishes and British English more or less 
behaved similarly.  
 No statistically verifiable preferential conceptualizations attributable to 
individual varieties or supraregional areas were found in the specific-level 
breakdowns of FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, and NATURAL FORCE. 
In fact, the preferences were the same for these source domains across the varieties. 
For FLUID IN A CONTAINER, all varieties collectively tended to emphasize HOT 
FLUID, which supported Lakoff’s (1987a) claim of its centrality to the 
metaphorical system of ANGER. For ILLNESS, there was a general preference for 
LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, although this was scaled between 26% - 35% for 
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NG, IN and GB, while KE was at half and SG was at over half of the ILLNESS 
metaphors. And although for NATURAL FORCE the instances of WATER was 
slightly higher in the Asian varieties, all varieties showed a preference for FIRE 
over WATER, which were the two biggest contributors to NATURAL FORCE.  
 Some indication of preferential conceptualizations occurred in the 
breakdowns of PERSON and WEAPON, however. OPPONENT appeared to be 
preferred by the IN and African varieties within PERSON, while WEAPON 
AIMED AT A TARGET was preferred by GB, NG, KE and SG, with the exception 
being IN. More data will be needed to confirm if these preferences hold, since 
OPPONENT and WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET were not exclusive to the 
varieties that prefer them in this dataset.  
 The minor metaphors discussed for the New Englishes and British English 
were relatively low in numbers and, thus, did not lend themselves well to statistical 
analysis. However, there was one source domain that begs further scrutiny for 
further research, namely, SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. 
This source domain only showed up once for GB and was more frequent in all of 
the New Englishes, albeit in low numbers (as a reminder, 6 tokens in NG, 5 tokens 
in IN and 4 tokens each in KE and SG). Considering the cultural element inherent 
to SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, it would be interesting 
to see if this slight distinction between British English and the New Englishes holds 
with more data. However, due to their lower frequencies in the present dataset, I 
was not able to conclusively decide if this is a preferential conceptualization for the 
New Englishes. Again, it could be assumed that infrequency goes hand in hand with 
more creativity, for which culture-specific content provides a more accessible 
motivational basis.  
 Nevertheless, the case of ANGER in New Englishes and British English was 
essentially the same for the most frequent source domains. This leaves us to 
consider what this signifies for the emotion concept ANGER from the perspectives 
of universality and variation. It was striking in the data above that the motivational 
bases for the meaning foci found on the specific levels were often discussed in terms 
of bodily experience. For example, the metaphors found for ANGER IS AN 
ILLNESS (LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY) correlated with the physical 
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experience of the body shaking in a fit or being in a state of paralysis, like in two 
examples highlighted in Section 5.3.4, repeated here as (280) and (281).  
(280) Even before the latest convulsion of anti-US rage, Mr Obama had sought to 
restore relations with the Muslim world […] (SG G) 
(281) Islamic rage is functioning to paralyze the West into “walking on eggshells” 
around Muslims […] (GB B) 
 
The body as a prevalent motivational basis for metaphors such as these is not 
surprising considering our physical responses to emotional states. Therefore, it was 
to be expected that it would show up and not differ widely in the varieties at hand. 
However, what was surprising is that, considering the uniqueness of the socio-
cultural context of these varieties there was not much in the way of cultural 
explanations to be found. The preliminary conclusion then for the case of ANGER 
is that throughout the New Englishes and British English, it is the bodily sense of 
embodiment that prevails.  
 With this preliminary conclusion we end the case study on ANGER and 
continue in the next chapter with FEAR.  
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6 Case Study: FEAR 
Like the previous case study, this chapter will briefly discuss previously attested 
metaphors, which helps to gauge what might occur in the FEAR data at hand. This 
will be followed by the presentation of the metaphor profiles of FEAR for each 
variety, as well as a ranking of the most common source domains in each variety. 
Then a finer-grained analysis will be attempted at the specific levels of the most 
common source domains, which will be illustrated by examples from the GloWbE 
data. Here, I will also take into account any indication of preference. Finally, this 
case study concludes with a discussion of the results overall and what they imply 
in terms of variation and/or commonality among the varieties.  
6.1 Previous Metaphors of FEAR 
Before introducing the empirical results of the present study, it is worthwhile to 
briefly consider previous scholarly work concerning metaphors that can collectively 
be viewed as reflecting folk theories or cultural models of FEAR. To reiterate a 
point I made in the ANGER case study, by doing this we have a benchmark or point 
of reference with which to contextualize the findings presented in this study. The 
question that guides us in this case study is: To what extent do previously attested 
metaphors of FEAR (largely intuitively constructed) relate to metaphorical patterns 
found in usage-based data? 
 The following outlines a cognitive model of FEAR presented by the most 
prolific emotion metaphor researcher, Kövecses (e.g., 1990, 2000). The point of 
departure for constructing a model of FEAR is to reconstruct its metonymic system, 
because it is an emotion “often defined as a dangerous situation accompanied by a 
set of physiological and behavioral reactions that typically ends in flight” (Kövecses 
1990: 69). While discussing a myriad of metonymies related to FEAR, Kövecses 
(1990) highlights the following as most central (73-74). They are illustrated below 
with corresponding linguistic examples (from Kövecses 1990: 70–73).  
 
(1) FEAR IS PHYSICAL AGITATION (He was shaking with fear.) 
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(2) FEAR IS AN INCREASE IN HEART RATE (His heart pounded with fear.)  
(3) FEAR IS BLOOD LEAVING THE FACE (You are white as a sheet.)  
(4) FEAR IS SKIN SHRINKING (I felt my flesh crawl as he described the murder.)  
(5) FEAR IS AN INABILITY TO MOVE (He was paralyzed with fear.)  
(6) FEAR IS AN (INVOLUNTARY) RELEASE OF BOWELS or BLADDER 
(You scared the shit out of me. / I was almost wetting myself with fear.) 
(7) FEAR IS SWEATING (The cold sweat of fear broke out.)  
(8) FEAR IS NERVOUSNESS IN THE STOMACH (He got butterflies in the 
stomach.)  
(9) FEAR IS DRYNESS OF THE MOUTH (He was scared spitless.)  
(10) FEAR IS WAYS OF LOOKING (There was fear in her eyes.)  
(11) FEAR IS A DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE (He froze with fear.) 
(12) FEAR IS FLIGHT (When he heard the police coming, the thief took to his 
heels.) 
 
 With this metonymic basis, Kövecses (1990) turns to the metaphors of FEAR, 
but does not identify a central metaphor, as was the case for ANGER (i.e., ANGER 
IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER.) In his view, FEAR can be 
conceptualized as FLUID IN A CONTAINER, illustrated in (13) below, but is 
lacking in the HEAT entailment which holds for ANGER. “Since the 
conceptualization of fear does not have a heat component, the fluid in the container 
does not produce steam and pressure, there is no explosion, and nothing comes out 
whose outflow could be held back or reversed” (Kövecses 1990: 86). For the present 
study, this conclusion remains an empirical issue which will be addressed in Section 
6.3.5. FEAR metaphors identified by Kövecses (1990: 75-79) are exemplified in 
the following.  
  
(13) FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (The sight filled her with fear.) 
(14) FEAR IS A VICIOUS ENEMY (HUMAN or ANIMAL) (He was choked by 
fear.)  
(15) FEAR IS A TORMENTOR (Her parents were tormented by the fear that she 
might drown.) 
(16) FEAR IS AN ILLNESS (She was sick with fright.) 
(17) FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING (She was haunted by the fear of 
death.) 
(18) FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (He was wrestling with his fear.)  
(19) FEAR IS A BURDEN (Fear weighed heavily on them as they heard bombers 
overhead.)  
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(20) FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (Fear swept over him. / She was engulfed in 
panic.)  
(21) FEAR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (Fear dominated his actions.) 
 
Furthermore, Kövecses (2000: 23) adds three more metaphors conceptualizing 
FEAR, illustrated by (22)-(24).  
 
(22) FEAR IS A HIDDEN ENEMY (Fear slowly crept up on him.) 
(23) FEAR IS INSANITY (Jack was insane with fear.)  
(24) THE SUBJECT OF FEAR IS A DIVIDED SELF75 (I was beside myself with 
fear.) 
 
 Stefanowitsch (2006a), employing his method MPA, tests these intuitively 
constructed metaphors and finds all of them in usage-based data, with the exception 
of BURDEN and A DIVIDED SELF (79). Furthermore, Stefanowitsch is able to 
identify metaphors that are not mentioned in the model above (81). These 
metaphors are illustrated in (25) – (37)76 and expand on Kövecses’ work.   
 
(25) FEAR IS A LIQUID (trickling/undercurrent of fear, sap of fear, fear 
evaporate, etc.) 
(26) FEAR IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) (fear 
fill X, fear pour out, pent_up fear, etc.)  
(27) FEAR IS A MIX (mixture of fear and EMOTION, X blend fear and 
EMOTIONS, etc.) 
(28) FEAR IS COLD (icy/cold fear, shiver of fear, be frozen in fear, etc.)  
(29) FEAR IS HEAT (heat of fear, fuel/spark off fear, etc.) 
(30) FEAR IS LIGHT (bright fear, flicker of fear, etc.)  
(31) FEAR IS DARK (shadow of fear, fear darken X, etc.)  
(32) FEAR IS HIGH (INTENSITY) (fear peak, X heighten fear, etc.) 
(33) FEAR IS PAIN (agony/convulsion of fear, X ache with fear, etc.)  
(34) FEAR IS A SHARP OBJECT (prick/shaft of fear, fear cut to X, etc.)  
(35) FEAR IS AN ORGANISM (growing fear, X breed/regenerate fear, etc.) 
_________________ 
75  In Kövecses (1998) he labels this metaphor as FEAR IS AN INCOMPLETE OBJECT. He later changes 
the source domain to A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF when considering it for HAPPINESS (see 
Section 7.1).  
76  Stefanowitsch (2006a) does not report the full citations from the corpus data but presents the metaphorical 
patterns in an abstracted form, i.e., verbs are in the infinitive, patterns that are similar grouped together in 
a compact form, etc. (73).  
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(36) FEAR IS A WILD / CAPTIVE ANIMAL (X handle/lose control over/unleash 
fear, etc.)  
(37) FEAR IS A BARRIER (barrier of fear, fear (be) obstacle, etc.) 
 
 Esenova's (2011) corpus-based study uncovers additional metaphors. (38) and 
(39) illustrates what Esenova considers to be sub-categories of CONTAINMENT 
(76-77). 
 
(38) FEAR IS A COLOR (“You guys are doing this all wrong,” I say, a slight tint 
of panic coloring my voice.) 
(39) FEAR IS A CHILD (In the Middle Ages, ignorance gave birth to fear.) 
 
Examples (40) – (42) illustrate metaphors not discussed either by Kövecses or 
Stefanowitsch above, but by Esenova (2011: 80, 92-93). 
 
(40) FEAR IS A PURE SUBSTANCE (I felt pure fear in those jaws.)  
(41) FEAR IS A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE (Nevertheless, he could almost smell 
the stench of fear: the house was too quiet. / […] a recent rancid fear of seeming a 
certain way (“snobbish”) […]) 
(42) FEAR IS A PLANT (The uncertainty blossomed into fear again […]) 
 
I have consolidated these findings in Table 6.1. Note that I have grouped together 
those source domains, which, although presented as separate mappings in the 
previous research, seem to go together in terms of their main meaning focus (e.g., 
TORMENTOR, A SOCIAL SUPERIOR, etc. as specific types of OPPONENT). 
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Table 6.1: Previously attested FEAR metaphors 
 
 
 Taken together, we have previously attested metaphors that contribute to a 
prototypical model of FEAR, which can be compared and contrasted to the findings 
for New Englishes and British English, which we turn to in the following section.  
6.2 Metaphor Profiles for FEAR 
The following section provides an initial overview of FEAR metaphors found for 
New English varieties and British English. As in the ANGER case study, this 
overview acts as the first step in answering the research questions: 1) What 
conceptual metaphors exist for FEAR in New English, as evidenced by corpus data, 
and 2) Does a comparison across New English varieties reveal commonalities 
and/or differences across the varieties? As previously, these metaphor profiles at 
first represent broadly labelled conceptual categories that will be broken down at 
later points of analysis.  
 For each variety, a total of 150 mappings (= type 2) were identified, which 
contained the target domain lexical item fear or, alternatively, concern, distress, 
FEAR IS: Source 
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER /  A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER 
(UNDER PRESSURE) / A LIQUID 
Kövecses (1990) and 
Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
AN ILLNESS / INSANITY / A DIVIDED SELF / PAIN 
Kövecses (1990, 
2000) and 
Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
AN OPPONENT / A VICIOUS ENEMY (HUMAN or ANIMAL) / A 
TORMENTOR / A HIDDEN ENEMY / A SOCIAL SUPERIOR 
Kövecses (1990, 
2000) 
A SUPERNATURAL BEING Kövecses (1990) 
A BURDEN Kövecses (1990) 
A NATURAL FORCE Kövecses (1990) 
A MIX Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
COLD / HEAT Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
LIGHT / DARK Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
HIGH (INTENSITY) Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
A SHARP OBJECT Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
AN ORGANISM Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
A WILD / CAPTIVE ANIMAL Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
A BARRIER Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
COLOR (OF SOMETHING IN A CONTAINER) Esenova (2011) 
CHILD (IN MOTHER-CONTAINER) Esenova (2011) 
A PURE SUBSTANCE Esenova (2011) 
A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE Esenova (2011) 
PLANT Esenova (2011) 
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dread, horror, terror, or worry. This resulted in a total sample of 750 metaphors. 
Table 6.2 provides an overview of the various source domains participating in these 
metaphors, as well as their absolute and relative frequencies for each variety.  
 
Table 6.2: Overview of absolute and relative frequencies of all source domains in FEAR 
metaphors per variety 
 
 
Note that the “miscellaneous” category contains expressions that did not contribute 
in large numbers to the overall metaphor profile, i.e., “metaphorical hapax 
legomena”, as in (43) and (44), which seem to be of an innovative or novel kind, or 
those metaphors that can be attributed to a broader source domain but that source 
domain showed up less than five times in a single variety, as in (45) and (46).  
 
(43) […] all designed to play into the human pysche [sic] and to create a giant 
bubble of fear that if PAP goes, Singapore is ruined. (SG G)  FEAR IS A 
BUBBLE 
(44) […] I will have to ‘abandon the ship of fear’ and surrender to the process of 
creativity. (IN G)  FEAR IS A SHIP 
(45) And that's what the tool is about for me, to turn the engine of fear on the 
perpetrators of fear, perpetrators of corruption and fraud. (NG B)  FEAR IS A 
MACHINE 
 GB NG KE IN SG total 
A Deep Place 
0  
(0%) 
3  
(2%) 
8 
(5.3%) 
5 
(3.3%) 
4 
(2.7%) 
20 
(2.7%) 
Fluid In a Container 
16 
(10.7%) 
3  
(2%) 
5 
(3.3%) 
4 
(2.7%) 
4 
(2.7%) 
32 
(4.3%) 
Illness 
23 
(15.3%) 
18 
(12%) 
19 
(12.7%) 
24 
(16%) 
20 
(13.3%) 
104 
(13.9%) 
Natural Force  
8 
(5.3%) 
6  
(4%) 
12  
(8%) 
28 
(18.7%) 
12  
(8%) 
66 
(8.8%) 
Part of a Journey 
12  
(8%) 
3  
(2%) 
6  
(4%) 
0  
(0%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
31 
(4.1%) 
Person  
55 
(36.7%) 
78 
(52%) 
60 
(40%) 
64 
(42.7%) 
65 
(43.3%) 
322 
(42.9%) 
Possession 
13 
(8.7%) 
1 
(0.7%) 
3  
(2%) 
4 
(2.7%) 
1 
(0.7%) 
22 
(2.9%) 
Related to Building / Structure 
8 
(5.3%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
21 
(14%) 
3  
(2%) 
11 
(7.3%) 
53 
(7.1%) 
Supernatural Being  
0  
(0%) 
13 
(8.7%) 
3  
(2%) 
2 
(1.3%) 
0  
(0%) 
18 
(2.4%) 
Weapon 
3  
(2%) 
4 
(2.7%) 
5 
(3.3%) 
0  
(0%) 
7 
(4.7%) 
19 
(2.5%) 
Misc.  
12  
(8%) 
11 
(7.3%) 
8 
(5.3%) 
16 
(10.7%) 
16 
(10.7%) 
63 
(8.4%) 
total  150 150 150 150 150 750 
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(46) […] the black irony that the machines of terror and destruction forged in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were supplied by the US […] (GB G)  FEAR IS A 
MACHINE 
 
 Disregarding the miscellaneous metaphors for the moment, the metaphor 
profiles show that all varieties make use of the most common source domains for 
conceptualizing FEAR, i.e., FLUID, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, PERSON, 
RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE, but vary in terms of the less frequent 
source domains. For instance, POSSESSION metaphors are attributable to all 
varieties (but only in very low numbers to the New Englishes). Furthermore, while 
A DEEP PLACE is represented solely in the New Englishes, it was not attested in 
the GB data. Also, the IN dataset does not contain any PART OF A JOURNEY and 
WEAPON metaphors, while GB and SG does not make use of SUPERNATURAL 
BEING. This is a marked difference from the previous metaphor profiles for 
ANGER, in which all ANGER source domains were represented in each variety to 
some extent.  
 In terms of the rankings, which resulted from the frequencies in Table 6.2, the 
picture is also not so straightforward, as can be gleaned from Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3: Five highest ranked FEAR source domains per variety 
Rank GB NG KE IN SG 
(1) PERSON PERSON PERSON PERSON PERSON 
(2) ILLNESS ILLNESS 
RELATED TO 
BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE 
NATURAL FORCE ILLNESS 
(3) FLUID 
SUPERNATURAL 
BEING 
ILLNESS ILLNESS 
NATURAL 
FORCE 
(4) POSSESSION 
RELATED TO 
BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE 
NATURAL 
FORCE 
A DEEP PLACE 
RELATED TO 
BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE 
(5) 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY 
NATURAL FORCE A DEEP PLACE 
FLUID & 
POSSESSION 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY  
total % of 
metaphor 
profile 
79.4% 83.4% 80% 86.1% 78.6% 
 
 
The highest ranked source domain for all varieties, which makes up 42.9% of all 
metaphorical data for FEAR, is PERSON. Yet, this is where the similarity ends. 
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GB, NG, and SG share ILLNESS as their second ranked source domain, while KE 
and IN have RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE and NATURAL FORCE 
in second place, respectively. Only KE and IN have ILLNESS in the third rank, 
while GB has FLUID; NG has SUPERNATURAL BEING; SG has NATURAL 
FORCE. The fourth and fifth ranks for all varieties are also not uniformly shared 
across the varieties: GB has POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY in the 
fourth and fifth rank, while NG has RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE 
and NATURAL FORCE; KE has NATURAL FORCE and A DEEP PLACE; IN 
has A DEEP PLACE and a tie between FLUID and POSSESSION; SG has 
RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE and JOURNEY. This made it difficult 
to identify which metaphors emerge as the most prominent for all varieties, other 
than PERSON and ILLNESS (which rank in the top 3 across the varieties). Thus, I 
forgo an analysis of variance, as was conducted in the ANGER case study for the 
(shared) top five most frequently used source domains.  
 Taking another glance at the absolute frequencies of all source domains in the 
top five ranking across the varieties, which is visualized in Figure 6.1, we can tease 
out some domains for statistical analysis.  
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Figure 6.1: Absolute frequencies of top five (not shared) source domains in FEAR metaphors 
per variety 
 
What becomes clear from Figure 6.1 is that PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL 
FORCE contribute to the bulk of metaphorical data, despite NATURAL FORCE 
being in the top five for the New English varieties (most prominently in IN) but not 
for GB. These source domains are given in percentages for each variety in Figure 
6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2: Percentages of ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and PERSON in FEAR 
metaphors per variety 
GB NG KE IN SG
A Deep Place 0 3 8 5 4
Fluid 16 3 5 4 4
Illness 23 18 19 24 20
Natural Force 8 6 12 28 12
Part of a Journey 12 3 6 0 10
Person 55 78 60 64 65
Possession 13 1 3 4 1
Related to Building / Structure 8 10 21 3 11
Supernatural Being 0 13 3 2 0
0
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These three source domains range from 57% to 77% of all metaphorical data for 
each variety. From a collective perspective across the varieties, they also make up 
the three most frequent source domains: PERSON with 322 tokens, ILLNESS with 
104 and, with a dramatic drop, NATURAL FORCE with 66. A chi-square test was 
performed for PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE, which revealed 
significant differences in distribution (x2 = 21.151, df = 8, p = 0.006757). It should 
be noted that this quantitative finding does not yet provide strong evidence for 
source domain preference, but we can use it as a point of reference to explore the 
more specific-level dimensions of the source domains.  
 Furthermore, normalized frequencies of the individual metaphor profiles have 
the potential to reveal another perspective. Consider the distributions of each 
metaphor in Figure 6.3 below.  
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Figure 6.3: Normalized frequencies of FEAR metaphors to 100%  
 
Figure 6.3 demonstrates that the varieties display differences regarding their 
relation to the average percentage of each source domain, in particular for those 
source domains that did not feature prominently in the FEAR data overall (i.e., A 
DEEP PLACE, POSSESSION, SUPERNATURAL BEING and WEAPON). For 
example, NG provides evidence of a variety-specific preference for 
SUPERNATURAL BEING, which was infrequent with only 18 instances out of 
the 750 metaphors. In a similar way, GB shows a preference for POSSESSION vis-
à-vis the New Englishes, but this source domain only contributed 22 instances 
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overall. Due to the low frequencies in general, it is difficult to ascertain if these 
source domains represent true preferences.  
 Out of those source domains that collectively contributed the majority of 
metaphor data across the varieties (i.e., FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, 
NATURAL FORCE, PART OF A JOURNEY, PERSON and RELATED TO A 
BUILDING / STRUCTURE), the most frequent source domains (i.e., PERSON and 
ILLNESS) do not demonstrate any major differences between the varieties. The 
remaining source domains provide some evidence for preferences. IN seems to 
prefer NATURAL FORCE with the highest normalized frequency at 212%, while 
the other varieties are below the mean to varying degrees. KE seems to prefer 
RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE with a normalized frequency of 
198%, followed by a dramatic drop in SG with 104% and the rest of the varieties 
below the mean, again to varying degrees. FLUID IN A CONTAINER seems to be 
a preference for GB with a normalized frequency of 250%, while PART OF A 
JOURNEY seems to be preferred by GB (194%) and to a lesser extent by SG 
(161%). Yet, again, frequency could be an issue here, considering NATURAL 
FORCE, RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE, FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER and PART OF A JOURNEY are much less frequent than the two 
major source domains PERSON and ILLNESS.  
 Nevertheless, to reiterate an important point, the categories presented in this 
section are intentionally broad, as dictated by the methodology of this study (see 
Section 4.1.4). Only when we break down these categories into a more fine-grained 
analysis can we gain a better understanding of the potential for variation or 
commonality. This is what the following sections will attempt.  
6.3 Specific-Level FEAR Metaphors across Varieties 
The analysis above served as a first step to discovering what is shared and what is 
different across varieties concerning FEAR metaphors. The distribution of 
PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE was found to be significant and, from 
the perspective of the normalized frequencies, there is some indication of variety-
specific preferences. These findings will guide further investigation into the 
breakdown of the most prominent source domains. Furthermore, in the following 
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subsections, examination of the internal structure of the source domains (PERSON, 
ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, RELATED TO A BUILDING/STRUCTURE, 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER and PART OF A JOURNEY) will be discussed on the 
basis of the evidence provided by the corpus data and in a variety-specific manner. 
They have been selected for more comprehensive treatment due to the fact that they 
make up 79% - 82% of the FEAR data across the varieties. All remaining source 
domains will be discussed together as “minor metaphors”, as their absolute 
frequencies were relatively low. 
6.3.1 FEAR IS A PERSON 
PERSON has been established as the most prominent source domain for FEAR, 
being ranked first by all varieties and constituting between 36.7% - 52% of all 
metaphor profiles. This is a considerable increase in comparison to the ANGER 
data, by which it was demonstrated that PERSON (also ranked first by all varieties) 
only represented 21.3% - 31.3% of the total metaphor profiles. Therefore, the 
personification of FEAR has a much greater share of the metaphors overall (42.9% 
of all FEAR data). Figure 6.4 illustrates the percentages of FEAR IS A PERSON 
for each variety, which shows it is most frequent in NG and least frequent in GB.  
 
 
Figure 6.4: Percentages of FEAR IS A PERSON per variety 
 
Recall that, from the ANGER case study (see Section 5.3.1), PERSON acts as a 
shorthand in this study for pervasive ontological metaphors involving 
personification (see Kövecses 2010). Personification involves the attribution of 
human qualities and actions to a non-human domain. The discovery of 
personification in linguistic metaphor analysis was illustrated by three examples 
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discussed in Dorst (2011), which had direct relevance to examples from the 
GloWbE data. These examples apply to FEAR as well. Furthermore, Dorst (2011) 
discusses a fourth example, reproduced in (47) below, which also has counterpart 
examples in this study. Therefore, a brief discussion of this fourth example is 
merited, before we turn to the breakdown of this broad category for FEAR.  
 
(47) […] the flat meadows where here and there stunted trees squatted like old men 
in cloaks. (BNC-Baby: CDB)       (Dorst 2011: 120) 
 
In this example, the personification of trees is due to the use of the verb squatted 
and the simile like old men in cloaks. Dorst notes that “[s]ince similes are 
necessarily more explicit in setting up and signalling comparisons, personifications 
expressed by similes are likely to be more noticeable and delibrate” and “may be 
similar to image mappings, with a strong visualization effect” (120-121). 
Personifications, expressed by similes77, are found in the GloWbE data, as 
illustrated by (48).  
 
(48) […] just like a thief, the worry habit steals on me […] (KE G)  ANGER IS 
A HIDDEN ENEMY (here A THIEF) 
 
In this case, ANGER is being conceptualized as a thief – an analysis that is 
supported by the presence of the simile like a thief and underscored by the phrase 
steals on me.  
 With this in mind, we  now turn to an overview of the specific levels identified 
for FEAR IS A PERSON in Table 6.4. This demonstrates the breakdown of the 
PERSON source domain, as evidenced by the GloWbE data, and, as for the 
ANGER case study, it is not assumed to be exhaustive. Furthermore, the possiblity 
of metonymic readings of what I have identified here as metaphors also holds and 
will be discussed on a by-example basis.  
 
 
 
 
_________________ 
77  Note that there were no examples of this kind in the ANGER dataset.  
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Table 6.4: Breakdown of FEAR IS A PERSON per variety78 
PERSON GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 0 0 0 0 
PERSON - ACCOMPLICE - specific-level (= level 2) 0 3 1 0 1 
PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
4 10 2 2 3 
PERSON - GUIDE - specific-level (= level 2)  1 0 1 0 1 
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 2)  3 0 0 1 4 
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2) 2 0 1 0 0 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)  7 9 7 15 8 
  A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3) 5 1 3 1 1 
  A THIEF (= level 3) 0 2 1 0 0 
  BEING BULLIED (= level 3) 1 0 0 0 0 
  DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 
3) 
0 2 1 0 3 
  WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3) 10 33 26 24 12 
  WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)  8 6 11 17 23 
  WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) 6 4 1 3 4 
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 0 1 0 
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - specific-level 
(= level 2) 
3 3 4 0 3 
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
0 2 0 0 0 
Misc. – FEAR TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON 
4 0 0 0 1 
Misc. – FEAR INVOLVED IN ACTIONS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON  
1 3 1 0 1 
total 55 78 60 64 65 
 
 
 The first insight from this breakdown is that none of the varieties 
conceptualize FEAR as a PERSON on a very generic level (= level 1), e.g., fear is 
a person, animal, being, etc. The majority of FEAR IS A PERSON metaphors are 
found on the specific level, which imply a main meaning focus or major theme in 
accordance with Kövecses (2010: 138). In order to explore this, I will first illustrate 
examples of each specific level as presented in Table 6.4 and then move on to 
examine the variety perspective.  
_________________ 
78  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.  
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 Despite the infrequency of this specific-level source domain (which is the 
case for the majority here), there is evidence that FEAR can be conceptualized as 
an ACCOMPLICE, which was not attested to in previous research. 
ACCOMPLICE, in its basic sense entails a person who participates in criminal or 
bad behavior, with whom you are associated. You feel compelled either to maintain 
this association, as in (49), highlight this association, as in (50), hide this 
association, as in (51), or name the accomplice as the guilty party, as in (52).  
 
(49) The turnout of registrants for the just-concluded exercise was massive - 
pleasantly assuaging the fear of voter apathy harboured before the exercise 
commenced. (NG G) 
(50) And in order to actualise his policy he embraced any African dictator and 
constitutional monarchy in the Middle East who joined the US fear. (NG G) 
(51) But it hides fear and insecurity as modernity challenges the roots of such 
heritage […] (NG G) 
(52) Most people have plenty of thoughts and feelings, but the problem for many 
seems to be the ability to take action. The culprit, of course, is fear. (SG G) 
 
This conceptualization of FEAR shows up only in NG, KE and SG, albeit only five 
times.  
 FEAR, in line with a broader interpretation of personification, can be 
compared to A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL, which is relatable to Stefanowitsch’s 
(2006a) WILD / CAPTIVE ANIMAL. It is not surprising that fear, as a generally 
viewed negative emotion, presents a danger not unlike an animal that has been 
unleashed or aroused from sleep, (53) and (54) respectively. These 
conceptualizations were also found for ANGER and, therefore, seem conventional 
for negative emotions in general.  
 
(53) Would I tell a Luo officer to stand aside for them to go unleash terror79? (KE 
G) 
(54) Arouse great fear and anxiety in many men and women […] (NG G) 
_________________ 
79  A note here on terror is warranted, considering its contemporary use to denote to terrorism. This, in and of 
itself, is metonymic, considering part of terrorism and terrorists acts is to illicit widespread feelings of 
terror. In the FEAR dataset, I did not annotate any instance of war on terror, considering its most recent 
American usage, which has naturally been picked up in the Englishes globally, especially in journalistic 
and political discourse. However, I did consider those instances of terror in a metonymic relationship with 
terrorism as metaphorical when, like example (57), they lend themselves to a direct comparison with 
another domain, like AN OCTOPUS SPREADING ITS TENTACLES.  
Case Study: FEAR 190 
unleash is particular salient for this conceptualization 7 out of 21 times for this 
source domain grouping. Nevertheless, FEAR IS A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL 
metaphors can also be very specific in the images they invoke.  
 
(55) A sickening, paralyzing fear coiled around my heart. (SG B) 
(56) However, I managed to save myself from the fangs of fear, and fortunately I 
found new strategies on how to boost my confidence. (SG B) 
(57) As terror spreads its ugly tentacles across the world, the instant reaction is 
one of horror (IN G) 
(58) It was successful in causing almost a stampede of humanitarian concern and 
focus on Africa. (NG G) 
(59) Is your mind in its resting place, or the termite of worry, the termite of fear or 
the termite of the fear of death, has eaten you up? (NG G) 
 
 In terms of the varieties, NG contributes the majority of FEAR IS A 
(DANGEROUS) ANIMAL with 10 of the total 21 tokens. 
 Previously unaccounted for is FEAR IS A GUIDE, represented by only three 
instances in GB, KE and SG, which demonstrates the understanding of FEAR as a 
person directing your actions in a particular endeavor, as in (60), or a person 
bringing you to a destination, as in (61). The latter aspect is, of course, closely 
related to PART OF A JOURNEY. Because of the obvious personification, I have, 
nevertheless, chosen to include it in here.  
 
(60) […] this simply means he is playing the politics of another era, guided by the 
fear to disturb the status quo, or his desire to preserve the status quo […] (KE B) 
(61) And interestingly enough, natural disasters don't really cause the kind of fear 
that brings people to church the way terrorism does. (SG B) 
 
 Also previously unaccounted for is that FEAR can be a HELPER, but in 
another sense than determined for GUIDE (although a guide is also technically a 
helper, albeit a rather specific one). FEAR as a HELPER highlights the protective 
properties of this emotion, which in essence give it a positive spin. The eight 
instances of this specific-level metaphor occur in GB, IN and SG.  
 
(62) And many fears are rational, of course, and can be friends to our lives; the 
fear that heightens our awareness in a dark part of town, for example, or the fear 
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of falling that we suddenly develop when standing too near a cliff’s edge on a windy 
day. (GB G) 
(63) Many sitting MPs will lose badly. This fear will keep the LS being dissolved 
at bay. (IN B) 
(64) Fear teaches you to stay safe, but it also predicts the outcome before it has 
happened, by focusing on the negative aspects and preventing you from taking 
risks. (SG G) 
 
 The advent or development of FEAR is highlighted by conceptualizing it as 
OFFSPRING, like in ANGER. (65) illustrates its relatedness to the ANIMAL 
domain by conceiving of FEAR in terms of (large-scale) breeding, while (66) 
describes first experiencing fear as a birth. Both senses would be covered by 
Stefanowitsch’s (2006a) ORGANISM or, more specifically, by Esenova’s (2011) 
special sense of CONTAINMENT, namely ANGER IS A CHILD.  
 
(65) First, Wagalla Massacre bred fear and hatred. People began despising their 
neighbours and the other Somali clans. (KE B) 
(66) While the fear of something happening is often unfounded, that doesn't make 
the fear any less real and such fears are born out of a lack of visible police presence 
combined with mind-bogglingly soft punishment for offenders. (GB B) 
 
 Like ANGER, FEAR is conceptualized to a large extent as an OPPONENT, 
which has been well established by previous research80. Also like ANGER, there 
are oppositional aspects that cohere to our basic experience of being afraid with 
origins in our biological evolution. FEAR, as an emotion concept, is “centered on 
threat” and functions “with a deep evolutionary origin, reflecting the fact that earth 
has always been a hazardous environment to inhabit” (Öhman 2008: 710). Hence, 
the world we live in (and in which our conceptual system is embodied) is dangerous 
and threatening, and fear has helped us to develop “defense responses to deal with 
life threats […] whether these are unhealthy chemicals in the surroundings, 
circumstances suggesting a hunting predator, or aggressive conspecifics” (710). In 
_________________ 
80 In Section 6.1, the example of the metaphor FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (he was wrestling with his fear) 
clearly highlights the physical struggle (Kövecses 1990: 77). Yet, I maintain that it is also apparent in 
Kövecses’ FEAR IS A VICIOUS or HIDDEN ENEMY, TORMENTOR and even, as I see it, in FEAR AS 
A SOCIAL SUPERIOR. The reason I view A SOCIAL SUPERIOR as a subcategory of OPPONENT again 
relates to the oppositional aspects I determine as basic for understanding OPPONENT. To my mind, 
Kövecses’ (1990: 78) examples to illustrate SOCIAL SUPERIOR (her fear prevented her from going into 
the house, his actions were dictated by fear, fear dominated his actions, etc.) speak to a situation in which 
a person’s wishes or intentions are at odds with those of someone else, who then can compel that person 
into compliance.   
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other words, the relationship between FEAR and OPPONENTS (i.e., threats in both 
human and non-human form) has been biologically established.  
 However, the metaphors attributable to FEAR IS AN OPPONENT, raise 
FEAR to the level of the threats themselves. An excess of fear is a destructive 
emotion that will hinder the person experiencing it in a particular situation. 
Regulating the feeling of fear within ourselves is often talked about in terms of 
fighting or facing our fears, as we would human opponents, so that there is no 
hindering excess of fear or so that the feeling of fear disappears altogether. 
Moreover, FEAR can launch an attack on you, as well. The comparison between 
FEAR and AN OPPONENT can be demonstrated in these general terms in (67) – 
(71).  
 
(67) When you are attacked by fear, go to your healing toolkit […] (GB G) 
(68) Fear is, and always has been, the greatest enemy of mankind. (NG B) 
(69) Her enemies wrestle with the fear that more Kenyan women will ascend to 
high office […] (KE B) 
(70) How can you look into the eyes of fear when you have already decided that it 
is your enemy? (IN G) 
(71) Be it a fear for pests or to face a huge group, you can only face those fears […] 
(SG B) 
 
Beyond this basic oppositional meaning, FEAR IS AN OPPONENT metaphors are 
the only type of PERSON metaphors that can be broken down into further meaning 
foci components (= level 3), which will be illustrated later in this section. 
 Like in the ANGER case study, FEAR as a PARENT is, of course, 
conceptually related to OFFSPRING. Furthermore, it indirectly presents the 
flipside of the coin to Esenova’s (2011) CONTAINMENT subcategory, FEAR IS 
A CHILD, by understanding FEAR as the PARENT-CONTAINER. In the 
PARENT sense FEAR is responsible for creating something (a sense I deem more 
visible at the linguistic level than CONTAINMENT), which, as illustrated by this 
single instance, is also related to the ANIMAL domain due to the use of breeds and 
spawns.  
 
(72) […] fear of loss of originality breeds rejectionism and spawns negativism. (IN 
G) 
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 Occurring in all varieties except IN; FEAR IS A PERSON WITH THE 
ABILITY TO SPEAK, similar to the ANGER types and also not found in previous 
research, can invoke a metonymic reading. The voice mentioned in (73) (which is 
further implied by the use of tape) can stand in for the fearful person him/herself.  
 
(73) […] by understanding that the voice of fear is not you. It is only a conditioned 
“tape” from the past projecting into the future. Once you can recognize that you are 
the one playing the tape and not the tape itself, you are free! (SG G) 
 
However, the more prominent conceptualization here is that of a person (inside 
oneself), speaking in lies (74), in whispers (75), in a particularly annoying way (76) 
or with whom we sit down for a conversation (77).  
 
(74) I don't always folllow [sic] through - mostly from lack of strength or courage 
- fear jumps in there between the two and fills my head with the lies. (NG B) 
(75) Every time fear whispers to you “what if this does not work” reply with “what 
if it does work”. (NG B) 
(76) We betray ourselves by being nagged by the fear that the lives we lead are not 
ours […]. (KE B) 
(77) Talk to your fear. Sit your fear down across the table and have a two-way 
conversation. (KE G) 
 
 The two instances of FEAR IS A PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS or WHO IS 
DYING are found only in NG. As in the ANGER case study, FEAR is sustained in 
a manner similar to an ill person being nursed in (78), a mapping not discussed in 
the previous research, and is capable of experiencing death in (79), which is 
relatable to Stefanowitsch (2006a) general domain of ORGANISM. 
 
(78) The fear we nurse before we get married is not really worth it. (NG G) 
(79) Don’t allow fear of failure hold you back, do the thing you fear and the death 
of fear is certain.... (NG G) 
 
 In addition to the specific levels outlined above, there are two miscellaneous 
categories within the broad FEAR IS A PERSON metaphor type that indicate the 
assigning of human-like characteristics and actions to a fearful feeling. They are 
not only relatively infrequent but also do not demonstrate conceptual unity among 
themselves. (80) is an illustration of FEAR TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS 
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ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON, while (81) is an illustration of FEAR INVOLVED 
IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON.  
 
(80) We need to decide if the fear is reasonable and logical or if it is unfounded 
and irrational. (SG B) 
(81) It is also a worry that touches me as whenever I perform my role […] (SG B) 
 
 The various specific-level FEAR IS A PERSON metaphors occur in small 
numbers. This makes comparison across the varieties challenging. The exception 
is, of course, OPPONENT, which appears as a special instantiation of personified 
FEAR. It not only can be broken down further into a level 3, but also contributes 
the most PERSON tokens at 255 (or, in other words, 79% of the PERSON data).   
 Furthermore, as Table 6.5 demonstrates, there are differences between 
varieties when conceptualizing FEAR as AN OPPONENT in comparison to another 
type of PERSON (ex. ACCOMPLICE, HELPER, OFFSPRING, etc.) 
 
Table 6.5: Absolute frequencies of OPPONENT as a special instantiation of FEAR IS A 
PERSON  
 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
OPPONENT 37 57 50 60 51 
PERSON (other) 18 21 10 4 14 
total 55 78 60 64 65 
 
 
A chi-square test was performed on figures for all varieties in Table 6.5 and 
revealed that the observed differences are significant (x2 = 15.389, df = 4, p = 
0.003959). It is interesting that the lowest proportion of OPPONENT metaphors is 
found in GB (67% of all PERSON metaphors). The percentages in the New 
Englishes were higher (NG with 73%, SG with 78%, KE with 83% and IN with a 
whopping 94%). Similar results were found for the ANGER case study, although it 
is striking that for FEAR, the percentages of OPPONENT in the New Englishes are 
much higher and provide a stronger indication for a preference, especially for IN.  
Taking a closer look at OPPONENT, it can be segmented into different 
meaning foci, which are reiterated in Table 6.6.  
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Table 6.6: Breakdown of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT per variety 
OPPONENT GB NG KE IN SG 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
7 9 7 15 8 
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3) 5 1 3 1 1 
A THIEF (= level 3) 0 2 1 0 0 
BEING BULLIED (= level 3) 1 0 0 0 0 
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT 
OPPONENT (= level 3) 
0 2 1 0 3 
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3) 10 33 26 24 12 
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= 
level 3)  
8 6 11 17 23 
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) 6 4 1 3 4 
total 55 78 60 64 65 
 
 
All varieties make use of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT in the general sense, especially 
in IN – largely due to nine instances of the construction face [V] + fear (or 
subordinate term). Otherwise, the majority of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT metaphors 
fall into two level 3 categories that highlight a more specific, additional meaning.  
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (WHO EXERTS CONTROL) 
(82) […] looking around to see who else might be there and basically letting fear 
control my life. (GB G) 
(83) Unfortunately, even many Christians are under the grip of the fear of death. 
(NG G) 
(84) Besides, some of the contenders are held hostage by supporters and fear of 
losing them in case they enter political marriages unlikely to be embraced by their 
communities. (KE G) 
(85) As most of the fireworks dealers have stocked crackers in their stores located 
in residential areas, a feeling of panic and fear has gripped the residents here. (IN 
G) 
(86) He was seized with terror lest he should die of the strain. (SG G) 
 
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST) 
(87) It totally eliminates any fear of a blank page. (GB G) 
(88) And then I would come home, incredibly proud of myself, for conquering my 
fear of death by cold water […] (NG G) 
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(89) […] you must be aware that you can stand to gain a lot by overcoming the fear 
of public speaking. (KE G) 
(90) […] you will be able to trounce your fear of being emotional in a hassle free 
manner. (IN B) 
(91) You too can learn how to master your fear, by understanding that the voice of 
fear is not you. (SG G) 
 
 In addition, FEAR can be conceptualized as AN OPPONENT in smaller 
numbers in accordance with additional meaning foci.  
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (A HIDDEN ENEMY) 
(92) The fear of facing the situation creeps in and responsibility is avoided, and 
then temporarily clouded by another step in the wrong direction. (KE G) 
(93) Fear is always lurking around, waiting for the moment to appear. (SG B) 
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (A THIEF) 
(94) The question is this, would you allow fear rob you of your financial destiny? 
(NG B) 
(95) Worry steals our happiness. (KE G) 
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (BEING BULLIED) 
(96) […] when it does talk about it is not above mocking and belittling the genuine 
concern of others on that score. (GB G) 
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT) 
(97) Fear would bury your spiritual growth. (NG G) 
(98) You know what really tortures people. The fear of the unknown more than the 
unknown itself. (SG B) 
 
FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS PREVAILING)  
(99) And when you look back upon your existence on this planet, you can be sure 
that you’ll be savouring all those moments of bravery and rueing all those moments 
when you were captured by fear. (GB B) 
(100) […] Singaporeans let fear get the upperhand. (SG B) 
 
 This completes the discussion of FEAR IS A PERSON on the specific level, 
in which OPPONENT emerges as the most likely candidate for a preferential 
conceptualization, especially for the Indian variety. The following section will take 
a look at FEAR conceptualized as an ILLNESS.  
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6.3.2 FEAR IS AN ILLNESS 
FEAR IS AN ILLNESS has been well testified to in the previous literature, most 
notably by Kövecses (1990), who identifies the mappings FEAR IS AN ILLNESS 
(sick with fright) and FEAR IS INSANITY (insane with fear). The ILLNESS 
domain is also implied in Stefanowitsch’s (2006a) FEAR IS COLD (shiver of fear, 
be frozen in fear) and FEAR IS PAIN (agony/convulsion of fear), as well as in the 
metonymic system of FEAR outlined by Kövecses (1990). What they all have in 
common is a focal meaning being extended to a state of fright, that is, a physical 
condition that prevents your body or mind from properly functioning. This is why 
it comes as no surprise that FEAR IS AN ILLNESS metaphors are prevalent in all 
of the varieties, having been ranked in either the second (GB, NG, SG) or third 
position (KE, IN).  
 In fact, with 104 tokens overall (13.9% of the data) ILLNESS emerges as the 
second most common source domain for conceptualizing FEAR, although this is a 
dramatic decrease in preferential status in comparison to FEAR IS A PERSON 
(42.9%) outlined above. The percentages across varieties are illustrated in Figure 
6.5.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Percentages of FEAR IS AN ILLNESS per variety 
 
 In terms of the metaphor profiles, GB and IN contain the largest portions of 
FEAR IS AN ILLNESS, yet for difference reasons when we take up a finer grain 
of analysis. Moreover, unlike ANGER IS ILLNESS outlined above, where we saw 
a more obvious grouping of this mapping at the more specific-level LOSS OF A 
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CONTROL OF BODY, this does not hold for a breakdown of FEAR IS AN 
ILLNESS, which is illustrated in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7: Breakdown of FEAR IS AN ILLNESS per variety81 
ILLNESS  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  7 3 5 2 4 
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2) 1 1 3 3 1 
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING 
SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)  
1 1 0 1 1 
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – 
specific-level (=level 2)  
0 0 0 0 0 
  COLD-RELATED (= level 3)  1 0 0 1 1 
   LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3) 2 4 2 3 9 
   PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3) 4 2 0 0 2 
   STOMACH-RELATED (= level 3) 0 1 1 0 0 
  VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (= level 3)  1 0 0 0 0 
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2) 2 3 5 12 2 
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
1 1 0 1 0 
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2) 3 2 3 1 0 
total 23 18 19 24 20 
 
 
Before delving into examples of each level shown in this table, it is interesting to 
note that almost everything labelled “level 2” is also shared with ILLNESS 
conceptualizations of ANGER, the exception being MEDICINE TO TREAT AN 
ILLNESS. Furthermore, in terms of ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS, 
which can be broken down into level 3s, two mappings emerge that are specific to 
FEAR, COLD-RELATED and STOMACH-RELATED. These two, in particular, 
are relatable to some aspects of the metonymic system Kövecses (1990) outlined, 
namely NERVOUSNESS IN THE STOMACH (butterflies in the stomach), DROP 
IN BODY TEMPERATURE (froze with fear) and, perhaps, even SWEATING (the 
cold sweat of fear broke out).  
 What is also clear from Table 6.7 is that FEAR, as a generally undesired 
emotion, can be conceptualized in a generic sense as AN ILLNESS, which, of 
_________________ 
81  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.  
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course, describes a generally undesired physical condition. Thus, as a consequence 
of experiencing fear, we can talk in terms of feeling sick (101) and (102), suffering 
or implied suffering (103) and (104), having symptoms or bouts (105) and (106), 
etc.  
 
(101) If you're feeling sick with dread every Sunday evening and preying [sic] each 
week that you will win the lottery […] (GB G) 
(102) The people they asked must have been sick with worry about making the 
house payments […] (SG G) 
(103) […] seem likely to become a target of Maliki's regime extending the fear that 
they suffered under Saddam Hussein. (GB G)  
(104) No one has ever questioned that and he does not live with the fear that one 
day a woman might show up at a campaign rally […] (KE B)82 
(105) Your dreams I think are a sympton [sic] of your inner fear of marriage and 
what you stand to lose […] (NG B) 
(106) It is deeply disheartening that some regions in Kenya are experiencing bouts 
of insecurity and fear, so close to the 2013 general election. (KE G) 
 
All examples above clearly demonstrate the comparison between FEAR and 
ILLNESS on the linguistic level. This comparison becomes more elaborated when 
we take a look at the more specific levels.  
 FEAR can be construed as such a precarious or unhealthy experience that it 
can lead to death. All varieties have at least one instance of this, with KE and IN 
both having three.  
 
(107) […] just like a thief, the worry habit steals on me, and I find myself deep in 
the throes of this deadly vice. (KE G) 
(108) The Sikh religious leadership heard and understood the message; and they 
succumbed to their fear. (IN G) 
 FEAR is being understood as AN ILLNESS as well when it is related to the 
partaking of an intoxicating substance, which, for this particular case, highlights its 
_________________ 
82  live with affords a good opportunity to illustrate collocational analysis as an aid to labelling the likely source 
domains. This phrase showed up twice in the KE data and my intuition was to initially annotate them as 
instances of personification, i.e., person you live with. This, after all, corresponds to a basic dictionary sense 
in Macmillan (“to live in the same house and have a sexual relationship with someone who you are not 
married to”). However, another definition (“to accept something unpleasant that you cannot change”), 
which is perhaps less structured, but, nevertheless, still a basic part of human experience, lead me to consult 
the collocations of live with in the GloWbE. The results spoke against my intuition. The human basic 
meaning was present (with 1,067 tokens), but the illness sense was much more prevalent (with 1,708), as 
in examples like to live with disabilities, diabetes, aids, cancer, etc.  
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origin outside of the body. You can be injected with it (109) or something you 
experience can be laced by it (110). It can be mind-altering in the manner of a drug 
(111) or just simply toxic (112).  
 
(109) The more such cases, the more the population is injected with fear and eager 
to turn over more of its hard-won rights to the government. (IN G) 
(110) […] our joy is discounted; laced by some fear over one of the success factors 
of his victory. (NG B) 
(111) […] adrift in the set's vast mid-section, following literally hours of simply 
mind-altering terror. (GB B) 
(112) […] we devour along their toxins of fear and hatred, which affects both our 
spiritual and physical health. (SG G) 
 
 Our experiences with being ill also include an illness’ ability to spread rapidly 
from person to person. This is a particularly salient conceptualization of FEAR for 
IN (12 of the 24 tokens), but is found in all other varieties as well. It is solely 
instantiated by some form of spread.  
 
(113) It's my first play, about the riots last year and the spread of fear. (GB G) 
(114) […] it only served to spread uncertainty and fear. (NG G) 
(115) […] if we burn you stand accused - because no politician can spread fear and 
hate without your help and support. (KE G) 
(116) It is poor judgment and a deliberate act of spreading fear to compare a nuclear 
bomb with a nuclear plant. (IN G) 
(117) An exaggeration or an attempt to spread fear (or otherwise silly) - one might 
think, but think about it. (SG B) 
 
 FEAR is also understood as AN ILLNESS, when it affects your mental health 
or, at least, your ability to think clearly. This mapping was not as common as in 
ANGER, but it is still present in the data for FEAR, as demonstrated below.  
 
(118) Dazed with fear, Okonkwo drew his matchet [sic] and cut him down. (NG G) 
(119) Once they rushed to seize it, a fear psychosis gripped the companies and that 
did the banks in. (IN G) 
 
 One specific level puts FEAR IS AN ILLNESS in a slightly more positive 
light. FEAR is an illness for which there is a treatment and, thus, relief, suggesting 
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it can be taken care of in the same way you can be treated for a certain illness. It is 
is found in all varieties, except SG.  
 
(120) […] I decided to have another go at curing her fear of loud bangs. (GB B) 
(121) If the complaint has any substance, how can the government mitigate their 
fear that this is going to end this way? (NG G) 
(122) Hands at his side, he appears casual, too casual, as though to assuage her 
fear, and his own. (KE B) 
(123) The only remedy for this fear gripped masses lies in educating them. (IN G) 
 
 A specific level within ILLNESS that can be further broken down is FEAR 
IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. The physical symptoms being 
attributed to FEAR include COLD-RELATED (124) and (125), LOSS OF 
CONTROL OF BODY (126) and (127), PHYSICAL PAIN (128) and (129), 
STOMACH-RELATED (130) and (131), and VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (132).  
 
(124) Why aren't parents clammy with fear that, without the priceless hurly-burly 
of cash-strapped independence, their children will turn into cosseted, emotionally 
stunted freaks? (GB G) 
(125) That made Vandhiya Thevan shiver in fear. Ravidasan spoke in a loud voice. 
(IN B) 
(126) Fear got him paralyzed, and made him inactive. (NG B) 
(127) […] what happens next? I didn't know. The fear was crippling. (SG G) 
(128) I got the part and was racked with fear but I made a promise to myself not to 
give up […] (GB G) 
(129) Not only can my heart feel the pain brought on by each new fear, or loss I 
experience, it could even differentiate each new sense of pain […] (SG G) 
(130) […] shoulders sagged with relief, but his stomach was still a roiling pit of 
fear. (NG G) 
(131) The shock was jaw-dropping; the terror was stomach-churning, and the 
tragedy of it all was just apocalyptic. (KE G) 
(132) Fear is very blinding. (GB B)  
 
 From the variety-specific perspective, the FEAR IS AN ILLNESS breakdown 
proved tricky, since it did not reveal any obvious grouping around a specific level, 
like in the ANGER case study. In fact, the varieties tend to be all over the place in 
terms of their preference within ILLNESS, although the numbers are too small for 
any meaningful statistical analysis. For instance, GB makes most of the generic 
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mapping (with 7 tokens), while KE has a tie between the generic and AN 
INFECTIOUS ILLNESS (with 5 each). NG has 4 tokens of LOSS OF CONTROL 
OF BODY, but 3 each at the generic level and AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS. IN 
and SG show a slightly more verifiable preference, however. As mentioned above, 
IN has the majority of ILLNESS on the specific level of AN INFECTIOUS 
ILLNESS. SG has almost half of its tokens (9 out of 20) attributable to LOSS OF 
CONTROL OF BODY. Therefore, other than having established that all varieties 
make use of ILLNESS to a certain extent in order to conceptualize FEAR, we can 
conclude this section and move on to NATURAL FORCE.  
6.3.3 FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE 
Although NATURAL FORCE is not nearly as frequent as PERSON and ILLNESS 
(which together make up 56.8% of all FEAR metaphors), it is the third most 
common source domain for FEAR with 66 tokens or 8.8%. Figure 6.6 demonstrates 
the percentages of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE across the varieties.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Percentages of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety 
 
With 28 tokens overall, IN displays the highest percentage (18.7%) of FEAR IS A 
NATURAL FORCE in its metaphor profile, followed by SG and KE with 8%. 
Therefore, it is useful to take a look at the internal structure of this broad source 
domain to understand what component parts contribute to this result. Before we do 
that, it should be noted that FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (fear swept over, 
engulfed by panic, etc.), was previously discussed by Kövecses (1990) but not 
broken down into specific levels, like FIRE or WATER. In this study, NATURAL 
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FORCE was also initially used in annotation as shorthand for those metaphors 
demonstrating a mapping of the properties of the elements of the natural world onto 
FEAR, which can be classified by more specific source domains. Table 6.8 
illustrates the dissection of NATURAL FORCE into specific levels.  
 
Table 6.8: Breakdown of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety83 
NATURAL FORCE  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 1 0 0 0 
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED – specific-
level (= level 2) 
3 4 3 13 9 
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2) 0 1 0 1 0 
   CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3) 0 0 0 1 0 
   DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3) 1 0 3 0 0 
   MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 3) 0 0 1 3 0 
   STARTING A FIRE (= level 3) 1 0 3 1 0 
STORM - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 1 0 0 
WATER - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 0 0 0 
   RAIN (= level 3) 0 0 1 0 0 
   WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3) 3 0 0 9 3 
total 8 6 12 28 12 
 
 
FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE contains the more specific levels of 
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED, FIRE, STORM and WATER, which are 
unevenly distributed across the varieties, seen in Table 6.8. Similar to ANGER, it 
also has one generic instance due to the ambiguity of swept in terms of source 
domain origin, illustrated in (133), as well as one instance of STORM, illustrated 
in (134). 
 
(133) In Nigeria, the lesson of the earlier bank failures appeared to have been 
forgotten as generalized distress swept the banking sub-sector […] (NG G) 
(134) At this stage of your marriage I would recommend that you have a heart to 
heart with him and for the both of you to be brutally honest with one another without 
the fear of a domestic brewing up […] (KE B) 
 
_________________ 
83  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.  
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This leaves the most common specific-level source domains of NATURAL FORCE 
as ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED, FIRE and WATER. The total tokens 
for FIRE and WATER overall were equal, 16 each, while ATMOSPHERE / 
CLIMATE-RELATED is at the helm with 32 total instances. As a reminder, FIRE 
and WATER were the most common source domains within NATURAL FORCE 
for ANGER. This is not the case for FEAR, in which ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-
RELATED – in and of itself at first glance a somewhat broader category entailing 
atmospheric or climate-related phenomena, but, as will become clear below, acting 
as a cohesive unit – makes its first appearance. The following will first detail FIRE 
and WATER, which reveal level 3 analysis, as well, and then move on to 
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED and the variety perspective.  
 Like ANGER, FEAR can be understood in terms of general burning, like in 
smouldering with fear (NG) and flicker of fear (IN), which were the only two 
instances. Unlike ANGER, we cannot trace it to the previous metonymic system set 
up by Kövecses (1990). Instead, it speaks to more of the correspondence between 
the intensity of burning and the intensity of a feeling of fright. The 14 other tokens 
of FEAR IS A FIRE can be broken down into the more specific-levels of 
CONTROLLING A FIRE, DESTRUCTIVE FIRE, MAKING A FIRE MORE 
INTENSE and STARTING A FIRE, which retain the intensity correlation. Notice 
that they were also the same for ANGER. Examples of these levels in FEAR are 
from GB, KE and IN, illustrated below. While SG did not indicate any FEAR IS A 
FIRE mappings, NG only had a generic instance (given above).   
 
FEAR IS A FIRE (CONTROLLING A FIRE) 
(135) […] they pierced and made a slow but steady entry into my very thought 
process, and eventually doused that smouldering fear […] (IN G)  
 
FEAR IS A FIRE (A DESTRUCTIVE FIRE) 
(136) I was consumed in fear, my heart was pounding. (KE B) 
(137) He was engulfed by sudden fear of the unknown and his knees felt like giving 
in. (KE G) 
FEAR IS A FIRE (MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE)  
(138) Another follower of Malthusian population theory, Stephen Enke also helped 
fuel fear of overpopulation. (IN B) 
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(139) He felt that the lack of institutional credibility has stoked the flames of fear. 
(IN G) 
 
FEAR IS A FIRE (STARTING A FIRE) 
(140) The fighting has displaced hundreds of thousands of people and sparked fear 
of another large-scale war in the country. (KE G) 
(141) His courage and pathetic promotion of it by this pathetic lawyer ignites fear 
among fellow non criminal and normal citizens […] (IN G) 
 
 The WATER domain has been previously attested to for FEAR by 
Stefanowitsch’s (2006a) more general label LIQUID (trickling / undercurrent of 
fear). In the GloWbE data, WATER groups around one specific domain; that is, 15 
of the 16 total instances are found in WAVES (FLOOD). The remaining instance 
is found in KE denoting a similarity between FEAR and RAIN (reigned [sic] terror 
on). FEAR IS WAVES (FLOOD) are found only in GB, IN, SG, with GB and SG 
contributing three instances each, while IN has the most with nine. Examples from 
this domain are illustrated in (142) – (146). They also indicate the mapping of 
intensity of this natural force, albeit by means of spotlighting the more specific 
image of waves or a flood. 
 
(142) […] the reality is a groundswell of concern - if not opposition. (GB G) 
(143) Anyone with links to the company rapidly gets swept up in a wave of fear. 
(SG G) 
(144) […] individuals who have the fortitude to stand their ground in the face of 
waves of fear and greed that sweep through the market. (IN G) 
(145) Being disrespectful to law of the land sends waves of fear among law abiders 
[…] (IN B) 
(146) The note, put up to the PM in November 2007 in the wake of rising concern 
over Raja's bid to ram through the ‘first-come, first-served’ policy […] (IN G) 
 
 It is noteworthy that for FEAR there is no clear preference between FIRE and 
WATER, although the majority of WATER mappings were found in the Asian 
Englishes, just like in the ANGER case study. Considering the prominence of the 
final NATURAL FORCE source domain in the following, this trend seems to be 
negligible.  
 The biggest contributor to FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE is 
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED. It makes up nearly half (48%) of the 
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metaphors of this kind. As mentioned above, at first glance it appears to be a rather 
broad category (I was unable of breaking it down into more specific meaning units 
after all). As the examples in (147) – (151) will show, the metaphors found for this 
specific level cohere in the meaning being imparted to FEAR.  
 
(147) If that's right, then maybe we can emerge from a climate of fear. (GB G) 
(148) Fear pervades the entire city; classrooms have been burnt and reduced to 
shards […] (NG G) 
(149) […] the early Moi years was vaporized and a gloom of darkness and fear 
enveloped the nation (KE B) 
(150) This constancy of fear hangs like a fog which obscures the legendary beauty 
of the valley. (IN B) 
(151) As a result, nobody knew who to trust. A cloud of suspicion and fear hung 
over Singapore. (SG G) 
 
As these examples demonstrate, this source domain is employed to understand 
FEAR in terms of something that is all encompassing, like our climate or more 
distinct images like a cloud or fog. This highlights our experience with being fearful 
as something that not only hampers us, like our limited visibility in a fog, but also 
as something that is essentially shared beyond the individual, like a fog spreading 
across a city.  
 In terms of the variety-specific perspective, IN clearly contributes most 
readily to NATURAL FORCE regarding the raw frequencies. Furthermore, all 28 
instances from IN fall into the most common source domains, ATMOSPHERE / 
CLIMATE-RELATED (13 tokens), FIRE (6 tokens) and WATER (9 tokens). In 
view of the other Asian variety, SG, ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED (9 
tokens) is used over WATER (3 tokens) and no instances of FIRE exist in the 
dataset. The rest of the varieties show essentially the same picture for 
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED with 3 tokens each in GB and KE and 
four in NG. The African varieties barely make use of WATER (with one instance 
in KE that proved to be an outlier as RAIN). Yet, NG and KE separate in terms of 
FIRE. KE is in a tie with IN with 6 tokens, but NG contributed only one. For the 
(former) norm-providing variety, GB, the instances of NATURAL FORCE are 
generally low (8 tokens), but are basically spread out almost evenly between 
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ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED (3 tokens), WATER (3 tokens) and FIRE 
(2 tokens).  
 Nevertheless, because the total bulk of NATURAL FORCE metaphors 
centers on ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED and considering it is the most 
common source domain in IN, which utilizes NATURAL FORCE most 
extensively, I decided to take a look at its distribution in comparison to all other 
NATURAL FORCE source domains across the varieties. Table 6.9 illustrates this.  
 
Table 6.9: Absolute frequencies of ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED as a special 
instantiation of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE 
 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
ATMOSPHERE / 
CLIMATE-
RELATED 
3 4 3 13 9 
NATURAL 
FORCE (other) 
5 2 9 15 3 
total 8 6 12 28 12 
 
 
A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 6.9 and 
revealed that the observed differences are not significant (x2 = 7.256, df = 4, p = 
0.12296).  
 Other than the fact that IN has the most NATURAL FORCE metaphors as 
part of its profile for FEAR, there is no good indication that this is a true preference. 
All varieties make use of it to some extent, as outlined above.  
6.3.4 FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE 
A mapping that did not feature in the previous research outlined in Section 6.1 is 
FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE. Although it only 
contributed to 7.1% of the overall FEAR data (53 instances), it showed up in the 
top 5 rankings for three varieties, KE (2nd), NG (3rd) and SG (5th). This ranking 
result is mirrored in the percentages across varieties, which demonstrate the highest 
proportion of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE in these 
three varieties, see Figure 6.7 below.  
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Figure 6.7: Percentages of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE per variety 
 
KE makes use of this mapping 14% of the time in its metaphor profile and is, 
therefore, the biggest contributor of instances of this type. SG (7.3%) and NG 
(6.7%) half that, but still contribute more than GB (5.3%) and IN (2%). By taking 
a look at the internal structure of this broad source domain in more detail, in Table 
6.10 below, and by examining the corresponding linguistic metaphors, a very 
specific reason for KE’s prominence becomes apparent.  
 
Table 6.10: Breakdown of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE per 
variety84 
 
RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  2 0 0 0 1 
ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE - specific-level 
(= level 2)  
6 10 16 2 9 
STRENGTHENING A BUILDING / STRUCTURE - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
0 0 5 1 0 
WEAKENING A BUILDING / STRUCTURE - specific-
level (= level 2)  
0 0 0 0 1 
total 8 10 21 3 11 
 
 
An obvious grouping for all varieties at the specific level is ENCLOSURE 
RELATED TO A HOUSE, to which, again, KE, NG and SG contribute the most. 
We will consider this specific level in more detail below, after illustrating the less 
common instances.  
_________________ 
84  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.  
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 First of all, a note on the label for this particular source domain is necessary. 
Although it contains various linguistic indications of the source domain HOUSE, 
that is not the whole story. HOUSE, of course, is one particular concept belonging 
to a more general source domain BUILDING / STRUCTURE, which entails some 
sort of construction. This is clear by examining the three generic instances from GB 
and SG.  
 
(152) This series encourages us to consider the artifice of fear, and its psychological 
construct. (GB G)85 
(153) It is behind fear’s reasonable façade that the real danger lies […] (GB G) 
(154) How can we ever be a real democracy if we keep retreating behind the wall 
of fear? (SG B) 
 
These examples present evidence that FEAR is understood in terms of a 
construction, that is, a product of workmanship rather than occurring in nature (152) 
and, as such, something that can be hidden behind (153) and (154). The constructed 
property of BUILDING / STRUCTURE is also present in FEAR when we talk 
about FEAR as a STRUCTURE that can be strengthened, as in (155) and (156), or 
that can be weakened, as in (157).  
 
(155) It is quite another to invoke and peddle not just lies in so doing, but also 
prejudice and stereotypes to bolster fear and hatred. (KE G) 
(156) The fear had been reinforced for a number of appointments after their first 
painful experience. (IN B) 
(157) This kind of damage would have riddled his ego, and more importantly 
shaken the foundations of fear nationwide. (SG B) 
 
 Yet, beyond this, the notion of construction also entails some sort of enclosure 
that in our basic experience is most prevalent in the places we dwell, stereotypically 
a HOUSE. The house itself can be implied, as in (158) and (159), but also specific 
images of its component parts, like a closet, a garage and rooms can be exploited 
for understanding FEAR, as in (160) – (162).  
_________________ 
85  The OED provides a more historical definition of artifice (“Human skill or workmanship as opposed to 
nature or a natural phenomenon”), which suggested that this example belongs to RELATED TO A 
BUILDING / STRUCTURE over PERSON, which would have been suggested by the basic definition of 
artifice in Macmillan (“behaviour that is intended to trick someone”). This is further supported by the 
addition of construct in this example.  
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(158) […] you don't have to live in fear for the rest of your life. (NG B) 
(159) Many have been laid off thus the top mangers [sic] know that the remaining 
live in fear of losing their jobs. (KE G) 
(160) […] issues which need to be spoken of and not closeted in shame or in fear 
of retributions. (IN G) 
(161) Do not let the enemy garage you with fear […] (NG G) 
(162) It’s as if she’s got lots of little rooms in her brain and she can shut the door 
on the worry ones […] (GB G) 
 
The examples were annotated as FEAR IS AN ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A 
HOUSE and they are clearly the most common across the varieties, especially so in 
KE. The main reason for this is the phrase live in, illustrated in (158) and (159) 
above, which constitutes 75.5% of all metaphors of this kind. It also generally 
makes up the bulk of this specific level when taking the variety-specific 
perspective: 5 out 6 in GB, 9 out of 10 in NG, 16 out of 21 in KE, 1 out of 2 in IN 
and all 9 in SG. Therefore, it is highly conventional.  
 Due to the obvious grouping of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE around the specific level of AN ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A 
HOUSE, it would be interesting to submit its distribution in comparison to all other 
BUILDING / STRUCTURE metaphors to statistical testing. However, this is not 
possible due to the zero value for NG that we would get, since all of its 10 instances 
are found in AN ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE. It suffices to say that 
for this particular source domain, NG, KE and SG contribute the most, but do not 
necessarily demonstrate a variety-specific preference since it can be also found in 
GB and IN. Therefore, we will leave it there and move on to FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER, which was surprisingly low in numbers for FEAR as compared to 
the ANGER case study.  
6.3.5 FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER is an attested source domain that is mapped onto FEAR 
(e.g., Kövecses 1990 and Stefanowitsch 2006a). That it would show up for FEAR 
metaphors in the GloWbE varieties was expected, but it is, nevertheless, surprising 
that it is not at all frequent. FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, with a total of 
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32 tokens, only makes up 4.3% of the total FEAR data. Correspondingly, the 
percentages in the individual metaphor profiles were low, as seen in Figure 6.8.  
 
 
Figure 6.8: Percentages of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER per variety 
 
Despite these low proportions, it is interesting that GB has by far the biggest share 
in FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 10.7%. The New English varieties 
all range between 2% - 3.3%.  
 In order to get a better picture of what is contributing the most to the broad 
domain of FLUID IS A CONTAINER in GB, we can take a look at the specific 
levels. An overview is provided in Table 6.11.  
 
Table 6.11: Breakdown of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER86 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  7 0 4 1 2 
BODY FLUID (= SWEAT) - specific-level (= level 2)  2 1 0 0 0 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level 
(= level 2)  
4 1 1 2 1 
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
0 0 0 0 0 
   FLUID BOILING DOWN IN A CONTAINER- (= level 3) 1 0 0 0 0 
   FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER 
PRESSURE)- (= level 3) 
1 0 0 0 0 
FROM SOLID TO LIQUID - specific-level (= level 2) 1 1 0 1 1 
total 16 3 5 4 4 
 
_________________ 
86 For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B. 
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GB, with the highest proportion of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, makes 
the most of the generic level of this source domain. The generic level mostly 
emphasizes the basic experience of filling a container, which is mapped onto FEAR, 
but also provides evidence that FEAR can be understood in another general way. 
The experience of immersion into a container full of a fluid (e.g., sinking into a 
bathtub full of water) is also used to construe the general confining sense we have 
when we are afraid. (163) and (162) illustrate the CONTAINER BEING FILLED 
sense, while (165) and (166) illustrate the BEING IMMERSED sense.  
 
(163) The prospect of the reality TV drivel that will inevitably be served up in the 
autumn schedules is filling me with dread. (GB G) 
(164) […] his actions during his short reign filled his Protestant subjects with fear 
[…] (GB G)  
(165) One minute self sufficient with some salary, the next plunged into poverty 
and fear […] (GB B) 
(166) When you sleep securely yourself, it's not that difficult to plunge everyone 
else into fear. (KE G) 
 
The bulk of the metaphors of this kind are found on this generic level (14 tokens or 
43.8%). Seven of them are found in GB, while the other seven are in KE (4 tokens), 
SG (2 tokens) and IN (1 token).  
 The only other somewhat more numerous specific level was FEAR IS 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER. The 9 total tokens (or 28.1%) are also not 
spread out evenly. GB has four, while the New Englishes only have one or two. As 
a reminder, the source domain here is understood by way of a folk model of 
ENERGY AS A (FLOWING) FLUID (see discussion in Section 5.3.2). Examples 
from the data are given below.  
 
(167) […] yes the paedophilia thing is generating fear […] (GB G) 
(168) Her ambition was fuelled by the fear that India would stray from Nehru's 
path. (IN B) 
 
While these representative examples do not make the underlying folk model of 
ENERGY AS (FLOWING) FLUID as explicit as in the ANGER case study, they, 
nevertheless, tap into this model concerning the presence of the verbs generate and 
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fuel. These verbs are commonly used to denote the production of energy, thus 
entailing its transfer, which is conventionally understood via FLOWING FLUID.87  
 The remaining specific levels in Table 6.11 are very infrequent. FROM 
SOLID TO LIQUID has a total of four instances (e.g., fear dissolving like the cubes 
of sugar we sometimes threw into soaked garri, NG). BODY FLUID (in particular 
SWEAT) is attested to a total of three times (e.g., doused in fear, GB), which is 
relatable to Kövecses’ (1990) metonymy of SWEATING. FLUID MOVING IN A 
CONTAINER, although broken down into two level 3s, is attested to only twice in 
GB.  
 
FEAR IS FLUID BOILING DOWN IN A CONTAINER 
(169) But perhaps many of us could agree that worry boils down to not allowing 
ourselves rest or peace of mind. (GB B) 
 
FEAR IS FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) 
(170) I still remember the scene that most frightened me and that fear came 
bubbling up to the surface in 1998. (GB G) 
 
It could be assumed on the basis of boils down and bubbling up that a HEAT 
component is involved here. However, some things speak against this. First of all, 
an insight by Kövecses (1990), which was quoted in Section 7.1, is repeated here 
for convenience. “Since the conceptualization of fear does not have a heat 
component, the fluid in the container does not produce steam and pressure, there is 
no explosion, and nothing comes out whose outflow could be held back or reversed” 
(86). In the examples above, I do not see any further indication that, for example, 
the bubbling up of fear is caused by a source of heat. Secondly, although boils down 
opens up the HEAT frame, its contextual meaning in (169) is related to a more 
general mapping that is not specific to emotion concepts, namely, something like 
DEDUCING THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING IS BOILING FLUID DOWN TO A 
RESIDUAL.  
_________________ 
87  A brief glance at the collocates in the GloWbE reveals that among the most common are electricity (1,748 
tokens) for generate and energy (1,695) for fuel as a verb.  
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 There is no obvious grouping of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER at a 
certain level. While GB makes use of it most frequently on the whole, I am not 
convinced that this is an indication of a preference. The overall frequencies were 
low here, and I assume that with a larger dataset the differences between GB and 
the New Englishes would be negligible.  
6.3.6 FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY 
A mapping relating FEAR to JOURNEY was suggested by the metonymy FLIGHT 
in Kövecses (1991), as well as by FEAR IS A BARRIER (barrier of fear, fear (be) 
obstacle) in Stefanowitsch (2006a), outlined in Section 6.1. Furthermore, FEAR 
can be understood as a JOURNEY in terms of the LOCATION system of the 
EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor by Lakoff (2007 [1993]). Therefore, we can 
expect FEAR to be conceptualized to some degree by the JOURNEY domain in the 
varieties, which, of course, is the case.  
 Nevertheless, it does not occur all too frequently. 4.1% of the FEAR data (a 
total of 31 tokens) is represented by FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY. Figure 6.9 
displays the percentages it contributes to the metaphor profiles of the individual 
varieties.  
 
 
Figure 6.9: Percentages of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety 
 
The largest proportion of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY goes to GB (8%), 
followed by SG (6.7%), KE (4%) and NG (2%). For the IN data no instances were 
found. Like for ANGER, the PART OF A JOURNEY source domain plays a role 
in conceptualizing FEAR, but obviously not a considerable one. Therefore, a more 
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detailed discussion of this source domain will take place in the HAPPINESS case 
study, where its contribution is more pronounced (see Section 7.3.2). For now, it 
suffices to consider its breakdown for FEAR and, in doing so, illustrate the specific 
levels, which it shares with ANGER. Table 6.12 provides an overview of this 
breakdown.  
 
Table 6.12: Breakdown of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety88 
PART OF A JOURNEY  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 0 0 0 0 
BARRIER / OBSTACLE  – specific-level (= level 2)  8 2 4 0 8 
DESTINATION – specific-level (= level 2)  2 0 0 0 1 
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)  2 0 2 0 1 
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)  0 1 0 0 0 
total 12 3 6 0 10 
 
 
Like ANGER, the FEAR data was distributed among the specific-level mappings 
BARRIER / OBSTACLE, DESTINATION, PATH and STARTING POINT, 
which are illustrated by (171) – (178).  
 
BARRIER / OBSTACLE 
(171) How can you breakthrough the fear of having another bad boring day, and 
instead feel more motivated than before? (GB G) 
(172) […] the fear of more reprisals and the unsolved land question are obstacles 
that still loom large. (KE G) 
(173) Fear can act as a barrier and hinder our personal growth. (SG B) 
 
DESTINATION  
(174) Sadly these conversations don't always take place, often leading to 
unnecessary distress at one of the most vulnerable times in people's lives. (GB B) 
(175) Thanks for your part in getting us back home and out of this detour into fear. 
(SG G) 
 
PATH 
(176) However, the criminals and terrorists that have chosen this path of terror on 
innocent Kenyans […] (KE B) 
_________________ 
88  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B. 
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(177) Fear can only lead to anger. (SG G) 
 
STARTING POINT 
(178) We have come a long way from fear and hate. (NG G) 
 
Although BARRIER / OBSTACLE is the most frequent of these specific levels in 
all varieties in which PART OF A JOURNEY is present, the low numbers and the 
complete absence of PART OF A JOURNEY in IN make statistical testing difficult, 
in order to have indication that BARRIER / OBSTACLE is a preference. Therefore, 
we are left to conclude that, while most varieties make use of FEAR IS PART OF 
A JOURNEY to some extent, it is an uncommon occurrence.  
 With this section an overview of the source domains contributing the most to 
the metaphor profiles of the varieties is complete. We now turn to the collection of 
“minor metaphors” for FEAR that, as a whole, did not contribute extensively to 
conceptualizations of FEAR in GloWbE.  
6.3.7 Minor Metaphors of FEAR 
This final section of the FEAR case study results provides an overview of those 
metaphor groupings and miscellaneous metaphors that did not contribute to a large 
extent to the metaphor profiles of the varieties. This concerns POSSESSION (with 
22 tokens), A DEEP PLACE (with 20 tokens), WEAPON (with 19 tokens), 
SUPERNATURAL BEING (with 18 tokens). Together with the miscellaneous 
metaphors, they represent 17.9% of the metaphors in KE, 18% in IN, 18.7% in GB, 
18.8% in SG, and 21.4% in NG. For some of these source domains, it was possible 
to do a specific-level breakdown (which can be consulted in Appendix B), but, on 
the whole, the frequencies remain so low that statistical comparison across varieties 
was not possible. The following provides an overview of these minor metaphors 
with some illustrative examples of each source domain category.  
 FEAR IS A POSSESSION metaphors, like in the ANGER case study, is 
relatively infrequent with 22 tokens in the whole dataset. It is, however, found most 
frequently in GB (with 13 tokens). In the New Englishes, only one token each was 
found for NG and SG, three for KE and four for IN. Of the 13 GB instances, six 
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highlight POSSESSION in terms of SHARED OWNERSHIP (179), while four 
highlight TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP (180).  
 
(179) I speak in an effort to unite the House, because the Opposition share the 
concern for farmers. (GB G) 
(180) […] this brings feelings of fear and you may feel down that you feel awful 
again. (GB G) 
 
The SHARED OWNERSHIP theme is also attested to in the New Englishes, as 
evidenced by (181) – (184).  
 
(181) Except people who have no human feelings many people share the grief and 
fear […] (NG G) 
(182) […] we Kenyans here can protest peacefully so that the rest of the world 
shares our concern. (KE B) 
(183) Rich and poor, high and low, men and women, can cooperate with each other 
if there is a sound reason and shared concern. (IN G) 
(184) To this day, I remember the deep fear and the tumbling waves of emotion the 
both of us shared back then. (SG G) 
 
The examples above demonstrate the conventionality of the pairing of share and 
fear (or a subordinate term) in a linguistic metaphor, which underscores this 
meaning focus for FEAR IS A POSSESSION metaphors. This is also why the 
above examples were not annotated as BURDEN, which entails heaviness – an 
aspect not present on the linguistic level. A more exhaustive examination of 
POSSESSION will be undertaken in the case study of HAPPINESS (see Chapter 
7), because it contributes much more extensively to the conceptualization of that 
emotion.  
Despite only 20 tokens, A DEEP PLACE is a notable source domain due to the 
fact that it is only attested in the New Englishes (three tokens in NG, eight tokens 
in KE, five tokens in IN, and four tokens in SG), although an association between 
DEPTH and FEAR appears to be perfectly conventional and despite not being 
mentioned in the previous research discussed in Section 6.1. 
 
(185) Expectedly, all these developmental moves are causing disquiet, sorrow and 
deep concern for those individuals […] (NG G) 
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(186) As for Tony, he was in deep distress, mourning a son and dreading the 
possible loss of his family. (KE G) 
(187) That is why Mews fear police which others in Jaipur can not understand and 
measure the depth of fear. (IN B) 
(188) The worry really at the bottom of your question is, can I afford an HDB flat 
[…] (SG G) 
 
The association of FEAR with A DEEP PLACE is highlighted by further findings. 
First of all, deep-seated, which albeit only shows up once in the KE data, collocates 
frequently with a negative emotion – in GloWbE the collocational analysis of deep-
seated yielded hatred (50 tokens), fear (46 tokens) and anger (28 tokens) in the top 
10 ranking. Secondly, as demonstrated in (189) – (192), the New Englishes specify 
FEAR as A DEEP PLACE, by denoting a physical activity associated with lowering 
the body, namely cowering.  
 
(189) If we can only speak out and not cower in fear, then our voice will be more 
powerful. (NG G) 
(190) Nostalgic because it brought back the memories of how we would cower in 
dread whenever she stood over our desks […] (KE G) 
(191) Unless we stand up and fight against such behavior, we would be cowering 
in fear all the time and what would such life be worth? (IN B) 
(192) […] we now have a Ministry of Education that is cowering in fear from (1) 
unknown, invisible conservative forces […] (SG G) 
 
 Like ANGER, FEAR can also be conceptualized as a WEAPON – albeit not 
as extensively, as evidenced by the total of 19 tokens (as compared to ANGER’s 
79 tokens). Of these 19 tokens, SG has the most with seven, while IN has none. 
FEAR IS A WEAPON can be attested at the generic level, as in (193) – (195) 
 
(193) […] he bellowed, flanked by fearsome guys whose presence drove home the 
point that fear is a legitimate weapon in political warfare. (NG G) 
(194) Once you make that initial mistake, you get into trouble. The enemy uses the 
weapon of fear. (NG G) 
(195) He or she will use fear as the weapon to motivate the employees to work. 
(SG G) 
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Yet, it can also be conceptualized more specifically as A BOMB (196) and (197), 
as well as A KNIFE (198) and (199), which is in line with Stefanowitsch's (2006a) 
SHARP OBJECT. 
 
(196) The one per cent levy was introduced early this year to fund research and 
marketing for the country's top income earner triggering fear that it would make 
Mombasa uncompetitive. (KE G) 
(197) However, at some point, the QE is finally working in defusing people's fear 
to put money into riskier destinations. (SG B) 
(198) To achieve immortality, judgments must pierce a man’s heart without striking 
fear in the hearts of men. (KE G) 
(199) So what's so scary about the Education Minister that his very utterance can 
strike fear into the hearts of the young and the old? (SG G) 
 
 SUPERNATURAL BEING is also found to conceptualize FEAR, as 
Kövecses (1990) previously points out, but unlike for ANGER, there was no 
indication that it also relates to RELIGIOUS PRACTICE (like the let anger be your 
prayer example in IN, see Section 5.3.6). Besides one instance of aura of fear in 
KE, the majority of FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING personifies FEAR as 
a demon, devil, evil spirit, etc. 
 
(200) That spirit of fear will show itself. That is why it is often said that the most 
common demon in the whole world is fear. (NG G) 
(201) Am also thanking God for delivering my brother from the torment of fear. 
(NG G) 
(202) […] he kept away from the media glare or was struggling with an innate fear 
that still haunts the political pelicans who manned State House corridors then. (KE 
B) 
(203) But the path can get clouded over by lethargy, lack of courage, fear of failure 
and insecurities. These invisible enemies are demons of the mind. (IN G) 
(204) 12 million people of J &K can't be hijacked by India, by raising the bogy of 
fear. (IN G) 
 
Once again, SUPERNATURAL BEING points to an emotion conceptualization 
that is preferred by the New Englishes – for the case of FEAR by NG, KE and IN. 
No metaphors of this kind are found in GB and SG. However, of the New Englishes 
conceptualizing FEAR as a SUPERNATURAL BEING, NG leads the pack, since 
13 of the 18 metaphors are attributable to this variety. This indicates that the 
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potential cultural specificity of SUPERNATURAL BEING is something that 
should be explored on a larger scale in future research.   
 Finally, the FEAR metaphor profiles contained miscellaneous metaphors for 
each variety, that either showed up less than five times in a single variety (e.g., 
DARKNESS, MACHINE, PLANT, VALUABLE COMMODITY, etc.) or were 
metaphorical hapax legomena (e.g., ARMOR, BUBBLE, SHIP, etc.). The majority 
of these metaphors are less conventional and, due to their low numbers, could be 
viewed as innovate or creative metaphors. The following illustrates an example of 
each source domain that occurred less than five times in one variety.  
 
(205) This is because as one approaches their young adult years, it is important to 
have outgrown fear and a general mistrust of people. (KE G)  FEAR IS 
CLOTHING 
(206) […] call it a fear of success, even though I'm cloaking it as a fear of blending 
in, an aversion to no longer being ‘different’. (KE B)  FEAR IS A COVERING 
(207) […] you might catch a cold at 8 weeks and start the cycle of worry all over 
again (SG G)  FEAR IS A CYCLE 
(208) But unfortunately, at the ground level victims are leading lives under the 
shadow of fear. (IN G)  FEAR IS DARKNESS (here A SHADOW)89 
(209) Sexual predators feed off of this fear to empower them […]. (GB B)  FEAR 
IS FOOD90 
(210) That we can not cower at knuckle-head cowards who use terror as an 
instrument of propaganda. (NG G)  FEAR IS AN INSTRUMENT / TOOL 
(211) And that's what the tool is about for me, to turn the engine of fear on the 
perpetrators of fear, perpetrators of corruption and fraud (NG B)  FEAR IS A 
MACHINE 
(212) It is the same for those who transform ideas into idioms and then, bucking 
fear instead of buckling under it, stand up and throw down. (SG G) FEAR IS A 
PHYSICAL BURDEN91 
(213) This kind of agenda can only plant seeds of fear in other people. (KE G)  
FEAR IS A PLANT92 
(214) Most teachers are fault cos they impose this silly ‘fear’ on students especially 
pupils.... I repeat.. primary school pupils. (NG G) FEAR IS A PUNISHMENT 
_________________ 
89  Directly corresponding to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) DARK (shadow of fear) 
90  Relatable to Esenova’s (2011) BAD TASTE (rancid fear), although FEAR is being consumed in this 
example.  
91  Directly corresponding to Kövecses’ (1990) BURDEN (fear weighed heavily) 
92  Relatable to Esenova’s (20011) PLANT (blossomed into fear) 
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(215) […] as the electorate continues to mature and free itself from the shackles of 
a fear of the political alternative […] (SG B)  FEAR IS A RESTRAINING 
DEVICE 
(216) He can smell still her stink of fear when his hand clamped over her mouth. 
(SG G) FEAR IS A SCENT93 
(217) I think every director likes to peddle some kind of sensation over others. I 
like to peddle fear. (IN B)  FEAR IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY 
(218) Fear is the greatest violence (IN G)  FEAR IS VIOLENCE 
 
The following examples demonstrate the 15 metaphorical hapax legomena in the 
data, and, as such, can be viewed as highly creative.  
 
(219) […] all designed to play into the human pysche [sic] and to create a giant 
bubble of fear that if PAP goes, Singapore is ruined. (SG G)  FEAR IS A 
BUBBLE 
(220) […] must also convince Jack Frost to join their ranks, as Pitch's campaign of 
fear & darkness threatens to envelop the world. (SG G)  FEAR IS A 
CAMPAIGN 
(221) And that's what the tool is about for me, to turn the engine of fear on the 
perpetrators of fear, perpetrators of corruption and fraud (NG B)  FEAR IS A 
CRIME 
(222) That's just the way I play. Never play with emotion or fear, just odds. (SG B) 
 FEAR IS A GAME 
(223) She stood outside a bathroom door, calling for her mother, poking her fear 
through the keyhole […] (KE G)  FEAR IS A KEY 
(224) I can always tell - for a brief period fear flashed through the bully's face like 
a meteorite tracing across the night skies. (SG B)  FEAR IS A METEORITE 
(225) I see the same characteristics now in moments of tremendous misery and loss 
coupled with having to adjust in dealing with hitherto unheard of struggles like 
power breakdown, disrupted train schedules and the fear of nuclear radiation. (IN 
G)  FEAR IS A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE 
(226) The begging question is whether this ruling is sound in law as it is patently 
engraved in the fear of the unknown. (KE G)  FEAR IS A SURFACE FOR 
ENGRAVING 
(227) The fear Mumbai witnessed after the announcement of Thackeray's death 
only details the politics […] (IN G)  FEAR IS AN EVENT 
(228) […] I will have to ‘abandon the ship of fear’ and surrender to the process of 
creativity. (IN G)  FEAR IS A SHIP 
(229) Instead, they pierced through the armour of despair and fear which had 
gripped me […] (IN G)  FEAR IS ARMOR 
_________________ 
93  Directly corresponding to Esenova’s (2011) BAD SMELL (smell the stench of fear) 
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(230) But this is Britain we are talking about, so the unchecked power that created 
this culture of fear was not the military or secret police; it was tabloid newspapers. 
(GB G)  FEAR IS CULTURE 
(231) […] this government will have to whip us and rule by fear but this would 
also be short lived and stupid. (SG G)  FEAR IS LAW 
(232) […] the first year is the most painful, when doubts about the past and concern 
over the future reach a crescendo. (GB G)  FEAR IS MUSIC94 
(233) Her hair was disheveled. Fear was written upon her face. (IN G)  FEAR 
IS WRITING ON THE FACE 
 
 On a final note, it is striking that the FEAR data presents a larger amount of 
miscellaneous metaphor data (63 tokens or 8.4% of the total data) in comparison to 
ANGER (34 tokens or 4.5%). This indicates that, taken as a whole, the domain of 
FEAR lends itself to more innovative metaphorization than ANGER, which makes 
use of more cohesive source domain groupings and which was reflected in the 
shared top five domains of PERSON, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, NATURAL 
FORCE, ILLNESS and WEAPON. This also explains why the rankings for FEAR 
only showed a wide preference for PERSON and ILLNESS across the varieties.  
 This concludes the overview and illustration of the FEAR metaphors in the 
New Englishes and GB. In the following section, the results will be discussed on 
the basis of the dimensions of metaphor variation and, in doing so, I will consider 
what this means for the debate surrounding universality and variation in metaphor. 
6.4 Discussion  
In this section, a brief discussion of the results focuses on what was shared (or not 
shared) between the varieties in terms of the whole picture. This will also involve 
taking account of the results in light of Kövecses’ (2005) variation types (congruent 
metaphors, range of target and preferential conceptualizations) and formulating a 
preliminary conclusion on what this case study says about universality and variation 
in FEAR.  
  
_________________ 
94  Stefanowitsch (2006a) would have likely annotated this as HIGH (INTENSITY) (fear peak, X heighten 
fear, etc.) I was led to annotate it as FEAR IS MUSIC, suggested by the basic definition of crescendo in 
the Macmillan online dictionary, which was “a gradual increase in sound in a piece of music”. 
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 Firstly, the metaphor profiles for each variety introduced in Section 6.2 
helped to gauge how the varieties compare in terms of the range of target. As a 
reminder, the range of target involves metaphors that make use of different source 
domains for the same target domain. In this case study, the target domain is FEAR, 
and, as the metaphor profiles in Table 6.2 indicated, FEAR metaphors were largely 
shared by the varieties. Nevertheless, the distribution of the most prominent source 
domains overall, i.e. PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE, across the 
varieties was significant, which prompted an examination at the specific level 
concerning source domain preference. Furthermore, unlike in the case study of 
ANGER, there were a few source domains that featured in some varieties and not 
in others. For instance, all New English varieties attested to A DEEP PLACE, but 
none were found for GB. IN did not have any FEAR IS A WEAPON and FEAR IS 
PART OF A JOURNEY metaphors, although they showed up in the other varieties. 
In addition, although SUPERNATURAL BEING showed up in NG, KE and IN, 
there were no instances of it in GB and SG. In a larger dataset it would be interesting 
to see if the source domains not attested to here for GB, IN and SG, in fact, do 
emerge for FEAR.  
 Concerning congruent metaphors, which have generic schemas that can be 
expanded upon via cultural input, there was no major indication in the specific-level 
breakdowns of the major metaphors that they exist to large extent for FEAR. The 
evidence of them, like in the ANGER case study, remained anecdotal. For example, 
in the ILLNESS metaphors, the African varieties were the only ones to specify 
FEAR as an ILLNESS in terms of the stomach. Examples are repeated here below.  
 
(234) […] shoulders sagged with relief, but his stomach was still a roiling pit of 
fear. (NG G) 
(235) The shock was jaw-dropping; the terror was stomach-churning, and the 
tragedy of it all was just apocalyptic. (KE G) 
 
Yet, this specification was confined to these two instances and more evidence is 
needed to determine if these are the result of culturally-conditioned extensions of 
the generic schema of ILLNESS.  
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 Similar anecdotal evidence exists for the minor metaphors in this case study, 
which also presented the problem of low numbers and thus made definitive 
conclusions difficult. The mapping FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING may 
be a preferential conceptualization, as it was the most prominent in NG (but also 
attested to twice in KE and IN). NG exclusively made use of the specific-level 
(RELATED TO) AN EVIL SUPERNATURAL BEING, as in the repeated 
examples below, which conceivably connects to cultural beliefs or values.  
 
(236) That spirit of fear will show itself. That is why it is often said that the most 
common demon in the whole world is fear. (NG G) 
(237) Am also thanking God for delivering my brother from the torment of fear. 
(NG G) 
 
However, it was problematic to assume a cultural force behind these instances with 
so few examples in the data. It does, however, point to an area that deserves further 
attention in future research – the assumption being that infrequency in emotion 
metaphors incites creative metaphorization, which would lend itself more readily 
to cultural filtration.  
 On the whole, preferential conceptualizations (which, if present, were 
assumed to occur when breaking down broader source domains into specific levels) 
were not prominent in the FEAR data. There was no real preference found for 
ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE, 
FLUID and PART OF A JOURNEY. For instance, although IN contributed the 
most FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE metaphors overall and the largest grouping 
within NATURAL FORCE was ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE, all varieties made 
use of it to some extent and the observed differences between them were not 
significant. Nevertheless, for the PERSON source domain, the New Englishes did 
seem to prefer OPPONENT (especially IN on the level 3s of EXERTING 
CONTROL and BEING PREVAILED AGAINST). However, it is not certain that 
this preference would hold in a larger dataset. Although the New Englishes used 
OPPONENT 73% - 94% of the time in PERSON, it still constituted 67% of 
PERSON for GB and, thus, played a certifiable role in British English. Therefore, 
Case Study: FEAR 225 
we are left to conclude that, although the FEAR data does show some variation, on 
the whole we are dealing with the same metaphorical behavior for FEAR.  
 Since conceptualizations of FEAR were largely the same for the varieties in 
this study, our final concern is FEAR metaphors in terms of universality (regarding 
bodily experiences) and culture-specific variation. Variation was not present on a 
significant scale, which leads to the conclusion that FEAR is conceptualized 
throughout the New Englishes and British English in a more bodily embodied way 
and is not overwhelmingly culturally filtered. This does not necessarily discount 
the cultural force behind emotion metaphors, but it does indicate that it might not 
happen as much as expected, at least in the GloWbE data, which was pulled from 
the international presence of the Internet. Furthermore, like in the case study of 
ANGER, the motivational basis used to explain the occurrence of many of FEAR 
metaphors was grounded in our understanding of the physical body as part of the 
physical world. For example, the domain of ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-
RELATED, which emerged as a specific level of NATURAL FORCE, relates to 
our physical experience of being enveloped by climate-related phenomena, like a 
fog, as illustrated by an example in IN, repeated in (238) below.  
 
(238) This constancy of fear hangs like a fog which obscures the legendary beauty 
of the valley. (IN B) 
 
Therefore, it was to be expected that body-based experiences would be mapped 
onto an emotion like FEAR, considering the relatedness of emotions to our body. 
However, the differences in the socio-cultural settings of the New Englishes and 
British English make it surprising that this is not extended or filtered in more 
culturally specific terms. Thus, the preliminary conclusion for FEAR, like ANGER, 
is that our physical experiences plays a larger role in conceptualizing this emotion 
throughout the varieties.  
 With this preliminary conclusion we end the case study on FEAR and 
continue on to HAPPINESS in the next chapter.  
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7 Case Study: HAPPINESS  
As in the previous case studies, this chapter opens with a brief discussion of 
previously attested metaphors in English, which aid expectations of what mappings 
may be uncovered in the GloWbE varieties. After reviewing this previous research, 
I will present the overall metaphor profiles of HAPPINESS constructed from the 
data and, with it, the ranking of the most common source domains for each variety. 
An account of the specific levels contributing to these source domains follows, 
which includes discussion of illustrative examples and any indication of preference. 
This case study closes with a discussion of the results as a whole and what they 
indicate in terms of variation and/or commonality in the conceptualization of 
HAPPINESS across the varieties.  
7.1 Previous Metaphors of HAPPINESS 
Before discussing the empirical results of the present study, metaphors reflecting a 
folk theory or cognitive model of HAPPINESS in English will be presented. As in 
the ANGER and FEAR case studies, this is outlined in order to have a point of 
reference with which to compare and contrast the findings of this study. 
Furthermore, it is the first step in answering the question: To what extent do 
previously attested metaphors of HAPPINESS, which have been largely intuitively 
constructed, relate to metaphorical patterns found in usage-based data? 
 The following outlines a cognitive model of HAPPINESS deconstructed by 
Kövecses (1991, 2000, 2008c, 2011b). As for ANGER and FEAR, our starting point 
is the metonymic system of HAPPINESS, which is divided into behavioral, 
physiological and expressive responses and illustrated with linguistic examples in 
parentheses (from Kövecses 2011b: 35).  
 
(1) Behavioral responses 
 (a) JUMPING UP AND DOWN (jump up and down with joy) 
 (b) DANCING / SINGING (dance/sing with joy) 
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(2) Physiological responses 
 (a) FLUSHING (flush/beam with joy) 
 (b) INCREASED HEART RATE (heart beats with joy) 
 (c) BODY WARMTH (be warm with joy) 
 (d) EXCITEMENT (be excited with joy) 
 
(3) Expressive responses 
 (a) BRIGHT EYES (shine with happiness/joy) 
 (b) SMILING (smile/laugh) 
 
 Metaphors for HAPPINESS can be discussed in various Kövecses’ 
publications (1991, 2000, 2008c, 2011b) and are presented here together in the 
following examples.  
 
(4) HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (He was overflowing with joy. 
/ She was bursting with joy.) 
(5) HAPPINESS IS HEAT / FIRE (Fires of joy were kindled by the birth of her 
son.) 
(6) HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL / PHYSICAL FORCE (He was swept off his 
feet. / He was hit by happiness.) 
(7) HAPPINESS IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (They live a life ruled by happiness.) 
(8) HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) (She was overcome by 
joy.) 
(9) HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL (His feelings of happiness broke 
loose.) 
(10) HAPPINESS IS AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL (I was purring with 
delight. / He is happy as a pig in shit.) 
(11) HAPPINESS IS INSANITY (They were crazy with happiness) 
(12) HAPPINESS IS DISEASE (Her good mood was contagious.) 
(13) HAPPINESS IS A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF (He was beside 
himself with joy.) 
(14) HAPPINESS IS LIGHT (Her face was bright with happiness.) 
(15) HAPPINESS IS UP / FEELING LIGHT (BEING OFF THE GROUND) / 
BEING IN HEAVEN (We had to cheer him up. / I was floating. / I was in seventh 
heaven.)  
(16) HAPPINESS IS A HIGH / BEING DRUNK (It was an intoxicating experience. 
/ I was drunk with joy) 
(17) HAPPINESS IS HEALTH / VITALITY (It made me feel great. / He was alive 
with joy.) 
(18) HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE SENSATION (I was tickled pink.)  
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(19) HAPPINESS IS WARMTH (That warmed my spirits.) 
(20) HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (You can’t buy happiness.) 
(21) HAPPINESS IS A DESIRED HIDDEN OBJECT (I have found happiness.) 
 
 Stefanowitsch (2006a: 82) questions Kövecses’ tendency to separate the 
source domains jointly illustrated in (15) and (17), respectively, since they appear 
to conceptually belong together, which is why I listed them as such. In his study, 
he find instances of the above illustrated metaphors, with the exception of BEING 
IN HEAVEN, which was problematically separated from UP anyway, and AN 
ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL (82-83). Furthermore, he identifies five more 
source domains being used to conceptualize HAPPINESS that are not attested to 
above (84).  
 
(22) HAPPINESS IS A LIQUID (source/spring of joy, flow/ river of joy, etc.) 
(23) HAPPINESS IS A MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE (pure/unalloyed joy, 
mixture of EMOTION and joy, etc.) 
(24) HAPPINESS IS A DESTROYABLE OBJECT (X break/destroy/mar Y’s joy) 
(25) HAPPINESS IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (fierce/wild/savage 
joy) 
(26) HAPPINESS IS AN ORGANISM (growing/short-lived joy, fruit of joy) 
 
 Employing MPA in a study of HAPPINESS in English and German, 
Stefanowitsch (2004: 143-147) finds the following mappings that he collective 
refers to as the QUEST model (examples (27) – (31)) and the TRANSFER model 
(examples (32) – (34)), respectively. These models will be discuss in more detail in 
Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. 
 
The QUEST model for HAPPINESS  
(27) TRYING TO ACHIEVE HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS 
(look for / search (for) happiness, etc.) 
(28) TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS PURSUING HAPPINESS (pursuit of 
/ pursue happiness, etc.) 
(29) ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING HAPPINESS (find / (re)discover 
happiness, etc.) 
(30) ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS CAPTURING HAPPINESS (capture / grab 
happiness, etc.) 
(31) THE PROCESS OF ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY TO 
HAPPINESS (way to happiness / obstacle to happiness, etc.) 
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The TRANSFER model for HAPPINESS  
(32) (POTENTIALLY) MAKING SOMEONE HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) 
GIVING SOMEONE HAPPINESS (bring / give happiness, etc.) 
(33) (POTENTIALLY) BECOMING HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) RECEIVING 
HAPPINESS (receive / gain happiness, etc.) 
(34) BECOMING HAPPY IS BUYING HAPPINESS (buy happiness, happiness 
be for sale, etc.) 
 
 I have consolidated these findings in Table 7.1. Note that I have grouped 
together those source domains, which, although presented as separate mappings in 
the previous research, seem to go together in terms of their main meaning focus 
(e.g., A SOCIAL SUPERIOR and AN AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL can be viewed as 
specific types of OPPONENT). 
 
Table 7.1: Previously attested HAPPINESS metaphors 
 
Collectively viewed, the above outlined metaphors contribute to a prototypical 
cultural model of HAPPINESS. This serves as the benchmark to which the findings 
HAPPINESS IS: Source 
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER / A LIQUID 
Kövecses (1991) and 
Stefanowitsch (2006a)  
AN OPPONENT / A SOCIAL SUPERIOR / AGGRESSIVE 
ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 
Kövecses (1991, 
2008c) and 
Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
A NATURAL / PHYSICAL FORCE / HEAT / FIRE 
Kövecses (1991, 
2008c) 
A CAPTIVE ANIMAL / AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL Kövecses (1991) 
INSANITY / DISEASE / A HIGH / BEING DRUNK Kövecses (1991 
LIGHT Kövecses (1991) 
UP / FEELING LIGHT (BEING OFF THE GROUND) / BEING IN 
HEAVEN 
Kövecses (1991) 
HEATH / VITALITY Kövecses (1991) 
WARMTH Kövecses (1991) 
A VALUABLE COMMODITY (see also TRANSFER model below) Kövecses (1991) 
A HIDDEN OBJECT (see also QUEST model below) Kövecses (1991) 
A PLEASURABLE SENSATION Kövecses (2000) 
A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF Kövecses (2008c) 
SOMETHING SEARCHED FOR, PURSUED, FOUND, 
CAPTURED or A JOURNEY (the QUEST model) 
Stefanowitsch (2004) 
SOMETHING GIVEN / RECEIVED / BOUGHT (the TRANSFER 
model) 
Stefanowitsch (2004) 
A MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
A DESTROYABLE OBJECT Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
AN ORGANISM Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
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in the present study will be compared. The following section provides an overview 
of these findings, initially as metaphor profiles for the New Englishes and British 
English. 
7.2 Metaphor Profiles for HAPPINESS 
The following section provides an initial overview of HAPPINESS metaphors 
attributable to the varieties in the GloWbE. As in the previous case studies on 
ANGER and FEAR, this overview illustrates the metaphor profiles for all New 
English varieties in the study along with British English, as a (former) norm-
providing variety. This preliminary setup acts as the first step in answering the 
research questions: 1) What conceptual metaphors exist for HAPPINESS in New 
English, as evidenced by corpus data, and 2) Does a comparison across New 
English varieties reveal commonalities and/or differences in these emotion 
metaphors? Again, it should be noted that in this first step we are dealing with 
broadly formulated conceptual categories concerning the source domain labels, 
which will be broken down during further analysis in this chapter.  
 For each variety, a total of 150 mappings (= type 2) were identified, which 
contained the target domain lexical item happiness or, alternatively, bliss, delight, 
elation, gladness, glee, or joy. This resulted in a total sample of 750 metaphors. 
Table 7.2 provides an overview of the various source domains participating in these 
metaphors, as well as their absolute and relative frequencies for each variety.  
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Table 7.2: Overview of absolute and relative frequencies of all source domains in HAPPINESS 
metaphors per variety 
 
Note that the “miscellaneous” category contains expressions that did not contribute 
in large numbers to the overall metaphor profile, i.e., “metaphorical hapax 
legomena”, as in (35) – (36), which seem to be of an innovative or creative kind, or 
those metaphors that can be attributed to a broader source domain but that source 
domain showed up less than five times in a single variety, as in (37) – (38). 
 
(35) If we really feel that inner joy is the breath of our life, if we feel that we cannot 
exist without joy and we will die at this very moment if we do not have it […] (IN 
G)  HAPPINESS IS BREATH 
(36) Prayer, Happiness and ur huge smile is your only weapon. (NG B)  
HAPPINESS IS A WEAPON 
(37) It is the brilliance of the wedding gown which the church wears that will emit 
the fragrance of gladness during the wedding of the Lamb. (KE G)  HAPPINESS 
IS A SCENT 
(38) The house smelled of ripe guava and blackcurrant juice, and.... happiness. (NG 
G)  HAPPINESS IS A SCENT 
 
 Ignoring the miscellaneous metaphors for the moment, the metaphor profiles 
show that all varieties make use of the range of source domains for conceptualizing 
FEAR, with the exception of ILLNESS, which proves to be an infrequently used 
 GB NG KE IN SG total 
Fluid In a Container 
17 
(11.3%) 
16 
(10.7%) 
13 
(8.7%) 
13 
(8.7%) 
12  
(8%) 
71 
(9.5%) 
Food / Drink 
11 
(7.3%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
5  
(3.3%) 
4  
(2.7%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
22 
(2.9%) 
Illness 
5  
(3.3%) 
0  
(0%) 
6  
(4%) 
2  
(1.3%) 
6  
(4%) 
19 
(2.5%) 
Light 
13 
(8.7%) 
13 
(8.7%) 
13 
(8.7%) 
16 
(10.7%) 
8  
(5.3%) 
63 
(8.4%) 
Natural Force  
7  
(4.7%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
3  
(2%) 
17 
(11.3%) 
4  
(2.7%) 
32 
(4.3%) 
Part of a Journey 
37 
(24.7%) 
33 
(22%) 
36 
(24%) 
28 
(18.7%) 
43 
(28.7%) 
177 
(23.6%) 
Person  
13 
(8.7%) 
18 
(12%) 
12  
(8%) 
6  
(4%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
59 
(7.9%) 
Possession 
19 
(12.7%) 
49 
(32.7%) 
38 
(25.3%) 
40 
(26.7%) 
37 
(24.7%) 
183 
(24.4%) 
Up 
10 
(6.7%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
6  
(4%) 
12  
(8%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
48 
(6.4%) 
Valuable Commodity 
1  
(0.7%) 
1  
(0.7%) 
3  
(2%) 
2  
(1.3%) 
9  
(6%) 
16 
(2.1%) 
Misc.  
17 
(11.3%) 
8  
(5.3%) 
15 
(10%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
10 
(6.7%) 
60  
(8%) 
total  150 150 150 150 150 750 
Case Study: HAPPINESS 232 
source domain for HAPPINESS in general (it is not attested in NG and constitutes 
only 2.5% of all metaphorical data). In terms of the highest preference, PART OF 
A JOURNEY and POSSESSION emerge as the two most prominent source 
domains across all varieties. They collectively make up nearly half of all 
HAPPINESS metaphors at 48% and are more frequent than all other source 
domains (not including the miscellaneous ones), which together make up 44% of 
the data. The centrality of PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION to 
HAPPINESS will be explored further in the following sections.  
 The rankings of the source domains was conducted in view of their 
frequencies in each variety in Table 7.2. The five highest ranked source domains 
for each variety are illustrated by Table 7.3, which demonstrates a different 
situation from what was previously encountered in the ANGER and FEAR case 
studies.  
 
Table 7.3: Five highest ranked HAPPINESS source domains per variety 
Rank GB NG KE IN SG 
(1) 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY 
POSSESSION POSSESSION POSSESSION 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY 
(2) POSSESSION 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY 
POSSESSION 
(3) FLUID PERSON FLUID / LIGHT 
NATURAL 
FORCE 
FLUID 
(4) LIGHT / PERSON FLUID PERSON LIGHT PERSON / UP 
(5) FOOD & DRINK LIGHT ILLNESS / UP FLUID 
VALUABLE 
COMMODITY 
total % of 
metaphor 
profile 
73.4% 86.1% 82.7% 76.1% 80.8% 
 
 
Here it is notable that all source domains have made it into the top five ranking 
across the varieties, which initially suggests a relatively uneven spread of the source 
domains throughout the varieties. As mentioned above, PART OF A JOURNEY 
and POSSESSION contribute to the bulk of the data, where PART OF A 
JOURNEY constitutes between 18.7% to 28.7% and POSSESSION between 12.7% 
to 32.7%. PART OF A JOURNEY occupies the first rank for GB and SG and the 
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second rank for NG, KE, and IN. Conversely, POSSESSION is ranked firstly for 
NG, KE, and IN and secondly for GB and SG. Preferences, in terms of ranking, 
diversify in the third, fourth and fifth ranks. FLUID IN A CONTAINER occupies 
the third rank for GB, KE (in a tie with LIGHT), and SG, while NG and IN have 
PERSON and NATURAL FORCE, respectively, in the third position. The fourth 
rank is a tie between LIGHT and PERSON in GB and PERSON and UP in SG, 
while NG, KE, and IN has FLUID IN A CONTAINER, PERSON, and LIGHT in 
the fourth place, respectively. FOOD / DRINK and VALUABLE COMMODITY 
debut in the ranking at fifth place for GB and SG, respectively, while NG has 
LIGHT, KE has a tie between ILLNESS and UP and IN has FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER.  
 Similar to the FEAR dataset, the ranking process for HAPPINESS did not go 
as straightforwardly as for ANGER. Considering that the top five source domains 
per variety are spread out across all available source domains, discounting the 
miscellaneous category, it was possible to only identify two source domains as 
prominent, i.e., PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION. Therefore, like in the 
FEAR case study, I forgo an analysis of variance.  
 Examining the frequencies of all source domains in the top five ranking across 
the varieties, provided in Figure 7.1, it is, nevertheless, possible to identify some 
source domains available for statistical analysis.  
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Figure 7.1: Absolute frequencies of top five (not shared) source domains in HAPPINESS 
metaphors per variety 
 
Figure 7.1 makes it apparent that FLUID, LIGHT, PART OF A JOURNEY and 
POSSESSION, taken together, comprise the majority of the metaphorical data for 
HAPPINESS, namely 65.9%. These source domains are given in percentages for 
each variety in Figure 7.2.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Percentages of FLUID, LIGHT, PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION in 
FEAR metaphors per variety 
 
GB NG KE IN SG
Fluid 17 16 13 13 12
Food / Drink 11 1 5 4 1
Illness 5 0 6 2 6
Light 13 13 13 16 8
Natural Force 7 1 3 17 4
Part of a Journey 37 33 36 28 43
Person 13 18 12 6 10
Possession 19 49 38 40 37
Up 10 10 6 12 10
Valuable Commodity 1 1 3 2 9
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These four source domains range from 57.4% to 74.1% of all metaphorical data for 
each variety. They also make up the four most frequent source domains of the 750 
metaphors collected: POSSESSION with 183 tokens, PART OF A JOURNEY with 
177 tokens, FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 71 tokens and LIGHT with 63 tokens. 
A chi-square test was performed for FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, PART 
OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION, which revealed no significant differences in 
distribution (x2 = 17.968, df = 12, p = 0.11667). 
 In order to examine another perspective, Figure 7.3 below illustrates the 
normalized frequencies within the metaphor profiles of each variety.  
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Figure 7.3: Normalized frequencies of HAPPINESS metaphors to 100% 
 
As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, the varieties show some differences in terms of their 
relation to the average percentage of each source domain, especially when 
considering those source domains that did not contribute extensively to the overall 
HAPPINESS data (i.e., FOOD / DRINK, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and 
VALUABLE COMMODITY). For example, GB (with a normalized frequency of 
250%) provides evidence of a variety-specific preference for FOOD / DRINK, 
although it should be kept in mind that this source domain only occurred 22 times 
out of the 750 total metaphors. Similarly, SG (with a normalized frequency of 
281%) shows a preference for VALUABLE COMMODITY, but this source 
domain was only accounted for 16 times overall. These lower frequencies in FOOD 
/ DRINK and VALUABLE COMMODITY (along with ILLNESS and NATURAL 
FORCE) make it difficult to verify true variety-specific preferences  
 Considering the source domains that collectively contributed the most to the 
metaphorical data for HAPPINESS (i.e., POSSESSION, PART OF A JOURNEY, 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, PERSON and UP), one of the most frequent 
source domains (i.e., PART OF A JOURNEY) does not display dramatic 
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differences between the varieties. For POSSESSION, there seems to be a slight 
preference for NG (with a normalized frequency of 134%) in comparison to the 
other New Englishes, which are close to the mean, and especially in comparison to 
GB (with a normalized frequency of 52%). FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, 
PERSON and UP are infrequent compared to POSSESSION and PART OF A 
JOURNEY. FLUID IN A CONTAINER does not display any major differences 
between the varieties. IN (with a normalized frequency of 127%) seems to slightly 
prefer LIGHT in comparison to GB, NE and KE, which are close to the mean, while 
SG (with 63%) is well below it. For PERSON, the biggest discrepancy is between 
NG (with a normalized frequency of 153%) and IN (with a normalized frequency 
of 51%), while the remaining varieties are closer to the mean. IN (with a normalized 
frequency of 125%) also seems to slightly prefer UP in comparison to GB, NG and 
SG, which are close to the mean (with KE below it at 63%).   
 Yet, as in the previous case studies on ANGER and FEAR, we are again at 
this stage dealing with broad source domain categories, which must be broken down 
in order to further our investigation into variety-specific preferences. In the 
following sections, each source domain will be examined individually and 
discussed on a cross-variety basis.  
7.3 Specific-Level HAPPINESS Metaphors across 
Varieties 
The previous analysis acted as the first step in discovering any source domain 
preferences across the varieties. We have yet to pinpoint any major dimensions of 
variation, considering the distribution between the most prominent source domains 
is not significant and the overall spread of the remaining source domains is 
extensive, although the perspective provided by the normalized frequencies give 
some indication of variety-specific preferences. Therefore, the following 
subsections will be devoted to breaking down these broadly formulated source 
domains in order to 1) gain insight into the inner structure of the individual source 
domains, as evidenced by the corpus data, and 2) continue to follow the line of 
investigation towards what is shared and what is different in terms of HAPPINESS 
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metaphors across the varieties. Each broadly formulated source domain 
(POSSESSION, PART OF A JOURNEY, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, 
PERSON, UP) will be discussed on the basis of examples in separate subsections, 
since they all made it into the top five ranking, when considering the varieties as a 
whole, and constitute between 73% - 93% of the data. All remaining metaphors 
along with the miscellaneous metaphors (which neither form a cohesive group nor 
contribute to the overall metaphorical content extensively) will be briefly treated in 
the section on “minor metaphors”.  
7.3.1 HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION 
Regarding the overall tokens, POSSESSION prevails as the most common source 
domain for HAPPINESS (183 tokens or 24.4% of the total data). Across the 
varieties, it is also ranked in either first (NG, KE, IN) or second place (GB, SG), 
which was the initial clue of its prominence. This was not anticipated on the basis 
of the review of previous HAPPINESS metaphors in Section 7.1., which did not 
discuss this mapping at all. Furthermore, while ANGER and FEAR presented 
PERSON metaphors as the most common overall, personification, in fact, did not 
play as extensive a role for HAPPINESS (7.9% of the total data). This is perhaps a 
curious result considering the metonymic relationship between EMOTIONS and 
PERSON. Nevertheless, the frequency with which POSSESSION shows up in the 
data for HAPPINESS can be explained by the fact that this particular mapping 
focuses on some aspects Kövecses (1991) has previously distinguished for a 
prototypical cognitive model for HAPPINESS understood as a value (versus a 
prototypical cognitive for HAPPINESS understood as the emotion itself, which I 
discuss in Section 7.3.3).95 The set of properties he arrives at for the value-based 
assessment of HAPPINESS are characterized by the following collection of our 
“folk knowledge” of this concept:  
 
Happiness is a state that lasts a long time.  
It is associated with a positive value. 
It is a desired state.  
_________________ 
95 Kövecses (1991) arrives at the set of properties in each prototypical cognitive model primarily via conceptual 
metaphors and metonymies for HAPPINESS (39-40). 
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It is pleasurable.  
It gives you a feeling of harmony with the world.  
It is something that you can ‘spread’ to others.  
It exists separately from you and is outside you.  
It is not readily available: it either requires an effort to achieve it or comes to you from 
external sources.  
It takes a long time to achieve it.  
It is just as difficult to maintain it as it is to attain it. (Kövecses 1991: 39).  
 
What especially relates to a general understanding of POSSESSION is the seventh 
property listed (“It exits separately from you and is outside of you”). While some 
people may go to great lengths to define themselves by virtue of what they possess, 
possessions, in the most basic sense, remain firmly in the object world and cannot 
be derived from some internal source. By mapping POSSESSION onto 
HAPPINESS, we construe it as we would any common possessions; we have 
ownership over something material that can be maintained, lost, transferred to 
another person or even shared.  
 Furthermore, POSSESSION, as it is understood here for HAPPINESS, has 
been previously accounted for in reference to the duality of Lakoff’s (2007 [1993]) 
EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, albeit indirectly. The duals in this general 
metaphor involve construing states as locations or objects and emphasize change of 
state as either movement of the thing changing to a location or movement of an 
object to or away from the thing changing (290). While the LOCATION system of 
EVENT STRUCTURE will be more relevant for the following section on PART 
OF A JOURNEY, the OBJECT system is relevant here for POSSESSION. As a 
submapping of EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT system), Lakoff describes the 
metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS (291) and since HAPPINESS can 
be considered an attribute of a person experiencing this emotion, HAPPINESS IS 
A POSSESSION can be seen as inheriting from EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT 
system). A study by Stefanowitsch (2004) on HAPPINESS in German and English  
confirms this relationship of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION to EVENT 
STRUCTURE (OBJECT system), which he terms the TRANSFER model that, 
based on linguistic metaphor evidence, contain three mappings: (POTENTIALLY) 
MAKING SOMEONE HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY GIVING), (POTENTIALLY) 
BECOMING HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) RECEIVING HAPPINESS, 
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BECOMING HAPPY IS BUYING HAPPINESS (146). The first two contribute to 
what I have termed broadly as POSSESSION, while the later was annotated under 
VALUABLE COMMODITY, which although it is obviously related, I considered 
sufficiently different in the meaning these metaphors conveyed, in order to give it 
a separate source domain category.  
 Considering Kövecses’ (1991) outline of “folk knowledge” of HAPPINESS 
along with its relationship to Lakoff’s (2007 [1993]) EVENT STRUCTURE, it is, 
therefore, unsurprising that POSSESSION is frequently used across all the varieties 
to highlight the value of HAPPINESS. Figure 7.4 illustrates the percentages of 
HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION, which demonstrates the proportion of its 
contribution to the individual metaphor profiles.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION per variety 
 
Interestingly, POSSESSION contributes much more to the metaphor profiles of the 
New Englishes (most prominently NG) than to GB, although GB has it in second 
place in the ranking. However, before we can take up this issue, it is important to 
zoom in to the internal structure of this broad source domain, as it presented itself 
via the linguistic metaphors in the data. Table 7.4 illustrates this breakdown into 
specific levels for POSSESSION, which is followed by a discussion of 
corresponding examples.  
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Table 7.4: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION per variety96 
POSSESSION GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 0 0 0 1 
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2) 3 6 4 8 6 
MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
0 2 0 0 1 
PREVENTING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
0 2 0 0 0 
SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2) 4 4 7 9 8 
TAKING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2) 4 6 3 3 2 
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
8 29 24 20 19 
total 19 49 38 40 37 
 
 
HAPPINESS is conceived of in the most generic terms as something that we 
possess, that is, in its most literal sense, something material. This was very rare in 
the GloWbE data, as only one instance was found in SG (joy is something we 
possess). Also rare are PREVENTING OWNERSHIP, with just two instances in 
NG (deprived of marital bliss), and MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP, with just three 
instances in NG (holding onto joy) and SG (horde it [happiness]). Although these 
two highlight more specific aspects about the nature of ownership entailed in 
HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION, as is apparent from Table 7.4, the remaining 
specific levels (are on the whole) much more frequent.  
 The last property listed by Kövecses (1991) of our “folk knowledge” speaks 
to the difficulty of maintaining HAPPINESS, i.e., if HAPPINESS is hard to keep 
in your possession, then it can be readily lost. This understanding is exemplified by 
metaphors annotated for LOSING OWNERSHIP.   
 
(39) Still hanging over your now-adult head and still stealing your joy, your 
security and your identity. (GB G) 
(40) […] if u keep sacrificing ur happiness for their personal gratification, u may 
just loose [sic] out on the best thing that has ever happened to u. (NG G) 
(41) […] the devil have stolen everything from me i mean every thing joy, husband, 
money, name it. (KE G) 
_________________ 
96  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C. 
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(42) In this age when electronic media has robbed man of the joy of reading books 
in seclusion, there is still an escape route for the seekers of the peace of mind. (IN 
G) 
(43) […] it just takes away the joy of learning and that is something we want to 
take a look at […] (SG G) 
 
 HAPPINESS can also be understood in terms of SHARED OWNERSHIP. 
This is also suggested by our folk understanding of happiness – in Kövecses’ (1991: 
39) words, HAPPINESS is “something that you can ‘spread’ to others.” That is, 
you can maintain a happy feeling for yourself, while simultaneously allowing others 
to participate in that same happy feeling. This is most commonly reflected by share 
(91% of the tokens), but not exclusively so.  
 
(44) It was more like happiness, a happiness shared between the cheering crowd, 
with their proud little Union flags and periscopes, and shared with the royal couple. 
(GB B) 
(45) If women learnt to get along a lot better and forgot about fighting, with each 
other, those silly wars we seem to thrive on, there would be a lot more happiness 
to go round. (NG B) 
(46) And President Kibaki was on hand to share in the joy of four million individual 
members […] (KE G) 
(47) But most importantly, they've laughed with me and spread the kind of joy in 
my life which is quite irreplaceable. (IN B) 
(48) Share with your children the joy of giving by sharing your time or resources 
to loved ones and worthy causes. (SG G) 
 
 The specific level of TAKING OWNERSHIP refers to the initial moment 
when someone takes something into ownership. This moment is most frequently 
reflected by the use of take (61% of the tokens), which also includes in the idiomatic 
take delight in.  
 
(49) What kind of person would take such delight in running Britain down and 
predicting catastrophe? (GB G) 
(50) The only reason Nigerians are so eager to know is that we take delight in 
hearing bad news which is a terrible trend. (NG G) 
(51) […] studies show that divorced couples tend to gain happiness from the 
dissolution of their marriage. (KE G) 
(52) It is a give and take. You can't simply take happiness for the asking. (IN G) 
(53) […] for every joy I receive from being a Daddy, I have learnt something from 
my kids as well. (SG B) 
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 TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP, which is the most frequent specific-level 
source domain in the breakdown with 100 total tokens, is encoded most frequently 
by bring (51%) and give (42%). Therefore, they are highly conventional patterns 
within the linguistic metaphors of this type. Their basic meanings in Macmillan 
focus on the transferring aspect of POSSESSION, which also entails a motion of 
sorts. The definition of bring is “to have something with you so that you can give 
it to someone when you arrive”, while for give it is “to put something in someone’s 
hand, or to pass something to someone”. These two aspects are highlighted in the 
examples below, as well.  
 
(54) I look back, the happiest times I had then, and that bring me happiness now, 
were not to do with economic growth […] (GB G) 
(55) […] the things I thought would give me joy and satisfaction are now the things 
that cause me so much pain […] (NG B) 
(56) […] many have given up on their marriages when they realized they just 
weren't delivering happiness. (KE G) 
(57) Running the theatre gives us happiness, regardless of whether we make money 
out of it or not. (IN B) 
(58) Only a dog owner can experience the joy the pet brings. (SG G) 
 
 The biggest grouping of POSSESSION metaphors is found on this specific 
level. Since TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP is largely comprised of the 
conventional patterns of bring + happiness term and give + happiness term, this 
apparent preference is unexpected, since it would be reasonable to assume that these 
patterns are also frequent in GB. However, all 8 tokens in GB that were attributable 
to TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP took the bring + happiness term pattern. This 
could just be a consequence of the randomized sample, but it is striking nonetheless.  
 With this in mind, it is interesting to consider the distribution of 
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP in comparison to all other POSSESSION 
domains. Table 7.5 demonstrates their absolute frequencies.  
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Table 7.5: Absolute frequencies of TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP as a special instantiation 
of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION 
 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
TRANSFERRING 
OWNERSHIP 
8 29 24 20 19 
POSSESSION 
(other) 
11 20 14 20 18 
total 19 49 38 40 37 
 
 
New Englishes, with the exception of IN, have slightly higher numbers for 
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP and, therefore, on the surface prefer this 
mapping given the choice between other POSSESSION source domains. A chi-
square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 7.5 and revealed 
that the observed differences are not significant (x2 = 3.234, df = 4, p = 0.51946).  
 Since no major variation can be pinpointed, it can be concluded from this 
overview that POSSESSION is a viable source domain for conceptualizing 
HAPPINESS in all varieties in general. We now move on to the second most 
frequent source domain for HAPPINESS, which is PART OF A JOURNEY.  
7.3.2 HAPPINESS IS A PART OF A JOURNEY 
In the previous section, HAPPINESS’s connection to the duality of EVENT 
STRUCTURE (Lakoff 2007 [1993]), namely its LOCATION and OBJECT 
systems, was briefly touched upon. While the OBJECT system plays a more 
obvious role for HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION, it is the LOCATION system 
that is emphasized in the HAPPINESS metaphors found utilizing PART OF A 
JOURNEY. To reiterate, the EVENT STRUCTURE in terms of the LOCATION 
SYSTEM (of which the OBJECT system is its dual) construes states / events as 
locations and change as movements of the thing changing to destinations (i.e., 
desired locations) (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 283-284, 291). EVENT STRUCTURE is 
inherited to prevalent mappings like LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which, in turn, inherit 
its structure to metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY (288). In the same manner, 
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we can view this inheritance for HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY97. 
Stefanowitsch (2004) shows that the OBJECT system of EVENT STRUCTURE is 
attestable for HAPPINESS, in what he calls the QUEST model. In his study of 
German and English terms denoting happiness, he found five mappings that 
constitute this model: TRYING TO ACHIEVE HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING 
FOR HAPPINESS, TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS PURSUING 
HAPPINESS, ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING HAPPINESS, 
ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS CAPTURING HAPPINESS and THE PROCESS 
OF ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY TO HAPPINESS (143-145)98. 
Furthermore, Kövecses (1991: 38) attests to the existence of HAPPINESS IS A 
DESIRED HIDDEN OBJECT (I have found happiness), which is a selection for 
HAPPINESS from the submappings of EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT system), 
specifically PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS and ACHIEVING A 
PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 291).  
 Given its attested relationship to EVENT STRUCTURE, the extensive 
contribution of the source domain A PART OF A JOURNEY to the 
conceptualization of HAPPINESS in the varieties is not unexpected. It is a close 
second to POSSESSION for the varieties, as evidenced by the 117 tokens or 23.6% 
of total HAPPINESS metaphors. Furthermore, it was ranked high in the top five 
source domains for each variety (first in GB and SG and second in NG, KE, and 
IN). Figure 7.5 demonstrates the percentages of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A 
JOURNEY in the individual metaphor profiles of the varieties.  
 
_________________ 
97  Note that this can also be read as HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY. I initially chose A PART OF A JOURNEY 
for the source domain label, in order to demonstrate its component parts. Furthermore, the linguistic 
metaphors instantiating HAPPINESS as the JOURNEY itself are in fact rare in the data.  
98  As will be apparent from the following, I tend to consolidate the first four of these mappings, due to their 
relatedness in basic meaning. 
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Figure 7.5: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety 
 
SG makes use of this source domain most widely at 28.7%, followed by GB with 
24.7%, KE with 24%, NG with 22% and IN with 18.7%. Yet, before we consider 
the variety-perspective, it is important to consider and illustrate the breakdown of 
PART OF A JOURNEY, which is given in Table 7.6 below.  
 
Table 7.6: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety99 
PART OF A JOURNEY  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 2 3 0 0 
A SEARCH  – specific-level (= level 2)  20 21 21 16 30 
DESTINATION (including special case: GOAL) – 
specific-level (= level 2)  
16 8 10 9 12 
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)  0 1 2 3 1 
POINTS ON A JOURNEY – specific-level (= level 
2) 
1 0 0 0 0 
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)  0 1 0 0 0 
total 37 33 36 28 43 
 
 
HAPPINESS is understood in general JOURNEY terms by either being labeled as 
the journey itself (journey of happiness) or being described with a phrase that 
frequently collocates with JOURNEY terms (joy […] cut short)100. This was 
_________________ 
99  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C. 
100  The JOURNEY terms in GloWbE that frequently collocate with cut short are: trip (87), holiday(s) (44), 
tour (41), journey (11), road (10) and race (8). Incidentally, the most frequent collocates of cut short are 
from target domains that are often participate in JOURNEY metaphors: life/lives (448) and career(s) (217). 
For evidence of LIFE / CAREER IS A JOURNEY, especially in the context of EVENT STRUCTURE, see 
Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 288-289).  
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relatively rare in the data, occurring only twice in NG and three times in KE. Very 
rare were the specific levels POINTS ON A JOURNEY (one instance in GB, 
veering wildly between elation and dread) and STARTING POINT (one instance 
in NG, a new beginning of joy).  
 The specific levels that contribute the most to PART OF A JOURNEY are A 
SEARCH, DESTINATION and PATH, although their contributions are uneven. 
HAPPINESS IS A PATH has at least one instance in the New Englishes (a total of 
7) and none in GB.  
 
(59) U are really a f**l that thinks that happiness ends in marriage. (NG G) 
(60) He formed our hearts n am beggin Him daily to mend it n get me (us) back to 
the path of joy n hope he intended for me (us). (KE G) 
(61) Happiness is a simple path and you make it complicated […] (IN B) 
(62) […] we don't know how to navigate the terrains of pure bliss because it is 
foreign territory […] (SG G)101 
 
The scarcity of PATH in the GloWbE data was unexpected, considering its 
centrality in the source-path-goal image schema of the domain JOURNEY (Lakoff 
1987a; Johnson 1987) and the EVENT STRUCTURE submapping MEANS ARE 
PATHS (TO DESTINATIONS) (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 284). However, this is a 
similar result to what was found for ANGER and FEAR, leaving us to conclude 
that the mapping of PATH onto the emotions is possible, but it is not done very 
frequently.  
 HAPPINESS IS A DESTINATION is much more frequent (55 tokens or 31% 
of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY). It is most often found in GB (16 
tokens), but also attested to by the New Englishes – 12 tokens in SG, 10 in KE, 9 
in IN and 8 in NG. Examples from each variety are listed below.  
 
(63) Leaving their humdrum selves behind on the bank like a shed skin and taking 
a short cut to happiness. (GB B) 
(64) Yet some others say that following your passion is the true road to happiness. 
(NG B) 
_________________ 
101  This particular example, although emphasizing HAPPINESS as the terrain itself, was added here due to the 
basic definition of navigate, which is “to choose a path so that a ship, plane, or car can go in a particular 
direction, especially by using maps or instruments” (Macmillan online). Therefore, navigating the terrain 
also entails discovering the paths within it.  
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(65) The damage was done when we placed roadblocks in her path to emotional 
happiness. (KE G) 
(66) Spirituality is a way of life that not only makes you a true human being but 
also helps you take the right track to bliss (IN G) 
(67) The bewildered in life can return to joy because the LORD keeps watch over 
him now, and forevermore. (SG B) 
 
 By far the most frequent specific level is HAPPINESS IS A SEARCH (108 
tokens or 61%), which was not present in the ANGER and FEAR data102. This 
specific level emphasizes a distinct type of JOURNEY and relates to four of the 
five mappings in Stefanowitsch’s (2004) QUEST model, namely TRYING TO 
ACHIEVE HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS (look for / search 
(for) happiness), TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS PURSUING 
HAPPINESS (pursuit of / pursue happiness), ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS 
FINDING HAPPINESS (find / (re)discover happiness), and ATTAINING 
HAPPINESS IS CAPTURING HAPPINESS (capture / grab happiness) (143-144). 
Here, I have consolidated Stefanowitsch’s separate mappings into HAPPINESS IS 
A SEARCH, because searching, pursuing, finding and capturing, in their basic 
senses, involve a journey during which you are specifically looking for something 
or someone.103  Examples from all varieties are illustrated below.  
 
(68) In fact the movie's default state is two people desperately reaching for 
happiness but looking for it in the wrong places. (GB G) 
(69) The quest in pursuit of happiness under democracy continues. (NG G) 
(70) Campus girls seeking their happiness in the Benz of an elder men dishing out 
drinks […] (KE B) 
(71) In our final Writing Story, Gauri Trivedi writes about how she finds joy and 
contentment with writing. (IN B) 
(72) We are all pilgrims looking for the joy of our Promised Land. (SG B) 
_________________ 
102  In the same vein, HAPPINESS did not have a specific level for OBSTACLE / BARRIER. That A SEARCH 
and OBSTACLE / BARRIER are missing for ANGER / FEAR and HAPPINESS, respectively, is to be 
expected considering the cognitive topology of these emotion concepts. ANGER and FEAR are not 
something you usually go looking for, while HAPPINESS is not deemed as a hindering emotional state.  
103  The basic definitions are as follows. search is defined as “to try to find something or someone by looking 
carefully”, while find is defined as “to discover something or someone, or to see where it is by searching 
for it.” Here, the entailment of LOOKING is made clear in the basic definitions. The definitions of pursue 
(“to chase someone or something in order to catch them”) and capture (“to catch someone”) don’t make 
LOOKING explicit, but it is nevertheless implied in both, i.e., in order to pursue or capture someone you 
have to have them in your sights. All definitions were taken from Macmillan online.  
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 Since this is the most obvious grouping of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A 
JOURNEY for all of the varieties, it is considered a special instantiation. Table 7.7 
shows its distribution in comparison to other PART OF A JOURNEY levels.  
 
Table 7.7: Absolute frequencies of A SEARCH as a special instantiation of HAPPINESS IS 
PART OF A JOURNEY 
 
 GB NG KE IN SG 
A SEARCH 20 21 21 16 30 
PART OF A 
JOURNEY (other) 
17 12 15 12 13 
total 37 33 36 28 43 
 
 
The preference between A SEARCH and other levels of PART OF A JOURNEY 
is starkest for NG, KE and, especially, SG. Nevertheless, a chi-square test was 
performed on the figures in Table 7.7 and the observed differences are not 
significant (x2 = 2.519, df = 4, p = 0.64124). Therefore, we have no indication that 
a major preference is at play here in variety-specific terms. All varieties focus on A 
SEARCH and DESTINATION source domains in the HAPPINESS IS A 
JOURNEY metaphors.  
7.3.3 HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER is a previously attested source domain for HAPPINESS 
(e.g, Kövecses 1991 and Stefanowitsch 2006a). With 71 tokens, it constitutes 9.5% 
of the HAPPINESS data in the present study. Therefore, in view of the ANGER 
and FEAR case study results, the FLUID AS A CONTAINER domain is in the 
middle (albeit on the lower end of the scale) in terms of its contribution for 
conceptualizing HAPPINESS – as a reminder, FLUID IN A CONTAINER 
contributed 21.5% to the overall data for ANGER and 4.3% for FEAR. Regarding 
its placement in the rankings on the basis of its absolute frequencies, GB and SG 
have it in third place; KE has it in third place in a tie with LIGHT; NG has it in 
fourth place; IN has it in fifth place. The percentages within the variety-specific 
metaphor profiles are illustrated in Figure 7.6.  
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Figure 7.6: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER per variety 
 
GB displays the biggest proportion of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER (with 11.3%), but not obviously so like in the FEAR data. The New 
Englishes follow closely behind with 10.7% for NG, 8.7% for both KE and IN, and 
8% for SG.  
 To understand what meaning foci are part of the broad source domain FLUID 
IN A CONTAINER, it has to be broken down into specific levels, which were 
suggested by the GloWbE data. An overview of this breakdown is provided in Table 
7.8.  
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Table 7.8: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER104 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER  GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  5 9 5 5 6 
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)  1 4 6 4 2 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level 
(= level 2)  
2 0 0 0 0 
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - specific-
level (= level 2) 
0 0 1 0 1 
FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
1 3 0 2 0 
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
0 0 0 0 0 
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM - (= 
level 3)  
2 0 0 0 0 
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) 
EXPLOSION - (= level 3)  
6 0 1 2 3 
total 17 16 13 13 12 
 
 
Note that the specific levels in Table 7.8 largely correspond to those found in the 
ANGER case study (see Section 5.3.2). The notable exceptions regard FLUID 
MOVING IN A CONTAINER, which for ANGER was broken down into FLUID 
BEING DISRUPTED, FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER 
PRESSURE), and FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER. For HAPPINESS, the first 
two did not show up in the data, although FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER did 
(which is why it is not listed here as a level 3, as it was for ANGER). Furthermore, 
although HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is attested for HAPPINESS in this 
dataset, it is not at all as frequent as it was for ANGER. The reasons for these 
discrepancies can be found by contrasting the physiological responses of 
HAPPINESS and ANGER. As Kövecses (2011b) notes (discussed in Section 7.1 
above), our physiological responses include flushing, an increased heart rate, body 
warmth and excitement. The difference seems to correspond to the intensity of the 
(albeit similar) physiological responses Kövecses (1990) outlines for ANGER 
(discussed in Section 5.1). The body heat attributable to ANGER is more intense 
than body warmth felt for HAPPINESS; redness in the face has a heightened 
_________________ 
104  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C. 
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visibility compared to flushing; agitation is understood as more extreme than 
excitement. Furthermore, unlike ANGER, there was no physiological response 
entailing internal pressure for HAPPINESS. Nevertheless, as the presence of 
HAPPINESS IS A FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER attests to, an excess of both 
ANGER and HAPPINESS is being compared to what happens when an excess of 
fluid in a container causes it to flow out.  
 That being said, the majority FLUID source domain for HAPPINESS is, in 
fact, just the generic FLUID IN A CONTAINER. With 30 overall tokens, it makes 
up 42.3% and is represented in all varieties (9 times in NG, 6 times in SG and 5 
times each in NG, IN and GB). Again, the general mapping being conveyed by 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER to HAPPINESS involves our basic experiences with 
filling a container and the knowledge that a container can be full. The following 
examples illustrate this general understanding.  
 
(73) […] installations that would fill even the world's biggest grump with a feeling 
of happiness and utopian joy. (GB G) 
(74) […] I ran towards them, unashamed, unafraid but full of love, hope and joy. 
(NG B) 
(75) […] her heart was pure and filled with joy and as long as we live, she too shall 
live […] (KE G) 
(76) Brimming with the joy of having sacrificed their lives to bring drinking water 
to thirsty millions in Gujarat? (IN G) 
(77) We would roam freely and full of joy, not tainted by limitations or obstacles in 
our path. (SG G) 
 
 The BODY FLUID domain, which is the second most common (with 17 total 
tokens or 24%), was mostly in reference to TEARS in the New Englishes, like in 
the following examples.  
 
(78) We would always remember the tears, the tears of joy ChiomaAjunwa brought 
to our eyes. (NG) 
(79) […] the lucky lot who shed tears of joy when they left the shanties and kissed 
goodbye the flying toilets. (KE G)  
(80) When she came up to the stage she was bubbling with the tears of joy […] (IN 
G) Tears of joy welled from her eyes as she thought of all the wonderful rewards if 
[sic] parenting. (SG G) 
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However, tears were not the only body fluid associated with HAPPINESS. 
Although infrequent, there were instances found in which HAPPINESS behaves 
like blood, as in (81) and (82), and in one novel metaphor, (83), like the milk of a 
cow. 
 
(81) […] the first GB gold medal of London 2012, emotion coursed through me - 
relief, pride and sheer elation. (GB G) 
(82) He says he still gets a rush of joy when he sees it hosting a match! (KE G)105 
(83) As milk is oozed out from the udder of the cow, it appears that objects ooze 
out satisfaction, joy […] (IN G)  
 
 The third most common source domain in general is HOT FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER (with 14 total tokens or 19.8%), although no instances were found 
in NG. Like for ANGER, it can be broken down into HOT FLUID BEING 
RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM (only two tokens in GB) and HOT FLUID BEING 
RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION (6 tokens in GB, 2 in IN, 3 in SG 
and 1 in KE).  
 
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASE AS GAS / STEAM 
(84) […] John himself had given vent to his elation in song. (GB G) 
(85) […]this is the place to vent those frustrations (or happiness when we win all 
be it not very often) isn't it? (GB B) 
 
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION 
(86) […] sometimes just Mum and at others just Dad - absolutely bursting with 
pride and joy at watching their children give of their very best. (GB B) 
(87) The jubilant and confident Wangui exploded with joy when she was declared 
winner of the by-election at Eldoret Municipal Hall tallying centre on Monday 
evening. (KE G) 
(88) The packed audience, who had been waiting for over an hour, erupted with 
joy, the moment Ranbir arrived along with Imtiaz and Karan. (IN G) 
(89) My heart bursts with joy and pride with each moment I get back into contact 
with these new batches of instructors […] (SG B) 
 
_________________ 
105 This was determined collocationally. The most frequent collocate of rush of in the GloWbE is blood (218 
tokens).  
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Disregarding the fact that in (85) vent happiness is most likely piggybacking on the 
early instance of vent frustrations, these metaphors, however infrequent for 
HAPPINESS, demonstrate a similar mapping process, as was discussed in the 
ANGER case study (see Section 5.3.2). As a reminder, our common knowledge 
about the properties of heated fluid in a container is that it exerts pressure on the 
container so that a release (in the form of gas, steam or an explosion) is the natural 
consequence. These mappings illustrate the marriage of two aspectual properties of 
emotions, namely intensity and control, which provide evidence, no matter how 
scant, that even HAPPINESS can be so intense that it becomes uncontrollable and 
manifests itself in some form of release, like the extreme joy of an electoral victory 
in (87) or at the arrival of a beloved celebrity (88). Furthermore, this has already 
been accounted for in a prototypical cognitive model of HAPPINESS as the 
emotion itself (rather than a value, which was discussed for POSSESSION in 
Section 7.3.1). Among various other aspects of this model, Kövecses (1991) 
highlights that, when you experience a joyful feeling:  
 
The intensity of your experiences is high. Beyond a certain limit, an increase in 
intensity implies a danger for you to become dysfunctional, that is, to lose control. It 
is not entirely acceptable to communicate and/or give free expression of what you feel 
(i.e., to become dysfunctional). […] you try to keep the emotion under control: You 
attempt not to engage in the behavioral responses and/or not to display the expressive 
reactions and/or not to communicate what you feel. […] You nevertheless lose 
control. (Kövecses 1991: 40-41).  
 
 HAPPINESS IS A FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER can be understood in 
a similar fashion. As stated above, the mapping of this domain onto HAPPINESS 
is used to understand this emotion in terms of what occurs when the volume of fluid 
is greater than the capacity of the container (i.e., it overflows). This mapping is 
evidenced by NG and IN only.  
 
(90) Last month we did our introduction and a lot of my relatives and friends were 
gushing with joy for me. (NG B) 
(91) He said there is someone here tonight, long before this year is over, your joy 
will over flow. (NG G) 
(92) When that happens, you will feel tremendous joy, so much so, that it will 
overflow. (IN G) 
(93) […] he wants to share his overflowing bliss with others (IN B) 
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Yet, this is not the only mapping that FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER entails 
for HAPPINESS. There are two instances that speak to something altogether 
different. In (94), HAPPINESS as FLUID can be poured from a container to 
highlight that it can be something that is shared. In (95), HAPPINESS as FLUID 
can be forced out of a container (e.g., squeezing the something out of a bottle), 
which emphasizes that it is something that can be lost (to the PERSON 
CONTAINER). In this manner, although rare, these FLUID mappings demonstrate 
a relatedness to POSSESSION.  
 
(94) Misaki Kawai pouring happiness all over the world one installation at a time. 
(GB G) 
(95) […] somebody who can point you to the solution to a knotty problem that is 
squeezing joy out of your life. (NG B) 
 
 The final two specific levels of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER were equally infrequent with 2 instances each. FLUID ACTING AS 
A BODY OF WATER, as illustrated by (96) and (97), was only found in KE and 
SG, while ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER, making use of the folk model 
ENERGY AS A (FLOWING) FLUID, were only found twice in GB, as illustrated 
by (98) and (99). 
 
(96) However, ignorance is bliss, bath in it pal! (KE G) 
(97) I see all my past painful sufferings through the eyes of one who had been 
bathed in this pool of His incredible love and joy. (SG G) 
(98) “The chamber,” wrote Alistair Cooke, our correspondent, “was crackling with 
currents of elation and despair.” (GB B) 
(99) On the contrary, it remorselessly unpicks romantic love and its supposed 
capacity to generate and sustain happiness. (GB G) 
 
 Taking the variety perspective on the whole of the domain FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER, there is no single specific level that emerges as the most frequent. 
Although GB has the biggest overall proportion and attested instances of all specific 
levels except for ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER, the numbers are too small 
here to have solid evidence for it as a preference. Regarding the specific levels, GB 
has HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER as its most frequently used source domain, 
while for KE it is BODY FLUID. The other New English varieties use the generic 
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level most frequently. Therefore, it is difficult to identify a more pronounced 
grouping to examine statistically. The determination of a preference for FLUID IN 
A CONTAINER will have to be left to larger-scale studies, although considering 
its relationship to the physical experience of fluid containment, it is unlikely that a 
culturally specific preference will emerge.   
7.3.4 HAPPINESS IS LIGHT 
The correspondence between LIGHT and HAPPINESS has been attested to by 
Kövecses (1991: 30) in linguistics metaphors like her face was bright with 
happiness. LIGHT, in the sense of brightness from the sun or some other source, is 
also implied in the metonymic system of HAPPINESS by the physiological 
response of FLUSHING (beam with joy) and the expressive response of BRIGHT 
EYES (shine with happiness) (Kövecses 2011b: 35). Therefore, we have grounds 
to expect its occurrence across the varieties in this study.  
 HAPPINESS IS LIGHT makes up 8.4% of the HAPPINESS metaphors (63 
tokens of the total 750), which is perhaps not as common as one would expect 
considering its experiential basis. In terms its contribution to the metaphor profiles 
of the varieties, the percentages can be gleaned from Figure 7.7.  
 
 
Figure 7.7: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT per variety 
 
 
IN (with 10.7%) and SG (with 5.3%) make for the two ends of the spectrum, while 
GB, NG and KE come in the middle with 8.7% each. LIGHT, although indicating 
a general sense of brightness, can be broken down into specific levels, for which an 
obvious grouping for the New Englishes emerges. This breakdown is provided by 
Table 7.9.  
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Table 7.9: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT per variety106 
LIGHT GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1) 7 3 1 3 1 
A LAMP - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 0 1 0 
LIGHT FROM WITHIN - specific-level (= level 2) 5 9 10 8 7 
SUN-RELATED - specific-level (= level 2) 1 1 2 4 0 
total 13 13 13 16 8 
 
 
While the generic level is the most common for GB, New Englishes seem to prefer 
the specific level LIGHT FROM WITHIN. Before examining this preference, the 
following provides illustrates of each level.   
 The generic level of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT includes all linguistic metaphors 
that simply reflect the brightness aspect of LIGHT; i.e., there is no further indication 
on the linguistic level that it is elaborated otherwise. This is illustrated by (100) – 
(104).  
 
(100) Your happiness today is all the brighter for its rarity […] (GB G) 
(101) The joy too, even vivid joy to illuminate the loss, that such a man existed, 
worked to such great effect, changed to realities the problems of the Niger Delta. 
(NG G) 
(102) This happiness does not fade away as the joy of touching a life and giving 
back to the society is irreversible. (KE B) 
(103) That they are in police custody has done nothing to dim their glee. (IN G) 
(104) But recently, whenever we young dads have lunch together, we no longer 
bring up the joy of parenthood that lit up our lives when our children were cute 
babies and toddlers. (SG G) 
 
 The brightness aspect in the examples above can be elaborated in three 
specific ways in this study. One of the specific levels was so rare (only one instance 
in IN) that it can be considered a novel extension of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT.  
 
(105) Let the Lamp of Wealth, Health and Happiness be Lit for You and fill You 
with Joy and Cheer […] (IN B) 
 
_________________ 
106  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.  
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 Another elaboration that is more common, at least for GB, NG, KE and IN, 
understands HAPPINESS as a source of light similar to the Sun. Although 
uncommon in this data, this is not a surprising comparison considering how salient 
the Sun is to our daily experience. In the examples below, various aspects of the 
Sun are being highlighted, which all imply brightness. The sunrays attributed to 
HAPPINESS in (107) and (109) are obvious, as well as the ability to bask in them, 
as in (108). A less obvious (but, nevertheless, implied sense of the Sun’s brightness) 
is (106), in which we understand that HAPPINESS will be able to shine like the 
Sun, once it has passed the darkness of a cloud.  
 
(106) […] it won t be long until ur true happiness resurfaces from this giant cloud 
of doom […] (GB B) 
(107) […] to the suposed [sic] lucky n favoured ones whose smiles and grin forms 
a magmanimous [sic] and beaming sunlight rays of happiness […] (NG G) 
(108) Looking at them seated side by side in their home in Mweiga, Central Kenya, 
one gets the impression of a couple that has already basked in the initial marital 
bliss […] (KE G) 
(109) It is because whenever the smallest ray of happiness enters your life - you 
resist it with all your might and continue being unhappy. (IN B) 
 
 Among the New Englishes, the most common specific level source domain 
for HAPPINESS is LIGHT FROM WITHIN. There are 10 instances in KE, 9 in 
NG, 8 in IN and 7 in SG, compared to the 5 in GB. LIGHT FROM WITHIN entails 
something that has already been pointed out by Kövecses (1991), who maintains 
that “the happy person is characterized by a great deal of energy; the light appears 
to derive from an internal heat energy” (30). This is apparent in the following 
examples, as well.  
 
(110) But then a “giant hormonal valve was opened in the minds of the people” and 
people were “suffused with a Ready Brek glow of happiness”. (GB G) 
(111) Happiness radiates from within. (NG B) 
(112) Boit, a firstborn in a family of 10, was beaming with happiness after he 
received the pay award news […] (KE G) 
(113) He seemed cheer personified and was glowing with happiness. (IN G) 
(114) […] being with the Yasukawas… how their faces radiate with happiness, 
kindness and warmth. (SG B) 
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 If more data was available, it would be interesting to test if this grouping 
around LIGHT FROM WITHIN holds for the New Englishes. A chi-square test of 
the frequencies for LIGHT FROM WITHIN and LIGHT (OTHER) in the varieties 
was not possible because over 20% of the expected frequencies were less than 5. 
Thus, we are left to conclude that, on the basis of the absolute frequencies, there 
seems to be a preference for LIGHT FROM WITHIN for the New Englishes. 
However, considering it also showed up in the GB data five times, this does not 
seem to be a true preference.  
7.3.5 HAPPINESS IS A PERSON 
PERSON plays a less substantial role in the conceptualization of HAPPINESS, 
making up merely 7.9% of the data with a total of 59 tokens across the varieties. 
Figure 7.8 illustrates the percentages of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON for each 
variety. 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON per variety 
 
While Figure 7.8 makes evident that this metaphor type is used most commonly in 
the African varieties and GB (in comparison to the Asian varieties), this does not 
necessarily demonstrate any real preference when taking into account the centrality 
of POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY, outlined above. This is a surprising 
result considering personification’s pervasiveness as an ontological metaphor (see 
Kövecses 2010) and its prominence in the conceptualization of ANGER and FEAR, 
which could have initially led us to believe that PERSON metaphors lend 
themselves easily to all emotional target domains.  
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 Yet, despite its lack of prominence, HAPPINESS can still be conceptualized 
in terms of broad personification. HAPPINESS IS A PERSON can also be 
segmented into more specific levels, albeit less extensively than ANGER and 
FEAR. This breakdown into specific levels are illustrated in Table 7.10 below.   
 
Table 7.10: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON per variety107 
PERSON GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  0 0 5 0 1 
PERSON - ANIMAL-RELATED - specific-level (= level 
2) 
0 1 0 1 0 
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= level 2) 2 0 0 0 0 
PERSON - LIVING IN A HOME - specific-level (= level 
2)  
1 1 1 1 0 
PERSON - OFFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2) 1 0 0 0 0 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)  0 2 0 1 0 
   WHO IS BEING CONTROLLED (= level 3) 1 0 0 2 0 
   WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)  0 2 1 0 0 
   WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) 5 1 2 1 0 
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2) 0 0 0 0 1 
PERSON - RELATED TO A JOURNEY - specific-level 
(= level 2) 
2 7 1 0 5 
PERSON - SHOUTING - specific-level (= level 2) 0 2 1 0 0 
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS  - specific-level (= level 2)  0 1 0 0 0 
Misc. - HAPPINESS TAKING ON 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON 
0 1 1 0 1 
Misc. - HAPPINESS INVOLVED IN ACTIONS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON 
1 0 0 0 2 
total 13 18 12 6 10 
 
 
 KE and SG are the only varieties to make use of the generic level (= level 1). 
In fact, for KE, a general personification of HAPPINESS is the most common, 
illustrated in (115) and (116) below.  
 
(115) I was happy but my joy was short lived when I opened the emails to read the 
cover letters and resumes! (KE B) 
_________________ 
107  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.  
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(116) Jackie says that although they incurred a bill of Sh700,000, nothing could 
match their joy at the survival of their baby. Unfortunately, their joy was short-
lived. (KE G) 
 
short(-)lived was the only term reflecting a PERSON metaphor on the generic-level 
in the entire study. It was considered an instance of general personification because 
of its meaning denoting organic existence, albeit a brief one. Stefanowitsch (2006a) 
reached a similar conclusion by including it as an instance of HAPPINESS IS AN 
ORGANISM (short-lived joy) (84). Although short(-)lived is admittedly a term not 
necessarily applied to people, it can be found to refer to other animate beings, like 
the mayfly. However, in all instances, the co-text of short(-)lived happiness did not 
specify the insect meaning, which prompted me to categorize it as reflecting 
personification in general and not as the following specific-level category, 
ANIMAL-RELATED.  
 There are only two instances of HAPPINESS IS ANIMAL-RELATED, 
which was intentionally styled in this manner due to these instances lacking in the 
DANGEROUS component that characterized the majority of ANGER and FEAR 
metaphors of this type. This is also the case for HAPPINESS and ANIMAL 
mappings Kövecses (1991) discusses, i.e., HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL 
(his feelings of happiness broke loose) and HAPPINESS IS AN ANIMAL THAT 
LIVES WELL (she was purring with delight) (35-36). Although these particular 
mappings were not found in the present study, the two instances that were 
uncovered have a decidedly creative quality.  
 
(117) […] you and your cohorts reel in opulence and happiness […] (NG G)  
FISH 
(118) It is my observation that learning to live with a smile is a road to happiness. 
It is inside you and try catching it and like a butterfly it flies away. Don't disturb it 
if it comes and sits on your shoulder. (IN G)  BUTTERFLY 
 
Due to the positive affect associated with HAPPINESS, it is unsurprising that 
DANGEROUS ANIMAL is not used. (117) highlights the attainment of a happy 
state by exploiting the image of a fish on a line being reeled in. (118) underscores 
our experience with happiness as a fleeting emotion, which is visualized as a 
butterfly flying and the tenuous situation of it alighting on your shoulder.  
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 HAPPINESS is a PERSON IN POLITICS, which could elicit a metonymic 
reading. This was only found in the GB data, illustrated by (119) and (120).  
 
(119) […] does a politics of happiness really give us the strength of character to 
match those challenges? (GB G) 
(120) Thus the politics of happiness should not be fought out over ONS survey data 
[…] (GB B) 
 
Being rare, it is not surprising that this was not accounted for in the previous 
research.  
 Similar to ANGER, HAPPINESS takes on the meaning of a COMPANION, 
but in a very restricted sense, i.e., that of a person with whom you share an abode. 
It was also not previously discussed in the studies outlined in Section 7.1.  
 
(121) Happiness is retrospective. Memory is the home of happiness. (GB G) 
(122) […] may joy and blessings success and divine health abide in your family 
[…] (NG G) 
(123) Married women need to realize that happiness does not reside in marriage. 
Happiness does not reside in a spouse or in children. (KE B) 
(124) All happiness and fulfillment is residing within you. (IN B) 
 
HAPPINESS is conceptualized as a PERSON LIVING IN A HOME, possibly 
primed by the familial associations mentioned in the co-text of (122) and (123). 
Also, the dwelling of HAPPINESS can be the individuals themselves (124), 
something associated with the individual, like memory in (121), or in terms of a 
human relationship (123).   
 The related domains of OFFSPRING and PARENT also occur in the 
HAPPINESS data and would likely have been attributed to the general source 
domain ORGANISM in Stefanowitsch’s (2006a) study, if they would have showed 
up in his results. Like in ANGER and FEAR, breed is again used to denote the 
elicitation of this emotion (perhaps in an animalistic sense), while the advent of a 
happy feeling is understood in terms of a birth.  
 
(125) The feelings of abundance breed happiness and joy, happiness and joy in 
turn create the results you want in life […] (GB G) 
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(126) But we all know the best pictures are the ones that capture genuine smiles 
spontaneously borne [sic] out of real delight. (SG G) 
 
 HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT shows up in the GloWbE data in a manner 
comparable to Kövecses (1991). He views this mapping as an indication of our 
understanding of HAPPINESS “as a powerful and intense emotion that we regard 
as taking control of us” (36). However, HAPPINESS as AN OPPONENT does not 
have the same entailments as ANGER or FEAR as AN OPPONENT. ANGER and 
FEAR present oppositional senses that come from our experience of regulating 
these negative emotions within ourselves. There are no oppositional aspects that 
connect to our basic experience of feeling happy or a need to regulate it in order to 
be better individuals or social beings. That being said, HAPPINESS can be 
understood as a temporal OPPONENT in moments when it is at its most intense, 
usually immediately after or during a fortunate event. This is reflected in (127) – 
(129), which illustrate HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT (WHO IS PREVAILING).  
 
(127) It's like a dream come true to me. I'm just overwhelmed with joy right now. 
(GB G) 
(128) I was overwhelmed with joy and happiness at the look of my result. (KE G) 
(129) A son of a junk dealer, Ankur was unable to control his happiness after he 
came to know that he had secured an all India rank of 956 in the prestigious All 
India Engineering Entrance Examination […] (IN G) 
 
The African varieties also demonstrate that HAPPINESS can be conceptualized as 
AN OPPONENT (WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST) when harm or a threat 
comes from an external source, i.e., outside the individual.  
 
(130) All of you harming the joy of nationhood from Nigerian [sic] will be 
destroyed. (NG G) 
(131) […] all u so called journalists are only interested in killing and destroying 
another person's happiness, image and character. (NG G) 
(132) Tell her that it is unfair that someone somewhere, with ill-motives made these 
stupid rules about marriage that trod on all human rights and happiness. (KE G) 
 
Furthermore, the conceptualization of HAPPINESS takes on oppositional qualities, 
when it is construed of as AN OPPONENT (WHO IS BEING CONTROLLED). The 
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controlling aspect entails the sense of weakening someone (= undermine) or 
restricting them (= hamper).  
 
(133) By creating this inherent sense of security, authoritative parenting insulates 
the developing child against the nagging anxiety that can easily undermine 
happiness. (GB G) 
(134) When you form close bonds, you get uncomfortable. This could hamper your 
lasting happiness. Get to a shrink now. (IN G)  
 
 Despite the small numbers, HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT turns out to be 
the most frequent HAPPINESS IS A PERSON metaphor, with 18 instances spread 
out among GB, NG, KE and IN (SG being the exception).  
 Considering the prominence of HAPPINESS as a PART OF A JOURNEY, 
outlined above, it is not a surprise that it would also be understood in term of a 
PERSON RELATED TO A JOURNEY, which is the second most frequent 
HAPPINESS IS A PERSON metaphor with 16 instances (NG and SG contributing 
the most with 7 and 5 tokens, respectively). It was not accounted for in previous 
research, but is exemplified by the varieties in this study, as in (137) – (138).  
 
(135) If it’s ambiguous and you spend more time in your mind trying to work out 
what the frick is going on or can not categorically say where you stand, happiness 
within a healthy relationship will elude you. (GB G) 
(136) That single act of forgiveness can open up great doors for your future and 
happiness. (NG G) 
(137) Are you the kind of man who sits and waits for happiness to find you? (KE 
B) 
(138) Others take the long road. In either case, we lay the injustice at God’s feet, 
and then arise and do good to those who abuse us. That is when joy returns. (SG 
B) 
 
 Like ANGER and FEAR, HAPPINESS has the ability to vocalize, but in the 
restricted sense of a shout or a squeal rather than being able to speak. This could 
also be read metonymically since a joyous person often expresses his/her joy in this 
manner.  
 
(139) It would be amazing have bird's eye view of the whole world and hear the 
shouts of joy ascending in an orchestra of voice boxes... (NG G) 
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(140) She took it personally that I did not accept her gift with the squeals of delight 
that greeted her when my sisters got their ‘Christmas clothes’. (KE G) 
 
This has an obvious relationship to the metonymic behavioral response Kövecses 
(2011b) identified as SINGING.  
 There is only one instance of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON WITH AN 
ILLNESS, which makes use of nursing – a term that has co-occurred with ANGER 
and FEAR terms. This collocational tendency seems to be a conventional way of 
talking about sustaining emotions in general, although it has not featured in any of 
the research discussed for a folk theory of HAPPINESS.  
 
(141) You wake up the next day and you are still nursing that inward feeling of 
uneasiness and happiness. (NG G) 
 
 In addition to the specific levels outlined above, there are two miscellaneous 
categories attributable to HAPPINESS IS A PERSON, in which human-like 
characteristics and actions are assigned to HAPPINESS, which did not display any 
conceptual unity. As such, they occur infrequently. HAPPINESS TAKING ON 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON is illustrated by (142), and 
HAPPINESS INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON is 
illustrated by (143).  
 
(142) So it was with startled joy that I came across a piece from The Banker 
recording our achievements in banking - and suggesting that Kenya has something 
to teach the world. (KE G)108 
(143) There is no doubt at all that kindness and happiness feed on each other. (SG 
G) 
 
 It should be noted that HAPPINESS as a PERSON metaphors do not 
obviously group around a particular specific level, like OPPONENT for ANGER 
and FEAR. While OPPONENT is the most frequent source domain overall (despite 
no instances found in SG), from the variety-specific perspective, it is only the most 
frequent in GB (6 total tokens) and IN (4 total tokens). Compared to OPPONENT, 
NG and SG uses PERSON RELATED TO A JOURNEY more frequently (7 and 5 
_________________ 
108  Relatable to Kövecses' (2011b) metonymy EXCITEMENT  
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tokens, respectively), while KE uses the generic level more frequently (5 tokens). 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine if OPPONENT has the status of a special 
instantiation of PERSON for the varieties. Thus, we will move to a more 
orientational metaphor that occurred in the data, i.e., HAPPINESS IS UP.  
7.3.6 HAPPINESS IS UP 
HAPPINESS IS UP is a well-established orientational metaphor, going all the way 
back to Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]), who define orientational metaphors as 
providing an abstract concept with a spatial orientation (14). The experiential basis 
for HAPPINESS IS UP has not only to do with the correlation of “erect posture 
with a positive emotional state” (15), but also is related to a behavioral and 
expressive metonymic response to HAPPINESS. Kövecses (1991) maintains that 
the “cognitive motivation for the upward orientation” of HAPPINESS IS UP is 
grounded in jumping up and down (behavioral response) and smiling (expressive 
response). “When we smile, the ends of the mouth turn upwards”, while “the action 
of jumping (up and down)” motivates metaphors like “He jumped for joy” (32). 
Furthermore, Grady (1997a) identifies HAPPY IS UP as a primary metaphor with 
the same physical basis as Lakoff and Johnson, i.e, erect posture, but also adds that 
it can be grounded in the “correlation between being in a higher position (e.g., on a 
hill and feeling safe, in control, etc.” (295). Therefore, the previous evidence leads 
to the expectation that HAPPINESS IS UP will occur in the GloWbE data.  
 This is, of course, the case. Nevertheless, the extent to which HAPPINESS IS 
UP occurs is surprising, because it does not seem at all that common. Out of the 
750 HAPPINESS metaphors, it collectively only occurs 48 times (6.4%). Figure 
7.9 illustrates the percentages of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON in the respective 
variety-specific metaphor profiles. 
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Figure 7.9: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS UP per variety 
 
GB, NG and SG share the same proportion of HAPPINESS IS UP, namely 6.7%, 
while KE is on the lower end of the scale with 4% and IN is on the higher end with 
8%. The breakdown of HAPPINESS IS UP was also limited – merely 
distinguishing between a generic sense (that of upward orientation) and a specific 
level that relates to the behavioral metonymic response of JUMPING UP AND 
DOWN. The latter was the most frequent for all varieties, as shown in Table 7.11.  
 
Table 7.11: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS UP per variety109 
UP GB NG KE IN SG 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  4 1 1 4 1 
JUMPING - specific-level (= level 2) 6 9 5 8 9 
total 10 10 6 12 10 
 
 
 All varieties provide at least one example of the generic level (= level 1), 
which demonstrate that HAPPINESS has an upward spatial orientation that is 
otherwise unspecified for this emotion concept.  
 
(144) There will be a come down from my elation today &; I have no doubt that 
there will be some difficult times ahead […] (GB G) 
(145) […] God's servants experience absolute peace and internal joy and they are 
progressively lifted up and prosperous. (NG B) 
(146) I was over the moon with happiness. At last this is happening. (KE G) 
(147) The object that you love deeply can upset your mind or raise your mind to 
heights of joy, as the case may be. (IN G) 
_________________ 
109  For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.  
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(148) I was literally over the moon with joy because I could run & swim with almost 
double my speed and not feel tired. (SG G) 
 
Although it might seem that (146) and (148) are making use of the specific image 
of the moon, which would be reflecting a mapping like HAPPINESS IS A HIGH 
PLACE OVER THE MOON, I consider the general idiomatic meaning of over the 
moon as encoding the general upward spatial orientation attributed to the 
conceptualization of HAPPINESS and, thus, not necessarily an elaboration of it. 
Furthermore, the use of moon acts as a stand-in for something we perceive of as 
being stereotypically above us, i.e., in the sky or out in space, which we commonly 
give an upward spatial orientation.   
 As mentioned above, the only specific level of HAPPINESS IS UP is that of 
JUMPING, which is also more frequent than the generic level in all varieties and, 
thus, their common preference. The source domain of JUMPING illustrates the 
interaction between this metonymy of HAPPINESS and corresponding metaphors. 
Although it is commonly reflected by jump for / in / with on the linguistic level, this 
is not exclusively so. With the exception of IN, all varieties use other phrasing as 
well.  
 
(149) The boat and being on the water excited him so much he was jumping for joy. 
(GB B) 
(150) He then fell to his knees in prayer while up in the stands his daughter Rihanna 
leapt up and down with delight. (GB B) 
(151) I wish I could jump for joy and give a high five to my granddaughter who 
was in the living room when I stumbled on the news on my laptop. (NG G) 
(152) A 34-year-old Nigerian nurse on Friday leapt for joy when an Oshodi 
Customary Court in Lagos dissolved the five-year-old marriage to her husband […] 
(NG G) 
(153) Ruth jumped with joy and laid flat on the stage after she was announced the 
winner. (KE B) 
(154) […] the part that had staged a prison-break from her brain and was wanted 
back dead or alive - leaped for joy at the prospect of spending an indefinite period 
close to Rashid. (KE B) 
(155) We are very elated. We jump up in joy. We cuddle. We are blissful. (IN B) 
(156) He would dash out from where he is at... and jump up and down with delight 
asking for a cuddle. (SG G) 
(157) Sam, for some reason, wasn't bouncing with joy like I was. (SG G)  
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 Finally, it should be noted that the metaphor BEING HAPPY IS BEING IN 
HEAVEN, which Kövecses (1991: 38) also assigns an upward orientation and 
views as motivated by the religious belief that the dichotomy of heaven and hell has 
an up-down orientation related to GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN, is not present 
in the data at all. Nevertheless, the general upward spatial orientation and the more 
specific JUMPING aspect is evidenced for all varieties and, thus, is not specific to 
any of them.  
 This concludes the overview of the biggest contributors to HAPPINESS 
regarding the source domains that map onto it. In the following, we will briefly 
rundown the minor metaphors that were found for HAPPINESS.  
7.3.7 Minor Metaphors of HAPPINESS 
This final section of the HAPPINESS results offers a glimpse at those metaphors 
that did not form a large portion of the variety-specific metaphor profiles. This 
pertains to NATURAL FORCE, FOOD / DRINK, ILLNESS and VALUABLE 
COMMODITY, which despite their lower numbers could be broken down into 
specific levels (see Appendix C). However, the minor metaphors of HAPPINESS 
also include the various miscellaneous metaphors. Collectively, these groups 
comprise 19.8% of the total HAPPINESS data overall. From a cross-variety 
perspective, they represent 27.3% in GB, 23.3% in IN, 21.3% in KE, 20.1% in SG, 
and, interestingly, only 7.4% in NG, which makes much more extensive use of the 
major HAPPINESS metaphors outlined in the sections above. The following 
provides an overview of these minor metaphors, which are illustrated by linguistic 
examples.  
 NATURAL FORCE is a source domain that maps onto HAPPINESS, but not 
as prominently as it does for ANGER and FEAR. Therefore, it was relegated to the 
minor metaphor grouping. The specific levels of HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL 
FORCE are FIRE, STORM and WATER and are illustrated below. Note that all 
three are relatable to previously attested metaphors, namely HEAT / FIRE and 
NATURAL FORCE by Kövecses (1991; 2008c) and, for (160), the more general 
LIQUID Stefanowitsch (2006a). 
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(158) Pastor William Kumuyi sparked joy and spontaneous happiness among 
members of the church […] (NG G) 
(159) Thunder and Lightning conjured up a tempest within, a tempest of elation. 
(GB B) 
(160) The soul is drowned in the ocean of joy. (IN G) 
 
 Nevertheless, HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE is infrequent (4.3% of 
the total data or 32 tokens). Yet, it should be noted that it is unevenly spread across 
the varieties. In GB, NG, KE and SG, it is between 0.7% - 4.7%.  In IN, 11.3% of 
the metaphor profile is constructed by HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE, 
exclusively due to the specific-level WATER, which can be further broken down 
into a level 3, and perhaps is evidence for a slight preference.  
 
(161) A person floats on the surface of the sea of happiness and sorrow, and does 
not know what will actually be in store for him tomorrow (IN G)  HAPPINESS 
IS WATER (OCEAN / SEA) 
(162) […] Kaka you were the ARADHANA of millions of Indians, you showered 
us with abundance bliss […] (IN G)  HAPPINESS IS WATER (RAIN) 
(163) We will be flooded with bliss. (IN B)  HAPPINESS IS WATER (FLOOD 
/ WAVES) 
 
Conventional constructions are associated with these last two examples. The RAIN 
domain is solely reflected by shower [V] on / over / upon / with, while the majority 
of FLOOD / WAVES is instantiated by flood [V] with.  
 The mapping of FOOD / DRINK onto HAPPINESS was neither discussed in 
Kövecses’ work nor in Stefanowitsch (2006a); yet, it was briefly treated as a minor 
metaphor of ANGER and FEAR in the present study. Like HAPPINESS IS A 
NATURAL FORCE above, the 22 total tokens (2.9% of the overall data) are 
unevenly spread across the data, with GB commanding exactly half (11 tokens), 
which indicates a slight preference. The structure of HAPPINESS IS FOOD / 
DRINK is illustrated by the following examples.  
 
HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK (generic level) 
(164) Having a rich network of close, supportive relationships with partners, 
friends, family and colleagues is probably the single most important ingredient of 
happiness. (GB G) 
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HAPPINESS IS CHOCOLATE 
(165) So you eat more, and more…secretly looking for chocolate to relieve the 
boredom, to have your treat, you deserve a reward (what did you do, save a life or 
just wash the dishes?), looking for it to give you that slice of happiness you crave 
under the wrapper. (GB G)  
 
HAPPINESS IS FRUIT 
(166) […] they become the sort of people who don't take offence at certain things, 
who are concerned about other things more, who display the fruits of the spirit. The 
love, the joy, the gentleness, the peace and so on. (GB B)110 
 
HAPPINESS IS SUGAR 
(167) Instead of consuming sugar, you can become sugar itself! This is the sugar of 
ananda, bliss. (IN B)  
 
HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED 
(168) Being a stage, the world feeds us on all manner of emotions be they those of 
joy, happiness and sorrow, but in the end, we are heard no more. (KE G)  
(169) My tastebuds were tingling with delight as I tasted each dish. (GB G) 
(170) I have drunk in the elation on Kubri al-Nil as Egypt's first democratically 
elected President […] (GB B) 
 
HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK GOING BAD 
(171) It had taken a long time. His elation soured. (GB G)  
 
 The emotional experience of being happy is not widely conceptualized in 
terms of ILLNESS in our varieties (with only 19 tokens in total). HAPPINESS IS 
AN ILLNESS composes just 2.5% of the total of data and is not found in NG at all. 
In fact, the percentages are low across the board (4% or 6 tokens each in KE and 
SG, 3.3% or 5 tokens in GB, and 1.3% or 2 tokens in IN). This makes clear that it 
is not a very common conceptualization for HAPPINESS in English in general and 
is perhaps contingent on the fact that happy feelings do not intuitively come to mind 
in connection with ILLNESS. 
_________________ 
110  This, of course, has its origins in the Bible. Galatians 5: 22-23 says, “But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, 
peace, forbearance, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. Against such things there 
is no law.” Nevertheless, I have included this example as a metaphor in GB because it is deeply rooted in 
the Christian tradition and otherwise widely known. It is, therefore, available to speakers, albeit as a 
historical metaphor. Furthermore, example (166) is not a direct quote from this passage in Galatians.  
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 Nevertheless, HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS has been previously attested to 
within a cognitive model of HAPPINESS. Kövecses (2000: 25) establishes that 
HAPPINESS is understood of in terms of INSANITY (they were crazy with 
happiness), which can be considered a specific instance of illness. He also 
demonstrates that HAPPINESS can be conceived of as DISEASE (her good mood 
was contagious) or as HIGH / BEING DRUNK (it was an intoxicating experience) 
(Kövecses 2008c: 135–136). Admittedly, the latter is not prototypical for 
ILLNESS, but it can be considered related, insomuch as it entails the experience of 
being in a physical state in which the body does not operate as normal. Despite this 
fuzzy boundary, I have included all linguistic metaphors reflecting HAPPINESS as 
being compared to a state beyond a normally functioning body as drawing from the 
source domain of ILLNESS, along with the related concept of MEDICINE TO 
TREAT AN ILLNESS. These linguistic metaphors are illustrated in the following 
via their specific-level breakdown.  
 
HAPPINESS IS A DEADLY ILLNESS 
(172) LUCKY!!! I would've died of happiness. (SG G)  
 
HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING 
SUBSTANCE 
(173) Happiness is a high - it only lasts a while. (GB G)  (here A DRUG-
INDUCED HIGH) 
 
HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS 
(174) Totally awed as I grinned from ear to ear. My heart fluttered with joy. (KE 
B)  (HEART-RELATED)111  
(175) So they ooh when he uses the backhand slice, sigh when he (occasionally) 
follows it in to the net to volley and become incontinent with delight when he 
scimitars that backhand down the line “on the dead run” as Amritraj loves to say. 
(IN B)  (LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY) 
(176) Sorry, I didn't know it was also my job to send you into paroxysms of joy. 
(GB G)  (LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY) 
(177) Sometimes, especially if it is an ugly person calling me ugly or a stupid person 
calling me stupid, I even feel a twinge of joy because it is so funny and ironic. (SG 
G)  (PHYSICAL PAIN)  
 
_________________ 
111  Relatable to Kövecses’ (2008c) metonymy INCREASED HEART RATE (heart beats with joy) 
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HAPPINESS IS AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS 
(178) As I listened to Jim, I could tell he had learnt his lessons well and he in turn 
had taught his wife and the joy and transformation in their marriage was infectious. 
(KE G)  
 
HAPPINESS IS A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY 
(179) But when Warren appeared on stage to accept the results, the crowd went 
delirious with joy (KE B)  
(180) Wilson, the bridegroom who is a painter in Nairobi, was beside himself with 
joy112 as he kissed his bride, sending the crowd into a frenzy of hand-clapping and 
ululation. (KE G)  HAPPINESS IS A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY  
 
HAPPINESS IS A MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS 
(181) A Little Dose of Happiness Here and There (SG G)  
 
HAPPINESS is like a deadly disease, when it is experienced suddenly or in excess, 
(i.e., outside of the realm of a normally functioning body, that is, a shock to the 
system), as in (182). The same is true for a LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE BODY 
and MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY in that HAPPINESS can induce a loss of 
physical faculties (i.e., wetting oneself), as in (187), or – like in ANGER and FEAR 
– convulsing, as in (176) or loss of mental faculties, as in (179) and (180). AN 
ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE, PHYSICAL 
PAIN and AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS are positively connoted in the context of 
HAPPINESS, but the language is clearly borrowed from the domain of ILLNESS 
as I define it (a [drug-induced] high, twinge of, infectious).  
_________________ 
112  This particular metaphorical instance was problematic and begs explanation for why it shows up here. First 
of all, recall that Kövecses (1990) coded a similar instance for FEAR (I was beside myself with fear) as A 
DIVIDED SELF, which likely presented problems for him as well, considering that he changed the label 
of this source domain in later publications (see footnote in Section 6.1). I initially thought I would get 
around this problem by employing the collocational analysis afforded by my methodology. However, this 
was only one of two instances that proved unsolvable with collocational analysis - the other being my head 
being all over the place in FEAR, which has similarity to Kövecses’ A DIVIDED SELF. Nevertheless, I 
decided to annotate both the FEAR and HAPPINESS example as MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY for 
the following reason. For instance, a collocational analysis, using the search string beside PRON with, in 
the GloWbE, yielded 412 results. I took a sample of 100 tokens and, after sorting out literal instances (like 
skip beside you with a baseball bat (GB G)), analyzed all beside PRON with + NOUN constructions. It was 
striking that all remaining 69 of the 100 tokens included an emotion term in the noun slot, 15 of which 
related to HAPPINESS. Despite this construction exclusively co-occurring with an emotion term, I made 
the analyst-specific decision to include it in my ILLNESS data set, since being beside oneself, in my 
opinion, denotes a mental state outside of the norm, which happens to also be deeply connected to one’s 
emotional state. Examples from the corpus, like The child's clueless young father was beside himself with 
anxiety (JM G), supported me in my decision, since anxiety is a term that both denotes an emotional state 
and an emotional disorder, which require clinical treatment (see, e.g., House & Hosker 2013) 
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 Kövecses (1990) discusses HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY, 
like in buy happiness, which focuses on our understanding of HAPPINESS as 
something “that does not arise within the self, but comes from a source external to 
the self” (38). In general, this is also a valid reading for HAPPINESS IS A 
VALUABLE COMMODITY examples in the present study.  
 
HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (generic level) 
(182) […] Singapore, bereft of even limited natural resources, lately shorn of its 
hinterland, and now finding itself in a hostile ‘Malay sea’, could little afford such 
fripperies as human dignity and joy (SG G) 
 
HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING BOUGHT 
(183) Money can buy you happiness - it's just that this happiness won't be as great 
as you expect […] (SG B) 
 
HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING SOLD 
(184) […] we should not sell our happiness for material things (NG G) 
 
HAPPINESS IS A CURRENCY / INCOME 
(185) […] the universe has no choice but to start deducting from your happiness 
credit. (KE G) 
 
 With a total of 16 overall instances of VALUABLE COMMODITY, which 
is just 2.1% of the HAPPINESS data, this mapping is verifiably rare. However, 
looking at its distribution across the varieties, it is noteworthy that 9 of these 16 
instances were found in SG, which make up 6% of its metaphor profile, as opposed 
to 0.7% in GB and NG, 1.3% in IN, and 2% in KE. Moreover, 7 of the 9 tokens of 
HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY in SG are captured under the 
specific level of A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING BOUGHT, solely 
reflected in the use of buy + happiness (which is incidentally never negated, as in 
the saying money can’t buy you happiness).   
 Finally, the miscellaneous group of metaphors contributed little to the 
metaphorical content of the profiles of each variety. They constitute only 11.3% of 
the data in GB, 5.3% in NG, 10% in KE, and 6.77% in IN and SG. As a reminder, 
metaphors were considered miscellaneous when they either contributed less than 
five instances in a single variety (e.g., PHYSICAL BURDEN, PURE 
Case Study: HAPPINESS 275 
SUBSTANCE, REWARD, etc.) or were metaphorical hapax legomena (e.g., 
BREATH, CALLING CARD, FRAGILE THING, etc.) As in the previous case 
studies on ANGER and FEAR, these metaphors appear to be less conventional and 
are infrequent, making them likely candidates for innovative or creative metaphors, 
but consequentially not suitable candidates for comparison. The following 
illustrates an example of each source domain that occurred less than five times in a 
single variety.  
 
(186) Anything to drown or swoon out that ghastly punk noise, and you can’t even 
hear the words, is a man or a woman, I turn into my parents with great, society-
crushing joy. (GB B)  HAPPINESS IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN 
(187) In fact it creates an integrated individual in you and only in that integration 
do flowers of bliss blossom, bloom; you start growing. (IN G)  HAPPINESS IS 
A PLANT (here FLOWERS)113 
(188) […] nightmares of their offspring writing in unadulterated joy the taboo 
words “Like that lor!” in response to comprehension questions, keeping them 
awake at night. (SG B)  HAPPINESS IS A PURE SUBSTANCE114  
(189) Your body will thank you by rewarding you with energy and happiness. (SG 
G)  HAPPINESS IS A REWARD 
(190) It is the brilliance of the wedding gown which the church wears that will emit 
the fragrance of gladness during the wedding of the Lamb. (KE G)  HAPPINESS 
IS A SCENT 
(191) May he see many seasons of joy, good health and victories. (NG G)  
HAPPINESS IS A SEASON 
(192) They were not crazy people. It was the bursting experience of a supernatural 
delight that entered them.(IN G)  HAPPINESS IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING  
(193) […] the lights went up there was a rich air of peace and joy throughout the 
huge auditorium of the Rainbow Theatre. (GB B)  HAPPINESS IS AIR 
(194) […] women whose entire happiness is built on marriage and children. (KE 
B)  HAPPINESS IS BUILDING-RELATED 
(195) The boys celebrated the victory but the elation was tempered with the fact 
that a bonus point was not registered. (GB G)  HAPPINESS IS STEEL BEING 
TEMPERED 
 
Note that SUPERNATURAL BEING only occurs in the New Englishes, namely 
one instance each in KE and IN. Unlike ANGER and FEAR, the conceptualization 
of HAPPINESS as a SUPERNATURAL BEING has positive connotations. In 
_________________ 
113  Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) ORGANISM (fruit of joy) 
114  Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE (pure joy) 
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(192) above, HAPPINESS is understood in a mixed metaphor with bursting (i.e., 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER) as a pleasant experience (and, incidentally, used to 
debunk the notion that the people experiencing it are crazy). The instance occurring 
in the KE data makes the positive connotation even clearer by associating 
HAPPINESS with mythical creatures that children believe to bring good things: 
sustaining the happiness fairies when we finally have them in our arms (KE G).  
 The following examples demonstrate the 20 metaphorical hapax legomena in 
the data, and, as such, can be viewed as highly creative.  
 
(196) Stevie's beautiful improvisation around a melody can convey pretty much any 
emotion, but joy is his calling card. (GB B)  HAPPINESS IS A CALLING 
CARD 
(197) It happened around the same time as the ACS clock-tower revival but it 
developed differently: it became a church. It was a  revival of tears, love and joy: 
one where the deep moving of the Spirit resulted in hundreds turning to Christ and 
being baptized, filled with the Spirit and having their lives transformed. (SG B)  
HAPPINESS IS A CHURCH REVIVAL 
(198) You will need to be able to deal with the cocktail of surprise, happiness and 
mild uncertainty. (SG B)  HAPPINESS IS A COCKTAIL (= MIXED 
SUBSTANCE)115 
(199) I think I probably shattered any post-set elation by taking them back to when 
things were less glamorous […] (GB G)  HAPPINESS IS A FRAGILE THING116 
(200) Christ’s ministry was simple, to stop the suffering, to establish His kingdom 
of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. (KE B)  HAPPINESS IS A 
KINGDOM 
(201) So skilfully is the young pretender, David Cameron, pressing buttons on 
wellbeing, quality of life and happiness that charges of superficiality and empty 
trendiness are coming thick and fast. (GB G)  HAPPINESS IS A MACHINE 
(202) To pin your hope and joy on the response of any imperfect human being is at 
best a precarious move […] (SG G)  HAPPINESS IS A PIN 
(203) It is the kind of joy and pride that overshadows his every nano-achievement 
[…] (SG G)  HAPPINESS IS A SHADOW BEING CAST 
(204) The players were singing songs of joy as they were travelling back […] (KE 
B)  HAPPINESS IS A SONG117 
(205) […] the survival of the Nigerian dream, which shall be measured by her 
people's and outsiders' happiness. (NG G)  HAPPINESS IS A TOOL FOR 
MEASURING 
_________________ 
115  Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE (mixture of EMOTION and joy) 
116  Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) DESTROYABLE OBJECT (X break Y’s joy) 
117  Relatable to Kövecses' (2011b) metonymy detailing an expressive response (sing with joy) 
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(206) The moment you know Brahman, the whole Universe of Bliss enters into you 
and simultaneously you enjoy the whole universe; saha brahmana vipashchita. (IN 
G)  HAPPINESS IS A UNIVERSE 
(207) Prayer, Happiness and ur huge smile is your only weapon. (NG B)  
HAPPINESS IS A WEAPON 
(208) She never got unnoticed when she walked into a room; she had a way of 
throwing in some happiness and made everyone laugh with her jokes. (NG G)  
HAPPINESS IS AN OBJECT TO THROW 
(209) Most of us have hopefully felt the unmoored elation of staying up all night 
talking with a friend or a lover. (GB G)  HAPPINESS IS AN UNMOORED 
BOAT 
(210) If we really feel that inner joy is the breath of our life, if we feel that we 
cannot exist without joy and we will die at this very moment if we do not have it 
[…] (IN G)  HAPPINESS IS BREATH 
(211) […] few Christians today ever come close to living that abandoned life of 
joy, generosity and radical other-centeredness that made the first church so 
attractive to the city of Jerusalem. (KE B)  HAPPINESS IS LIFE 
(212) There will be a great commotion of joy: “The king has come to my house!” 
(IN G)  HAPPINESS IS NOISE 
(213) So does happiness need to be built-in to the fabric of an office place? (GB 
G)  HAPPINESS IS PART OF A FABRIC 
(214) […] for those whose families live at a distance this elation can be tinged with 
sadness as most grandparents desperately want to be involved in their 
grandchildren's lives. (GB G)  HAPPINESS IS SOMETHING COLORED 
(215) And on Tuesday, happiness was written all over the face of the former Law 
Society of Kenya chairman as he reflected […]. (KE G)  HAPPINESS IS 
WRITING ON THE FACE 
 
 On a final note, similar to the FEAR data, HAPPINESS has almost double 
the amount of miscellaneous metaphor data (60 tokens or 8% of the total data) in 
comparison to ANGER (34 tokens or 4.5%). This could be indicative of 
HAPPINESS being an emotion that lends itself more easily to innovative 
metaphorization in comparison to ANGER, which saw the varieties sharing in five 
frequent source domains. This is also part of the explanation for why the rankings 
for HAPPINESS demonstrated only a preferred standing for two source domains, 
namely POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY,   
 This concludes the survey of HAPPINESS metaphors across the varieties. In 
the following section, the results will be discussed on the basis of the dimensions 
of metaphor variation, which will also be contextualized in terms of the notions of 
universality and variation.  
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7.4 Discussion  
This section discusses the results of the HAPPINESS case study according to 
Kövecses’ (2005) types of metaphor variation (i.e., congruent metaphors, range of 
the target and preferential conceptualizations), in order to sum up what has been 
shared by the varieties and what has not been shared. In addition, this section will 
offer a preliminary conclusion on universality (in the sense of having physical 
bodies) and variation (in the sense of cultural specificity) regarding the 
conceptualizations of HAPPINESS. 
 Firstly, in terms of the range of target (= metaphors using different source 
domains for the same target domain), which can be gleaned from the individual 
variety-specific metaphor profiles of HAPPINESS in Table 7.2. (see Section 7.2), 
the varieties shared the same source domains, with one small exception. NG had no 
attested instances of HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS, although it should be noted 
that ILLNESS was considered a minor metaphor and did not contribute to the data 
extensively overall. Regarding the ranking of the most prominent source domains, 
the varieties were similar in that they had either PART OF A JOURNEY or 
POSSESSION listed in either the first or second rank. These two source domains 
were the most prominent for HAPPINESS across all varieties. Therefore, the New 
Englishes and British English are comparable regarding the range of target and do 
not display any major variation.   
 Kövecses (2005) also postulates metaphor variation along the lines of 
congruent metaphors, which have a generic schema that can be filled out by 
culturally specific content. At the specific-level analysis of HAPPINESS, where I 
assumed congruent metaphors would arise, there was no major indications that this 
in fact was the case on a large scale. As in the previous case studies, we can only 
point to anecdotal evidence that would have to be confirmed in further research 
endeavors. For instance, consider (216), which was one of two instances of 
HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (ENERGY IN A (BODY) 
CONTAINER) found only in GB.  
 
(216) “The chamber,” wrote Alistair Cooke, our correspondent, “was crackling with 
currents of elation and despair.” (GB B) 
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The image being evoked here is one of electricity, which is understood by a folk 
model of ENERGY AS (FLOWING) FLUID. While it only occurred in the GB 
data, the previous case study findings speak against this being a congruent 
metaphor, since the other emotions, ANGER and FEAR, were conceptualized as 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER in all varieties. 
 Another anecdotal piece of evidence for a congruent metaphor could be found 
in what seemed a novel extension of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT, since it occurred only 
once in IN. It is repeated here in (217).  
 
(217) Let the Lamp of Wealth, Health and Happiness be Lit for You and fill You 
with Joy and Cheer […] (IN B) 
 
There could be particular cultural significance to HAPPINESS as a LAMP that is 
not immediately assessable to me as an analyst who does not speak Indian English 
as a native language. Therefore, more data is needed to determine if examples like 
(216) and (217) are indeed congruent metaphors and not just novel extensions of an 
established mapping on the part of the individual speakers.  
 The same could be valid for the minor source domain FOOD / DRINK, which 
could conceivably be more inclined to cultural specification. Although, like in the 
ANGER case study, it was slightly more common in GB, there was at least one 
instance found in each of the New Englishes. Furthermore, examples, like (218) 
and (219), although perhaps novel extensions, could be considered cultural to a 
certain degree, considering (218) makes use of a food item that is a common snack 
in Great Britain, while (219) is an extension of the imagery used in the Bible and, 
thus, common in Christian societies.  
 
(218) So you eat more, and more…secretly looking for chocolate to relieve the 
boredom, to have your treat, you deserve a reward (what did you do, save a life or 
just wash the dishes?), looking for it to give you that slice of happiness you crave 
under the wrapper. (GB G)  
(219) […] they become the sort of people who don't take offence at certain things, 
who are concerned about other things more, who display the fruits of the spirit. The 
love, the joy, the gentleness, the peace and so on. (GB B) 
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However, FOOD / DRINK was considered a minor metaphor. Yet, again we are 
forced to accept that more data is needed to determine its cultural salience. 
Furthermore, a viable assumption for these infrequent metaphors is that it is their 
infrequency that necessitates creativity, which would lend itself more readily to 
cultural influences as a motivational basis.  
 Kövecses’ (2005) preferential conceptualizations (= metaphors that are 
shared, but some are preferred over others) made up the bulk of the specific-level 
analysis. It was assumed that the breakdown of the broad source domains would aid 
in uncovering what mappings are, in fact, preferred by the varieties, especially since 
it was already previously established that they behave similarly concerning the 
range of the target. However, no major preferences were found in the varieties, 
leading to the conclusion that they, on the whole, share conceptualizations.  
 For example, it was determined that POSSESSION and PART OF A 
JOURNEY were the largest contributors of HAPPINESS metaphorical data across 
the varieties. On the basis of absolute frequencies it first appeared that the New 
Englishes prefer the specific level TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP within 
POSSESSION, but the distribution was not significant. For PART OF A 
JOURNEY, all varieties had A SEARCH as the most widely used source domain 
in their respective metaphor profiles, with DESTINATION coming in as a close 
second in all varieties. Therefore, we cannot speak of differences along the lines of 
preferred conceptualizations. This was also true of FLUID and PERSON, in which 
there was no obvious grouping around a specific level, and LIGHT, in which 
LIGHT FROM WITHIN seemed like a preference in the New Englishes, although 
it did show up multiple times in GB. Finally, in UP, although the smallest of the 
source domains considered under the label of “major” metaphors, all varieties made 
use of the specific level JUMPING most frequently.  
 The minor metaphors discussed for the New Englishes and British English 
also suffered from the problem of low numbers, so that further statistical analysis 
was not possible and thus the status of preferential conceptualizations here is 
questionable. On the basis of absolute frequencies, however, there were slight 
indications that a preference could be found if more data was available. This 
included a slight preference for IN to use WATER in NATURAL FORCE, GB to 
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use FOOD / DRINK more frequently overall and SG to use VALUABLE 
COMMODITY (especially on the specific level of A VALUABLE COMMODITY 
BEING BOUGHT).  
 Therefore, on the whole, HAPPINESS seems to be conceptualized in a similar 
manner overall in New Englishes and British English. In terms of the motivational 
bases for the meaning foci discussed in the specific-level breakdowns, HAPPINESS 
demonstrated the same result as ANGER and FEAR. That is, the metaphors were 
largely discussed in terms of their relationship to our bodily experience. For 
example, LIGHT and UP have an obvious bodily basis, which is illustrated in 
repeated examples below.  
 
(220) But recently, whenever we young dads have lunch together, we no longer 
bring up the joy of parenthood that lit up our lives when our children were cute 
babies and toddlers. (SG G) 
(221) Ruth jumped with joy and laid flat on the stage after she was announced the 
winner. (KE B) 
 
The correlation of LIGHT and HAPPINESS as in (220) goes back to the 
interactional properties we experience with our physical bodies. We feel light and 
the warmth it brings on our skin and we can see in a lighted area and that makes us 
feel safe. Both feelings can be thought of as pleasant and, thus, are not that far from 
evoking a feeling of happiness. In (221) the spatial orientation of HAPPINESS as 
UP is also clear and made possible by having the types of bodies that we have, as 
well as connects to the things we do with those bodies when we feel happy, i.e. 
jumping up and down.  
 This prevalent motivational basis for metaphors was not unexpected and, in 
fact, assumed that it would show up to some degree. However, what was striking 
was how little could be said for the motivational basis on cultural terms, considering 
the unique socio-cultural and regional circumstances of the varieties under 
investigation. Therefore, the preliminary conclusion for the case of HAPPINESS is 
that, across the Englishes, it is the body-rooted sense of embodiment that seems to 
be the more likely motivation.  
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 This concludes the case study of HAPPINESS, which is the final one in the 
present study that will end in the following chapter with a brief overall conclusion, 
as well as an outlook for further research.  
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8 Conclusion and Outlook  
The present study was devoted to exploring the conceptualization of the emotions 
ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS in the New Englishes and their (former) norm-
providing variety, British English. Chapter 1 positioned the present study in the 
tradition of CMT. It also highlighted central tenets from CMT (i.e., systematicity, 
pervasiveness and embodiment) that were crucial to approaching a cross-variety 
study of emotion metaphors. These tenets set up basic expectations for the empirical 
part of this study. 1) By assuming the systematic and pervasive nature of conceptual 
metaphors, linguistic metaphors can be examined in usage-based data (like corpora) 
and used as evidence to further our understanding of the conceptual structure of 
emotions that exist for speakers of a pluricentric language. 2) By assuming that the 
grounding of metaphors is in bodily and sociocultural experience, emotion 
metaphors in Englishes around the world will (by virtue of their unique socio-
cultural and regional settings) display both bases of motivation in their 
conceptualizations of emotion concepts (i.e., in the metaphors they use to talk about 
the emotions).  
 Chapter 2 delved deeper into this last assumption by discussing an extended 
view of embodiment to more clearly account for culture that could either be 
understood as an oppositional force that has to be reconciled with the strong view 
of embodiment (in the sensorimotor sense) or, alternatively, as functioning as a 
cultural filter for bodily experiences that shape cognition. This was applied to a 
discussion of the universal and culture-specific properties of emotion metaphors, 
which also outlined types of metaphor variation (specifically, congruent metaphors, 
range of target and preferential conceptualizations) that were introduced in 
Kövecses’ (2005) “embodied cultural prototype” approach. It was these types that 
were deemed most likely to occur in the data of the present study and were, thus, 
the focus for contextualizing the results. Furthermore, Chapter 2 discussed the 
suitability of the New Englishes as a testing ground for this approach and, in doing 
so, briefly reviewed newly emerging cognitively-oriented paradigms like Cognitive 
Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics, which offer valuable insight into the 
study of a cognitive phenomenon like conceptual metaphor in a single language 
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with diverse cultures. This section also highlighted the heightened academic interest 
in New English metaphor that has as an overall aim the uncovering of what is shared 
and what is not shared in terms of the metaphors of these varieties. The present 
study directly contributes to this growing body of work by filling a research gap in 
larger-scale studies that take into account not only a (former) norm-providing 
variety but also representatives from four supraregional areas. Furthermore, it 
promotes the visibility of a target domain in metaphors (i.e., EMOTIONS). While 
EMOTIONS are, on the whole, well researched, they are yet underrepresented in 
studies that compare multiple varieties of New Englishes simultaneously.  
 Chapter 4 outlined a transparent and detailed methodology used to extract and 
analyze metaphor data from a large-scale corpus, which included established 
procedures for metaphor extraction and identification, MPA and MIPVU, 
respectively. It not only introduced so-called “intuition-boosters” (e.g., 
collocational analysis) to aid the analyst in making decisions that were unavoidably 
more of an intuitive nature, but it also developed a level system to gain deeper 
insight into the granularity of the metaphors, once they were determined to be of 
the conceptual kind. This methodology was employed consistently throughout the 
case studies on ANGER (Chapter 5), FEAR (Chapter 6) and HAPPINESS (Chapter 
7). It also helped to reveal previously unattested metaphors for each emotion 
concept. For ANGER, these included the specific-levels of ANGER IS A PERSON 
(i.e., ACCOMPLICE, COMPANION, HELPER, PARENT, PERSON IN 
POLITICS, PERSON WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK, PERSON WITH AN 
ILLNESS / DYING), as well as PUNISHMENT, FOOD / DRINK and a more 
complex conceptual structure surrounding ANGER IS A WEAPON. For FEAR, 
the specific-level breakdown of FEAR IS A PERSON also uncovered the source 
domains ACCOMPLICE, HELPER, PARENT, PERSON WITH ABILITY TO 
SPEAK and PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS / DYING along with GUIDE. Further 
previously unattested metaphors for FEAR included FEAR IS RELATED TO A 
BUILDING / STRUCTURE, FEAR IS A POSSESSION, FEAR IS A DEEP 
PLACE, as well as more conceptual complexity for FEAR IS A WEAPON. For 
HAPPINESS, along with FOOD / DRINK, the specific-levels of HAPPINESS IS 
A PERSON revealed COMPANION, PERSON IN POLITICS, PERSON 
SHOUTING and PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS. Furthermore, the methodology 
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also brought forth various miscellaneous metaphors, of which many were 
innovative (e.g., ANGER IS COMPOST, FEAR IS A SHIP, HAPPINESS IS 
BREATH).  
 The hypothesis going into the case studies was that the emotion metaphors 
would, on the one hand, demonstrate variation on the basis of the socio-cultural 
distinctions between the varieties. On the other, they would also demonstrate 
commonalities by virtue of English having a common core and its speakers 
(naturally) sharing the same basic biological makeup. To repeat something I stated 
in Section 3.3, “although we can expect to find great similarities in a cross-cultural 
study of metaphorical conceptualizations of emotion reflected in the many varieties 
of English, we can also readily expect to find differences in the way emotions are 
conceptualized, owing to each variety’s unique socio-cultural circumstances.” As 
the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS illustrate, this expectation was 
not fully met. For all three emotion concepts, little difference between the varieties 
was visible in their emotion metaphors, which were largely of the conventional 
type. Even when a preference (like ANGER IS AN OPPONENT for IN and the 
African Englishes) came to light, it is not entirely certain that this preference would 
not become negligible with more data, especially considering this mapping was 
attested to in the remaining varieties, i.e., GB and SG. Furthermore, there were no 
conceptualizations that were completely unique to a single variety or even a single 
supraregional area, like East Africa, West Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, 
which would have been stronger evidence for culture-specific metaphors or 
preferences. Therefore, the original hypothesis was not confirmed and the overall 
conclusion of the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS is that no major 
differences exist between the varieties in terms of their emotion metaphors.  
 Additionally, preliminary conclusions in the case studies about the universal 
vs. cultural qualities of the metaphors were in accord. The emotions, at least in this 
study, are more grounded in bodily experience. That is, for the particular data at 
hand there were no obvious clues that the emotions were undergoing a cultural 
filtration or being extended via conceptual content specific to the cultures of the 
varieties. Nevertheless, this is where I see the most potential for future research, 
since the scope of this study was limited and a few caveats must be conceded.  
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 First of all, the nature of the data, originating from the GloWbE corpus, only 
provided a snapshot of the language of emotion metaphors. This means that the text 
types were not as diversified as in other corpora (like ICE) and text type could play 
a role in what metaphor is used, although this was not explored in the current study. 
In a related sense, web-based English could potentially cause (albeit unconsciously) 
people to speak and write in a less regionally specific way, considering the potential 
of reaching a global audience by publishing something on the Internet. Secondly, 
the issue of authorship in the GloWbE was problematic, resulting in the forced 
verification of each author in long Internet searches, which then yielded only those 
members of the language communities that had enough web presence. This 
undoubtedly skewed the data towards prominent members (like public figures, 
journalists, etc.), although there is a selection of private citizens, especially those 
who put their biographies in the format of a blog or identified themselves as living 
in a certain country via their social media accounts. Be that as it may, it was not 
possible to control the data for a representative cross-section of the respective 
populations – a consequence of having to rely on a corpus like the GloWbE. 
However, this can be remedied in future research by employing more qualitative 
methods like interviews, surveys and the like. Finally, I restricted the target domains 
under investigation to ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. This, too, presented only 
a limited scope in terms of the emotion concepts. Other emotion concepts (like 
SADNESS, PRIDE, SHAME, etc.) need to be explored for the New Englishes, 
which could reveal very different results.   
 As the results in this study indicate, there is no strong evidence for the 
varieties behaving significantly different for the conceptualizations of ANGER, 
FEAR and HAPPINESS. The New Englishes neither stand out as a group from 
British English, a traditionally norm-providing variety, in terms of source domain 
preference, nor do they display major cultural differences among themselves. 
Overall, the conclusion is that emotion metaphors are largely the same for these 
particular target domains and these particular varieties. One could speculate on, for 
example, the universal characteristics of embodied cognition pertaining to emotion, 
the erosion of cross-cultural differences due to globalization (Boers 2003: 236), and 
so on. This would certainly merit more extensive investigation for cognitive 
phenomena like metaphors. With this study, I do not intend to discount the many 
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findings that illustrate conceptual differences between varieties or even between 
different languages. I do, however, intend to further question the extensiveness of 
these differences in the metaphorical systems for emotion concepts, since it is yet 
unclear how pervasive these differences may be in shaping said systems. For 
instance, in the respective discussion sections of the case studies, I formulated the 
assumption that the less frequent a metaphor is, the more creative it tends to be, 
which, in turn, apparently invites culture-specific content and experiences as a more 
readily available motivational basis. An indication of the validity of this assumption 
can be seen in the findings pertaining to the normalized frequencies, which revealed 
that FOOD / DRINK was preferred by GB in ANGER and HAPPINESS, while NG 
preferred SUPERNATURAL BEING in both ANGER and FEAR. Considering that 
these variety-specific preferences showed up for more than one emotion concept, it 
is worth further exploring to what extent the unique cultural contexts of these 
varieties plays a role.  
 Therefore, the extent of conceptual difference in the varieties’ metaphorical 
systems for emotion concepts is an important point to be further considered, 
especially since the domain of emotions is so pivotal in human experience. It is still 
reasonable to expect some variation considering the interplay of body and culture 
that can influence construal of emotion concepts and, thus, impact the way they are 
talked about. However, in order to understand how extensively this occurs in the 
shaping of the complex metaphorical systems from speakers of the same language, 
with varieties emerging in different cultures, it is imperative to conduct more 
research in the future. Thus, I encourage further work to expand the picture of 
emotion language and metaphor in Englishes worldwide.
References 288 
 
References 
Ahrens, Kathleen. 2011. Examining conceptual metaphor models through lexical 
frequency patterns: A case study of U.S. presidential speeches. In Sandra Handl 
& Hans-Jörg Schmid (eds.), Windows to the Mind: Metaphor, Metonymy and 
Conceptual Blending (Cognitive Linguistics Research 48), 167–184. Berlin, 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Ansah, Gladys N. 2011. The Cultural Basis of Conceptual Metaphors: The Case 
of Emotions in Akan and English. In Kathrin Kaufhold, Sharon McCulloch & 
Ana Tominc (eds.), Papers from the Lancaster University Postgraduate 
Conference in Linguistics and Language Teaching Volume 5: Papers from 
LAEL-PG 2010, 2–25. 
Ansah, Gladys N. 2014a. Cognitive models of anger in Akan: A conceptual 
metaphor analysis. Cognitive Linguistic Studies 1(1). 131–146. 
Ansah, Gladys N. 2014b. Culture in Embodied Cognition: 
Metaphorical/Metonymic Conceptualizations of FEAR in Akan and English. 
Metaphor and Symbol 29. 44–58. 
Apresjan, Valentina. 1997. Emotion Metaphors and Cross-Linguistic 
Conceptualization of Emotions. Cuadernos de Filologia Inglesa 612. 179–195. 
Arppe, Antti, Gaëtanelle Gilquin, Dylan Glynn, Martin Hilbert & Arne Zeschel. 
2010. Cognitive Corpus Linguistics: five points of debate on current theory and 
methodology. Corpora 5(1). 1–27. 
Athanasopoulous, Panos, Steven Samuel & Emanuel Bylund. 2017. The 
psychological reality of spatio-temporal metaphors. In A. Athanasopoulous 
(ed.), Studies in Figurative Thought and Language, 295–321. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Baider, Fabienne & Georgeta Cislaru (eds.). 2014. Linguistic Approaches to 
Emotions in Context. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Barcelona, Antonio & Javier Valenzuela. 2011. An overview of cognitive 
linguistics. In Mario Brdar, Stefan T. Gries & Milena Žic Fuchs (eds.), 
References 289 
Cognitive Linguistics: Convergence and Expansion, 17–44. Amsterdam, 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Barret, Lisa F., Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross. 2007. On the automaticity of 
emotion. In John A. Bargh (ed.), Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The 
Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes (Frontiers of Social Psychology), 
173-217. New York: Psychology Press. 
Bednarek, Monika. 2009. Emotion talk and emotional talk: Cognitive and 
discursive perspectives. In Hanna Pishwa (ed.), Language and Social 
Cognition: Expression of the Social Mind, 395–431. Berlin, New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter. 
Beger, Anke. 2011. Differences in the use of emotion metaphors in expert-lay 
communication: Converging evidence from two complementary studies. In 
Doris Schönefeld (ed.), Converging Evidence: Methodological and theoretical 
issues for linguistic research (Human Cognitive Processing 33), 321–347. 
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Beger, Anke & Olaf Jäkel. 2009. ANGER, LOVE and SADNESS revisited: 
Differences in Emotion Metaphors between Experts and Laypersons in the 
Genre Psychology Guides. metaphorik.de 16. 87–108. 
Berber Sardinha, Tony. 2007. Metaphor in corpora: a corpus-driven analysis of 
Applied Linguistics dissertations. Rev. Brasileira de Linguística Aplicada 7(1). 
11–35. 
Berber Sardinha, Tony. 2008. Metaphor probabilities in corpora. In Mara S. 
Zanotto, Lynne Cameron & Marilda C. Cavalcanti (eds.), Confronting 
Metaphor in Use: An applied linguistic approach (Pragmatics & Beyond New 
Series 173), 127–147. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Berber Sardinha, Tony. 2010. A Program for Finding Metaphor Candidates in 
Corpora. ESPecialist 31(1). 49–67. 
Berber Sardinha, Tony. 2011. Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics. Rev. Brasileira 
de Linguística Aplicada 11(2). 329–360. 
Berber Sardinha, Tony. 2012. An assessment of metaphor retrieval methods. In 
Fiona MacArthur, José L. Oncins-Martínez, Manuel Sánchez-García & Ana M. 
Piquer-Píriz (eds.), Metaphor in Use: Context, culture, and communication 
References 290 
(Human Cognitive Processing 38), 21–50. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Boers, Frank. 2003. Applied linguistics perspectives on cross-cultural variation in 
conceptual metaphor. Metaphor and Symbol 18. 231–238. 
Boers, Frank & Jeannette Littlemore. 2003. Cross-cultural differences in 
conceptual metaphor: Applied linguistics perspectives. Mahwah, N.J: L. 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Bolton, Kingsley. 2009. World Englishes Today. In Braj B. Kachru, Yamuna 
Kachru & Cecil L. Nelson (eds.), The Handbook of World Englishes (Blackwell 
Handbooks in Linguistics), 240–269. Malden, MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub. 
Bond, Michael H., Vladimir Žegarac & Helen Spencer-Oately. 2000. Culture as 
an Explanatory Variable: Problems and Possibilities. In Helen Spencer-Oately 
(ed.), Culturally Speaking: Managing Rapport Through Talk Across Cultures, 
47–71. London, New York: Continuum. 
Boroditsky, Lera. 2000. Metaphoric structuring: understanding time through 
spatial metaphors. Cognition 75. 1–28. 
Boroditsky, Lera. 2001. Does language shape thought? English and Mandarin 
speakers' conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology 43(1). 1–22. 
Boroditsky, Lera & Michael Ramscar. 2002. The Roles of Body and Mind in 
Abstract Thought. Psychological Science 13. 185–188. 
Bowdle, Brian F. & Dedre Gentner. 2005. The Career of Metaphor. Psychological 
Review 112(1). 193–216. 
Braisby, Nick & Bradley Franks. 1997. What Does Word Use Tell Us about 
Conceptual Content? Psychology of Language and Communication 1(2). 
Callies, Marcus. 2011. Widening the goalposts of cognitive metaphor research. In 
Marcus Callies, Wolfram R. Keller & Astrid Lohöfer (eds.), Bi-directionality in 
the cognitive sciences: Avenues, challenges, and limitations (Human Cognitive 
Processing 30), 57–81. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Callies, Marcus. 2017. 'Idioms in the making' and variation in conceptual 
metaphor. Cognitive Linguistic Studies 4(1). 63–81. 
Callies, Marcus & Alexander Onysko. 2017. Metaphor variation in Englishes 
around the world. Cognitive Linguistic Studies 4(1). 1–6. 
References 291 
Cameron, Lynne & Alice Deignan. 2003. Combining Large and Small Corpora to 
Investigate Tuning Devices around Metaphor in Spoken Discourse. Metaphor 
and Symbol 18(3). 149–160. 
Casasanto, Daniel. 2009. When is a linguistic metaphor a conceptual metaphor? In 
Vyvyan Evans & Stéphanie Pourcel (eds.), New Directions in Cognitive 
Linguistics (Human Cognitive Processing 24), 127–145. Amsterdam, 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Casasanto, Daniel & Lera Boroditsky. 2008. Time in the mind: Using space to 
think about time. Cognition 106. 579–593. 
Charteris-Black, Jonathan. 2003. Speaking with a forked tongue: A comparative 
study of metaphor and metonymy in English and Malay phraseology. Metaphor 
and Symbol 18. 289–310. 
Charteris-Black, Jonathan. 2004. Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor 
Analysis. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chen, Peilei. 2010. A Cognitive Study of “Anger” Metaphors in English and 
Chinese Idioms. Asian Social Science 6(8). 73–76. 
Constantinou, Maria. 2014. Conceptual metaphors of anger in popularized 
scientific texts: A contrastive (English/Greek/French) cognitive-discursive 
appraoch. In Fabienne Baider & Georgeta Cislaru (eds.), Linguistic Approaches 
to Emotions in Context, 159–188. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Croft, W. & D. A. Cruse. 2004. Cognitive Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Csatár, Péter. 2014. Data Structure in Cognitive Metaphor Research 
(Metalinguistica 26). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
Davies, Mark. 2013. Corpus of Global Web-Based English: 1.9 billion words 
from speakers in 20 countries. Available at: http://corpus.byu.edu/glowbe/. 
Davies, Mark & Robert Fuchs. 2015. Expanding horizons in the study of World 
Englishes with the 1.9 billion word Global Web-based English Corpus 
(GloWbE). English World-Wide 36(1). 1–28. 
Deignan, Alice. 1998. A Corpus-Based Study of Some Linguistic Features of 
Metaphor. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of Birmingham. 
References 292 
Deignan, Alice. 1999. Corpus-based research into metaphor. In Lynne Cameron & 
Graham Low (eds.), Researching and Applying Metaphor, 177. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Deignan, Alice. 2003. Metaphorical Expressions and Culture: An Indirect Link. 
Metaphor and Symbol 18(4). 255–271. 
Deignan, Alice. 2005. Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics (Converging Evidence in 
Language and Communication Research 6). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Deignan, Alice. 2006. The grammar of linguistic metaphors. In Anatol 
Stefanowitsch & Stefan T. Gries (eds.), Corpus-Based Approaches to Metaphor 
and Metonymy (Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 171), 106–122. 
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Deignan, Alice. 2007. Linguistic and Figurative Patterns in Natural Language 
Data. Ilha do Desterro 53. 95–107. 
Deignan, Alice. 2008a. Corpus linguistic data and conceptual metaphor theory. In 
Mara S. Zanotto, Lynne Cameron & Marilda C. Cavalcanti (eds.), Confronting 
Metaphor in Use: An applied linguistic approach (Pragmatics & Beyond New 
Series 173), 149. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Deignan, Alice. 2008b. Corpus Linguistics and Metaphor. In Raymond W. Gibbs 
(ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 280–294. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Deignan, Alice. 2009. Searching for Metaphorical Patterns in Corpora. In Paul 
Baker (ed.), Contemporary Corpus Linguistics, 9–31. London, New York: 
Continuum. 
Deignan, Alice, D. Gabrys & A. Solska. 1997. Teaching English metaphors using 
cross-linguistic awareness-raising activities. ELT Journal 51(4). 352–360. 
Díaz-Vera, Javier E. 2015. Love in the time of corpora. Preferential 
conceptualizations of love in world Englishes. In Vito Pirrelli, Claudia Marzi & 
Marcello Ferro (eds.), Word Structure and Word Usage. Proceedings of the 
NetWordS Final Conference, Pisa, March 30-April 1, 2015. 
References 293 
Dirven, René. 2002. Introduction. In René Dirven & Ralf Pörings (eds.), 
Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, 1–38. Berlin, New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Dirven, René, Hans-Georg Wolf & Frank Polzenhagen. 2007. Cognitive 
Linguistics and Cultural Studies. In Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, 1203–1221. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dorst, Aletta G. 2011. Personification in discourse: Linguistic forms, conceptual 
structures and communicative functions. Language and Literature 20(2). 113–
135. 
Drewer, Petra. 2003. Die kognitive Metapher als Werkzeug des Denkens: Zur 
Rolle der Analogie bei der Gewinnung und Vermittlung wissenschaftlicher 
Erkenntnisse. Tübingen: Narr. 
Ebensgaard Jensen, Kim. 2017. Corpora and Cultural Cognition: How Corpus-
Linguistic Methodology Can Contribute to Cultural Linguistics. In Farzad 
Sharifian (ed.), Advances in Cultural Linguistics, 477–505. Singapore: Springer 
Nature. 
Ekman, Paul. 1992. Are there Basic Emotions? Psychological Review 99(3). 550–
553. 
Esenova, Orazgozel. 2011. Metaphorical Conceptualisation of ANGER, FEAR 
and SADNESS in English. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Eötvös Loránd University, 
Faculty of Humanities, Budapest. 
Evans, Vyvyan, Benjamin K. Bergen & Jörg Zinken. 2007. The cognitive 
linguistics enterprise: an overview. In Vyvyan Evans, Benjamin K. Bergen & 
Jörg Zinken (eds.), The Cognitive Linguistics Reader (Advances in Cognitive 
Linguistics), 2–39. London, Oakville: Equinox. 
Evans, Vyvyan & Melanie Green. 2006. Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Fauconnier, Gilles & Mark Turner. 1998. Conceptual Integration Networks. 
Cognitive Science 22(2). 133–187. 
Fauconnier, Gilles & Mark Turner. 1999. Metonymy and Conceptual Integration. 
In Klaus-Uwe Panther & Günter Radden (eds.), Metonymy in Language and 
References 294 
Thought (Human Cognitive Processing 4), 77–90. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Fauconnier, Gilles & Mark Turner. 2002. The Way We Think: Conceptual 
Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books. 
Fauconnier, Gilles & Mark Turner. 2006. Conceptual integration networks. In 
Dirk Geeraerts (ed.), Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings, 303–371. Berlin, 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Fauconnier, Gilles & Mark Turner. 2008. Rethinking Metaphor. In Raymond W. 
Gibbs (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 53–66. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fernandez, James W. (ed.). 1991. Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of Tropes in 
Anthropology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Fillmore, Charles J. 1975. An alternative to checklist theories of meaning. 
Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. 
123–131. 
Fletcher, Garth J. O. 1995. Two uses of folk psychology: Implications for 
psychological science. Philosophical Psychology 8(3). 221–238. 
Folkersma, Petra. 2010. Emotionen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Körper und 
Kultur: Eine kognitiv-semantische Untersuchung von Aspekten der 
Motiviertheit körperbezogener phraseologischer Einheiten aus dem 
Denotatbereich „Emotion“ (Deutsche Sprache und Literatur 1993). Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang. 
Forceville, Ch & Eduardo Urios-Aparisi. 2009. Multimodal metaphor 
(Applications of cognitive linguistics 11). Berlin, New York: M. de Gruyter. 
Forceville, Charles. 2017. 10. Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor. In Nina-Maria 
Klug & Hartmut Stöckl (eds.), Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen Kontext 
(Handbücher Sprachwissen Band 7). Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Gandy, Lisa, Nadji Allan, Mark Atallah, Ophir Frieder, Newton Howard, 
Kanareykin, Sergey, Koppel, Mosche, Mark Last, Yair Neuman & Shlomo 
Argamon. 2013. Automatic identification of conceptual metaphors with limited 
knowledge. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and the Twenty-Fifth Innovative Applications of Artificial 
References 295 
Intelligence Conference, 11-18 July 2013, Bellevue, Washington, USA, 328–
334. Aalo Alto, Calif.: AAAI Press. 
Geeraerts, Dirk. 2003. Cultural models of linguistic standardization. In René 
Dirven, Roslyn Frank & Martin Pütz (eds.), Cognitive Models in Language and 
Thought: Ideology, Metaphors and Meanings, 25–68. Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Geeraerts, Dirk. 2006. A rough guide to Cognitive Linguistics. In Dirk Geeraerts 
(ed.), Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings, 1–28. Berlin, New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter. 
Geeraerts, Dirk. 2010. Theories of Lexical Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Geeraerts, Dirk & Hubert Cuyckens. 2007. Introducing Cognitive Linguistics. In 
Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive 
Linguistics, 3–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Geeraerts, Dirk & Stefan Grondelaers. 1995. Looking back at anger: Cultural 
traditions and metaphorical patterns. In John R. Taylor & Robert E. MacLaury 
(eds.), Language and the Construal of the World, 153–180. Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Geeraerts, Dirk, Gitte Kristiansen & Yves Piersman (eds.). 2010. Advances in 
Cognitive Sociolinguistics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Gelman, Susan A. & Christine H. Legare. 2011. Concepts and Folk Theories. 
Annual Review of Anthropology 40. 379–398. 
Gentner, Dedre. 2001. Spatial metaphors in temporal reasoning. In Meredith 
Gattis (ed.), Spatial Schemas and Abstract Thought, 203–222. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Gentner, Dedre & Donald R. Gentner. 1983. Flowing Waters or Teeming Crowds: 
Mental Models of Electricity. In Dedre Gentner & Albert L. Stevens (eds.), 
Mental Models, 99–129. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
Gevaert, Caroline. 2001. Anger in Old and Middle English: A 'Hot' Topic? 
Belgian Essays on Language and Literature. 89–101. 
Gevaert, Caroline. 2005. The Anger is Heat Question: Detecting Cultural 
Influence on the Conceptualization of Anger through Diachronic Corpus 
Analysis. In Nicole Delbecque, Johan van der Auwera & Dirk Geeraerts (eds.), 
References 296 
Perspectives on Variation: Sociolinguistic, Historical, Comparative, 195–208. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 1992. Categorization and metaphor understanding. 
Psychological Review 99(3). 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 1994. The poetics of mind: Figurative thought, language, 
and understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 1999. Taking Metaphor out of our Heads and Putting it into 
the Cultural World. In Raymond W. Gibbs & Gerard Steen (eds.), Metaphor in 
Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive 
Linguistics Conference Amsterdam, July 1997 (Amsterdam Studies in the 
Theory and History of Linguistic Science 175), 145–165. Amsterdam, 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2002. Metaphor: A multidisciplinary approach (Theoria et 
Historia Scientiarum 6,1). Toruń: Nicholas Copernicus Univ. Press. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2006. Embodiment and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2007. Why cognitive linguists should care more about 
empirical methods. In Vyvyan Evans, Benjamin K. Bergen & Jörg Zinken 
(eds.), The Cognitive Linguistics Reader (Advances in Cognitive Linguistics), 
40–56. London, Oakville: Equinox. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2008. Metaphor and Thought: The State of the Art. In 
Raymond W. Gibbs (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 
3–13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2009. Why Do Some People Dislike Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory? Cognitive Semiotics 5. 14–36. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2010. The wonderful, chaotic, creative, heroic, challenging 
world of Researching and Applying Metaphor. In Graham Low, Zazie Todd, 
Alice Deignan & Lynne Cameron (eds.), Researching and Applying Metaphor 
in the Real World, 1. Amsterdam, New York: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2011. Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Discourse 
Processes 48(8). 529–562. 
References 297 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2012. Metaphors, snowflakes, and termite nests: How nature 
creates such beautiful things. In Fiona MacArthur, José L. Oncins-Martínez, 
Manuel Sánchez-García & Ana M. Piquer-Píriz (eds.), Metaphor in Use: 
Context, culture, and communication (Human Cognitive Processing 38), 347–
371. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. 2017. Metaphor Wars: Conceptual Metaphors in Human 
Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. & Herbert L. Colston. 2006. The cognitive psychological 
reality of image schemas and their transformations. In Dirk Geeraerts (ed.), 
Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings, 239–268. Berlin, New York: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Glucksberg, Sam. 2001. Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to 
Idioms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Glucksberg, Sam & Boaz Keysar. 1990. Understanding metaphorical 
comparisons: Beyond similarity. Psychological Review 97. 3–18. 
Glucksberg, Sam, Boaz Keysar & Matthew S. McGlone. 1992. Metaphor 
Understanding and Accessing Conceptual Schema: Reply to Gibbs (1992). 
Psychological Review 99(3). 578–581. 
Goatly, Andrew. 2007. Washing the Brain: Metaphor and Hidden Ideology. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Goldman, Alvin I. 1993. The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 16. 15–28. 
Goleman, Daniel. 2003. Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A 
Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama. New York: Bantam Dell. 
Gómez-Moreno, José Manuel Ureña & Pamela Faber. 2011. Strategies for the 
Semi-Automatic Retrieval of Metaphorical Terms. Metaphor and Symbol 26. 
23–52. 
Goosens, Louis. 1990. Metaphtonymy: the interaction of metaphor and metonymy 
in expressions for linguistic action. Cognitive Linguistics 1(3). 323–340. 
Goosens, Louis. 2002. Metaphtonymy: The interaction of metaphor and 
metonymy in expressions for linguistic action. In René Dirven & Ralf Pörings 
(eds.), Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, 349–377. Berlin, 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
References 298 
Gordon, Sallie E. 1992. Implications of Cognitive Theory for Knowledge 
Acquisition. In Robert R. Hoffmann (ed.), The Psychology of Expertise: 
Cognitive Research and Empirical AI, 99–120. New York, London: Psychology 
Press. 
Goschler, Juliana. 2005. Embodiment and Body Metaphors. metaphorik.de. 33–
52. 
Goschler, Juliana. 2008. Metaphern für das Gehirn: Eine kognitiv-linguistische 
Untersuchung (Sprachwissenschaft Bd. 6). Berlin: Frank & Timme. 
Grady, Joseph E. 1997a. Foundations of Meaning: Primary Metaphors and 
Primary Stress. University of California, Berkeley Doctoral thesis. 
Grady, Joseph E. 1997b. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS revisited. Cognitive 
Linguistics 8(4). 267–290. 
Grady, Joseph E. 1999. A Typology of Motivation for Conceptual Metaphor: 
Correlation vs. Resemblance. In Raymond W. Gibbs & Gerard Steen (eds.), 
Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International 
Cognitive Linguistics Conference Amsterdam, July 1997 (Amsterdam Studies in 
the Theory and History of Linguistic Science 175), 79–100. Amsterdam, 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Grady, Joseph E. 2007. Metaphor. In Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, 188–213. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Grady, Joseph E., Todd Oakley & Seana Coulson. 1999. Blending and Metaphor. 
In Raymond W. Gibbs & Gerard Steen (eds.), Metaphor in Cognitive 
Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics 
Conference Amsterdam, July 1997 (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and 
History of Linguistic Science 175), 101–124. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Greenbaum, Sidney (ed.). 1996. Comparing English Worldwide: The 
International Corpus of English. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gudykunst, William B. 2000. Methodological Issues in Conducting Theory-Based 
Cross-Cultural Research. In Helen Spencer-Oately (ed.), Culturally Speaking: 
Managing Rapport Through Talk Across Cultures, 293–315. London, New 
York: Continuum. 
References 299 
Güldenring, Barbara A. 2017. Emotion metaphors in new Englishes: A corpus-
based study of ANGER. Cognitive Linguistic Studies 4(1). 82–109. 
Gut, Ulrike. 2011. Studying structural innovations in New English varieties. In 
Joybrato Mukherjee & Marianne Hundt (eds.), Exploring Second-Language 
Varieties of English and Lerner Englishes: Bridging a paradigm gap (Studies 
in Corpus Linguistics 44), 101–123. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Hamilton, Craig A. 2002. Mapping the mind and the body: On W.H. Auden's 
personifications. Style 36(3). 408–427. 
Hampe, Beate. 2008. Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics: Introduction. In 
Beate Hampe (ed.), From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive 
Linguistics (Cognitive Linguistics Research 29), 1–12. Berlin, New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Hart, Christopher. 2008. Critical discourse analysis and metaphor: Toward a 
theoretical framework. Critical Discourse Studies 5(2). 91–106. 
Hart, Christopher & Dominik Lukeš (eds.). 2010. Cognitive linguistics in critical 
discourse analysis: Application and theory. Newcastle: Cambridge scholars 
Pub. 
Hoffmann, Sebastian, Marianne Hundt & Joybrato Mukherjee. 2011. Indian 
English - An Emerging Epicentre? A Pilot Study on Light Verbs in Web-
derived Corpora of South Asian Englishes. Anglia 129(3-4). 258–280. 
Hofstede, Geert. 1980. Culture's Consequences: International Differences in 
Work-Related Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hofstede, Geert. 2001. Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions and Organizations Across Nations. Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications. 
Hofstede, Geert. 2011. Dimensionalizing Culture: The Hofstede Model in 
Context. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2(1). 3–26. 
Hofstede, Geert & Michael H. Bond. 1988. The Confucius Connection: From 
Cultural Roots to Economic Growth. Organizational Dynamics 16(4). 5–21. 
Hofstede, Geert, Gert J. Hofstede & Michael Minkov. 2010. Cultures and 
organizations: Software of the mind : intercultural cooperation and its 
importance for survival, 3rd edn. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
References 300 
Holland, Dorothy & Naomi Quinn (eds.). 1987. Cultural Models in Language and 
Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
House, Allan & Christian Hosker. 2013. Emotional disorders in neurological 
rehabilitation. In Michael P. Barnes (ed.), Neurological rehabilitation 
(Handbook of Clinical Neurology Vol. 110 : 3rd ser), 389–398. Edinburgh: 
Elsevier. 
Huber, Magnus. 2004. Review of English in Cameroon (Contributions to the 
Sociology of Language 85), by Hans-Georg Wolf. Journal of Pidgin and 
Creole Languages 19(1). 207–210. 
Izard, Carroll E. 1992. Basic Emotions, Relations among Emotions, and Emotion-
Cognition Relations. Psychological Review 99(3). 561–565. 
Jelec, Anna. 2014. Are Abstract Concepts Like Dinosaur Feathers? Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory and the Conceptualization Strategies in Gesture of Blind and 
Visually Impaired Children. Poznan: Adam Mickiewicz University Press. 
Johnson, Mark. 1981a. Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition. In 
Mark Johnson (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, 3–47. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Johnson, Mark (ed.). 1981b. Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination, and Reason. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Johnson, Mark. 2008. Philosophy's Debt to Metaphor. In Raymond W. Gibbs 
(ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 39–52. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 1983. Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of 
Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Katz, Albert. 1989. On choosing the vehicles of metaphors: Referential 
concreteness, semantic distances, and individual differences. Journal of 
Memory and Language 28. 486–499. 
Katz, Albert & Ada Law. 2010. Experimental Support for Conceptual Metaphors 
with an Episodic Memory Task. Metaphor and Symbol 25(4). 263–270. 
References 301 
Kempton, Willet. 1987. Two theories of home heat control. In Dorothy Holland & 
Naomi Quinn (eds.), Cultural Models in Language and Thought, 222–242. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kimmel, Michael. 2004. Metaphor Variation in Cultural Context: Perspectives 
from Anthropology. European Journal of English Studies 8(3). 275–293. 
King, Brian. 1989. The conceptual structure of emotional experience in Chinese: 
The Ohio State University Doctoral thesis. 
Kloss, Heinz. 1978. Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen seit 
1800. Düsseldorf: Schwann. 
Koller, Veronika. 2006. Of critical importance: Using electronic text corpora to 
study metaphor in business media discourse. In Anatol Stefanowitsch & Stefan 
T. Gries (eds.), Corpus-Based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy (Trends 
in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 171), 237–266. Berlin, New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Koller, Veronika, Andrew Hardie, Paul Rayson & Elena Semino. 2008. Using a 
semantic annotation tool for the analysis of metaphor in discourse. 
metaphorik.de 15(141-160). 
Komatsu, Llyod K. 1992. Recent Views on Conceptual Structure 112(3). 500–
526. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 1990. Emotion Concepts. New York, Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 1991. Happiness: A Definitional Effort. Metaphor and 
Symbolic Activity 6(1). 24–46. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 1998. Are there any emotion-specific metaphors? In Angeliki 
Athanasiadou & Elzbieta Tabaskowska (eds.), Speaking of Emotions: 
Conceptualization and Expression, 127–151. Berlin, New York: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 1999. Metaphor: Does it Constitute or Reflect Cultural Models? 
In Raymond W. Gibbs & Gerard Steen (eds.), Metaphor in Cognitive 
Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics 
Conference Amsterdam, July 1997 (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and 
History of Linguistic Science 175), 167–187. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
References 302 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2000. Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in 
Human Feeling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2002. Folk and expert theories of emotion and the 
disappearance of psychology. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum VI(1). 333. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2003a. Language, Figurative Thought, and Cross-Cultural 
Comparison. Metaphor and Symbol 18(4). 311–320. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2003b. The scope of metaphor. In Antonio Barcelona (ed.), 
Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective, 79. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2005. Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2008a. Metaphor and Emotion. In Raymond W. Gibbs (ed.), 
The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 380–396. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2008b. Conceptual metaphor theory: Some criticisms and 
alternative proposals. Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics 6. 168–184. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2008c. The Conceptual Structure of Happiness. COLLeGIUM: 
Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities 3. 131–143. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2008d. Universality and Variation in the Use of Metaphor. In 
N.-L. Johannesson & D. C. Minugh (eds.), Selected Papers from the 2006 and 
2007 Stockholm Metaphor Festivals, 51–74. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2010. Metaphor: A Practical Introduction, 2nd edn. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2011a. Recent developments in metaphor theory: Are the new 
views rival ones? Review of Cognitive Linguistics 9(1). 11–25. 
Kövecses, Zoltán. 2011b. The Conceptualization of Life and Happiness. Journal 
of Humanities Therapy 2. 19–53. 
Kövecses, Zoltán, Gary B. Palmer & René Dirven. 2002. Language and emotion: 
The interplay of conceptualisation with physiology and culture. In René Dirven 
& Ralf Pörings (eds.), Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, 
133–159. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Kövecses, Zoltán & Péter Szabó. 1996. Idioms: A View from Cognitive 
Semantics. Applied Linguistics 17(3). 326–355. 
References 303 
Kövecses, Zoltán, Veronika Szelid, Eszter Nucz, Olga Blanco-Carrión, Elif A. 
Akkök & Réka Szabó. 2015. Anger Metaphors across Languages: A Cognitive 
Linguistic Perspective. In Roberto R. Heredia & Anna B. Cieślicka (eds.), 
Bilingual Figurative Language Processing, 341–367. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Krennmayr, Tina. 2011. Metaphor in newspapers. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit. 
Kreyer, Rolf. 2012. "Love is like a stone - it burns you when it's hot": A corpus-
linguistic view on the (non-)creative use of love-related metaphors in pop 
songs. In Sebastian Hoffmann, Paul Rayson & Geoffrey Leech (eds.), 
English Corpus Linguistics: Looking back, Moving forward. Papers from the 
30th International Conference on English Language Research on Computerized 
Corpora (ICAME 30) (Language and Computers: Studies in Practical 
Linguistics 74), 103–115. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi. 
Kristiansen, Gitte & René Dirven (eds.). 2008a. Cognitive Sociolinguistics: 
Language Variation, Cultural Models, Social Systems (Cognitive Linguistics 
Research 39). Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Kristiansen, Gitte & René Dirven. 2008b. Cognitive Sociolinguistics: Rationale, 
methods and scope. In Gitte Kristiansen & René Dirven (eds.), Cognitive 
Sociolinguistics: Language Variation, Cultural Models, Social Systems 
(Cognitive Linguistics Research 39), 1–17. Berlin, New York: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Kroeber, Alfred L. & Clyde Kluckhohn. 1952. Culture: A Critical Review of 
Concepts and Definitions. Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum. 
Lakoff, George. 1986. The Meanings of Literal. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 
1(4). 1–6. 
Lakoff, George. 1987a. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories 
Reveal about the Mind. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, George. 1987b. The Death of Dead Metaphor. Metaphor and Symbolic 
Activity 2(2). 143–147. 
Lakoff, George. 1988. Cognitive Semantics. In Umberto Eco, Marco 
Santambrogio & Patrizia Violi (eds.), Meaning and Mental Representations, 
119–154. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
References 304 
Lakoff, George. 1990. The Invariance Hypothesis: is abstract reason based on 
image-schemas? Cognitive Linguistics 1(1). 39–74. 
Lakoff, George. 2006. Moral Politics How Liberals and Conservatives Think, 2nd 
edn. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, George. 2007 [1993]. The contemporary theory of metaphor. In Vyvyan 
Evans, Benjamin K. Bergen & Jörg Zinken (eds.), The Cognitive Linguistics 
Reader (Advances in Cognitive Linguistics), 267–315. London, Oakville: 
Equinox. 
Lakoff, George. 2008. The Neural Theory of Metaphor. In Raymond W. Gibbs 
(ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 17–38. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lakoff, George, Jane Espenson & Adele Goldberg. 1991. Master Metaphor List. 
PDF. Available at: 
http://araw.mede.uic.edu/~alansz/metaphor/METAPHORLIST.pdf 
Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied 
Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. 
Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 2003 [1980]. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, George & Zoltán Kövecses. 1984. The Cognitive Model of Anger Inherent 
in American English. University of California, Berkeley. Berkeley Cognitive 
Science Report No. 10. 1–30. 
Lakoff, George & Rafael Núñez. 2002. Where Mathematics Comes From: How 
the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. New York: Basic Books. 
Lakoff, George & Mark Turner. 1989. More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to 
Poetic Metaphor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Langacker, R. W. 1990. Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of 
Grammar : Bod Third Party Titles. 
Lemerise, Elizabeth A. & Kenneth A. Dodge. 2008. The Development of Anger 
and Hostile Interactions. In Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones & 
Lisa Feldman Barrett (eds.), Handbook of Emotions, 3rd edn., 730–741. New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
References 305 
Leung, Angela K. Y., Lin Qiu, Lay S. Ong & Kim-Pong Tam. 2011. Embodied 
Cutural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio-cultural 
Contexts. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5(9). 591–608. 
Li, Xiaoying. 2015. A Study on Emotional Metaphors in Yellow Emperor. Open 
Journal of Modern Linguistics 5. 475–480. 
Littlemore, Jeannette. 2003. The effect of cultural background on metaphor 
interpretation. Metaphor and Symbol 18. 273–288. 
Low, Graham. 1988. On Teaching Metaphor. Applied Linguistics 9(2). 125–147. 
Lutz, Catherine A. 1988. Unnatural Emotions: Everyday sentiments on a 
Micronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Lyons, William. 1999. The Philosophy of Cognition and Emotion. In Tim 
Dalgleish & Mick J. Power (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, 21–44. 
London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Mair, Christian. 2015. Responses to Davies and Fuchs. English World-Wide 
36(1). 29–33. 
Majoros, Krisztián. 2013. Metaphor und Kookkurrenz: Eine alternative 
"Trichter"-Methode zur korpus-basierten Untersuchung metaphorischer 
Ausdrücke in öffentlich zugänglichen elektronischen Zeitungskorpora am 
Beispiel der Wissenschaftsberichterstattung im Bereich der Zellbiologie. 
Sprachtheorie und germanistische Linguistik 23(1). 
Mandler, Jean. The Foundations of Mind: Origins of Conceptual Thought. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mandler, Jean & Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas. 2014. On defining image schemas. 
Language and Cognition 0(1-23). 
Matsuki, Keiko. 1995. Metaphors of anger in Japanese. In John R. Taylor & 
Robert E. MacLaury (eds.), Language and the Cognitive Construal of the 
World, 137–151. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
McGlone, Matthew S. 2001. Concepts as metaphors. In Sam Glucksberg (ed.), 
Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms, 90–107. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McGlone, Matthew S. 2007. What is the explanatory value of a conceptual 
metaphor? Language & Communication 27(109-126). 
References 306 
Medin, Douglas L. 1989. Concepts and conceptual structure. American 
Psychologist 44(12). 1469–1481. 
Mesthrie, Rajend. 2009. Contact Linguistics and World Englishes. In Braj B. 
Kachru, Yamuna Kachru & Cecil L. Nelson (eds.), The Handbook of World 
Englishes (Blackwell Handbooks in Linguistics), 273–288. Malden, MA, 
Oxford: Blackwell Pub. 
Mukherjee, Joybrato. 2015. Responses to Davies and Fuchs. English World-Wide 
36(1). 34–37. 
Mukherjee, Joybrato & Marco Schilk. 2012. Exploring variation and change in 
New Englishes: looking into the International Corpus of English (ICE) and 
beyond. In Terttu Nevalainen & Elizabeth Closs Traugott (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of English, 189–199. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Murphy, Gregory L. 1996. On metaphoric representation. Cognition 60. 173–204. 
Murphy, Gregory L. 1997. Reasons to doubt the present evidence for metaphoric 
representation. Cognition 62. 99–108. 
Murphy, Gregory L. & Douglas L. Medin. 1985. The Roles of Theories in 
Conceptual Coherence. Psychological Review 92(3). 289–316. 
Musolff, Andreas. 2004. Metaphor and Political Discourse: Analogical 
Reasoning in Debates about Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Musolff, Andreas. 2006. Metaphor scenarios in public discourse. Metaphor and 
Symbol 21(1). 23–38. 
Musolff, Andreas. 2012. The study of metaphor as part of critical discourse 
analysis. Critical Discourse Studies 9(3). 301–310. 
Musolff, Andreas. 2016. Political Metaphor Analysis: Discourses and Scenarios. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Musolff, Andreas. 2017. Metaphor and Cultural Cognition. In Farzad Sharifian 
(ed.), Advances in Cultural Linguistics, 325–344. Singapore: Springer Nature. 
Nacey, Susan. 2013. Metaphors in Learner English (Metaphor in Language, 
Cognition, and Communication 2). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Naidu, Shashikala. 2009. Metaphorical Expressions in Indian English: A Cross-
Cultural Usage-Based Study. Oklahoma State University Doctoral thesis. 
References 307 
Nelson, Gerald. 2015. Responses to Davies and Fuchs. English World-Wide 36(1). 
38–40. 
Nerlich, Brigitte & David D. Clarke. 2007. Cognitive Linguistics and the History 
of Linguistics. In Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, 589–607. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Neuman, Yair, Dan Assaf, Yohai Cohen, Mark Last, Shlomo Argamon, Newton 
Howard & Ophir Frieder. 2013. Metaphor identification in large texts corpora. 
PloS one 8(4). e62343. 
Núñez, Rafael. 2008. A Fresh Look at the Foundations of Mathematics: Gesture 
and the Psychological Reality of Conceptual Metaphor. In Alan Cienki & C. 
Müller (eds.), Gesture and Metaphor, 93–114. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Oakley, Todd. 2007. Image Schemas. In Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, 214–235. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ogarkova, Anna. 2007. "Green-Eyed Monsters": a Corpus-Based Study of 
Metaphoric Conceptualizations of JEALOUSY and ENVY in Modern English. 
metaphorik.de 13. 87–148. 
Ogarkova, Anna & Cristina Soriano. 2014. Variation within Universals: The 
'Metaphorical Profile' Approach to the Study of ANGER Concepts in English, 
Russian and Spanish. In Andreas Musolff, Fiona MacArthur & G. Pagani (eds.), 
Metaphor and Intercultural Communication, 93–116. London: Bloomsbury. 
Öhman, Arne. 2008. Fear and Anxiety: Overlaps and Dissociations. In Michael 
Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones & Lisa Feldman Barrett (eds.), Handbook 
of Emotions, 3rd edn., 709–729. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Ortony, Andrew & Terence J. Turner. 1990. What’s Basic about Basic Emotions? 
Psychological Review 97(3). 315–331. 
Patowari, Jyotirmoy. 2015. A Comparative Analysis of Emotion Conceptual 
Metaphor in English and Bangla. Language in India 15(11). 264–274. 
Plato. Phaedrus, Section 246b. In Perseus Digital Library Project, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.01
74%3Atext%3DPhaedrus%3Asection%3D246b (accessed on April 5, 2017). 
References 308 
Platt, John, Heidi Weber & Mian L. Ho. 1984. The New Englishes. London, 
Melbourne: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Polzenhagen, Frank. 2007. Cultural Conceptualizations in West African English: 
A Cognitive-Linguistic Approach (Duisburg Papers on Research in Language 
and Culture 69). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
Polzenhagen, Frank & Hans-Georg Wolf. 2010. Investigating Culture from a 
Linguistic Perspective: An Exemplification with Hong Kong English. ZAA 
58(3). 281–303. 
Pragglejaz Group. 2007. MIP: A Method for Identifying Metaphorically Used 
Words in Discourse. Metaphor and Symbol 22(1). 1–39. 
Prinz, Jesse. 2004. Which Emotions Are Basic? In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse 
(eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality, 69–88. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pütz, Martin, Justyna A. Robinson & Monika Reif (eds.). 2014. Cognitive 
Sociolinguistics: Social and cultural variation in cognition and language use. 
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Quinn, Naomi. 1987. Convergent evidence for a cultural model of American 
marriage. In Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn (eds.), Cultural Models in 
Language and Thought, 173–192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Quinn, Naomi. 1991. The Cultural Basis of Metaphor. In James W. Fernandez 
(ed.), Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of Tropes in Anthropology, 56–93. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Rakova, Marina. 2002. The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay? 
13(3). 215–244. 
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2016. Folk Psychology as a Theory. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/folkpsych-theory/ (accessed on January 12, 
2017). 
Rohrer, Tim. 2007. Embodiment and Experientialism. In Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert 
Cuyckens (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, 25–47. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rosch, Eleanor. 1973. Natural Categories. Cognitive Psychology 4. 328–350. 
References 309 
Rosch, Eleanor. 1975. Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General 104. 192–233. 
Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. Principles of Categorization. In Barbara B. Lloyd & 
Eleanor Rosch (eds.), Cognition and Categorization, 27–48. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Rosch, Eleanor & Caroline Mervis. 1975. Family resemblances: studies in the 
internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology 7. 533–605. 
Schneider, Edgar W. 2003. The dynamics of New Englishes: From identity 
construction to dialect birth. Language 79(2). 233-281. 
Schneider, Edgar W. 2009 [2007]. Postcolonial English: Varieties around the 
world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schneider, Edgar W. 2013. English as a contact language: the "New Englishes". 
In Daniel Schreier & Marianne Hundt (eds.), English as a Contact Language 
(Studies in English Language), 131–148. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Schneider, Klaus P. & Anne Barron. 2008. Where pragmatics and dialectology 
meet: Introducing variational pragmatics. In Klaus P. Schneider & Anne Barron 
(eds.), Variational Pragmatics: A Focus on Regional Varieties in Pluricentric 
Languages, 1–32. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Schwarz-Friesel, Monika. 2007. Sprache und Emotion (Uni-Taschenbücher 
2939). Tübingen: Francke. 
Sewell, Jr., William H. 2005. The Concept(s) of Culture. In Gabrielle M. Spiegel 
(ed.), Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the 
Linguistic Turn, 76–95. New York, London: Routledge. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2003. On Cultural Conceptualisations. Journal of Cognition 
and Culture 3(3). 187–207. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2006. A cultural-conceptual approach and world Englishes: the 
case of Aboriginal English. World Englishes 25(1). 11–22. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2008. Cultural models of Home in Aboriginal children's 
English. In Gitte Kristiansen & René Dirven (eds.), Cognitive Sociolinguistics: 
Language Variation, Cultural Models, Social Systems (Cognitive Linguistics 
Research 39), 333–352. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
References 310 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2009. On collective cognition and language. In Hanna Pishwa 
(ed.), Language and Social Cognition: Expression of the Social Mind, 163–180. 
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2010. Semantic and pragmatic conceptualizations within an 
emerging variety: Persian English. In Andy Kirkpatrick (ed.), The Routledge 
Handbook of World Englishes, 442–457. London, New York: Routledge. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2011. Cultural Conceptualisations and Language: Theoretical 
Framework and Applications. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2015a. Cultural Linguistics. In Farzad Sharifian (ed.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Language and Culture, 473–492. London, New York: 
Routledge. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2015b. Cultural Linguistics and world Englishes. World 
Englishes 34(4). 515–532. 
Sharifian, Farzad (ed.). 2017a. Advances in Cultural Linguistics. Singapore: 
Springer Nature. 
Sharifian, Farzad. 2017b. Cultural Linguistics: The State of the Art. In Farzad 
Sharifian (ed.), Advances in Cultural Linguistics, 1–28. Singapore: Springer 
Nature. 
Sharifian, Farzad, René Dirven, Ning Yu & Susanne Niemeier (eds.). 2008. 
Culture, Body, and Language: Conceptualizations of Internal Body Organs 
Across Cultures and Languages. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Shaver, Phillip, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson & Cary O'Connor. 1987. 
Emotion knowledge: Further exploration of a prototype approach. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 52(6). 1061–1086. 
Shore, Bradd. 1996. Culture in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Siemund, Peter (ed.). 2011. Linguistic Universals and Language Variation. 
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Solomon, Robert C. 1984. Getting angry: The Jamesian theory of emotion in 
anthropology. In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (eds.), Culture theory, 238–
254. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
References 311 
Spencer-Oately, Helen. 2000. Introduction: Language, Culture and Rapport 
Management. In Helen Spencer-Oately (ed.), Culturally Speaking: Managing 
Rapport Through Talk Across Cultures, 1–8. London, New York: Continuum. 
Steen, Gerard. 2008. The Paradox of Metaphor: Why We Need a Three-
Dimensional Model of Metaphor. Metaphor and Symbol 23. 213–241. 
Steen, Gerard. 2011a. Issues in collecting converging evidence: Is metaphor 
always a matter of thought? In Doris Schönefeld (ed.), Converging Evidence: 
Methodological and theoretical issues for linguistic research (Human 
Cognitive Processing 33), 33–53. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Steen, Gerard. 2011b. Metaphor in language and thought: How do we map the 
field? In Mario Brdar, Stefan T. Gries & Milena Žic Fuchs (eds.), Cognitive 
Linguistics: Convergence and Expansion, 67–86. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Steen, Gerard. 2014. The Cognitive-Linguistic Revolution in Metaphor Studies. In 
Jeannette Littlemore & John R. Taylor (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to 
Cognitive Linguistics, 117–142. London: Bloomsbury. 
Steen, Gerard, Ewa Biernacka, Aletta G. Dorst, Anna A. Kaal, Irene López-
Rodríguez & Trijntje Pasma. 2010a. Pragglejaz in practice: Finding 
metaphorically used words in natural discourse. In Graham Low, Zazie Todd, 
Alice Deignan & Lynne Cameron (eds.), Researching and Applying Metaphor 
in the Real World, 165–184. Amsterdam, New York: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Steen, Gerard, Aletta G. Dorst, J. Berenike Herrmann, Anna A. Kaal, Tina 
Krennmayr & Trijntje Pasma. 2010b. A Method for Linguistic Metaphor 
Identification: From MIP to MIPVU (Converging Evidence in Language and 
Communication Research 14). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Stefanowitsch, Anatol. 2004. HAPPINESS in English and German: A 
metaphorical-pattern analysis. In M. Achard & S. Kemmer (eds.), Language, 
Culture, and Mind, 137–149. Stanford: CSLI. 
Stefanowitsch, Anatol. 2006a. Words and their metaphors: A corpus-based 
approach. In Anatol Stefanowitsch & Stefan T. Gries (eds.), Corpus-Based 
References 312 
Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy (Trends in Linguistics: Studies and 
Monographs 171), 63–105. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Stefanowitsch, Anatol. 2006b. Corpus-based approaches to metaphor and 
metonymy. In Anatol Stefanowitsch & Stefan T. Gries (eds.), Corpus-Based 
Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy (Trends in Linguistics: Studies and 
Monographs 171), 1–16. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Stefanowitsch, Anatol. 2011a. Cognitive linguistics as a cognitive science. In 
Marcus Callies, Wolfram R. Keller & Astrid Lohöfer (eds.), Bi-directionality in 
the cognitive sciences: Avenues, challenges, and limitations (Human Cognitive 
Processing 30), 295–309. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Stefanowitsch, Anatol. 2011b. Cognitive linguistics meets the corpus. In Mario 
Brdar, Stefan T. Gries & Milena Žic Fuchs (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics: 
Convergence and Expansion, 257–289. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Stocklmayer, Susan M. & David F. Treagust. 1996. Images of electricity: how do 
novices and experts model electric current? International Journal of Science 
Education 18(2). 163–178. 
Strathern, Andrew. 1996. Body Thoughts. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Toward a Cognitive Semantics (v. 1). Cambridge, MA, 
London: MIT Press. 
Tay, Dennis. 2014. Lakoff and the theory of conceptual metaphor. In Jeannette 
Littlemore & John R. Taylor (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics Companion, 49–59. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Taylor, John R. & Thandi G. Mbense. 1998. Red dogs and rotten mealies: How 
Zulus talk about anger. In Angeliki Athanasiadou & Elzbieta Tabaskowska 
(eds.), Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualization and Expression, 191–226. 
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Tendal, Markus & Raymond W. Gibbs. 2008. Complementary perspectives on 
metaphor: Cognitive linguistics and relevance theory. Journal of Pragmatics 
40. 1823–1864. 
References 313 
Tissari, Heli. 2010. Love, metaphor and responsibility: Some examples from 
Early Modern and Present-Day English corpora. In Graham Low, Zazie Todd, 
Alice Deignan & Lynne Cameron (eds.), Researching and Applying Metaphor 
in the Real World, 125–143. Amsterdam, New York: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Tissari, Heli. 2011. Oops blush! Beyond metaphors of emotion. In Mario Brdar, 
Stefan T. Gries & Milena Žic Fuchs (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics: Convergence 
and Expansion, 291–304. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Türker, Ebru. 2013. A corpus-based approach to emotion metaphors in Korean: A 
case study of anger, happiness, and sadness. Review of Cognitive Linguistics 
11(1). 73–144. 
Turner, Mark. 1990. Aspects of the Invariance Hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics 
1(2). 
Vereza, Solange. 2008. Exploring metaphors in corpora: A study of 'war' in 
corpus generated data. In Mara S. Zanotto, Lynne Cameron & Marilda C. 
Cavalcanti (eds.), Confronting Metaphor in Use: An applied linguistic 
approach (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 173). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Vervaeke, John & John M. Kennedy. 1996. Metaphors in language and thought: 
Disproof and multiple meanings. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 11. 273–284. 
Wan, Wan & Graham Low (eds.). 2015. Elicited Metaphor Analysis in 
Educational Discourse. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Wasow, Thomas & Jennifer Arnold. 2005. Intuitions in linguistic argumentation. 
Lingua 115. 1481–1496. 
Wcisɫo, Anna. 2011. Melting pot or salad bowl: a theory of conceptual metaphor 
analysis into linguistic image of American society. In Kamila Turewicz (ed.), 
Cognitive Methodologies for Cutlure-Language Interface: from Lexical 
Category to Stereotype through Lady Macbeth Speech, 145–169. Łodz: 
Wydawnictwo Akademii Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej w Łodzi. 
References 314 
Wilson, Paul A. & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk. 2017. Pride in British English and 
Polish: A Cultural-Linguistic Perspective. In Farzad Sharifian (ed.), Advances 
in Cultural Linguistics, 247–288. Singapore: Springer Nature. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan. 
Wolf, Hans-Georg. 2008. A Cognitive Linguistic approach to the cultures of 
World Englishes: The emergence of a new model. In Gitte Kristiansen & René 
Dirven (eds.), Cognitive Sociolinguistics: Language Variation, Cultural 
Models, Social Systems (Cognitive Linguistics Research 39), 353–385. Berlin, 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Wolf, Hans-Georg & Thomas Chan. 2016. Understanding Asia by means of 
cognitive sociolinguistics and cultural linguistics - the example of GHOSTS in 
Hong Kong English. In Gerhard Leitner, Azirah Hashim & Hans-Georg Wolf 
(eds.), Communicating with Asia: The future of English as a global language, 
249–266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wolf, Hans-Georg & Frank Polzenhagen. 2007a. Culture-specific 
conceptualizations of corruption in African English: Linguistic analyses and 
pragmatic applications. In Farzad Sharifian & Gary B. Palmer (eds.), Applied 
Cultural Linguistics, 125–168. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Wolf, Hans-Georg & Frank Polzenhagen. 2007b. Fixed expressions as 
manifestations of cultural conceptualizations: Examples from African varieties 
of English. In Paul Skandera (ed.), Phraseology and Culture in English, 399–
435. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Wolf, Hans-Georg & Frank Polzenhagen. 2009. World Englishes: A Cognitive 
Sociolinguistic Approach. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Yu, Ning. 1995. Metaphorical expressions of anger and happiness in English and 
Chinese. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 10(2). 59–92. 
Yu, Ning. 1998. The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: A perspective from 
Chinese. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Yu, Ning. 2001. What does our face mean to us? Pragmatics and Cognition 9(1-
36). 
References 315 
Yu, Ning. 2008. Metaphor from Body and Culture. In Raymond W. Gibbs (ed.), 
The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, 247–261. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Yu, Ning. 2009. From Body to Meaning in Culture: Papers on Cognitive 
Semantic Studies of Chinese. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
Yu, Ning. 2015. Embodiment, Culture, and Language. In Farzad Sharifian (ed.), 
The Routledge Handbook of Language and Culture, 227–239. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Zichler, Csilla. 2010. Metaphern in der Wissenschaftssprache. Sprachtheorie und 
germanistische Linguistik 20(1). 95–112. 
Zlatev, Jordan. 2012. Prologue: Bodily motion, emotion and mind science. In Ad 
Foolen, Ulrike M. Lüdtke, Timothy P. Racine & Jordan Zlatev (eds.), Moving 
Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and emotion in intersubjectivity, 
consciousness and language, 1–25. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
 
 
Online Dictionaries: 
 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online, 
http://www.ldoceonline.com/ 
Macmillan Dictionary, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/ 
Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 316 
Appendix A 
MRWs Used in Annotation of ANGER According to Source Domain  
 
Note that, in order to avoid repetition, MRWs are listed as lexemes unless it was 
necessary to provide more unique direct phrasing to understand the annotation 
process.  
 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  brimming with, buckets into 
which […] poured, dilution 
to, filled with, full of  
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)  drips with, flow through you 
and then out from your body, 
rushed thru [someone], 
seeping, spewing (out), surge 
of […] course through me, 
taste of biilous [sic]   
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
reservoir(s) of 
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
– 
   FLUID BEING DISRUPTED  - (= level 3) stir up / with 
   FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER 
(UNDER PRESSURE)  - (= level 3) 
bottled up, build up, surge of, 
swell with, well up 
   FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER  - (= level 
3) 
evaporated, pour (forth), 
over-pouring [ADJ], spill 
onto / out 
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HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-
level (= level 2)  
boiling [N], boiling [ADJ], 
boil over / with, brimming 
hot, broiling [ADJ], bubble 
up / forth, long-simmering, 
need to cool down, reach 
boiling points, seething 
[ADJ], seethe (with), 
simmering [ADJ], simmer[V] 
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / 
STEAM - (= level 3)  
vent (off / out), steaming with  
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A 
(VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION - (= level 3)  
(a) burst(s) (of), burst (forth / 
out (of) / through), erupt, 
erupt and inflame whatever 
was on its path, eruption of, 
explode (in / with), explosion 
of, lava (of), lava of [...] 
swept through the streets 
with scorching  frenzy, 
simmering […] eruption, 
volcanic (vent)  
 
Special Case Based on Folk Model: ENERGY AS FLUID 
 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - 
specific-level (= level 2)  
channel [V] (also: 
channelise, channelize), 
drive [V], (driving) force(s), 
energy, energy subsides, 
energized by, fuel [V], 
generate 
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FOOD / DRINK MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  food […] decays, grow stale, 
well kept in the freezer 
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF FOOD / DRINK – 
specific-level (= level 2) 
– 
    ALCOHOLIC DRINK (= level 3)  hung over from  
    COOKIES (= level 3) cookies 
    OLIVES (= level 3)  [Co-text]: […] OIL, THAT 
THE OLIVES PRODUCE, 
THE PRESS WILL CRUSH 
THE ANGER […] AND 
FROM THAT WILL COME 
OIL. 
    TEA (= level 3)  first flush of, infuse (with) 
FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED – 
specific-level (= level 2)  
feed on / off, give taste of, 
swallow, taste [V] 
FOOD / DRINK BEING PREPARED – 
specific-level (= level 2) 
whip up 
 
 
ILLNESS  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  bout(s) of, dangerous 
disease, full-blown, immune 
from, suffer  
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 
2) 
slowly kill 
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AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN 
INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – 
specific-level (=level 2)  
adrenaline induced, fired up 
on, intoxicating, poison [V] 
(with),toxic, unaddicted to, 
under the influence of 
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL 
SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)  
– 
   ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL (= level 3) foaming at the mouth, 
hurling […] venom  
   LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3) apoplectic, convulsion of, 
cripple [V], fit(s) of (also: in 
a fit of and prone to fits of), 
incapacitated with, paralyze, 
shake with, tremor of 
   PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3) endure, faces twisted in 
   WOUND / SKIN-RELATED (= level 3)  fester [V], festering [ADJ], 
red […] pocked [V]  
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
outbreak of, spread, 
widespread 
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – 
specific-level (=level 2) 
(go) crazy with, (become / 
go) mad (with) 
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
assuage, eradicate, get out of 
system, heal from, purge [V], 
relief from, survive 
MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS – 
specific-level (=level 2) 
a (heavy) dose of 
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NATURAL FORCE  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  sweep  
AVALANCHE – specific-level (= level 2) avalanches of 
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2) burn[V] (bright), burn [V] 
(over / with), fiery, fire, 
flares of, full-scale […] 
blazed, fume (in / with), 
(slow-)burning, spark of 
   CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3) put out the inferno of, stamp 
out 
   DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3) consumed (by / with), 
engulfed by, setting fire to 
one’s own home 
   MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 
3) 
fan (the flames / embers of), 
fuel [V], pour petrol on the 
raving fires of, stoke (up)  
   STARTING A FIRE (= level 3) (en)flamed by, (re)ignite (a 
fire), kindle [V], spark 
[V](off) 
HEAT - specific-level (= level 2) hot, heat (of the sun), 
incandescent with 
STORM - specific-level (= level 2) brewing 
WATER - specific-level (= level 2) drowning in 
   RAIN (= level 3) rain down 
   WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3) groundswell, on a wave of, 
riding on the crest of, riding 
on (the) wave(s) of, rising 
tide of, stem the tide of, 
subside, swept away by, 
swept off by the torrent of, 
swept off with the deluge of, 
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tidal wave of, wave of ([…] 
swept), wave(s)  
WIND - specific-level (= level 2)  blowing, whirling vortex of  
 
 
PART OF A JOURNEY  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
BARRIER / OBSTACLE  – specific-level (= 
level 2)  
the barriers of, the obstacle 
of, crossing, move beyond 
DESTINATION – specific-level (= level 2)  lead to […], move from […] 
to 
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)  bring [someone somewhere], 
[…] lead to, the only way 
forward, the way of 
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 
2)  
starting with[…] and moving 
on through  
 
 
PERSON MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)   – 
PERSON - ACCOMPLICE - specific-level 
(= level 2) 
betray, harbour [V], 
surrender […] had been 
harbouring 
PERSON - BEING APPEASED / CALMED 
- specific-level (= level 2) 
appease, calm down, 
catering to the sensitivities 
of, mellow [V], pacify, 
placate 
PERSON - COMPANION - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
bring to bed, court [V], dwell 
in, invite, present me with 
[…] gift 
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PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
arouse, howl of, let out […] 
roar of, milk [V], released 
(on), squeals and roars, 
unbounded […] struck, 
unbridled, unleash (our 
beasts of) 
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 
2)  
rescue [V], restore […] keep 
grounded 
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
elect [ = vote], politics of 
[…] go so far 
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
breed, born (of / from), 
grandfathers of 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
afraid of, encounter [V], face 
[V], fear [V], fight [V] with, 
greatest enemy / enemies, in 
the face of, onslaught of, 
powerful foe, staring 
everyone in the face, struggle 
[V] with, wrestle with 
   A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3) creep in, lurking  
   BEING CONTROLLED (BY FORCE) (= 
level 3) 
control, hold back, repress, 
restrain [V], suppress  
   DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT 
OPPONENT (= level 3) 
casualty of, destroyer, killing 
[ADJ], murderous, rage [V], 
turn vicious and dangerous, 
violent, vitriolic  
   FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE(= level 3) escape [V], evade,  flee  
   WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3) dictate, holds so many back, 
reign supreme, slave and 
victim of, took control  
   WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= 
level 3)  
defeated [ADJ], conquer, 
curtail, fend off, overcome, 
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prevail (over), protected 
from, stave off, stood down, 
withstand 
   WHO IS IN PURSUIT (= level 3)  catch up with [someone], 
hound [V] 
   WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) allowed to conquer, fell 
victims to, get / take the best 
of [someone], get the better 
of [someone], overcome (by)  
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 
2) 
children of, give birth 
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
find a collective voice, greet, 
respond to, screams, silent, 
quiet  
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - 
specific-level (= level 2)  
blind, demise of, die, frenzied 
[= crazy], hyperventilating, 
nursing  
Misc. - ANGER TAKING ON 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED 
TO A PERSON 
furious, irrational, jealous, 
petulant, rational, righteous, 
zealous  
Misc. - ANGER INVOLVED IN ACTIONS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON  
flips the switch, sculpted by, 
soil [V], stump [V] [= 
confuse], tool of  
 
 
POSSESSION MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  got (= have, own [V]), 
possess 
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
let go of, lose  
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MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-
level (= level 2)  
hold on / onto 
SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
share [V] 
TAKING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
leave here with 
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP- specific-
level (= level 2)  
be left with 
 
 
PUNISHMENT MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level  (= level 1)  – 
DESERVING PUNISHMENT - specific-
level (= level 2)  
earn 
RECEIVING PUNISHMENT  - specific-
level (= level 2)  
incur 
RISKING PUNISHMENT - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
risk [V] 
SPARED PUNISHMENT - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
spared  
 
 
SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICE 
MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
A RELIGIOUS PRACTICE – specific-level 
(= level 2) 
invoke, prayer 
(RELATED TO) A DEITY – specific-level (= 
level 2) 
holy, from heaven, in the 
glory of an omnipotent, 
sacrificing to the gods of 
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(RELATED TO) AN EVIL 
SUPERNATURAL BEING – specific-level 
(= level 2) 
cast out the devil of, 
delivered from this spirit of, 
demon of, demons who 
obstruct, evil spirits of, 
exorcise, spirit (of), unholy 
 
 
WEAPON MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1) brandish, deadly [co-text: 
confront enemies], fight back 
with, hurt someone with, 
overpower with 
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
– 
   A WEAPON TO SUFFOCATE SOMEONE 
WITH (= level 3) 
suffocate with 
   ARROWS (= level 3) shooting their arrows of 
   BLUNT INSTRUMENT (= level 3)  (bear) the (full) brunt of, 
strike down with 
   BOMB (= level 3)  bomb, bring down on, defuse, 
fall on someone, navigate a 
minefield of, trigger [V]  
   GUN(-RELATED) (= level 3)  ammunition, shot of 
   KNIFE (= level 3)  stab with 
A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
aim at, direct (against / at / 
towards), focus on, 
misdirected, point at, take 
out on /at, target [V], 
target(s) of / for, turn on 
someone, [prepositions= 
special case]: against, at, on 
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A WEAPON DIRECTED AWAY FROM 
ORIGINAL TARGET - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
deflect, shield from 
 
 
MISC. MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
ANGER IS A CORD cord of  
ANGER IS A DEVICE TO AMPLIFY THE 
VOICE 
must amplify our voices 
ANGER IS A HAZE (OF WATER OR 
SMOKE) 
wandering around in a haze 
of 
ANGER IS A LETTER letters of  
ANGER IS A MACHINE turn off 
ANGER IS A MANUFACTURED 
PRODUCT 
manufactured 
ANGER IS A MASK a mask of 
ANGER IS A METAL BEING 
MANIPULATED 
galvanizing, tempered 
ANGER IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN bear [V], bring […] on 
[someone], displacing […] 
on you, lay all […] on us, 
letting […] strain, weight of 
ANGER IS A PLANT reap, rooted out, sow (the 
seeds of (growing)), take 
deep root in, water the seeds 
of 
ANGER IS A RESTRAINING DEVICE free yourself from the 
shackles of, wear […] 
around my neck like a yoke 
ANGER IS A SCHOOL  graduated from  
ANGER IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY treasure [V] […] sell 
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ANGER IS CLUTTER /  DEBRIS clutter, his confusing debris 
of  
ANGER IS COMPOST a kind of compost 
ANGER IS SKIN BEING SHED shed [V] 
ANGER IS SOMETHING WORN ON THE 
FOREHEAD 
wear […]on my forehead 
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Appendix B 
MRWs Used in Annotation of FEAR According to Source Domain  
 
Note that, in order to avoid repetition, MRWs are listed as lexemes unless it was 
necessary to provide more unique direct phrasing to understand the annotation 
process.  
 
A DEEP PLACE MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  at the bottom of, deep, deep-
seated, measure the depth of 
TO COWER IN - specific-level (= level 2) cower in, cringe in 
 
 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  filling, fill with, plunge into 
BODY FLUID (= SWEAT) - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
bathed with, coated in, 
doused in   
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
– 
   FLUID BOILING DOWN IN A CONTAINER 
- (= level 3) 
boils down 
   FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER 
(UNDER PRESSURE) - (= level 3) 
came bubbling up to the 
surface 
FROM SOLID TO LIQUID - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
dissolve, dissolving like the 
cubes of sugar we sometimes 
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threw into soaked garri, 
melted into 
 
Special Case Based on Folk Model: ENERGY AS FLUID 
 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - 
specific-level (= level 2)  
fuel [V], fuelled by / through, 
generate, outlet for, surge 
[tr. V],  
 
 
ILLNESS  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  bouts of, chronic, develop 
[…] syndrome, feeling sick 
with, feigns acute, latent, live 
with, pathological, plagued, 
sick with, stricken, suffer 
(from), sympton [sic] of, 
syndrome of  
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 
2) 
death, die, killing, mortal, 
succumb to, throes of […] 
deadly  
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN 
INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-
level (=level 2)  
injected with, laced by, mind-
altering, toxins of  
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL 
SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)  
– 
   COLD-RELATED (= level 3)  clammy with, shiver and 
shudder in, shiver in   
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   LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3) benumbed by, cripple [V], 
crippling [ADJ],  distorted 
by, fainting with, frozen by, 
numb with, paralyse (also 
paralyzed and papralysing 
[sic]), shakes with, tremble 
   PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3) contortions of stark, get 
pang(s) of, pain brought on 
by, numb[V], racked with, 
searing pang, wracked  
   STOMACH-RELATED (= level 3) stomach-churning, stomach 
[…] roiling pit 
   VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (= level 3)  blinding 
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
(curb) the spread of, spread 
[V], spread of, spread over, 
widespread (also wide 
spread) 
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – 
specific-level (=level 2) 
dazed with, my head being all 
over the place with, psychosis 
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
assuage, curing, free from, 
magical cure to take the fear 
away, mitigate, relieved from, 
remedy for  
 
 
NATURAL FORCE  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  swept 
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ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED – 
specific-level (= level 2) 
atmosphere of, climate of, 
cloud of […] hung over, 
clouded (over) by, clouds of 
[...] darken, dark cloud of, 
emerge from a climate of, 
enveloped in a climate of,  
fogged out, gloom of 
darkness […] enveloped, 
hangs like a fog which 
obscures, heightened the […] 
barometer, miasma of ([...] 
descended), pervade, 
shrouded in a fog of, under 
cloud of  
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2) flicker of, smouldering with  
   CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3) doused that smouldering 
   DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3) consumed (by / in), engulfed 
by  
   MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 
3) 
fuel [V], fuelled by, stoked 
(the flames of)  
   STARTING A FIRE (= level 3) ignites, sparked [tr. V.]  
STORM - specific-level (= level 2) brewing up 
WATER - specific-level (= level 2) – 
   RAIN (= level 3) reigned [sic] on 
   WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3) breaking upon, flood surge 
of, groundswell, in the wake 
of rising, tumbling waves of, 
wave of […] passes over, rise 
new waves of, sends waves of, 
swept up in a wave of, 
wave(s) of, wave of [...] 
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struck, wave of [...] sweep, 
wave […] spread 
 
 
PART OF A JOURNEY  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
BARRIER / OBSTACLE  – specific-level (= 
level 2)  
avoiding […] only way to get 
'past' is to go 'through', 
barrier (of), being a block, 
broken through (also: 
breakthrough), get over / 
past, go through, hindrance, 
huge obstacle, hurdle to 
overcome, jump that […] 
huddle [sic], move through, 
moved past, obstacles that 
still loom large, overcome 
[...] in the journey, stumbling 
block  
DESTINATION – specific-level (= level 2)  detour into, lead to […] 
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)  chosen this path of, […] lead 
to 
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 
2)  
come a long way from 
 
 
PERSON MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
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PERSON - ACCOMPLICE / CRIMINAL - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
culprit, harbour [V], hides, 
join  
PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
a clever beast, arouse, coiled 
around, driven by, fangs of, 
let loose, rear it's [sic] head, 
release, spread its ugly 
tentacles, stampede of, 
swallow up, tame [V], termite 
[…] has eaten you up, 
unleash 
PERSON - GUIDE - specific-level (= level 2)  brings people to church, 
guided by 
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 
2)  
friends […] that heightens 
our awareness, given 
succour, keeps […] at bay, 
makes us aware of situations 
and things that could harm 
us, protect, protective, 
teaches you to stay safe, 
underwrites 
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
born out of, bred, breeding 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
attacked by, baleful, battle 
(against / with), combat [V],  
comes upon, confront, 
cowering away from, 
disengage, enemies, face [V], 
face head on, fighting, fight 
(off), greatest enemy of 
mankind, in the face of, keep 
us safe from the threat of, 
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leader of, look [...] in the eye, 
look into the eyes [...] your 
enemy, onslaught of , smiling 
at [co-text: stood their 
ground], struggle with, tackle 
[V], take on, trade tackles 
with, wrestle with  
   A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3) cold fingers of […] begin to 
creep, creeping [ADJ], 
creeps up on / in, lurking 
[ADJ], lurk (around), stalked 
the corridors, stalk [V], steals 
on me  
   A THIEF (= level 3) rob, steals 
   BEING BULLIED (= level 3) mocking […] belittling  
   DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT 
OPPONENT (= level 3) 
bury, destroyer, destroying, 
torture [V], violence meted 
out […] by  
   WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3) allow [...] to rule, allow(ed) 
([...]) to stop, cage [V], 
captive of, controlled by, 
dictated by, did not allow, 
dominate (by), drive [V], 
driven by, enslaved by, give 
[...] its power, grip [V], held 
hostage by, hindering, hold 
[...] back, holds us, hostage 
of, impeded by, imprisoned 
by,  in / under the (tight) grip 
of, keeping you from, keeps 
[...] poor, kept me away, 
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kingdom of, left unchecked 
[...] continue to obstruct, 
letting […] control my life, 
lets us, made me keep away, 
made some people remain 
where they are, make […] 
jump […] and whip, makes 
everyone wear a mask, makes 
[...] less competitive, nut [= 
not] let, prevent, pushed, put 
a person in bondage, reign 
[V], reign of, restrained by, 
rule of, seize (by / with), 
slavishly subdued by, step on 
the toes, stop [V], takes hold, 
tightened the [...] grip of, 
won't allow   
   WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= 
level 3)  
a master over, banish, 
bucking, conquer, conquest 
of, destroy, eliminate, handle 
[V], keeping at bay, loses its 
power over, master [V], 
mastery thereof, overcome, 
pushing back, set free from, 
taking the control away from, 
triumph [N], trounce   
   WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) captured by, checkmated by, 
finishes them off, fooled by, 
got the better of, kept getting 
at me, let [...] get the 
upperhand, overcome (with), 
overwhelmed, overwhelming 
Appendix B 336 
[ADJ], presses in from every 
direction, tear down the 
hedge of protection, trump    
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 
2) 
breeds […] spawns 
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
fills my head with lies, 
nagged by, nagging [ADJ], 
niggled, niggling [ADJ], talk 
to […] have a two-way 
conversation, tape […] 
playing the tape [i.e., audio 
recording of a voice], voice 
of, whispers to you  
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - 
specific-level (= level 2)  
death of […] is certain, nurse 
[V]  
Misc. - FEAR TAKING ON 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO 
A PERSON 
irrational, rational, 
reasonable […] logical, 
relentless   
Misc. - FEAR INVOLVED IN ACTIONS 
ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON  
come in, has been vindicated, 
jumps in there, put to rest, 
ran meetings, touches  
 
 
POSSESSION MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
get rid of, let go of, lose  
MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-
level (= level 2)  
holding on to 
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SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
share[V], shared [ADJ] 
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP - specific-
level (= level 2) 
bring (to), brings home, 
gives, left […] with, pass on 
 
 
RELATED TO A BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE 
MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  artifice of […] construct, 
behind […] façade, behind 
the wall of 
ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE - 
specific-level (= level 2)  
closeted in, garage [V] with, 
little rooms […] shut the door 
on, live in 
STRENGTHENING A BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE - specific-level (= level 2) 
bolster, founded on, pillar, 
reinforced, well-founded 
WEAKENING A BUILDING / 
STRUCTURE - specific-level (= level 2)  
shaken the foundations of 
 
 
SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICE 
MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
AURA – specific-level (= level 2) aura of 
(RELATED TO) AN EVIL 
SUPERNATURAL BEING – specific-level 
(= level 2) 
delivering […] from the 
torment of, demon(s), haunts, 
making the devil […] more 
strong, raising the bogy of, 
releases the power of the 
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devil, spirit of, spiritual force 
that kills, torment ([…] one of 
devil’s age-long tricks), 
ungodly  
 
 
WEAPON MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1) a legitimate weapon in […] 
warfare, blunt [V] the force 
of, killed with, use […] as the 
weapon, uses the weapon of 
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
– 
   BOMB (= level 3)  defuse, trigger [V], shot down 
[…] like a rocket  
   KNIFE (= level 3)  stab, strike (in / into) 
 
 
MISC. MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
FEAR IS A BUBBLE giant bubble of 
FEAR IS A CAMPAIGN campaign of 
FEAR IS A COVERING cloaking [V], under the cover 
of 
FEAR IS A CRIME perpetrators of 
FEAR IS A CYCLE (CIRCLE) rescued from this vicious 
circle of, start the cycle of 
FEAR IS A GAME play with 
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FEAR IS A KEY poking […] through the 
keyhole  
FEAR IS A MACHINE machines of […] forged, turn 
the engine of […] on 
FEAR IS A METEORITE flashed through […] like a 
meteorite tracing across the 
night skies 
FEAR IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN buckling under, carried over, 
heavy 
FEAR IS A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE struggles 
FEAR IS A PLANT fertile soil to plant seeds of, 
plant [V], plant the seeds of, 
root, rooted in, seed [V], sow 
(the seeds of) 
FEAR IS A RESTRAINING DEVICE break the […] shackles of, 
free […] from the shackles of, 
yoke of  
FEAR IS A SCENT exudes, smell […] stink of 
FEAR IS A SHIP abandon the ship of 
FEAR IS A SURFACE FOR ENGRAVING engraved in  
FEAR IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY cheap, make money out of, 
making a quick buck out of, 
peddle, worth anything  
FEAR IS AN EVENT witnessed 
FEAR IS AN INSTRUMENT / TOOL the use of […] to achieve, 
tool, tools of, use […] as an 
instrument, uses […] to 
control, use […] to help 
protect  
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FEAR IS ARMOR pierced through the armour of 
FEAR IS CLOTHING outgrown, wore off 
FEAR IS CULTURE culture of 
FEAR IS DARKNESS dark, darkness, oppressive 
night of, (under the) shadow 
of 
FEAR IS FOOD feed off of, survive on 
FEAR IS LAW rule by 
FEAR IS MUSIC reach a crescendo 
FEAR IS PUNISHMENT impose […] on, visited on 
FEAR IS VIOLENCE chokehold, violence  
FEAR IS WRITING ON THE FACE written upon her face 
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Appendix C 
MRWs Used in Annotation of HAPPINESS According to Source Domain  
 
Note that, in order to avoid repetition, MRWs are listed as lexemes unless it was 
necessary to provide more unique direct phrasing to understand the annotation 
process.  
 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  brimming with, fill [V] (with), 
filled with, full of 
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)  bubbling with tears of, 
coursed through me, ooze 
out, rush of, shed [V], (shed) 
tears of, tears of […] taste 
sweet, tears of [...] welled 
from her eyes, weep […] 
tears of  
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER 
- specific-level (= level 2) 
bath in, bathed in this pool of 
FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
gushing with, over flow / 
overflow, overflowing [ADJ], 
pouring […] all over, 
squeezing […] out of 
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-
level (= level 2)  
– 
   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / 
STEAM - (= level 3)  
vent [V], given vent to 
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   HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A 
(VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION - (= level 3)  
bursting [ADJ], burst (out) 
with, erupted with, exploded 
with, explosion of, the burst 
of   
 
Special Case Based on Folk Model: ENERGY AS FLUID 
 
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - 
specific-level (= level 2)  
crackling with currents of, 
generate 
 
 
FOOD / DRINK MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  ingredient of, long for, recipe 
for, served on a platter, […]-
starved, thirst for  
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF FOOD / DRINK – 
specific-level (= level 2) 
– 
   CHOCOLATE (= level 3)  slice of […] you crave under 
the wrapper 
   FRUIT (= level 3) fruits of the spirit [analogous 
to biblical metaphor] 
   SUGAR (= level 3)  sugar of 
FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED – 
specific-level (= level 2)  
drunk in, eating […] away, 
feeds us on,  smacks of, taste 
[V], tastebuds were tingling 
with 
FOOD / DRINK GOING BAD – specific-
level (= level 2) 
sour [V], spoil  
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ILLNESS  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
can also kill, die from, died of 
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN 
INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-
level (=level 2)  
a high […] only last a while 
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL 
SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)  
– 
   HEART-RELATED(= level 3) fluttered with, pulsating with  
   LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3) catatonic, incontinent with, 
send you into paroxysms of 
   PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3) feel a little twist of, twinge of 
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level 
(=level 2) 
infectious 
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – 
specific-level (=level 2) 
beside himself / myself with, 
delirious with, mad with, wild 
with 
MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS – 
specific-level (=level 2) 
a little dose of  
 
LIGHT MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  all the brighter, does not fade 
away, effulgent, faded 
(away), flashes of, glittery, lit 
up, nothing to dim, reflecting, 
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scintillating, shine through, 
sparkling, vivid […] 
illuminate 
A LAMP - specific-level (= level 2) Lamp of […] be lit 
LIGHT FROM WITHIN - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
beam with, beamed up with, 
beams of, flashes forth as, 
gleamed with, glow with, 
glowing [ADJ], inner glow of, 
lit up with, radiant […] from, 
radiate (with), seen the 
radiance of […] in, shine in, 
shining with, suffused with a 
[…] glow of, the glow of 
SUN-RELATED - specific-level (= level 2) bask in, beaming sunlight 
rays of, ray, resurfaces from 
this giant cloud, sunlit […] 
sky blue  
 
 
NATURAL FORCE  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  – 
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2) spark of 
   CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3) dampened, doused 
   DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3) combust out of 
   STARTING A FIRE (= level 3) sparked   
STORM - specific-level (= level 2) a tempest of, struck  
WATER - specific-level (= level 2) – 
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   RAIN (= level 3) shower [V] (on, over, upon, 
with) 
   OCEAN / SEA (= level 3) drowned in the ocean of, 
floats on the surface of the 
sea of, oceanic 
   WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3) flood [V] (with), flow [V], 
heady, ride [...] the wave of, 
ripples of, wave of [...] that 
swept, waves of […] remain 
as buoyant    
 
 
PART OF A JOURNEY  MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  cut short, journey of  
A SEARCH  – specific-level (= level 2)  bucket of gold at the end of 
the rainbow, embark on their 
pursuit of, find [V], found 
[…] the hidden treasure of, in 
search of, look for or chase 
after, looking for it in the 
wrong places, place to find, 
pilgrims looking for, pursue, 
pursuit of, quest for, quest in 
pursuit of, search [N], search 
[V] for, seek   
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DESTINATION (including special case: 
GOAL) – specific-level (= level 2)  
achieve, attain the supreme 
goal, back to, barrier to, 
bound for, discovering, 
doorway to, find [V], found 
some island of, get closer to, 
go to, guide […] into, hinder 
us from the realm of, holding 
you back from, journey to, 
lead to […], path to / that will 
bring, pathways to, return to, 
road to, road to […] best 
walked, roadblocks in / on 
[…] path to, route(s) to, 
stand between you and your / 
in the way of, strive for, take 
the right track to, taking a 
short cut to, trip to the land 
of, way(s) to 
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)  […] ends in, navigate the 
terrains of, navigating the 
[…] terrain, one-way street, 
path, road […] paved with  
POINTS ON A JOURNEY – specific-level (= 
level 2) 
veering wildly between  
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 
2)  
a new beginning of  
 
 
PERSON MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  short(-)lived  
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PERSON - ANIMAL-RELATED - specific-
level (= level 2) 
catching […] butterfly […] 
flies away, reel in 
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
politics of […] give us the 
strength of character […],  
politics of […] should not be 
fought out […] 
PERSON - LIVING IN A HOME - specific-
level (= level 2)  
abide in, home of, resides in, 
residing within   
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
breed [V] 
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= 
level 2)  
enemy of, sadistic, versus 
   WHO IS BEING CONTROLLED (= level 3) hamper [V], master of, 
undermine   
   WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= 
level 3)  
harming, killing and 
destroying, trod on  
   WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3) overcome with, overwhelm, 
overwhelmed with, pale into 
oblivion in the face of , 
unable to control, win [V] 
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 
2) 
borne [sic] out of  
PERSON - RELATED TO A JOURNEY - 
specific-level (= level 2) 
elude, fled, knew no bounds, 
open up great doors for, 
propel, return, waits for […] 
to find you  
PERSON - SHOUTING - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
shouts of, squeals of 
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS  - specific-level 
(= level 2)  
nursing  
Appendix C 348 
Misc. - HAPPINESS TAKING ON 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO 
A PERSON 
giddy, gin-filled, startled  
Misc. - HAPPINESS INVOLVED IN 
ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON 
embraces, feed on, serve [V]  
 
 
POSSESSION MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  possess  
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
gave […] away, gamble [V], 
grabbed, lose, risk [V], 
robbed, sacrifice [V], 
snatched, steal, take away  
MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-
level (= level 2)  
holding onto, horde [V, sic], 
keep 
PREVENTING OWNERSHIP - specific-
level (= level 2)  
deprive 
SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
share [V] (in), spread [V], to 
go around 
TAKING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= 
level 2) 
gain [V], take, receive, 
reclaim back 
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP - specific-
level (= level 2) 
bestow, bless […] with, 
bring, deliver, gift of, give, 
leaves them with, trust […] 
with 
 
 
Appendix C 349 
UP MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  a come down from, at its 
highest, begins to peak, 
higher, lift up with, lifted up, 
over the moon with, raise 
[…] to heights of, reaches a 
pinnacle, soaring with 
JUMPING - specific-level (= level 2) bouncing with, hopping with, 
jump for / in / with, jump up 
in, jump up and down for / 
with, leap for / from / with, 
leaping into the air in, leapt 
out of, leapt up and down 
with, makes you leap and 
punch the air,  
 
 
VALUABLE COMMODITY MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
Generic-Level (= level 1)  afford 
VALUABLE COMMODITY - BEING 
BOUGHT - specific-level (= level 2) 
buy, no price too high for 
VALUABLE COMMODITY - BEING 
SOLD - specific-level (= level 2) 
sell 
VALUABLE COMMODITY - CURRENCY 
/ INCOME - specific-level (= level 2) 
heaps of shillings, start 
deducting from your […] 
credit, TOTAL […] but nett 
nett [sic] 
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MISC. MRWs / SD Lexemes and 
Phrases 
HAPPINESS IS A CALLING CARD calling card 
HAPPINESS IS A CHURCH REVIVAL revival of [co-text: church] 
HAPPINESS IS A COCKTAIL (= MIXED 
SUBSTANCE) 
cocktail of  
HAPPINESS IS A FRAGILE THING shattered 
HAPPINESS IS A KINGDOM establish His kingdom of 
HAPPINESS IS A MACHINE pressing buttons on 
HAPPINESS IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN carrier of, casts off, crushing 
HAPPINESS IS A PIN pin [V] […] on  
HAPPINESS IS A PLANT blight [V], cultivate, flowers 
of […] blossom, harvest of, 
reap 
HAPPINESS IS A PURE SUBSTANCE pure, (pure, purely) 
unadulterated, unmixed […] 
not be contaminated 
HAPPINESS IS A REWARD deserve, reward, rewarding 
[…] with, worthy of 
deserving 
HAPPINESS IS A SCENT emit the fragrance of, exude, 
scent that encapsulates, 
smelled of 
HAPPINESS IS A SEASON season(s) of  
HAPPINESS IS A SHADOW BEING CAST overshadows  
HAPPINESS IS A SONG singing songs of  
HAPPINESS IS A SUPERNATURAL 
BEING 
[…]-fairies, supernatural  
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HAPPINESS IS A TOOL FOR 
MEASURING 
measured by 
HAPPINESS IS A UNIVERSE universe of  
HAPPINESS IS A WEAPON weapon  
HAPPINESS IS AIR (rich) air of 
HAPPINESS IS AN OBJECT TO THROW throwing in  
HAPPINESS IS AN UNMOORED BOAT unmoored 
HAPPINESS IS BREATH breath of our life 
HAPPINESS IS BUILDING-RELATED built on, golden castle of, 
living in, reinforce,  
unlocking 
HAPPINESS IS LIFE living that abandoned life of  
HAPPINESS IS NOISE commotion 
HAPPINESS IS PART OF A FABRIC built-in to the fabric  
HAPPINESS IS SOMETHING COLORED tinged with 
HAPPINESS IS STEEL BEING 
TEMPERED 
tempered 
HAPPINESS IS WRITING ON THE FACE written all over the face of 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht Emotion Metaphern in den so genannten „New 
Englishes“. New Englishes sind die globalen Varietäten des Englischen, die in 
Regionen, wie z.B. Ost- und Westafrika, Südasien und Südostasien, neben 
einheimischen Sprachen gesprochen werden und die meist als Konsequenz der 
britischen Kolonialisierung entstanden sind. Emotion Metaphern werden als 
konzeptuelle Metaphern nach der Konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie von Lakoff & 
Johnson (2003 [1980]) verstanden, wobei Metaphern nicht nur auf der 
linguistischen Ebene fungieren, sondern eine Verbindung zwischen Sprache, 
Denken und Handeln darstellen. Demnach hat unser konzeptuelles System eine 
grundsätzliche metaphorische Natur (3).  
Eine zentrale Hypothese der Studie war, dass die unterschiedlichen 
soziokulturellen Gegebenheiten der New Englishes in der Art Emotionen zu 
konzeptualisieren sichtbar sind. Obwohl emotionale Erfahrungen zu 
grundsätzlichen menschlichen (und auch körperlichen) Erfahrungen gehören, 
können diese jedoch durch die jeweiligen Kulturen gefiltert werden. So entstehen 
kulturspezifische Konzeptualisierungen der Emotionen, die wiederum in 
Metaphern zu finden sind. Es wurde angenommen, dass Emotion Metaphern diesen 
kulturellen Filterprozess in gewissem Maße in den New Englishes belegen können, 
besonders wenn Emotion Metaphern von verschiedenen Varietäten der New 
Englishes mit einander und mit Emotion Metaphern des britischen Englisch 
verglichen werden.  
Um festzustellen inwieweit New English Emotion Metaphern sich voneinander 
und vom britischen Englisch unterscheiden (oder gar Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen), 
wurde eine Korpusstudie anhand des GloWbE-Korpus (Corpus of Global Web-
Based English) geplant und durchgeführt. Hierfür wurde eine mehrstufige Methode 
(auf der Basis von „Metaphorical Pattern Analysis“ (Stefanowitsch 2006a) und 
„Metaphor Identification Procedure Vrije Universiteit“ (Steen et al. 2010b)) 
entwickelt, um linguistische Metaphern, die konzeptuelle Metaphern im 
konzeptuellen System der Varietäten-Sprechern reflektieren, aus dem Korpus zu 
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extrahieren und nach „Source Domain“ (Quellbereich, der das Zielbereich-
Konzept, i.e., eine bestimmte Emotion, strukturiert, z.B. WUT IST FEUER (ich 
brannte vor Wut)) zu klassifizieren. Die korpus-basierten Daten wurden als 
Vergleichsbasis zwischen den Varietäten verwendet.  
Der empirische Teil der vorliegenden Studie wurde in drei Fallstudien, die 
jeweils einem Emotionskonzept gewidmet wurden, aufgeteilt. Die erste Fallstudie 
befasst sich mit New English Metaphern zu WUT (englisch: ANGER). In der 
zweiten Fallstudie stand ANGST (englisch: FEAR) im Fokus. Die dritte und letzte 
Fallstudie stellte Metaphern zu FREUDE (englisch: HAPPINESS) in den 
Mittelpunkt.  
Die Ergebnisse der Fallstudien zeigten, dass die anfängliche Hypothese für 
Emotion Metaphern zum Teil zurückgewiesen werden muss. Es gab keine 
signifikanten Indikatoren, dass sich die Varietäten vor dem jeweiligen Hintergrund 
der Kulturen in den Emotion Metaphern weitestgehend unterscheiden, besonders 
wenn es um häufige Metaphern, wie z.B. WUT IST EINE PERSON oder WUT IST 
FLÜSSIGKEIT IN EINEM BEHÄLTER, handelte. Die Unterschiede zwischen den 
Varietäten waren hinsichtlich der weniger häufigen Metaphern, wie z.B. WUT IST 
ESSEN / TRINKEN, in der Regel am stärksten ausgeprägt. Allerdings eigneten sich 
solche Metaphern auf Grund der geringeren Zahlen nicht für eine statistische 
Auswertung. Zudem war die Motivationsbasis der meisten New English und 
britischen Metaphern in Bezug auf die so genannte Embodiment-These, die unsere 
körperliche Erfahrung als Basis für Konzeptbildung betont, erklärbar, was den 
universellen Charakter der Metaphern um WUT, ANGST und FREUDE in den 
Varietäten des Englischen unterstreicht.  
 
 
 
 
 
